HARALD HØFFDING

EXPERIENCE AND INTERPRETATION

STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

NYT NORDISK FORLAG
(OTTO HALLING & CHR. NIELSEN)
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PREFACE

The essay that has given this book its name was written on the occasion of my excellent friend and colleague Théodore Flournoy of Geneva having published, in his "Archives de Psychologie" in the year 1915, notes by a lady in which she described her ecstatic states and the influence they had on her religious life. This description seemed to me not only to have great psychological interest in and of itself, but also to invite comparison with similar phenomena, particularly as regards the relation between what is itself experienced and the involuntary or fully conscious, perhaps willed interpretations. I therefore resumed earlier studies concerning the remarkable Spanish nun Santa Teresa. As an introduction I have given shorter descriptions of kindred phenomena from various times.

The title "Experience and Interpretation" also fits the other parts of the book reasonably well. With good will it can also be made to apply to the piece on Madvig as a Philosopher, since it deals in part with his position on the religious problem, grounded in his own experience. But I admit that the essay on Aristotle's conception of friendship can be subsumed under the common title only if one sees it as describing how the great Greek interpreted his experiences concerning a significant human relation of life.

Carlsberg, August 19, 1918. HARALD HØFFDING

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EXPERIENCE AND INTERPRETATION

A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

INTRODUCTION

THERE is, in the strictest sense of the word, no entirely simple and immediate experience. We are never at any time wholly passive. Even the simplest sense-perceptions have their character determined by their relation to other sensations that occur simultaneously or have occurred beforehand, as well as by our whole state of mind. Strong emotion can thus be an obstacle to the occurrence of sense-perceptions. Apart from this, processes of recognition at once interweave themselves with what is sensed or felt. Both in immediate and in mediate recognition what is experienced is at once brought into connection with something we knew beforehand or believed we knew. And this connection can set in so quickly that we do not notice the process that is taking place here, but believe that we are behaving in a wholly receptive way. This can be the case both when the recognition is valid, and when it (as in an illusion of memory) is invalid. That we have in fact put something into it, we discover only when the recognition proves to be false. Then we can distinguish between experience and interpretation. But in the first moment they always appear in involuntary connection. What appears in our consciousness is always experience and interpretation at once. If by experience [Erfaring] is understood experiences that have been brought into a definite context, we may say
[10] that experience is a limiting case of experience [Erfaring]. The element of interpretation is here at its minimum.

In more specific and composite cases it is easy to distinguish between the two elements. When an object appears to one person as small, to another as large, it is obvious that the difference rests on the standard that each of them brings with him or applies, without being aware of it. When a color in one case appears to me as saturated, in another case not, it can be discovered that the difference rests on which color I saw together with it or before it. When one and the same historical person or historical event is judged differently, despite equally great knowledge of it, the difference must spring from the judges' different personal presuppositions. One is then at once ready with the proposition that what is seen depends on the eyes that see.

In a little sketch of the earthquake in San Francisco (1906), which he experienced at close quarters, William James has given an analysis of what took place in him during this sudden event. The earthquake lasted only 48 seconds, and by thinking back on

that moment — which he did as soon as he came to his senses — he could trace no actual reflection (little thought, and no reflection); sensation and emotion dominated the moment. The emotion was delight and admiration, and they presuppose a certain recognition (gleeful recognition). The fact was that anyone who goes to San Francisco must be aware of the possibility of earthquakes. James thus at once had clarity about what he was experiencing, and was intent on getting to experience it. There was no fear present. One of the first thoughts was how well the little wooden house he lived in had held up. When there was a recognition, it did not concern the earthquake as a process in which layers of earth collapse; it stood there as a Something with a certain *[11]* personification and came over him as a unified whole. And this conception of the event as an individual presented itself quite involuntarily and, so to speak, in an unavoidable and irresistible manner. No human action could point more definitely to a living being as source and origin. Others too received from the event such an impression of individual action. But not everyone stood so intellectually interested in the experience and was so glad to be part of it, as the philosopher. For some it stood as a demonic being. For one lady it stood as the end of the world and the beginning of the Judgment, and this theological interpretation occupied her mind so completely that it was only after she had come down into the street that it dawned on her that it was an earthquake.[*)]

Not least in our dreams interpretation and experiences weave together. At the transition from waking to sleep one can sometimes observe how sense-perceptions and elementary hallucinations are involuntarily combined into objects and events. Such hypnagogic states make it possible to spy on the work of our mental life in connecting its elements and bringing intelligible connection among them. And in this work memories of earlier experiences naturally co-operate. Also within the dream itself this work can sometimes be traced, especially in the so-called dramatic dreams, in which we are in distress or embarrassment and then find help and consolation. A deceased colleague told me that he dreamed he was walking naked in the street and was very unhappy about it; but then he had met me, and I had consoled him with the remark that he was *[12]* dreaming. He must himself have devised this consolation, though it seemed to come to him through someone else. During awakening (in the hypnopompic state) work often goes on that brings more connection into the dreams one has had than there was. It has been established thereby that when a dream is suddenly interrupted by awakening, and one then at once notes its content, this presents a series of scenes without connection. The longer one postpones the noting, the more connection the dream presents, and this

[*)] *William James: On some mental effects of the earth-quake.* (Memories and Studies. 1911).

connection generally grows still greater through the later accounts. The more one can, so to speak, take the dream by surprise, the more chaotic a character it has.[*)]

Emotions and changes of mood can arise suddenly and apparently without motive, and then often become very painful to the one who experiences them, because they do not seem to connect with earlier experiences. It then often turns out that it is some painful experience, perhaps far back in time, and long involuntarily repressed and shut out from memory, — a "trauma", — that, so to speak, in a subterranean way exerts its after-effects through low spirits and depression. By searching questioning and discussion, — so-called psychoanalysis, — modern psychiatrists seek to draw the hidden cause forth and to remove its influence by placing it in the clear daylight of consciousness.

Hallucinations, whether they appear as visions or as auditions or move in the do-
[13] mains of the process of touch, often make a great effect by their sudden appearance, and yet it can in many cases be traced that they have developed successively, do not stand at a stroke in their completed form, but grow from the indefinite and particular to more definite, clearer and more richly equipped forms. And this growth then proves to be conditioned by the individuals' world of memory and world of thought. This explains why visions on the whole agree with the whole spiritual horizon within which the visionary individuals live. Besides the examples to which I have referred in my Psykologi (6th ed. p. 192), namely Benevenuto's vision in prison and Bernadette's vision in the rock crevice at Lourdes, I shall here refer to a vision in the Revelation of John (I, 10 ff), where the audition precedes the vision, in that the seer hears a voice behind him, and the sight comes only when he turns around. In later mystics, whose description is more exact, the indefinite sensation of a presence often precedes the audition, and this again the vision. The Spanish nun Sta Teresa noticed in an ecstatic state that someone was present; the unaccustomed state, in which nothing was heard or seen, instilled fear in her, and she began to weep. But then she heard calming and consoling words and thereupon became convinced that it was Jesus who was present. Although she was plagued by her confessor with the question how she could know that it was Jesus, when she saw nothing, she nevertheless held fast to her interpretation. The sensation of presence persisted for several days, and thereupon the hands of the figure showed themselves to her, some days later the whole figure. That Jesus thus little by little revealed himself to her, and not at once wholly, she derives from her weakness and her imperfect
[14] faith.[*)] — Examples of what appeared in the Spanish nun's exalted visions are also to

[*)] Cf. *Foncault*: L'évolution du rêve pendant le réveil. (Revue philosophique. 1904).

[*)] *Vie de Ste Terèse écrite par elle-même.* Trad. Bruix. Chap. 27-28.

be found in more vulgar hallucinations.[*)] And what must especially be noted, the ideas that are woven into the experiences need not be objects of recognition, even if it can be demonstrated that they are due to the individual's earlier experiences [Erfaringer]. A lady among Morton Prince's patients saw her deceased husband before her and heard him speak consoling words to her. It later turned out that these words she had some months before heard from a friend, to whom the deceased had at one time spoken them. When they sounded for her in the hallucination, she did not recognize them, but they stood before her as new. When she had been hypnotized, she remembered both the conversation with the friend, and that it was he who had heard the consoling words from the deceased.[**)]

From the experiences now discussed the purely ecstatic states differ in being so concentrated that nothing can be remembered from them. Every emotion has a tendency to inhibit or exclude all sensations and ideas; in ecstasy this tendency appears at its culmination. In the ecstatic state hallucinations may arise that perhaps can be remembered later, just as dreams can be remembered. But pure ecstasy is declared by those who have experienced it to be indescribable, although it is at the same time declared to be the highest bliss. As we shall see in the course of this investigation, the mystics of a more recent age are able better than those of earlier ages to distinguish between ecstasy itself and the visions or images it can bring with it, and it is precisely a chief aim of the present essay to demonstrate this. — If one asks about the physiological side of ecstasy, *[15]* hardly a better answer can be given than that contained in the following statements by Flournoy: "As regards what takes place in the nervous system in the few moments in which the crisis is at its height, one must admit that we know nothing about it. To judge from the mental effects that follow it, — certainty, joy, peace, courage, feeling and exercise of greater energy and self-surrender — it must be a reorganization of the brain centers, the establishment of new coordinations of a sensory and motor kind, which gives the individual a new attitude toward the surroundings.... One might present the matter by one of the anatomophysiological schemas of the kind that have been proposed for similar cases. But all that is still so vague that I will not dwell on it."[*)]

By its character of involuntary concentration[**)] ecstasy stands in sharp contrast to the ordinary life of consciousness, which is precisely conditioned by contrast and alter-

[*)] See my *Religionsfilosofi* § 57.

[**)] *Morton Prince*: *The Unconscious.* The fundamentals of human personality normal and abnormal. New York 1914. p. 40.

[*)] Th. *Flournoy*: *Une Mystique moderne.* (Archives de Psychologie. Genève 1915). p. 181.

[**)] The ecstatic concentration can sometimes be prepared by a concentration of attention and thought prepared with effort and maintained. But this is not always possible, and at the height it has a character of being seized and gripped, which precisely conditions the enigmatic quality of the phenomenon.

nation. Therefore ecstatic states are especially suited to illuminate the relation between experience and interpretation. Interpretation has in such states very little to build on. The way in which ecstatic states are brought into relation to people's other experiences and to their life of ideas will vary with the stages and forms of spiritual development.

[16] Three historical types can be distinguished, as regards this relation, — an animistic type, a dogmatic type and an empirical type.

In animism the explanation of ecstatic states is found in the influence of, or rather the indwelling of, a foreign mental life. This interpretation is carried out quite involuntarily, in that the transmitted faith in the spirits of ancestors (or similar beings) immediately dominates the mind. Experience and tradition fuse from the very first, and it is their common product that makes itself known to consciousness, without its being able to analyze it.

At the dogmatic stage there is a developed worship and a doctrine of faith carried through with reflection, which are recognized by the individual as authorities that ought to be taken as basis in the interpretation. The difference between experience and interpretation begins to assert itself, but is abolished again through reverence for the transmitted norm. In Israelite prophetism and Christian mysticism there are significant examples of this, and we shall dwell especially on Saint Teresa, whose mysticism has great psychological interest.

When reflection has developed so far that the relation between experience and interpretation can become an object of critical examination, experience comes to stand with greater independence than in the two preceding forms, and it can even assert its superior power against every attempt at interpretation. Neither fusion nor dogmatic adaptation takes place, and the immediately given comes more into its own. In the most recent time Flournoy in his essay "Une Mystique Moderne" (which has the subtitle "Documents pour la psychologie religieuse") has given an extraordinarily interesting example of this type.

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I.

THE PRIMITIVE STAGE

1. *Totemism.*[*)]

[*)] Cf. I. G. *Frazer*: *The Golden Bough*[3]. (1913). Especially Part VII, 2. p. 225—278. — Émile *Durkheim*: *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse.* Le système totémique en Australie. (1912). p. 141—199; 223—233.

All over the earth, among the most diverse peoples, there takes place at the transition to adult age an initiation of the young men, which is to make them participants in the tribe's tradition and faith. Among the most primitive peoples of whom we have closer knowledge, the Central Australians, this initiation stands in close connection with totemism. A totem is an object, for the most part a plant or an animal, that stands as expression of the tribe's essence and as condition of its welfare. Mythologically this is explained by the tribe's primal fathers in the morning of the ages having transformed themselves into such an object. The point now is to lead the young to feel themselves One, or rather to become One, with the tribe's essence expressed in the totem. This is achieved through an initiation, after which there is handed over to the young man a sacred implement, a churinga, a sacred stick or stone, which is provided with signs and is held to be the common body of the man and of his totem primal father, so that the young man is thereby connected at once with the ancestor and with the tribe's totem, into which the ancestor had at one time transformed himself.[*)] The feeling of unity with *[18]* the tribe's totem becomes after the initiation so strong and intense that every single individual declares himself to be the animal or the plant that is the totem. A Central Australian can therefore say: "I am a kangaroo!" "I am an emu!"

The difference between essence and symbol does not exist at this stage. When this difference is emphasized, doubt has already begun to stir. The great psychological struggle that extends through the whole history of religion concerns precisely this difference between essence and symbol (logically speaking: between identity and analogy). When Luther at the colloquy on religion at Marburg maintained that in the proposition: "This is my body and blood" the word "is" must be taken literally (as copula), whereas Zwingli interprets "is" as "means"[**)] — then the spirit of the original, primitive religion speaks undoubtedly through Luther. He speaks like that totemist who "was" a kangaroo. —

A totem is an expression of the tribe's history. The primal fathers, in the old days, felt their fate tied to a definite object, which thereby became the tribe's totem; these fathers' souls are born, according to the people's faith, anew in the following generations. But in order truly to become a partaker in the ancestors' essence and become One with them, the natural birth is not enough. A new birth is required, and the young attain *[19]*

[*)] See *Strehlow*: *Die Arunda- und Loritza-Stämme in Zentralaustralien.* Frankfurt 1911. II p. 75 ff. Churinga is said to mean "the own secret". — The excellent missionary, to whom some of the best information about the Central Australians is due, testifies to the seriousness with which the initiations were performed. The ceremonies are regarded as a kind of divine service, just as the Christians regard their own religious exercises. "This," he adds (III p. G.), "was assured to me by both Christian and heathen natives."

[**)] See on the discussion between Luther and Zwingli: *Eduard Zeller*: *Das theologische System Zwingli's.* Tübingen 1853. p. 129.

it through the initiation they undergo at the transition to adult age. By strict exercises and castigations, partly mutilation (such as circumcision and cutting off of teeth), partly privation and self-torments, their minds are prepared to receive the sacred tradition. They are brought into a state of passivity, which is akin to dream and ecstasy, and thereupon they are brought, under very dramatic forms, into connection with the Holy, whereupon the handing over of the sacred implements takes place. Sometimes a real birth is imitated at the initiation, as well as possible. From the paroxysms that the initiation and the preparations for it have called forth, the individual wakes up to new life, and some time may pass before the memory of what precedes the whole ordeal awakens again.

Not always is the individual's totem the same as the tribe's. In the visions that can arise in a young man under the exaltation aroused by strict exercises and self-torments, he sees perhaps an animal or a plant that comes to stand for him as tied to his essence and fate. But such totemism is derived from the social totemism, which shows itself in an older relative guiding the young man during the preparation that leads him to choose his totem.

In a similar way, only still more violently, it goes when peculiar medicine men, shamans or priests are initiated. Here too the point is to bring about a state in which the mind is opened to the sacred tradition. The paroxysms are here stronger, assume what one now calls a hysterical character, and it is presumably also individuals with a predisposition to hysteria who most readily become medicine men, and through whom the spirits of the departed can most easily come to speak.

[20] An analogy to the Central Australians' initiation magic, thus a similar relation between ecstasy and tradition, occurs among the Eskimos. The angakoks are trained and initiated, under the guidance of paid teachers, to see the spirits, get answers from them and get them to help. The training lasts about 10 years. After a kind of self-hypnotization (by rubbing for hours a small stone against a larger) a time is spent in fasting and tension. Then the young man is devoured by a sea monster, but lives again, — is thus reborn. The ecstasy, which sets in at the culmination of this whole process, is conceived as the departure of the soul from the body.[*)]

At a stage like that appearing in these examples the difference between experience and interpretation does not assert itself. After his initiation the young Central Australian feels himself immediately One with his totem. He does not distinguish between his state and that which in this state appears to him. Such a distinction would presup-

[*)] W. *Thalbitzer*: *The Heathen Priests of East Greenland* (10. Amerikanistkongres. Wien 1909).

pose that he could experience similar states without interpreting them, and that he on the other hand could stand over against the tribe's tradition as a particular fact. But neither of the two is the case. The more inclined to ecstasy he is, the more quickly the transmitted ideas present themselves, and the more he is convinced that his own soul has been away, and that his ancestor's soul has taken its place. Ecstatic states are regarded not merely as particularly susceptible to the intervention of spirits, but such states stand as inexplicable if one does not assume such an intervention. Ecstasy itself is a sign of the working of a spirit.[**)] In Greenland older angakoks select as their pupils *[21]* especially boys who have shown themselves to be clairvoyant.[*)]

There is indeed something mysterious both about the ecstatic states and about the transmitted ideas that are used to interpret them. Neither ecstasy nor tradition seems able to be traced back to definite causes. One does not know, and one does not ask, whence they come. They both work through their mysteriousness, both point beyond the individual's limited experience and thereby exert a mutual attraction on each other, imperceptible to the individual persons. Through the solemn initiation the young undergo, the two elements are united once for all for them.

It is fully consistent when the primitive human being regards his ecstatic experiences partly as effect of spirits, partly as expression of a communion with spirits. The world of spirits is for him a reality, a part of his world. Doubt perhaps stirs in individuals; even among the Papuans there are said to be skeptics who do not share the tribe's faith. But on the whole tradition stands as sacred, i.e. inviolable, indisputable. It is then fully consistent when what is related about the world of spirits is involuntarily applied to the explanation of otherwise inexplicable phenomena. —

What is thus characteristic of the stage that we call the primitive (without thereby presupposing that there should not have been other stages preceding)[**)] asserts itself later on under other forms, right up to our own time. In what follows immediately I *[22]* give some examples of this.

2. *Bacchantism.*

From the Orient strong currents of ecstatic enthusiasm have at various times passed into Europe. Thus the Dionysus cult came from Asia Minor through Thrace into the

[**)] I. G. *Frazer*: *The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead.* 1913. p. 15. 444.

[*)] W. *Thalbitzer*: *The Heathen Priests of East Greenland.* p. 454.

[**)] In my criticism of the book by Durkheim mentioned above (see below the section "Sociology and the Philosophy of Religion") I have laid weight on the fact that the religion that is regarded as the most primitive we know, the Central Australian, we know only as fully finished, so to speak systematized. It must have reached this fixed form through a long series of individual initiatives and psychical processes (combinations, postponements and displacements).

Greek world at a very early stage of its culture. True, the oriental Dionysus underwent a thorough Hellenization, and the ecstasies were brought, especially by the Delphic oracle's wise conduct, into harmonious forms. But the original ecstatic element shows itself constantly, even after Apollo had entered into a pact with Dionysus. At Delphi the ecstatic priestess's body is animated by the god, or her soul is released from her body, in order to receive divine revelations; one seems not sharply to have distinguished between these two explanations, since the human being by both ways can be said to become One with the god, raised above his customary consciousness. The originally Greek word enthusiasm, which has passed into more recent languages to denote every kind of enthusiasm, properly means the state of being in God. In the period from the eighth to the sixth century B.C. there arose in Greece a whole series of seers and prophets, in legend under the name of Sibyls and Bacids. In them a need and longing found vent that was not satisfied by the clearly formed Greek worship. They were individual personalities who by their enthusiasm and ecstatic nature won authority in larger or smaller circles and in the following generations had to give name to various written books of prophecy.[*)]

[23] The oriental spiritual tendency that expressed itself in the Dionysus cult spreads at the close of antiquity in a series of forms.[*)]

3. *Witch Trials and Demonic Possessions*[**)]

The medieval faith in demonic possessions and the witch trials connected with them rests, as the Swedish psychiatrist Bror Gadelius has shown in an interesting work, on the same psychological presuppositions as the primitive human being's religious beliefs. In earlier times, he maintained, the tendency to ecstasy and hallucination was far stronger than nowadays, and the dark sides of mental life played a far greater role than now in relation to reflection and self-possession. What would now stand as abnormal could then very well accord with normal mental life. We dare not transfer the modern distinction between healthy and sick mental life to the older times. Even to this day this difference is not easy to make. The tendency to splitting of personality was formerly far more common than now, and sudden changes of state, visions and impulses that stood in opposition to the individual's customary conduct were regarded as manifestations of the Devil's activity; if they got the upper hand, both the individual himself and others regarded the state as a demonic possession.

[*)] Erwin *Rhode*: *Psyche*[2]. II. p 59—65.
[*)] *Sam Wide*: *De græsk-orientalske Mysteriereligioner* (1915).
[**)] *Bror Gadelius*: *Tro och öfvertro i gångna tider.* Stockholm 1912—13.

Of Gadelius' many examples I cite the following, which is taken from the Swedish nobleman Niels Gyllenstierna's unprinted autobiography and deals with his spiritual affliction during a visit to Stockholm, when he was 22 years old (1732). He was transported in the ecstasy into "the dark eternity"; "the eternal darkness that was in his soul *[24]* and outside it in the whole black abyss", hid almost the customary world from him. As he then describes what he in this state sometimes "saw, heard, understood, felt and experienced", he mentions a multitude of dark spirits, who were the authors of all vices and misdeeds on earth. He saw the red dragon from the Revelation of John etc. — Gadelius remarks, that what here showed itself to Gyllenstierna stood in immediate connection with the religious movements that pervaded the age of Pietism. "He is a visionary hysteric of the folk-psychological type that is so frequent in the history of religion, and one must judge every such case by a special standard, which is adapted to the circumstances of the time and other presuppositions. Especially it is worth noticing the ease with which inner conviction is embodied by sense illusions."

Here again, then, there is a meeting of inner states and transmitted ideas, without the individual being able to conceive the possibility of other explanations of his immediate experience, which here consists in the darkening of the mind. —

A remarkable counterpart to Gyllenstierna's "Experiences" is formed by Swedenborg's visions, which were rather of a bright character. "Swedenborg too is", says Gadelius "an example of the hysterical development of subconscious (visionary) faculties, and it is undoubtedly not correct to regard him as insane in the modern clinical sense".[*)] It was brighter thoughts, partly arisen under the dawning rationalism[*)], that *[25]* here determined Swedenborg's visions. Even where he depicts Hell, this depiction is abstract and colorless in comparison with what the folk belief of the eighteenth century demanded.

Such a contrast shows how the interpretation of what is experienced, even when it comes involuntarily and in the form of vision, is conditioned by the character of the one experiencing, his past and his imagination, and also how interpretation and experience can immediately merge into one.[**)]

[*)] According to (*Kleen*: *Swedenborg*. En lefnadsskildring. Stockholm 1917. I. p. XIX.) Gadelius is said later to have recognized that *Swedenborg* suffered not only from hysteria, but also from paranoia (derangement). The characteristic relation between the life of moods and the nature of the visions retains its interest, and Gadelius' significant warning against applying without further ado the modern psychiatry's distinction between healthy and sick mental life to earlier times' "folk-psychological types" still stands firm.

[*)] As is clearly seen from the Swedenborgian vision I have cited in my *Religionsfilosofi*. § 57.

[**)] Only after the composition of this chapter did I come to read *Henrik Schück*'s fine portrayal of Petrus de Dacia, author of the legend of Saint Christina *(Vår første Forfattere.* En själshistoria från medeltiden. Stockholm 1917). It gives classical examples of how ecstatic and hallucinatory experiences are interpreted

4. *Spiritualism.*

Of Swedenborg the man who in the nineteenth century strove to reach a scientific
[26] basis for belief in spirits,†) says that he led philosophy back to Heaven, in contrast to Socrates, who in his time had led it from Heaven to earth. It was Frederic Myers' life task to find a scientific basis for belief in the eternity of human souls, which neither the hitherto existing religions nor the hitherto attempted speculations had been able to do. And the task was to be solved through a study of the ecstatic states, a study that was to be carried through according to the strict method of empirical science. Since he believes himself to have arrived at the result that the manifestations that occur in such states cannot be explained by psychological and physiological means, but necessarily presuppose the continued existence of departed human beings and the possibility of their intervention, he finds what he seeks in spiritualism, with full consciousness that he thereby returns to an old folk belief.

"I admit most readily", he says (II. p. 218), "that my true predecessors in many of the thoughts that are maintained in this book are the poor thinkers of the Stone Age, the believing adherents of witchcraft and shamanism." And he finds here a great continuity through the ages. "Of all subjective religious experiences ecstasy is the one that most insistently and convincingly asserts itself, and it is not limited to any single religion… From the medicine men of the lowest savages up to the Apostles John, Peter and Paul, Buddha and Muhammad not to be forgotten, we find accounts which in their psychological essence are alike, however different they may be in moral and intellectual respect. We find also at all stages that the soul is believed to leave the body, or, if not leave it, yet extend its range of experience (range of perception) in a state akin to ecstasy.… The
[27] medicine man has (when he is not a mere impostor) just as much access to a spiritual world as Peter or Paul; — only the part of the world of spirits he gains access to is different from theirs: instead of feeling himself raised up into a brighter world, he is struck with horror by his misty and dark visions. But for us the mere fact that we believe in his vision helps to strengthen and support our faith in the Apostle's vision of 'the seventh heaven'." (II. p. 260).

The mediumistic phenomena indicate, according to Myers, that human beings can

with great inwardness, but in conformity with the ideas of the time. In Christina it is partly diabolical, partly divine forces that stand behind her extraordinary experiences. "All her impulses were embodied and assumed shapes of angels and devils, who waged a murderous struggle for her soul. The dreams that for a modern person appear in the form of poetry, appear for her in the form of reality." (p. 101). — It would be of special interest to compare her ecstatic states with the modern mystic's, of whom we shall later speak.

†) *Frederic W. H. Myers*: *Human Personality and its survival of bodily death.* (1904). I. p. 6.

lose their ordinary consciousness (the supraliminal soul), and that the subconscious (the subliminal soul) can step into its place. In the subconscious the souls of the departed can take up their abode and say or write what the human being in the supraliminal state could not know or think. Or else the subliminal soul itself can go wandering, move about in the regions of the world of spirits and bring knowledge back. In the first case a taking possession (possession) takes place; in the second case there is ecstasy in the proper sense (II. p. 259).[*)]

When Myers, the theorist of "scientific" spiritualism, thus resolutely places himself on a line with "the Stone Age's poor thinkers", there is yet the significant difference that whereas the primitive human beings' belief in spirits rests on immediate and involuntary fusion of experience and interpretation, of individual need and social tradition, Myers builds his faith on what he regards as an empirical-scientific investigation. It was his personal need for light and consolation that led him to try whether it might not be possible by the way of observation to attain a knowledge of the world of spirits that neither positive religion nor speculative thinking had been able to bring. He also pays *[28]* homage in his own way to the most important principle of empirical science, namely that the causes by which given phenomena are explained must themselves be capable of being shown as phenomena within our experience [Erfaring]. Thereby he comes into opposition to the superstition of earlier times. Only spirits whose existence has been experienced [erfaret] independently of the experiences that are to be explained can be regarded as causes of these. Therefore in spiritualism there is no longer talk of angels or devils[*)], only of departed human beings' souls. In any case there can be no talk of the influence of devils; for in none of the very many observations Myers believes he has at his disposal has he met with any connection of spirit and evil. The old belief in the Devil melts away, the more one studies the body of evidence that is available (the evidence before us) (II. p. 78-200).

A rationalistic tendency shows itself here in Myers, which exerts a critically purifying effect. It separates him from such spiritualists for whom spiritualism is from the first a religion, and who therefore expressly warn against methodical inquiry in these matters.[**)] Myers wants to unite faith and knowledge. He and his followers have also (like so many mystics) had to contend with the belief that all revelations of spirits, especially such as occur in ecstatic states, are the work of the Devil.[***)] Every positive religion must

[*)] Ecstasy means literally "to be outside oneself".

[*)] A devil is not a creature whose existence is independently known to science. (II. p. 199).

[**)] See on *Stainton Moses*: *Human Personality* II, 223—237.

[***)] The pastor *Sanders* was so unfortunate as to have unauthorized revelations. (II, p. 17).

limit the extent and nature of the revelations that are to be recognized as such. And the new access to the world of spirits, which according to Myers and his followers is now
[29] opened, after it since the primitive human being's time had so often been misjudged, also makes claim to take the place of dogma and church faith, whose impotence is held to be firmly established. "I maintain", says Myers (II, 279), "that a beginning has now been made of the application of a method for winning divine knowledge with the same certainty and calm assurance as that with which we constantly make progress in the knowledge of earthly things. The authority of observation and experiment will take the place of the authority of dogmas and churches" (II. p. 279). Christ stands here as a great predecessor. But it has gone with his discovery of the world of spirits as with the Norsemen's discovery of America. It belongs to legend and cannot now show us the way. The land must be discovered anew, not by any individual, but through a great human joint labor of interpreting observations that one has hitherto misjudged.[*)]

Faced with the objection often raised against spiritualism, that the things the "spirits" communicate are as a rule trivial and insignificant, if not foolish, Myers declares (II. p. 202) that one must not meet with too great expectations regarding what the spirits of the departed can communicate. They can naturally only tell us what they know, and we cannot expect that they have quickly been able to gather knowledge of the new conditions in which they live. And at the same time their communications are always conditioned by the medium's capacity of apprehension and cannot rise high above the latter's circle of ideas.

Whereas totemism and the belief in witches are immediately dominated by the folk
[30] belief, modern spiritualism comes to stand in opposition to two independent, fully organized spiritual authorities. The one is the Church's dogmatics, the other is modern science. Against the first spiritualism turns in principle, yet in such a way that it seeks to show that the great personalities to whose work the rise and continuance of the Church is due drew their thoughts from ecstatic communion with the world of spirits. Toward science, on the other hand, spiritualism itself believes it does not stand in any opposition; it believes precisely to proceed according to scientific method. As we have seen, Myers believes he builds on the principle that the cause of a phenomenon is to be sought in something that itself is present within experience. The appeal to the spirits of the departed satisfies according to his opinion this principle, for it is indeed a fact that the departed have really lived! But — the question is precisely whether they still live, and about that there is no experience. And the question is next whether they are what they

[*)] *Fragments of Inner Life.* p. 86. (In "Fragments of Prose and Poetry by F. W. H. Myers. Edited by his wife Eveleen Myers". 1904).

in the visions give themselves out to be, — whether their identity can be demonstrated. And for both spiritualism lacks every means.

As regards the last question, the recognition of the spirits, it already came up in the ancient Church. While in the orthodox Church about the year 200 A.D. they had begun to settle down with the idea that revelation had once for all taken place and been laid down in the holy books, the Montanists maintained that new revelations continually came through ecstatic experiences. They were then asked how they could recognize the spirits, be assured that it was the true God or the real Jesus that showed himself to them. To this Tertullian, the most outstanding representative of Montanism, answered with the counter-question that undeniably struck his Bible-believing opponents: "How was Peter on the Mount of Transfiguration able to recognize Moses and Elijah? It must have been in the spirit (in spiritu). From images or statues he cannot have recognized *[31]* them, for such were forbidden in the Law. He must have been in a supersensible state (in spiritu, non in sensu constitutus), since he recognized them!" Thus the recognition of what shows itself in the ecstatic states is for Tertullian so far from being a problem, that he sees precisely in the fact that Peter recognized Moses and Elijah a proof that he was in ecstasy (amentia), overshadowed by divine power (obumbratus virtute divina).[*)]

But the spiritualists cannot dismiss the problem in this way, if they wish to stand on the ground of empirical science. In empirical science it is not least important to be able to identify phenomena. As we shall see, the problem of recognition turns up again in the Catholic and in modern mysticism.

The main point, however, is this, that before one resorts to supernatural (or at any rate supernormal) explanations, one must demonstrate the impossibility that the content of the visions could be due to earlier experiences which the individuals in their ordinary states cannot call up in memory. The study of hypnotic states and of double consciousness has in one case after another established that ideas that an individual in his ordinary state does not have at his disposal can come forth in hypnosis or in trance. On the whole, by close knowledge of a medium's earlier history one will very often find the key to ideas and tendencies that at the moment stand as mysterious, because they do not seem compatible with the existing states and situations. Even imagination often produces, especially in its highest forms and degrees, images and thoughts that stand as inexplicable to the individual himself and to others. An unconscious work has gone *[32]* on, which may very well have been able to make use of what the individual has come to know in his earlier life. The unconscious in mental life (whatever it may otherwise be)

[*)] See F. C. A. *Schwegler*: *Der Montanismus.* Tübingen 1841, p. 25.

can thus not only preserve experiences and ideas that the individual in the ordinary state does not acknowledge as his own, but also produce new thoughts and images, without there being reason to assume other forces at work than such as history, psychology and physiology can demonstrate. So long as the content of a vision can be explained in an "endogenous" way, that is to say, from the individual's earlier history, there is no reason to appeal to the departed. Myers himself admits indeed that the content of the vision is conditioned by the individual's capacity of apprehension and presuppositions. But can any limit be set to this conditionedness? Where the endogenous explanation cannot be completed, we stand before a problem, and the proof that this problem can be solved only by the appearance of the departed, rests upon spiritualism, not upon its opponents. From the fact that the individual during the vision believes himself to be wholly passive, nothing can be concluded. For there can be an activity in us that does not become an object of our consciousness, but only in its results comes up over the threshold of consciousness.

It is the Geneva psychologist Théodore Flournoy who with the greatest energy and with the most open mind has studied the so-called spiritualistic phenomena. He has especially laid weight on knowledge of the mediums' whole past and has applied this principle with great success in his masterly study of the somnambulist Mlle Smith.[*)]
[33] Later he has, besides various new "Documents d'Enquête" given an excellent development of the psychological and epistemological principles that are of importance with regard to the phenomena to which spiritualism appeals, and with regard to the interpretation it gives of them.[*)] In the most recent time he has brought forth "a modern mystic", who in a later section will be examined as a characteristic counterpart to the mysticism of earlier times.

With respect to the spiritualistic interpretation Flournoy stands decidedly doubting. There is not a single fact that has convinced him, though he admits that several remain unexplained. He has here come to the same negative result as Henry Sidgwick and William James, who after some twenty-odd years' occupation with the phenomena mentioned declared that they had not come further than they were at the start.[**)]

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II.

PROPHETISM AND MYSTICISM

[*)] *Des Indes à la Planète Mars.* Essai sur un cas de sonnambulisme avec Glossolalie. Genève 1900.
[*)] *Esprits et Médiums.* Genève 1911.
[**)] *William James: Memories and Studies*, p. 174.

1. *The Prophets of Israel.*

The prophets of the Jewish people are remarkable in the history of religion, not only for the power of their visions, their ethical force and their lofty poetry, but — and this is of special interest for our subject — because the relation between experience and interpretation appears in them with greater clarity than where belief in spirits is at once woven into the experiences. Within the Old Testament there appears a sharp contrast between demonic and properly prophetic inspiration.[*)] In demonic inspiration it is an obscure power that seizes the individual. In an unclear way the divine being and the personality of the inspired person melt together into one. During the ecstasy unintelligible sounds were stammered out, and by exalted actions, dance and music, a captivating effect was produced on the multitude. Prophecy proper, as it first appears in the written tradition with Amos, interprets the ecstasy as the revelation of a God whose will the prophet proclaims. The inner experiences themselves were for the prophet testimony to the dominion of a power different from himself in his mind; but an obscure fusion of the two does not take place. When the prophets brought Yahweh's word to *[35]* the people, and when they appeared with authority, it was because something had happened in their minds that was not "of themselves," and which they had perhaps even resisted. He who speaks out of himself they declare a false prophet. Often the prophet has resisted what he was driven to proclaim; in this he sees (see Jeremiah I, 6-11) a testimony that he is working in the service of a Higher One. We often find again this trait of resistance, before full self-surrender to the ecstatic state can take place, in the history of mysticism, and often precisely used as proof of a supernatural intervention. Prophetism differs from the mysticism of a later age in that for the prophets it is not first and foremost peace and rest in the mind that are to be attained through the ecstatic states, but these states spur them on to vigorous, often violent action outwardly. The prophet stands at once in the midst of his people and raised above it. Its conduct and its fate condition his action. He directs his speech against priest and king alike. Prophetism is a countermovement against the stiffened worship, especially against the elements of heathen worship that, after the establishment of the kingdom, were mingled with Mosaism.[*)] Amos thus speaks against sacrifices, pilgrimages, songs and feasts, and demands in their place right and justice (V, 21—24). In a similar way Jeremiah (Chap. 7) and Isaiah (Chap. 8). The prophets maintain that worship did not belong to the people's original religion and was not found in the time when Yahweh led it through the

[*)] Gustav *Hølscher*: *Die Profeten.* Untersuchungen zur Religionsgeschichte Israëls. Leipzig 1914, p. 94, 100, 197.

[*)] Hermann *Gunkel*: *Israëls Profeter.* (Norwegian trans.) Kristiania 1916 p. 33—37.

desert. Against what is established the prophets maintain the original, just as against the outward they maintain the inward.

[36] The same blindness that made the people fall into magical worship lulled it into security and groundless self-confidence in the face of the dangers that threatened from the great world empires, which step by step developed at the expense of the small neighboring countries. The great prophets stood here as "prophets of misfortune," again and again overwhelmed by the dangers that threatened land and people, and warning in vain the short-sighted people and its princes. Precisely under such conditions they demanded of each individual purity and honesty of mind. Just as the individual prophet stepped forward in the face of the established national authorities in church and state and thereby asserted the authority of the individual personality to follow what his own experiences had led him to acknowledge as an ideal, so it was also a personal ideal that they demanded to be fulfilled by individuals. If there ~ — as Isaiah foretells — through the suffering that the people will have to undergo, a possibility of salvation can be glimpsed, then the condition for each individual will be that in faith and trust he bow his mind beneath the demands of purity and righteousness. Both in the prophet's own mind and in the demand he makes of his people, there manifests itself a liberation of the personality from the dominion of tradition and of outward authorities. And it is the free relation between experience and interpretation that makes this process of liberation possible, whereby the prophetism of Israel marks a great turning point in the history of the human life of the mind. As prophetism ebbed away, worship and temple service came again into the foreground, and the people's spiritual leaders became the priests, not the prophets, even though the prophetic forms still persisted for a long time.

In Amos, Isaiah and Jeremiah alike there appears in the description of the visions a progressive clarity. Often presentiment and vision come overwhelmingly, without any
[37] idea of their significance being formed. It is then a divine voice (audition) that helps to understand the vision. And on closer reflection the significance and application of the vision can be worked out in detail. It follows of itself that when the experiences were to be written down, reflection had to take the place of the immediate being seized. What thus holds for the individual prophet in relation to his experiences also appears in the history of prophecy, which shows a progressive development from ecstasy to reflection and to poetry. "The ecstatic becomes an author, the prophet a poet"(Hølscher p. 317). Ecstasies and hallucinations were, after all, not in themselves testimony to truth; they occurred in "false prophets" as well as in the "right" prophets. The weight came then, especially from Jeremiah's time (Hølscher p. 291 f), more and more to lie on the

confirmation by experience [Erfaring] and reflection of what had been proclaimed after the ecstatic states.[*)]

2. *Primitive Christianity.*

When the relation between experience and interpretation is to be discussed with regard to Christianity, especially with regard to ecstatic experiences, then, since the dispute is precisely in this area still unsettled, it will be important to be clear about the presuppositions that are laid down as a basis. They have already been stated in the foregoing, especially on the occasion of modern spiritualism. The essential presupposition for all psychological and historical research is that the interpretation which *[38]* human beings give of their experiences, not least of the most powerfully gripping ones, will always be conditioned by the experience [Erfaring] they have had before the experiences, and by the ideas that in various ways have come to make up their spiritual content. This is what has been called the endogenous explanation. The experience and its interpretation then both stand as members in the whole life of the human being and are understood within the whole coherence of that life. As regards Christianity, emphasis must here be placed on the ideas of a coming Redeemer, who through suffering and humiliation was to bring salvation and exaltation, ideas that from the time of Deutero-Isaiah had developed in Jewish prophetism and later entered into connection with Oriental ideas of resurrection and the end of the world, which stem especially from Persian influence. In the light of such ideas the individual who through unusual inner experiences felt himself called to a great task would naturally regard himself, and in the light of them those who joined him would naturally come to regard him. As to the application in detail there may be dispute, but an endogenous explanation must keep to this point of view. It does not exclude great and perhaps unique originality; for this expresses itself in the way in which the various historically given elements are combined — partly with one another, partly with one's own experiences. And it rests especially on the ethical and humane ideas that are drawn forth into the light by the interpretation reached and are maintained as decisive for life.

Confronting the New Testament and primitive Christianity there are for research two main problems, both of which rest on the relation between experience and interpretation.

[*)] When, besides the sources themselves, use has here been made especially of the works of *Hølscher* and *Gunkel* on the history of religion for purposes of the psychology of religion, this has been possible in part only because scholars such as those named are themselves well versed in the psychological research of our time.

First: how did Jesus of Nazareth himself interpret what stirred in him and especially
[39] came to breakthrough in him in ecstatic states? Did he call himself the announced Messiah, or the Son of Man, or God made man? He felt himself in any case to be the one whose coming meant the near end of the earthly existence of human life, so that faith in him and his significance had to become a question of life or death. His life, as it is set out in the legends, is a life in expectation, with a view to an imminent glorification through suffering, a glorification that was one with the entry of the life of the world into new, transfigured forms. Therefore the New Testament ethics too is an ethics of expectation, an ethics of tension and hope, which leaves all purely human relations and tasks as matters of indifference, if not as hindrances; these relations and tasks belong, after all, to the old order of things, not to the coming kingdom. In this thought, which was historically prepared both in the history of Judaism and in other Oriental religions, lay a basis for the interpretation of the ecstatic states, which again and again took place in Jesus himself and those nearest to him.[*)]

The second question is how the first congregation conceived Jesus of Nazareth, — especially how it interpreted the emotions, the ecstatic experiences, which his life and death called forth in the members themselves. So much is certain, that in the New Testament authors all gripping mental experiences [Erfaring], all extraordinary experiences are referred to Jesus of Nazareth as the source of life, and that all hope and all fear are
[40] in the end gathered in the thought of him and of his return. — Since now the New Testament authors themselves belonged to the first congregation and shared its presuppositions, the answer to the first question is in the end dependent on the answer to the second, and on this rests the great and difficult problem that is here posed for historical research. But in the end the problem is and remains a psychological one and concerns the relation between experience and interpretation. And this problem becomes all the more difficult in that no firm distinction is yet made between experience and interpretation, but they melt together very quickly. "The enthusiastic disciples of Jesus said of him the highest thing that Judaism knew how to say. And not in order to fathom the secret of his person, as if Jesus were the first thing given and Christology the second, but the souls who longed for the nearness of the Godhead and felt a need for a Son of God come from heaven transferred the ideals of their hearts to him. The New Testament Christology is thus a mighty hymn that history sings about Jesus."[*)]

[*)] On the various attempts that have been made, on a psychological-historical basis, to elucidate the life and personality of Jesus, see *Albert Schweitzer*: *Von Reimarus zu Wrede.* Eine Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung. Tübingen 1906.

[*)] *Hermann Gunkel*: *Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des neuen Testaments* (1903), p. 94.

The creed of the Christian church is, from the psychological standpoint, a more or less systematically carried through interpretation of the accounts of the experiences of Jesus and the first congregation, but in such a way that the experiences and endeavors of later times seek to find their interpretation in and with the interpretation of the congregation's oldest traditions. Through a series of combinations, often mere compromises, these attempts at interpretation advance through the history of dogma. A main problem, which confronts all theology with great difficulties, is how the wholly new culture, intellectual, emotional and material, which has developed since the time of the first congregation, can be brought into connection with the New Testament circle of *[41]* thought, for which all this cultural work partly did not exist and partly could have no value.

But as far as the relation between experience and interpretation is concerned, there arises a decisive difference between the founding of the church and the continuation of church life after ecclesiastical tradition and dogmatic interpretation had become fixed. With the great prophets, with Jesus and still in part in the first congregation, life could still intervene in a decisive way and set new beginnings, so that the choice of interpretation, of models and symbols, was conditioned by the experiences. But for those who acknowledge the church and the authority of the norms maintained by the church, the experience itself is determined by the normed interpretations. No weight may be laid on experiences that do not fall within the framework of the interpretations given once for all. One is directed to undergo certain definite experiences [Erfaringer], to have certain experiences, preferably in a definite order (ordo salutis). Thereby religious experience [Erfaring] in the ecclesiastical sense differs from the kind of experience that otherwise in life and in science gains influence on people's thoughts[*)].

There was in the ancient church a long struggle between new experiences and handed-down interpretations. The ecstatic states, visions and revelations did not cease because certain books were acknowledged as norms. Montanism, mentioned above, was one of the strongest contributions to this struggle, which for a time indeed subsided with the consolidation of the Catholic church, but which — as will be mentioned in what follows — was continued in the Middle Ages in the opposition between mysticism and scholasticism. It was now not only within the church that ecstatic states *[42]* appeared, also after the time of the Apostles. Opponents of Christianity and heretics, too, could appeal to states that were interpreted as effects of the intervention of spirits. A gripping and moving example is the so-called Fourth Book of Ezra, which was written

[*)] See further on this *Religionsfilosofi*, § 29 and 59—60.

by a pious Jew whose visions are determined by horror at the fact that Jerusalem was destroyed before the Messiah came. When thus spirits spoke on both sides, there had to be a need for a criterion to decide on whose side right and truth lay. Ecstasy is in and of itself essentially of the same nature wherever it occurs, and therefore contains in itself no guidance for deciding which interpretation is the right one. What mattered was to "try the spirits," and the criterion that was applied in this trial had in the end to be the ethical effects that the ecstatic states produced. One concluded then, as Weinel, who has illuminated this point very clearly, remarks, not from what is mysterious or marvelous that it is a holy spirit that is at work; but one concluded from the ethical content, from the action that was called forth, that the states were of a supernatural character[*)]. It is then not the intensity but the quality that becomes decisive. And the intensity also gradually dwindled, and with it the living expectation that sustained the primitive Christian ethics.

3. *Neoplatonism.*

In the history of mysticism it became of great importance that the last great current of thought that developed on Greek soil, Neoplatonism, laid great stress on ecstatic experiences.

[43] Already in Plato there is a mystical element, in peculiar union with the intellectual and ethical movement that stemmed from Socrates. It seems to have been Orphic influence that thus ran alongside the Socratic. Plato often refers to the mystery cults, their expressions and their ceremonies. Even though he decidedly interpreted these in a symbolic way, — so that e.g. "purification" (catharsis) in him does not mean liberation from liturgical impurity, but from the thought's and the mind's enthrallment in base sensuality, — it is nevertheless characteristic of him that he feels a need for the circle of images of the mysteries precisely when his thought reaches its heights. When thought, in its ascent from the finite and sensible phenomena, comes to the concluding concepts, the last presuppositions, and seeks to gather them in one Idea, dialectic is replaced by enthusiasm, and in a sudden vision the Divine is revealed to it (Phaedrus 249, Symposium 210 E). And then the highest is attained; only then is life worth living. But Plato does not himself remain on these heights. At once he takes up again the work of thought, without which that vision would have no significance, although it itself stands above all thinking and science (Symp. 211 A). The Highest is not merely that which makes

[*)] *Heinrich Weinel*: *Die Wirkungen des Geistes und der Geister im nachapostolischen Zeitalter* (1899), p. 149.

knowledge possible, but is at the same time that which makes the knowing beings exist, thus the ultimate ground of all thought and of all being (Republic VII p. 508 E; 509 B).

In relation to what can thus appear at the high points of the life of thought, although it itself lies beyond all thinking, faith in gods is for Plato something subordinate. The divinity of the gods rests only on their participation in that which is also for human beings the highest. The true thinker lives in "that in which it is God's divinity to live" (Phaedrus 249 C); the difference

is only that what for the gods is a constant possession is for human beings an object *[44]* of constant striving (Phaedrus 278 D).

When we go from Plato to Plotinus, the mystical element appears decidedly in greater fullness, takes up and satisfies the craving for life in a far stronger way than in Plato. The method is the same: ascent along the path of thought to the Highest, which is more than thought. Plotinus's biographer Porphyry says expressly of him that he followed the path Plato had indicated in the Symposium. But although this path could be long, the goal that was reached was nevertheless not a distant and otherworldly one; the goal, "unity with and nearness to the God who works in all," was always near (Vita Plotini. Cap. 23). This immediate presence, which is far more valuable than science (παρουσία κρείττων. Ennead. VI 19, 4), can be reached only through the work of thought. It is thus at once distant and near. But the nearness, the immediate unity with the Divine, presupposes a mental state raised above the ordinary life of consciousness, — an ecstasy.

The ecstatic state is described by Plotinus not merely, as by Plato, as inspiration, enthusiasm, but as stillness and rest. At the high point there is no longer, as in Plato, any talk of beholding. The soul is "outside of itself" (ἔκστασις), and it enters a state that is at once simplicity (ἅπλωσις) and unfolding (ἐπίδοσις). The contrast between the seer and the vision falls away. It is as if two centers coincide, and it is as if the human being had become another. That is why it is so difficult to give a description of what is experienced in such states (Ennead. VI, 9, 10—11—11).

Of great interest is the consequence that Plotinus draws from the circumstance that the Highest is not reached through science, but makes itself known through immediate *[45]* experience of an indescribable character. When we wish to communicate such an experience to others through speech or writing, we can only lead them to it indirectly. As long as we are on the way, there can be talk of instruction; but the goal itself presupposes a personal craving, without which the soul is not irradiated by the highest light (Ennead. IX, 6, 41). It is already apparent here how mysticism leads to an emphasis

on individual experiences [Erfaringer], in opposition both to scientific research and to handed-down dogmatics. When one of Plotinus's friends, who was an eager participant in the temple festivals, wanted Plotinus to accompany him to such a festival, he answered: "It is the gods who must come to me, not I who must go to the gods." (Vita Plotini. Cap. 10). Plotinus agrees with Plato that human beings can have access by their own way to that on which the divinity of the gods rests, or, as he expresses it (Ennead. IX, 1, 2), "The cause of gods being gods must be a God who stands above them in dignity." The concept of divinity appears in such utterances clearly as a determination of value.

The reason why the highest experience according to Plotinus takes on the character of ecstasy, and cannot be an object of description, is first that what is to be known lies beyond all oppositions, whereas knowledge comes about only by thought's passing from one thing to another. The absolute unity can be experienced [erfares] only through rest and complete concentration. But second, it is because this unity itself contains in itself an infinite fullness. The two determinations belong closely together, for if there were anything outside the Godhead, it would be limited and could not be an absolute
[46] unity. (VI, 9, 4—6). For both reasons the Highest is inexpressible. For any predicate one might apply to it, one would make it something single, determinate and limited. (V, 3, 13). Plotinus here sets up a fundamental principle of all mysticism[*)].

Neoplatonism becomes foundational for the mysticism of the Middle Ages, on which it gains influence partly through Augustine, partly through Dionysius the Areopagite. Whereas medieval thought rested essentially on Aristotle's encyclopedic production, as far as knowledge of the world is concerned, it was Neoplatonic ideas that conditioned the concluding spiritual content. The relation of medieval mysticism to scholasticism is conditioned by the fact that the energetic absorption in, and being seized by, this spiritual content came to form an opposition to scholastic dialectic. To use Plotinus's expression: the immediate presence of the Divine (Parusi) was set above science (Episteme) of the Godhead.

4. *Augustine.*

The great Church Father too had ecstatic experiences, and even if they were not brought about by Neoplatonic influence, yet he has, what is in this connection of special interest, interpreted them in Neoplatonic forms. From this time on, two ways of interpretation contend, on the whole, over extraordinary, especially ecstatic experiences, —

[*)] See on this my *Religionsfilosofi*, § 21 and Note 57.

the animistic (in the widest sense), which finds the explanation in the intervention of souls or personal beings, and the Platonic, which at the high point assumes a revelation of something that cannot find expression in any image or any concept. The turning point is marked by Plotinus and Augustine.

Augustine owes, as he has himself repeatedly declared, to Plotinus as representa- *[47]*
tive of Platonism, an extraordinary amount. Platonism led him away from materialistic ideas. After a hard struggle he gave up imagining God in bodily form. Next he was led by his Platonic (Neoplatonic) studies to self-knowledge, to the study of his own inner life. And finally he was led in Plotinus's footsteps step by step away from the accustomed ideas and from the world of sensation up to the Unchangeable, the true being, which can only be grasped in mystical beholding, — or, as he himself expresses it, "in the flash of a trembling glance" (in ictu trepidantis aspectus). To hold fast this vision he could not, and when he was again in his daily state (redditus solitis), it was only a "loving memory" (amans memoria), a mood of joy and gratitude, that he retained — a craving for the scent of the food he had not been able to make his own[*)]. Indeed, after his conversion, he experienced again in conversation with his mother on the day of her death an ecstasy, as mother and son were gradually led in speech and thought beyond everything sensible — and they attained a gentle touch of the Eternal in the full rapture of the heart (attingimus [sapientiam] modice toto ictu cordis); but the firstfruits of the spirit, in which they had become partakers, they had to leave and return again to what the ordinary language could express. And he attempts a translation of it which, when one looks closer, proves to be a translation of passages in Plotinus: When all is silent, within us and outside us, and the soul itself is silent and steps out beyond itself by non-thinking, then God reveals himself by himself, without voice and without sight, and there comes a moment of understanding (momentum intelligentiæ), in which a swift *[48]*
act of thought touches the eternal wisdom. — Augustine adds that approximately in this way he had spoken, though not in the same words. And he adds further: might not that which is experienced in such a moment be what is expressed in the words: "Enter into the joy of thy Lord?"[*)] — This last is characteristic of the fusion of Platonism and animism on which all theology rests, as well as of mysticism, as it developed under the influence of Augustine in the medieval church. To illuminate the relation between experience and interpretation the sections of Augustine's Confessions used here are of great interest.

[*)] *Confessiones* VII, 23 (17). — By the expression amans memoria cannot be understood memory in the proper sense, but the mood that remains after a vision whose content cannot be held fast.

[*)] *Confessiones* IX, 23—26 (10). Cf. *Plotinus*: *Ennead.* V, 1, 2 and III, 8, 9. — See *Religionsfilosofi*, § 61.

Naturally Augustine does not identify Platonism and Christianity. Platonism could only see the goal, but not go the way to the end[**)]. In his old age he reproached himself in his "Retractationes" with having placed Platonism and Christianity too near each other.

But Plotinus has, among much else, taught him to distinguish sharply between the immediate experience and its interpretation. This lesson was not wholly forgotten in the history of mysticism, though the stricter formulation of the dogmas under ecclesiastical authority could, for both inner and outer reasons, make it difficult to hold it fast.

5. *Medieval Mysticism.*

Although medieval theology sought to take up the knowledge of antiquity, espe-
[49] cially as it had been summed up in the works of Aristotle, Galen and Ptolemy, the goal it strove for lay nevertheless beyond all knowledge and thought in immediate union with the Godhead. One has therefore been able to say with a certain justice that not Aristotle, but Plotinus is the true teacher of the medieval philosophers[*)]. The medieval organization of studies, which begins with encyclopedia and philosophy and ends in mysticism, is really already found in the Neoplatonic school at Alexandria, which used the writings of Aristotle as an introduction and preparation to the study of Plato, whose line of thought was interpreted in a mystical direction[**)]. Mysticism did not necessarily stand in opposition to scholasticism, but could stand as its conclusion. It has indeed also been shown that the boldest of the medieval mystics, Eckehart, himself wrote scholastic works[***)]. But there was in mystical spirits a tendency to build on the inner life and its experiences and to set them far above analyzing and distinguishing thought, a tendency that could easily lead to conflict with the ecclesiastically sanctioned scholasticism. And in the school of the inner life the mystics learned, what became still more dangerous, to distinguish between experience and interpretation. Often it was only in a convulsive way that they were able to unite their personal experiences [Erfaringer] with the
[50] ecclesiastical interpretation. The opposition between mystics and Scholastics rests, as I have shown in my Religionsfilosofi[*)], in respect of epistemology on the fact that the lat-

[**)] *Confessiones* VII, 27 (21).

[*)] Fr. *Picavet*: *Esquisse d'une Histoire comparée des philosophies médiévales.* Chap. 5.

[**)] Cf. *William Norvin*: *Olympiodoros fra Alexandria.* (1915). Chap. 1.

[***)] *Denifle*: *Meister Eckehart's lateinische Schriften und die Grundanschauungen seiner Lehre* (Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters) (1886). — Even earlier (1838) *Engelhardt* in his book on Richard a St. Victore and Johannes Ruysbrook (p. 97) had shown that mystics and Scholastics did not belong to two wholly different worlds.

[*)] *Religionsfilosofi* § 21 (with Note 37). — On this point too *Plotinus*, and after him *Augustine*, stand as predecessors, in that they maintain that the fundamental scientific concepts (the categories) have validity only for the sensible world, not for the Godhead, in whom no distinction can be drawn between essence and attribute or between attributes among themselves. See on this *Den menneskelige Tanke.* p. 143.

ter maintain the validity of the analogies by which the Godhead alone can be thought, whereas the former deny this validity. The opposition between mysticism and scholasticism thus depends not only on the opposition between experience and interpretation, but also on the opposition between criticism and dogmatism.

A few single examples from the history of medieval mysticism shall here be brought forward to illuminate our subject.

By Hugo a St. Victore (at the beginning of the 12th century) ecstasy is described in the following way. After having passed through various stages the soul goes as it were out of itself and is carried away, without knowing whither. "Then I become," it says, "suddenly renewed and transformed and feel a joy that I cannot describe. The conscience is cleared; all sorrow over suffering endured is forgotten; the heart rejoices; the understanding becomes clear, the mind illumined. Longing satisfied;... and there is something I hold fast with inward love's arm, without knowing what it is." To this the answer is: "It is thy Beloved (dilectus tuus) who visits thee; but he comes invisible, hidden and incomprehensible. He comes to touch thee, not to be seen by thee." Clearly a distinction is here drawn, as in Plotinus, between ecstatic experience and visionary beholding. And the ecclesiastical doctrine of a personal God is used, with allusions to the erotic language of "the Song of Songs," to interpret the indescribable that is experienced. *[51]* — As stages leading up to the high point where the ecstatic experience becomes possible, Hugo names four: reading (for devotion) (lectio); reflection (meditatio); prayer (oratio); good deeds (operatio). The high point is called contemplation (contemplatio), which is one with ecstasy; it is different from reflection and signifies nothing intellectual[*)]. — This series of stages points back through many intermediate links to Plato's Symposium and recurs with various nuances in other mystics. Thus especially in Richard a St. Victore (in the middle of the 12th century), who not only describes the stages that precede "contemplation," but also the highest stage itself more thoroughly and with more distinctions. Of interest for our subject is the difference that is drawn between "speculation," in which we see through a mirror, and "contemplation," in which we behold the truth without a veil. But it is precisely this immediacy that makes the state of

[*)] A. *Liebner*: *Hugo von St. Victor und die theologischen Richtungen seiner Zeit* (1832) p. 270—276. — The various stages that Hugo indicates are already found in similar characterization among the mystics of earlier times, not only among the Neoplatonists, but also in Indian mysticism (Yoga and Buddhism). *Friederich Heiler (Das Gebet.* 1918 p. 253—258) gives a (probably schematic and detached-quotation-based) comparison (Tafel der Gebets- und Versenkungsstufen), which shows how the mystics of all times know approximately the same stages of absorption. Much probably rests here on tradition; but that the tradition has become more than dead transmission can be explained only by new, independent experience. And this becomes clear when one goes back from the identical expressions and utterances to the way in which they are motivated in the individual mystics.

[52] contemplation into ecstasy[**)]. This state appears after longing, anxiety and repentance have been felt, and it has the character of a peaceful stillness, a gentle breeze, in which the human being is carried beyond himself and sees the light of the highest wisdom without a veil. But what has thus been beheld in the state of rapture is afterwards to be considered and thought through, so that it can be understood, and so that by means of reasons and comparisons it can be brought to general understanding. And the mysteries of faith, which are known by revelation or taught by theologians, these one is to bring into contemplation, so that they may become objects of admiration and enjoyment.[*)]

In these last sentences the relation between experience and interpretation, fateful for all mysticism, is hinted at. The mystic is convinced that it is God he has been in contact with during the ecstasy; but when no analogies suffice, how then explain it to others, and how recognize the relation between what is experienced and what the church teaches? Richard indeed remedies the difficulty by urging that Bible and church doctrine be put into the ecstatic state itself, in order to admire the doctrine so much the more (in that it thus enjoys the benefit of the state of enthusiasm). But this reading in can mean nothing other than a hasty interpretation. In the ecstasy itself one is not able to put anything in, although the ideas in which one otherwise lives will naturally come to determine the visions that can attach themselves to the ecstasy.

With Master Eckehart (about the year 1300) the difference between experience and interpretation recedes, not because he follows Richard's counsel to put theology into
[53] the immediate experience, but precisely the reverse, because he at once and decisively interprets the dogmatic ideas from the mystical experience. As long as the soul is occupied with what is distant in time and space, and as long as differences and oppositions in general make themselves felt to it, so long it is not as it ought to be, not raised above all sorrow. What matters is to experience in an eternal Now the whole fullness of existence. That God sends his Son into the world is not a distant event, but something that happens in the innermost of the soul, where God's being and man's own being are one. Blessedness rests neither on knowledge nor on love, but on that from which both knowledge and love spring, and where there is neither a past nor a future. For him who has even once glimpsed this depth, the greatest material goods lose their value, and there is on the whole no external end for action, not even God or eternal blessedness; one acts out of the soul's innermost depth, where God dwells — nearer to the soul than

[**)] H. O. *Taylor (The Mediaeval Mind. A History of the development of Thought and Emotion in the Middle Ages* (1911 II p. 363) aptly speaks of the "irrational immediacy of conviction," by which the mystic feels and knows his object.

[*)] *Engelhardt*: *Richard von St. Victor und Johannes Ruysbrook.* p. 81.

the soul is to itself. One is not here to ask whether it is through grace or through nature that God works in the soul, both are one. The proof that God works in the soul consists in the happiness and rest that arise. There is an immediate way to unity with God, and the masters in the schools wrongly make themselves great scruples over how it can be possible for man to become one with God. It demands renunciation and abstinence; but God is in us; it is only we who are not at home with ourselves.[*].)

It was no wonder that the church became uneasy about such utterances. Eckehart was accused of heresy, and 28 propositions that were extracted from his writings *[54]* were condemned. Eckehart himself, however, did not live to see the condemnation. In the Catholic world Eckehart is not highly esteemed. Denifle seeks to reduce him to a preacher for pious ladies and derives his mysticism from his ignorance of dogmatics.

Eckehart is influenced by Augustine and (through Dionysius and Erigena) by Neoplatonism. But clearly there lies at the bottom an original mental experience. He has had moments filled with that peace and rest which is possible only through absorption in one's inner life and in the life that can there involuntarily well up. And as far as one can see, these moments have for a substantial part been conditioned by an intellectual interest in working oneself out beyond the differences and oppositions with which the life of thought directed against experience [Erfaringen] has to contend. But this intellectual interest has for Eckehart gone hand in hand with a striving after attachment to, or rather union with, something that is raised above strife and division. And when he without further ado uses the word "God" of that which stirs innermost in him, the concept of God appears clearly as a predicate concept. The experience is of the highest value; therefore it is to be called divine; and therefore it must signify God's indwelling. We meet here the Neoplatonic thought which above (p. 46) was called the foundation of all religious mysticism.

Moreover it will always turn out that when the question of what God is is seriously raised, it is always the inner or outer experience that human beings have that dictates the answer[*]. But from the involuntarily given answer there is again

a distance to the answer that the religious tradition, within which the individual *[55]* moves, will give.

What the church condemned in Eckehart was the strict carrying through of the thought of unity on the basis of what had been experienced in ecstatic states about

[*]In this characterization I have used the translation of selected writings of Eckehart that *Aage Marcus* has given. (*Mester Eckehart; Prædikener og Traktater.* Oversat og indledet. 1917).

[*]Cf. *Upanishad.* Übers. v, Deussen. p. 204 f, 395, 799 f. — *Augustine*: *Confessiones.* Book 10. — *Luther*: *Catechismus Major.* (The explanation of the first Mosaic commandment). (Libri Symbol. ed. Hase p. 403). — *Spinoza*: *Tract. theol. polit.* Cap. 14. (Deus: veræ vitæ exemplar).

freedom from all differences and all barriers. His disciple Suso also incurred an ecclesiastical condemnation; but since he was less bold in his thinking, and more careful to remain in agreement with church doctrine, he avoided greater trouble. And he gains precisely through this striving for ecclesiastical interpretation interest for our subject, in that he is thereby led to distinguish sharply between experience and interpretation.

In the 54th chapter of his Life he describes ecstatic states which for a time occurred every morning and every evening. "He then sank so wholly into God, the eternal Wisdom, that he could not speak of it. Sometimes he had a loving conversation with God; at other times he fell into wailing and sighing or into longing weeping or into quiet laughter, often it was to him as if he hovered in the air or swam between time and eternity in the deep sea of God's unfathomable wonders. Sometimes his heart was so full that he laid his hand on it and said: Ah, dear heart, what is to become of thee!" — This ecstasy has rather the character of a vision. In an earlier ecstasy, the first he had, the visionary recedes more before the emotional. In the 3rd chapter of his Life he relates that as he, suffering and disconsolate, stood alone one day in the church, his soul was rapt — whether it was in the body or outside the body — and he saw and heard what no tongue can utter: "It was without form and shape and yet caused as great a delight as
[56] all forms and shapes together cause. The heart yearned and was yet satisfied; the mind was glad and content; every wish and all desire was satisfied. He was wholly absorbed in the gazing toward a radiant light, which made him forget himself and all things. Was it not night? that he did not know. It was a lovely breaking forth of the eternal life in the present, quiet receiving. He then said: If this is not Heaven, then I do not know what Heaven is!… When he came to himself again, he felt like a person who comes from another world." After-effects of this experience persisted long, as a "heavenly taste," just as a box in which one has kept a precious substance retains the taste of it. It is Augustine's "loving memory" (amans memoria) (see above p. 47) that we here meet again.

Like Augustine, Suso experienced a great contrast between the ecstatic moments and the ordinary conditions. And there was a great difference between what he wrote in his ordinary state and what was given him in the ecstatic states. But even this latter he subjected to a thorough criticism, so that nothing should be found in it that departed from the utterances of the holy Fathers, but that what the divine Wisdom imparted to him through spiritual illumination could be supported by the authority of Holy Scripture, preferably in such a way that it was both in word and in meaning one with its utterance[*)].

[*)]Et quum ea, quæ data erant, ad tabulam concepisset, ad se reversus studiose rimatus est, ut nihil in iis esset, qvod a dictis sanctorum Patrum discreparet, sed hoc, qood divina tradente Sapientia sibi per

This utterance (which I have already used in my Religionsfilosofi § 62) is of classical significance as regards the relation between personal experience and ecclesiastical *[57]* authority. It clearly illuminates the difference between the psychological and the sociological conception of the essence of religion.

Socially and ecclesiastically emphasis is laid on regularity and definite, recurring forms, and here the ecstatic experiences are threatened with danger if they are not carefully interpreted according to ecclesiastical dogmatics or at least expressed in accordance with ecclesiastical usage. There stirs in such states a restless, and in any case a decidedly individual element. The church must hold fast that all experiences of life can come under its once-for-all formed circle of images and ideas, and it must see a danger in the fact that the most valuable experiences should not be capable of being interpreted exhaustively by means of it. —

I now pass to the main subject of this essay, a comparison between mysticism, as it in the sixteenth century appears in a Spanish nun, and mysticism, as it in the twentieth century appears in a Protestant woman teacher. The foregoing characterizations were to serve only as an introduction to it.

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III.
SAINT TERESA

1. *The First Stages.*

Teresa de Cepeda was born in 1515 in the city of Avila in Spain, of a noble family. In her autobiography, which she wrote at the command of her confessor, she tells of her religious development. Religious romanticism stirred in her very early; at seven years of age she wanted, together with her brother, to go to the Moors in order to become a martyr and thereby reach Heaven the sooner. She belonged to a strictly Catholic family; yet she confesses that she had a great desire to adorn herself and a great desire to read romances of chivalry. From her fourteenth year she was brought up in a convent, but felt at the beginning great reluctance toward the life of the cloister, and she chose it only because the privations and sufferings it entailed were less than those Purgatory would bring. But by degrees she came into a more inward relation to the life that was

spiritualem illustrationem infundebatur, auctoritate sacræ scripturæ… fulciretur, quum idem in sensu, aut etiam idem in verbis et sensu… reperiretur esse. (*Heinrich Suso's Leben und Schriften.* Herausg. von Diepenbrock 1829. p. VIII f.)

lived in the convent, and when she was consecrated a nun, nineteen years old, she felt herself as if irradiated by a divine light. Very early the contrast between her inner life and the ecclesiastical representations of her confessors came to the fore. She had a long struggle to wage here, for her ecstatic and visionary experiences were often taken by her confessors to be inspirations of the Devil, who ought to be brought before the court
[59] of the Inquisition. But apart from the times of trial she felt herself so certain that her inner experiences were of divine origin, that she would not be shaken by the warnings she received in the confessional. She kept changing confessors until she found one who understood her. She speaks sharp words of half-learned confessors, ignorant of the inner life. A confessor she regarded as necessary, for she was a Catholic in her inmost soul and wished to live and die in accordance with the doctrine of the one Church that brings salvation. And she felt her lack of learning when it was a question of finding the right interpretation of what she experienced. There was here, she thought, a danger that might threaten women in particular. They must have an authority to lean on in order not to go astray, but it must be men who from their own experience [Erfaring] know "the spiritual ways." And one should therefore choose one's spiritual guide with care and after trial. It was among the Jesuits that she found what she sought. Their Master had himself had ecstasies and visions, and yet no one had done as much as he for the fortification of the Catholic Church.Teresa's Jesuit confessor was convinced that her remarkable experiences were of divine origin. Only he thought that she lacked self-knowledge and humility, and he had her go through St. Ignatius' "spiritual exercises." This school trained the imagination in picturing the bliss of Heaven and the horror of Hell and in living itself into the life of Jesus in humiliation and exaltation, but aimed above all at strengthening obedience to the holy Church and the will to follow the goal of life that it set[*)].

It was through prayer that Teresa gained access to the spiritual world, which un-
[60] folded ever more richly and more inwardly for her, until in the course of 2 or 3 years (from her 44th year) she lived through a series of ecstasies and visions, which undoubtedly mark the culmination of her spiritual life.

There are three main sources for Teresa's inner experiences, — her autobiography, which she wrote down and rewrote in the years from 1562 to 1566[*)], her letters[**)] and her writings[***)], especially the book on the "Castle of the Soul" (Château de l'âme 1577).

[*)] A thorough characterization of Ignatius' *Exercitia spiritualia* is given by *Boehmer*: *Les Jésuites.* (Trad. frane. par Monod. p. 25—38). Cf. also *Henri Joly*: *St. Ignace de Loyola.* (1899).

[*)] *Vie de Sainte Térèse* écrite par elle même. Trad. Brouix 14. éd. Paris 1896.

[**)] *Lettres de Sainte Térèse.* Trad. Brouix. 2 éd.

[***)] *Les Oeuvres de Sainte Térèse.* Trad. Arnauld d'Andilly. Paris 1670.

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Teresa confesses that in her first time in the convent she had a great desire for distraction, especially for conversation with visitors. She attended to her exercises and said the prescribed prayers, but it was only the mouth, not the heart, that prayed, and when she lay in prayer in the church, seemingly full of devotion, she yearned nevertheless in her inmost self to hear the stroke of the bell that announced the end of the hour of prayer. She thus belonged in this period to those of whom she later says in her book on the "Castle of the Soul" that they knew only the castle that their own soul is, in the same way as the guard who makes his round outside the castle, but never comes into it. The door to the castle of the soul is the prayer that does not consist merely in words, but in which thought is present, and in which the whole mind is present: oraison mentale, as opposed to oraison verbale.

The first dwelling in the castle of the soul is the home of self-knowledge. But one learns to know oneself best by knowing God; his greatness makes man recognize his own smallness. In the next two dwellings God speaks to man, not only through prayer, but also through the words of good people, through books and through sickness and *[61]* sorrow. The need for penance arises, and love of one's neighbor awakens. To avoid false security even those who do not enter a convent ought to have a person to whose will they submit themselves, so that they do not act according to their own will, but learn full humility. And only then comes — in the fourth dwelling of the castle — the stage at which prayer truly takes on an inward character and through the prayer of reflection (oraison de méditation) passes over into becoming the prayer of quiet (oraison de quiétude). So long as reflection still rules, full collection and peace are not attained. But in the midst of contemplation or reading it may happen that the soul feels itself gripped by the presence of God, sinks into him as into a divine abyss. In such absorption neither thought nor imagination is at work; memory is almost vanished; the will is absorbed in love, and the understanding is seized by the greatness that reveals itself.

To a state like this one cannot raise oneself. One must wait until one is drawn upward. Therein consists precisely the difference between the prayer of quiet and the prayer of meditation. Meditation is to be compared with the watering of a garden that is effected by the water being led through pipes in over the garden's plants, or by one's laboriously drawing the water up out of a well. The spring from which the water is fetched is God himself. But in the prayer of quiet the spiritual watering takes place immediately, as when a sweet rain streams down over our garden. It takes place quite quietly; but when our own reflection and striving cooperate, it does not pass off without

noise. —

In the book on the "Castle of the Soul" Teresa says that she now sees these things more clearly than 15 years before (that is to say, than when she began to write her autobiography). She is thinking presumably above all of the psychological description
[62] of her remarkable states. She had earlier grieved that even in states in which all her faculties ought to have been concentrated on the thought of God, her ideas could flutter about in highly diverse regions, often among the unclean and poisonous animals that romped outside the castle, in whose inner dwellings she believed that her soul had now taken up residence. She now understood that there were two kinds of thought. The one goes from subject to subject as the imagination goes from image to image; the other consists in concentration on a single point and is at bottom one with the will to hold fast a definite direction in longing and striving. All thought has therefore not, as she had formerly said, vanished in the "prayer of quiet." It is the difference between discursive thinking and instinctive concentration that now stands more clearly before her. After she had had this confirmed by "a very learned man," she no longer let herself be troubled by the fact that there might be noise and unrest in the inner and outer regions of the soul, while in her inmost longing she gathered her mind about the one, great, divine thought.

Other psychological experiences, which also seem to originate from a later time than the autobiography, are likewise of interest for the psychology of the mystical states.

It does not help to practice self-compulsion in order to bring about the state that is called the "prayer of quiet." This remark is directed against certain "Contemplatives" who maintain that one should turn with attention toward what God wills to work in us, while one must not let reflection work. Such preparation, according to Teresa, helps not at all. Before we have turned the mind in the direction of God, God may already have led us into the castle of the soul, without our knowing how we have come in there. And if preparation does not help, why then not use our reflection for something useful, instead
[63] of exerting oneself to refrain from thinking! Use your faculties in the best way, until God himself brings forward such lofty subjects before you that thought sinks away in holy seizure! — By these remarks a greater difference is evidently set between the prayer of reflection (oraison de méditation) and the prayer of quiet (oraison de quiétude) than she had set before. This point is of all the greater importance in that the mystics and ecstatics of all times saw, precisely in the sudden, unprepared and involuntary manner in which their highest experiences arose, a proof that they had a supernatural origin, — whether God or the Devil was this supernatural cause.

The "prayer of quiet," despite its sweetness, is not the highest spiritual state. And it may contain a danger, in that it may leave behind a period of passivity, of sinking away, which has a particular attraction especially for melancholy natures, so that they revel in such states and seek to bring them about and to maintain them by long-continued prayer, vigils and chastisement. They thereby think to attain a continuation of the state of the "prayer of quiet," which is the work of God, and are perhaps even inclined to confuse what they experience in this way with the highest (not yet mentioned) ecstatic states. The enjoyment of a natural state is confused with the joy of a supernatural state. And the Devil surely has a finger in the game, in that he tempts weak natures to attain through chastisement what must come as a gift. Chastisements with this aim ought therefore to be forbidden by the confessor or the prioress.

2. *The Highest Stage.*

The highest form of prayer is the prayer of union (oraison d'union). In the prayer of quiet the soul's longing was indeed concentrated on a single subject, but still there was *[64]* yet the possibility that memory and reflection might romp about. This possibility has vanished in the prayer of union. The feeling of union here becomes ecstasy, which is soon described as elevation (élévation), soon as rapture (ravissement). Ecstasy is related to the mere feeling of union as a bonfire is related to a gentle fire. In the gentle fire the iron still lies as a black mass, but in the bonfire it becomes glowing. — In the book on the "Castle of the Soul" ecstasy is described in a manner similar to that in the autobiography; it belongs there in the fifth dwelling.

The description of this leads Teresa to some interesting remarks. One notices that her attention to nuances and transitions has been sharpened in the school of experiences.

a. At its sudden onset, as well as at its culmination, the ecstatic state is quite simple and plain. The soul has no feeling and no will; and it knows not what it is filled with, — knows not what it loves. An immediate presence makes itself known, without anything being seen or heard. The state is therefore indescribable. And yet it is a state of immediate certainty. If one wishes to ask how there can be certainty when nothing is either seen or heard, the answer is that it is one of the secrets of Omnipotence. It is like a nourishment that we notice in ourselves without having eaten it. Afterward, when the strongest ecstasy is over, there may arise visions and auditions, which can be the subject of description. And later again one may try, through express comparison, to make the experience clear to oneself.

The simple certainty of a presence may be called a vision, but one must then distinguish between spiritual vision (vision intellectuelle) (and audition), which is without
[65] images and without words[*)], and the vision proper (visions imaginatives) (and audition). Auditory hallucinations often arise before visual hallucinations. When Teresa asked who it was that made himself known to her in an intellectual vision (hallucination of presence), Jesus made himself known by speaking to her. She had, however, beforehand (by the mere presence) been certain that it was he.

b. The visions proper (the imaginative ones), in which something is seen or heard, often develop successively. Thus Jesus, after having first acted by his mere, indeterminate existence, let her see first his hands, and then the rest of his body.

As to these pictorial visions themselves, Teresa distinguishes between those in which she saw Jesus himself, and those in which she saw only an image of him. — This difference seems to correspond to that which has been made between hallucination and pseudohallucination. In pseudohallucination the object stands as it were with a symbolic character, without direct reality. —

The successive arising of visions is of great interest, because — as already remarked above — it opens greater access for ideas that the individual has had earlier to gain influence on the content of the visions. Thereby it is understood why visions on the whole agree with the whole circle of experience and ideas of the visionaries. Already where there is no pictorial vision, but where, as with Teresa's "intellectual vision," the
[66] immediate sensation or feeling of a presence fills the whole state, there begins an interpretation in the form of recognition: Teresa was certain that it was Jesus who was present, though she as yet heard and saw nothing! — We shall later see an example of the immediate sensation or feeling of a presence that retains its indeterminate form, without any recognition. It depends on how near and how firm the interpreting ideas lie.

c. The enthusiastic and enthralling rapture may be connected with pain, because it comes so overwhelmingly, and because the divine influence is like a consuming fire. During the very refreshment pain may be suffered — also because the longing is so deep that it asserts itself again and again. Once, when Teresa had sunk away, seized by privation and longing, she saw at her side a cherub, who pierced her with a glowing iron arrow, which was thrust through her heart down into her entrails, which seemed

[*)] In a letter of 1576 Teresa describes vision intellectuelle as the apprehension of a presence, without any inner or outer vision being connected with it. One notices on which side the object is more distinctly than if one saw it. The immediate recognition too is mentioned in this letter. *Lettres de Sainte Térèse*[2]. Trad. par Brouix. 1882. I p. 366.

to follow when the arrow was drawn out. "The pain of this wound was," she says, "so vivid that it drew forth moaning; but this unutterable martyrdom made me at the same time feel the sweetest joy, and I could not wish that it should cease. It is not a bodily suffering, but wholly spiritual, though the body has a share in it."

It would surely be wrong to take this description as testimony to the erotic-sexual origin of religious ecstasies. The Freudian school cannot without more ado claim it as support. The relation is rather that the violent being-seized has as it were streamed out over the central organs and has taken possession of the whole body, so that "the entrails" too have come along. In my Psykologi I have called this phenomenon the diffusion of the feelings. In such a diffusion, which can be observed in all strong emotions of an inward and pervasive kind, lies one of the reasons why the erotic-sexual language lies *[67]* so near at hand when the mystics seek expression for their experiences[*)]. The question is, however, complicated, and another mystical phenomenon will in a later section give occasion to return to it.

3. *Teresa and the Doctrine of the Church.*

Only on a few occasions does Teresa hint at a difference between experience and interpretation. As a rule there was connected with rapture an immediate certainty, which stood before her herself afterward as a wonder. And likewise, even if nothing was seen or heard, an immediate recognition asserted itself, which could be further unfolded and motivated through auditions and visions. When she comes to raise the question of what stirred in her in the ecstatic and visionary states, it was a psychological rather than a theological problem that she posed. It concerned the inner experiences in the soul in such states (les sentiments intérieurs dans cet état), — what the soul did while they lasted (ce que l'âme pouvait faire pendant ce temps). The question presented itself to her when, after the ecstasy had ceased and she had received communion, she prepared to write about it. But she could not become clear about it and declared it a divine secret. Especially the experience of a presence without vision and audition was enigmatic. But — she adds — something she must nevertheless have been able to grasp from these states, otherwise she could not even have expressed herself about them by means of comparisons.

To express how the soul can sometimes raise itself above itself without ceasing to be itself she says that it is like a hearth fire, which flaming rises into the air: the more *[68]* violent the fire is, the higher the flame rises above the hearth, without however ceasing

[*)] Cf. *Religionsfilosofi* § 62.

to be the hearth's fire. This image, which is meant to illustrate the relation between the "soul" and the "spirit," bears, as it appears in the eighth chapter of the autobiography, the stamp of an involuntary symbol. By contrast a more arbitrary comparison appears in the image that is carried out both in the book on the "Castle of the Soul" and in the autobiography, of the garden and the different ways in which it can be watered. It is a widely spun-out allegory. Another allegory is that expressed in the title of the book on the "Castle of the Soul." The soul's different stages of development in the direction of absorption in and union with the Godhead are compared with the different dwellings in the castle. Seven such dwellings are distinguished, and peace and deep mood may reign in one room, though noise and unrest are heard from another.

As allegory is related to symbol, the arbitrary comparison to the involuntary one, so is — when she, so to speak, passes over from psychology to theology — the conscious theological interpretation of the experiences related to the immediate assurance of the presence or revelation of divine beings in ecstasy. Although she humbly admits that she is no theologian, she is nevertheless convinced that in some of her visions she has beheld the mystery of the Trinity — and precisely as the Athanasian Creed sets it forth! Everything stood clear and vivid before her. Jesus showed her how one God can appear in three Persons. But she was (unfortunately) not able afterward to give a closer explanation of what she had beheld. The higher enlightenment that in such cases was
[69] granted her comes sometimes through words she hears, but sometimes also "in an incomprehensible manner, which without words gave her an even clearer understanding than many learned men together would have been able to impart to her." Thus she saw in a vision how all things are in God; but she cannot describe how this was shown to her. "I did not see them in their particular shapes, and yet the sight I had was of an extraordinary clarity."

When she theologized with full consciousness, she sometimes drew conclusions from her experiences that scandalized her confessors. That God is present in all beings became clear to her in that, in the "prayer of union," she discovered God's presence in her soul. "Some people who were not learned" told her that God becomes present in us only through grace; but a learned Dominican explained to her that God was in reality present in all things, which was a great consolation to her. — The "learned Dominican" Master Eckehart also held this belief, which with him was closely connected with very heretical views (see above p. 53), which would surely have given offense to Teresa.

Teresa felt, as one sees, certain of her cause, but it was nevertheless a need for her to obtain an ecclesiastical confirmation of her interpretations. By this double relation to

religious authority her relation to her confessors was especially determined, a relation already touched on above, but deserving a closer exposition.

For 20 years she had, she says, sought in vain for a confessor who understood her. A confessor must have good judgment, personal experience and thorough learning. There is great danger in being guided by a man who is ignorant of the doctrine of the Church. Better to give up spiritual prayer than to go astray from the beginning! But the confessors who indeed have theological learning, but do not know the inner experiences, *[70]* are inclined to think that ecstasies and visions come from the Devil. Teresa herself was for a time regarded by all, with the exception of her Jesuit confessor, as a victim of the Devil's inspirations. The confessor was advised to distrust her, so that she feared that in the end she would be unable to obtain any confessor. Confessors must be humble, must not imagine that they understand what is after all a closed world to them. Teresa has the greatest pity for ecstatic souls who suffer under ignorant confessors who do not understand them. And she complains that when one reports visions that the Devil has inserted, the confessors have no doubt, whereas they are at once hesitant when one reports visions that have God as their author. (Fondation de Medine des Champs. chap. 8). She was often threatened with the Inquisition on account of her visions.

As far as one can see from Teresa's accounts, the confessors' scruples did not originate from the content of her visions. She was also too Catholic in her stamp and disposition from childhood on to engage in heresies. She says of herself: "She is so unshakably bound to the Creed that all conceivable revelations, even if they showed her the heavens open, would not shake her faith, not even in the smallest of the articles the Church teaches. If it happens that the soul wavers in its faith regarding a doctrine of the Church, or if it only for a little moment stops at the thought that when God has said something to it, this may be just as true as what he has said to the saints, — then this wavering or this thought would originate from the Devil… When a person does not find this manly strength in his faith, and when the inwardness of pious moods and the visions that are granted him do not contribute to strengthening faith, then he must not regard them *[71]* as trustworthy… I see clearly, and I know from experience, that one ought not to be sure that anything comes from the Spirit of God, except in so far as it agrees with Holy Scripture. Were there the slightest deviation, I would believe that the visions came from the Father of Lies." (Autobiography. Chap. 25)[*)].

[*)] Teresa sometimes had visions of the Devil, in some cases an "intellectual vision," in other cases an "imaginative vision"; moreover she had attacks of emptiness, frivolity and indifference, which she was certain were directly aroused by the Devil. Hell also sometimes appeared to her, quite in agreement with the accounts she had read and heard of it. Indeed, she saw in such a vision even the place in Hell that stood prepared for her, if she was not to be saved! (Vie de Sainte Térèse. Chap. 30—31).

The scruples must have originated in the fact that she had at all another access to entering into a relation to God than through the Church, pastors and the sacraments. She herself too is sometimes uneasy about the immediate relation that has been granted her. From an ecclesiastical standpoint there lies a danger in every such immediate relation, in which the individual becomes independent of tradition and worship. This danger the Church sought to avert by its condemnation of two such eminent mystics as Eckehart and Suso; but in their case it was not only the source, but the very content drawn from the source, that was aimed at. In a mystic of the twentieth century we shall see the contrast between experience and tradition emerge very sharply. —

A doubt about the objective, real character of what stirred in ecstasy and was made known in the visions is not to be traced in Teresa, any more than in her scrupulous confessors. The possibility that the great experiences should be due merely to her own
[72] imagination is rejected at once, partly because of the resistance that the mind tries to make against surrendering to them, partly finally because of their effects in bringing the soul peace and awakening a need for works of love. No Either—Or between imagination and reality asserts itself, but rather an Either—Or between two realities, one that originates from God, and another that originates from the Devil. The criterion for deciding between these two origins was for Teresa the effects that the great experiences led to: joy, courage, aversion to the world, a feeling of one's own nothingness. Teresa stands here at the same stage as the early Church (see above p. 42).

4. *Autobiography and System.*

Hitherto in this exposition we have been able to use the autobiography and the "Castle of the Soul" side by side. But at the point we have now reached, a difference asserts itself between the biographical and the systematic presentation.

In the autobiography Teresa tells how, after the high experiences she has described, there arose an unspeakably painful suffering, from which she cannot free herself, and which she has great difficulty in describing. She adds: "It is this state of unspeakable suffering in which I now find myself. It lies, then, after the period when I, faithful in prayer, received such great joys and tokens of grace from the Lord. Now and then he is so gracious as to lavish such upon me; but my soul's most usual state is to feel itself crushed by the pain of which I shall now speak." The description that now follows rests first on a comparison with the pain that — because of the soul's infinite longing and slight capacity — was felt in the midst of the rapture itself. The difference is that now the soul feels itself forsaken — "like the lonely sparrow on the roof." God seems to

be far away. And if a glimpse of glory is granted the soul, it serves only to make the *[73]* forsakenness be felt so much the more strongly. The soul asks itself: Where is now your God? (Autobiography Chap. 20—21).

This depiction corresponds to what in the "Castle of the Soul" is given as characteristic of the sixth dwelling. The sojourn here means a state of great sufferings. From without comes misjudgment, and God is distant. And the pain of being separated from God is the greater, the more glorious the visions were in former times. What is to be done, then? The high experiences cannot be forced, and therefore one ought in the dark times to immerse oneself in contemplations of the humanity of Jesus, of the Madonna and the saints, — contemplations that one must not cast aside because they do not reach up to the heights of contemplation. We are after all not angels, in whom love is never extinguished! — It takes great courage to endure such a state.

In the "Castle of the Soul" this stage, which in the autobiography is the concluding one, is the introduction to a last stage, the seventh dwelling, of which nothing is reported in the autobiography, which indeed is also 15 years older than the more systematic work.

Two things are said to be characteristic of the sojourn in the seventh dwelling, namely first a more inward absorption in the religious ideas, no longer mere understanding, but spiritual beholding of the mystery, — and second a greater continuity between the different states, which in the sixth dwelling stood in so painful an opposition to one another; ecstasy and flight of the spirit are rare, but the spiritual dryness is over; when God sometimes leaves the soul to itself, it is only in order that it may so much the more appreciate what it means to be in communion with God. —

Of these two peculiarities it is now only the latter that is decisive. For, as mentioned *[74]* above (p. 68), Teresa could already at earlier stages — 15 years before the composition of the "Castle of the Soul" — grasp in one vision the mystery of the Trinity. In a letter from the years 1560—1562 (the same years in which the first draft of the autobiography was drawn up) Teresa communicates to her confessor an imaginative vision of the Trinity, which agrees with what she had heard learned men say. And this vision is evidently the same as that which is related in the last chapter of the autobiography, and as that whose effects on the mind are described in the seventh dwelling of the "Castle of the Soul"[*)]. It is therefore not correct when it has been held that Teresa first in the last period of her life was able to unite the God of the Bible and of mystical experience. This capacity she had — as the whole preceding exposition shows — already earlier possessed, and at none of her stages did she have the slightest doubt of the truth of the doctrine of the

[*)] *Lettres de Sainte Térèse.* I p. 37 ff. (with the Editor's Notes).

Church, so impregnated as she was from first to last with the spirit of Catholicism.

The description of the seventh dwelling in the "Castle of the Soul" concerns, then, not a stage at which were attained intuitions that were not earlier supposed to have been possible. Rather, it reproduces a period in which the great contrasts in the domain of the inner life had fallen away and been replaced by a continuity, within which there could indeed arise rising and falling, but where yet the image of the lonely sparrow on the roof did not at any point come to apply. The overwhelming ecstasies no longer occur, nor the painful longing, the burning thirst to feel oneself one with God. A balance prevailed
[75] throughout, — a balance that the interruptions taught one to appreciate so much the more. This characteristic distinguishes the last of the states described in the "Castle of the Soul" from the state with which the autobiography ends.

In an interesting discussion of Teresa's mysticism in the French Philosophical Society Delacroix maintained that ecstasy does not mark the culmination of Teresa's mystical life, but that this is to be sought in the seventh dwelling of the "Castle of the Soul," where the contrasts are overcome, and where a calm and continuous harmony reigns, — a synthesis or systematization of the contrasts of earlier periods. "We see," he says[*)], "Saint Teresa reach the seventh dwelling, this last and definitive state, a synthesis of the preceding ones. It is the equivalent of ecstasy, in that it spreads over the whole soul and over the whole of life that which ecstasy had gathered in one eternal moment, which, so to speak, was lived high above life. The seventh dwelling is the apotheosis of life." — A similar conception has been advanced from the Catholic side by Abbé Pacheu in a book in which he seeks to unite psychological method and scholastic theology in his theory of mysticism. The difference between Pacheu and Delacroix is this, that whereas Delacroix wishes to carry through a purely psychological method at all points, Pacheu maintains that where natural causes do not suffice, an appeal must be made to the intervention of God, so that the psychological mechanism becomes an instrument on which God plays, — and he makes the transition very quickly from the instrument to the divine organist. But Pacheu agrees with Delacroix in this, that ecstasy is not the culmination in the development of Teresa's mysticism; the culmination is a beholding, which brings peace
[76] of mind, in that the mystical experiences and the theological doctrine melt together in a kind of crystallization[*)]. But in order to substantiate this theory the Catholic author must do violence to psychology. He asserts, namely, that there is a continuity of memory between ecstasy and the later reflection that leads to interpretation; by this ecstasy

[*)] *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie.* 26. Oktober 1905. (Le développement des états mystiques chez Sainte Térèse).

[*)] *L'expérience mystique et l'activité subconsciente.* (1911). p. 76.

is supposed to differ from hypnosis. When one has come to oneself after ecstasy, the mystic, Pacheu thinks, has a perfect knowledge of what has taken place[**)]. But that this should always be possible conflicts with the express testimonies of Paul, Plotinus, Suso and Teresa. Ecstasy at its culmination excludes every interpretation, also every proper beholding. As we have seen, Teresa is referred to involuntary and arbitrary comparisons, to symbols and allegories, in order to express what she has experienced. And even the imaginative visions unfold as a rule successively, so that there is room for the involuntary influence of ideas won earlier. Finally, Teresa, like Suso, is very careful to exclude all non-orthodox elements from the interpretation that she holds to. A critical labor goes on here that does not build on an analysis of the experiences themselves, but is to secure agreement with tradition. —

To return to Teresa herself, ecstasies undoubtedly stand for her as the highest states, and she exults over the glory that in them has been granted her, little as she can make it clear to others. With melancholy she recognizes in the autobiography that their time is past, and that she now lives in the time of longing and of spiritual oscillations — corresponding to what she 15 years later calls living in the sixth dwelling. Nevertheless the depiction of life in the seventh dwelling in the "Castle of the Soul" is scarcely a pure *[77]* construction. It rests on the fact that Teresa has reconciled herself to the fact that the time of the great experiences, of the mighty visions, is past, and that she now appreciates the harmony and continuity that her life has gained in her old age. Whether there is, as Delacroix maintains, an equivalence between the mighty momentary movement of the ecstasies and the later state's subdued harmony, is a very difficult question to decide. It is at bottom the same problem as the question whether in the form of disposition there can come full compensation for what was experienced in the form of emotion. In my Psykologi I have discussed this problem. But as far as Teresa is concerned, she maintains no equivalence here. She makes no comparison between the stage at which she wrote the autobiography, and that at which she composed the "Castle of the Soul." Otherwise it could not have escaped her that she had already in what corresponded to the fifth dwelling been able to behold the theological mysteries in full clarity, so that it was no peculiarity of "the seventh dwelling." She says herself several times that when practical duties had interrupted her exposition, she does not read through what precedes before she continues.

In a letter from May 1884 (the year before her death) she gives an account of her spiritual state. This description corresponds to the depiction of "the seventh dwelling,"

[**)] Après être revenu à soi ou sait parfaitement ce qui c'est passé. *L'expérience mystique et l'activité subconsciente.* p. 142. cfr. p. 176.

which she composed four years before. There is, however, a certain melancholy present, and the contrast to the preceding periods is stressed much more strongly than in the "Castle of the Soul." She feels herself now secure and has no longer any need of strong bodily chastisements. Imaginative visions have ceased, while intellectual visions can still come; the Trinity dwells constantly in her soul. Such flaming movements as she
[78] could formerly be put into did not now arise, but neither such strong pains. It is a calm and reconciled mood of old age that reigns here, — but no "higher unity," no equivalence in relation to what the time of the great experiences had brought. And that it is "the seventh dwelling" that she now believes she lives in appears from a letter of November of the same year. She asks here a woman friend to read the chapter on "the seventh dwelling" to Father Rodrigo and tell him that "the one he knows well" has reached the state described and enjoys the perfect repose and peace of which the said section speaks[*)]. —

Alas, old age may bring its peace and its resignation; but it does not always bring, indeed very seldom, full compensation for what in its time stirred mightily in us. Even if with this more vigorous life there came also unrest, doubt and tension, yet even this was a testimony to the force of life. Where one believes one has obtained full equivalence, not to say attained a higher unity, it often rests on an illusion. — Yet Saint Teresa had a happier old age than the two Danish pastors who in their old age confessed their poverty to one another[**)].

The time when life stirs vigorously, and when the real work is done, shall have its due, and keep it. —

If one compares Teresa with the mystics of the Middle Ages, one gets the impression of greater psychological ability in the description of the mystical experiences in their successive development, more purely historical in the autobiography, more systematic and influenced by the calm of old age in other writings (especially the "Castle of the
[79] Soul"). Thereby it is for an investigating consideration easier to discover the relation between experience and interpretation. In her own case this relation has naturally not come to clear consciousness; for that she is from the outset too much lived into the ecclesiastical tradition, although her independence shows itself in the critical attitude toward the confessors. Even in the most indeterminate, inarticulate and unusual states immediate recognition and confident explanation appear. With modern mystics it was to be presumed that on this point it would be otherwise, and there is a most interesting example that it is also the case.

[*)] *Lettres de Sainte-Térèse.* III p. 367.

[**)] See below my little study *To Præster.*

[80]

IV.
A MODERN MYSTIC

1. *Psychology and Mysticism.*

In December 1910 the distinguished psychologist Théodore Flournoy of Geneva, whom we have already had occasion to mention above (p. 32f), was visited by the headmistress of an educational institution for young girls, conducted in an orthodox Protestant spirit, Mlle Cécile Vé, as he calls her in his account[*]. She came to ask his advice about her whole mental condition. This was a peculiar kind of double consciousness. She felt herself divided between two selves. The one was sensual and passionate and expressed itself in strong erotic impulses, which took on a demonic character and made her nights restless and painful. The other appeared in her striving to work in her calling as a teacher, inspired by positively religious ideas, such as prevailed in the circle within which she worked. Her condition, however, did not fall under genuine double consciousness, whether the simultaneous or the successive, for she experienced both *[81]* states as her own, and her two "selves" had mutual consciousness of each other. The split was not complete, and just thereby it became so much the more painful. "Je suis à la fois A et B, et l'une aussi sincèrement que l'autre."

The two "selves" point back to the oppositions between which she had been tossed about in her earlier life. She was 47 years old when she turned to Flournoy. At the age of 18 she had suddenly been torn out of her childlike simplicity about sexual matters through brutal rape. This episode she could never forget. The memory-image surfaced again and again with a mixture of horror, disgust, and voluptuousness. Later she had felt an inclination for a married man, but had broken with him. The relationship seems to have had a playful and frivolous character. But the fact that she had not obtained satisfaction for her erotic craving, and not least for her craving to experience the relation of motherhood, brought on violent crises in her, in which she thought that demonic forces overwhelmed her. What she experienced she herself described as "nocturnal genital hallucinations", "nightmares", "half-somnambulisms", "possession by a lower personality".

[*] *Une Mystique Moderne.* Dcouments pour la Psychologie religieuse. (Archives de Psychologie. Ed. Flournoy et Claparède. Tome XV. Mai 1915.) — It is Cécile's own experiences and communications that are presented here, for the most part from the time before she knew that Flournoy was thinking of publishing them. In what follows I have attempted, on the basis of them, a characterization of her remarkable experiences, and I compare it later with the conception Flournoy has put forward.

Flournoy rightly says that if she had lived in earlier times, she would have been regarded as possessed. The "half-somnambulism" from which she suffered came to stand in a so much more glaring and more repellent light for her as her religiosity, after her return from a stay abroad, had settled to rest in the traditions of orthodox Protestantism. In accordance with these she worked with earnestness and energy as head and teacher at an institute for young girls. The opposition between what stirred in her in the times of
[82] "possession" and what was both her personal faith and animated her work of teaching became at last intolerable to her.

It is significant that she went to a psychologist and not to a pastor. She not only had a psychological sense, but was also not unacquainted with modern psychology. She looked, on the whole, from the outset differently upon her experiences than she would have done if she had lived in earlier times or had met with other presuppositions. She was not disappointed in turning to Flournoy. He not only represented to her that even very believing people did not escape spiritual trials, and that even Paul from his own experience knew a "Satan's angel", but he also impressed upon her that sexual sins are not of such essential importance as sin against justice and love. And above all he explained to her that the sexual drive has so deep a ground in the nature of all that lives that it again and again rises up against the barriers which social life sets for it, while on the other hand it is so closely bound up with energy in the conduct of life that its extirpation would bring not purity but dullness. Finally he advised her to exact observation and investigation of her states, since the study of our restless and unruly states is often the best means of diminishing their influence. These instructions he supplemented with a prudent use of hypnosis to fortify the insight and strengthen the will to apply it. — Flournoy's way of taking up this whole matter recalls to a high degree the means which Spinoza (Ethica V. 1—20) prescribes against the "affects" (remedia affectuum). Cécile herself has stated how beneficial the adoption of the psychological standpoint
[83] was for her. It freed her from the many self-accusations and from "Protestant scruples". "My real divine inspiration", she says, "came to me the day when I resolved to regard the whole endless struggle from a medical standpoint, and when psychological explanations set me afloat (m'ont mise au large), in that they greatly lightened my moral responsibility… The morbid states I can and ought to fight against, but they do not attack my moral purity". "That I have been set afloat shines out in my whole life. If in a certain sense I have become more indulgent toward myself, then I can say that I have also become so toward others, and that I am able to love them in a better way". —

The struggle, however, was not over. But a good year and a half after she had turned

to Flournoy, she received an inner help which made it possible for her to do without hypnosis. Whereas the half-somnambulistic experiences which she called demonic had a tendency to personify themselves as uncanny beings, there now appeared as a counterweight also a beginning personification of the opposing tendencies in her nature. She often had an indefinite sensation of the presence of an invisible friend. Everything that went on in her and tormented her she could confide to him. No visual sensations were connected with the "presence" she perceived. And when the "Friend" spoke, she could not decide whether the words sounded in her inner self or came to her from outside. One of these experiences she describes thus: "I felt that he came from the other side of the room and approached my bed, so that I had the sensation that I could reach him if I stretched out my arm. But the material sensation played the smallest part in this revelation (apparition); the prevailing impression was that of friendly presence, and presence of something that was mightier than I myself. Throughout my whole life I have felt a *[84]* strong craving to be supported, to be protected, indeed, to obey a will that is stronger than my own. And it is this craving, so often felt, that has now personified itself". At times the invisible guest could remind her of her father, to whom she had looked up greatly and whom she had greatly missed. Perhaps her hypnotist and psychological confessor too has contributed elements to the figure.

When she spoke to the "Friend", she did not always receive an answer; but she could sense whether he approved or disapproved of what she said. When he answered, the answer came slowly, automatically, and the content was only what she had often thought of herself, but was not thinking of at the moment. A poem which she had learned in her youth and was very fond of, but of which she could remember only the first verse, he recited to her almost completely.

The phenomenon had developed gradually, as, according to Flournoy's experience, it often does in somnambulists. Cécile could give no definite date for its first appearance, but she could recognize it when it came, even before it had assumed a more definite shape. At times she could sense the guest before he actually came; it seemed to her then as if beyond the threshold of her consciousness there were something that could not press in, because each of her moments was occupied by her work or its preparation. She could then try to make room for the hidden experience (l'expérience latente), much as one tries to call up something in one's memory that has fled away. —

The consciousness of a presence which Cécile here describes we already know from Teresa. It is what the Spanish nun called intellectual vision (as opposed to imaginative vision). It is a phenomenon which is well known, also outside the psychology of re- *[85]*

ligious life. And likewise there are examples outside this branch of psychology of the sense of presence passing over into visual hallucination, as appeared above in Teresa[*)]. Flournoy describes the sense of presence itself as a hallucination in the domain of the vital sensations (hallucination cénéstétique), as a rule connected with organic well-being (euphoria), calm and rest, and sometimes connected with muscular numbness (engourdissement musculaire) and with cold legs and arms, — symptoms which he has often found in the examination of somnambulists (mediums).

In Cécile the hallucination of presence did not develop further, as it did in Teresa. She never came to see her Friend. At most she had, in addition to the sensations of presence, what she herself calls an illusion of touch, but in such a way that she was perfectly clear that nothing touched her. She adds that nevertheless the conviction of a presence was beyond doubt; she knew when the "Friend" came, and when he went, and the visit always produced a feeling of moral help, of calm and of purity. She is loath to admit that the "Friend" should be merely a product of her imagination, and rests her case on the fact that she is not master of his coming and going. But she is clear that it is a deep craving in her being that here finds expression and satisfaction. She would wish that she were not so sure that there was only a doubling of something in her own personality — just as other elements in her nature tended toward personification through sexual hallucinations. She would, she thinks, take the phenomenon more seriously if she were
[86] not so sure of its mystical origin; now she sees all too clearly the threads by which the puppet is guided (je vois trop les ficelles).

The most significant effect of the visits of the "Friend" is, according to Cécile, that coherence comes into her divided being. Although his visits are an illusion, they nevertheless help her forward; she believes she can establish greater unity in her nature (plus d'unification)[*)]. This unity could work its way forward in her with greater ease than if she had suffered from genuine double consciousness. It was not necessary (as in Morton Prince's patient B A C) to cultivate a new personality that could displace both of the two warring selves. The self that stirred in her in both of the opposed states was clarified and strengthened with the help of the "Friend".

It is probably a reaction against the demonic side of her nature that works its way forward in the "Friend". It is her ideals from different times and in different domains that here form a peculiar complex. Cécile looks, despite the strength with which she is seized

[*)]Cf. *William James*: *Varieties of Religious Experience.* Chap. 3.

[*)]Cf. with this *Hannah Joël*'s description of how the transition, in her case, from a state of soul-sickness to one of soul-health was experienced as a struggle for unity and coherence. (See my *Mindre Arbejder.* III. p. 81.)

and despite the peace she owes to the phenomenon, at it in a purely psychological way. The "Friend" is identified neither with Jesus nor with any other Biblical personality, nor with her deceased father or with her psychological confessor. She does not believe, as a spiritualist would, that she is visited by the spirit of one deceased. She does not fear that the phenomenon, by a purely psychological interpretation, would lose its value for her.

2. *A Modern Mystic's Ecstasies.*

After Cécile for half a year had had her spiritual abode with the "Friend", there fell to her a new kind of experience through ecstatic states. Whereas in the revelations of *[87]* the "Friend" she had had a sensory basis in the hallucination of presence, in ecstasy every such basis dropped away. There was nothing to describe. In her accounts, therefore, the moments in which the ecstasy sets in are marked only by dashes. Whereas Teresa's highest states (see above p. 64) were hallucinations of presence, Cécile has known states that were still more indeterminate. Teresa could immediately recognize what was present to her, and to the mere vision of presence (the "intellectual vision") there soon joined other visions ("imaginative"), which made a more detailed description possible. What stood so enigmatically before Teresa was merely the soul's own state during the visions; it is for this state that she looks for symbols and allegories.

Just as for Teresa the vision of presence could pass continuously into imaginative vision, so Cécile maintains that there was — however different the experiences with the "Friend" seemed to be from the ecstatic experiences — a continuous transition between them. The transition took place through the receding of the tendency to personification which expressed itself in the "Friend"; it set a limit which there was a need to transgress. With the "Friend" she could still talk; but she sensed a deeper craving, a craving for something that could make everything in her fall silent. From this sprang what she called the divine experience (l'expérienec divine).

If the difference between experience and interpretation made itself felt already in Cécile's case with the revelations of the "Friend", it had to — for her intellectual honesty and psychological eye — make itself felt still more in the face of the ecstatic experiences, which left no real memories at all.

In the accounts Cécile sent to her psychological confessor, the ecstasies appear as *[88]* lacunae. Only the preceding and the following states could be described. Beforehand there may come longing and expectation with involuntary concentration, palpitation, muscular numbness and coldness in hands and feet. When the ecstatic state is about to

break forth, a certain resistance may arise against it; the soul clings, as it were, to its self and will not surrender itself, not become wholly passive, — all the while longing to be gripped by a mighty, surging wave. What was experienced in the ecstasy itself stood afterwards before her as an experience of an inwardness, a depth, an infinity and a simplicity, which set it in opposition to all other experiences, also to the half-somnambulism in which the "Friend" appeared, and which now seemed to her to have moved only in more superficial layers of her personality. The ecstasy came each time as something original, elementary; only later could she recognize it as ecstasy, as something she was not experiencing for the first time.

Only after the end of the ecstasy were reflection, analysis and judgment possible. And if it is asked how it was possible to think about it when it had vanished and could not be recalled, the answer is that after awakening a flood-wave of wonder and glad enthusiasm went through the soul. "I felt", she says on one occasion, "that I had been permeated by the Divine, — that I had been beyond the world of the senses and of reflection, beyond all time, and that I was now myself again, ignorant of what had taken place, but preserving a kind of radiation (rayonnement), which made life easier for me." It is what I have called the expansion of feeling that here asserts itself. It asserts itself
[89] without interruption in higher or lower degrees, in that our state of mind is not merely determined by what we experience in the moment, but also by what we, more or less immediately beforehand, have experienced, even if we no longer think of it or can think of it. After ecstasies and visions that cannot be recalled, it is the only demonstrable after-effect. It is what Augustine (see above p. 47) called amans memoria, the only thing that remained after the great vision. In the last canto of "Paradise" Dante says, after the last great vision has ended, that while the memories of the vision have vanished, "the sweet effect" endures. What holds of visions holds still more of ecstasy in the narrower sense.

But Cécile calls the experience "divine", and expérience divine becomes in the following time a technical expression for her. It is characteristic of her acuteness, as well as of her honesty, that she expressly seeks to become clear why she calls the experience divine. It is a determination of value, but it is nevertheless a predicate. And with what right is this predicate used here? She at once makes the remark that she had conceived the Divine differently. She was accustomed to imagine it in personal form, hence as an object. When she now used the word divine, it was because that which had asserted itself in her during the ecstatic experience stood before her as a norm, as that which ought to be, and which one must unconditionally acknowledge. Or, as she explains it more closely: "This experience acts on me as a force that drives me forward, and which

at the same time keeps me up at a level of thoughts and presuppositions that is higher than that which I formerly occupied. I notice its influence even in domains that do not seem to me to have anything to do with the region in which the experience unfolds. That is why, I believe, it is divine for me, i.e. permeating my whole being and convincing me *[90]* of a reality that stands above that in which my daily life goes on." At times she calls the higher life that enfolds her in the ecstatic moments straight out God: cette vie-là, c'est dieu! — Faust's confession of faith, which indeed likewise appears as an outcome of an enthusiastic state, fits well her description, although she does not refer to it. — Other expressions too from the circle of her accustomed religious ideas she finds use for, e.g. grace. (Ce n'est que maintenant que je comprends le sens du mot "Grâce"). —

It is characteristic that the first and most important predicate that presents itself to the modern mystic is a determination of value, an expression of an evaluation of feeling. The mystic describes here something that we can all know in other forms and degrees, and which life cannot do without. Our experiences do not stand on an equal level in personal value. We distinguish between our best moments, the high points of our life, and the ordinary course, which takes up the greater part of life, apart from the moments we call dry, low, perhaps bestial. And we regard the former as "norm", i.e. as the reality to which we wish to give as large a place as possible in our life. We find in the ordinary and low moments — as soon as we can raise ourselves above them — a consolation in having had experiences of the high kind. Thus the ecstatic moments stand for the mystics. I disregard here the psychological and physiological conditions of the high moments, which we too rightly call a grace to have, because they come involuntarily, even though we can strive to make ourselves worthy of having them. These conditions seem more enigmatic in ecstasy than in the high moments of ordinary people; and yet it is a question whether we know more about these than about those. *[91]* — A question in itself is whether the evaluation that lies in expressions like "divine" or "high" can be rationally grounded. This question there is here no reason to enter into[*)]. The evaluation itself, which finds expression in these predicates, is a fact, and it is, as said, significant that the modern mystic sees clearly that a predicate of value is the first predicate that can be used of the strange experiences. —

In Teresa's attempts to express her ecstatic experiences there is really nothing that corresponds to Cécile's explanation of why she calls her experience divine. She does not know pure determinations of value. On the other hand there is something kindred between the two female mystics in their use of analogies to express what they have

[*)] See on this *Den menneskelige Tanke* § 145—146. — *Totalitet som Kategori.* (Vid. Selsk. Skrifter 1917). Chap. 5.

experienced. As in Teresa, so in Cécile too an involuntary comparison springs up. She too needs symbols. There is an image that again and again presses itself forward in Cécile, and which is due to a memory from a stay on the Scottish coast in her young days. She had there one evening seen a black plank lying at the water's edge. The waves constantly rocked it, until at last it was swept along and carried out to sea, where it was shone through by the splendor of the evening sun. This memory-image came forth involuntarily in her immediately after the first ecstasy: "It seems to me that I too have been seized by the current and carried out into the sun, by which I am now wholly shone through". Later this image often comes forth after her ecstasies, and it stands for her as the only thing that to any degree corresponds to what she believed she
[92] had experienced. Once the image is changed so that a small boat appears instead of the plank, and it also appears before the onset of an ecstasy, where the resistance of the boat or of the plank against the waves' attempt to sweep it along symbolizes the resistance that was involuntarily made against being overwhelmed by the ecstatic seizure.

In Teresa the image of the iron corresponds to this symbol, which in a gentle fire lies as a black mass, but in a blaze becomes glowing (above p. 64), as the plank is shone through by the evening sun. In the involuntary use of a kindred image the similarity between the experiences of the two mystics comes to light, despite all the difference that otherwise appears between them[*)]. —

Another circle of symbols presses forward in Cécile, images which, however, have significance not merely as analogies, but according to her conviction point to a real connection. Ecstasy is illuminated by comparison with sexual self-surrender. What is experienced during this can no more than the ecstatic experience be described. Cécile finds the kinship between the erotic and religion to consist in this, that in both domains the craving for inward and immediate connection and complete interpenetration is satisfied. Both are expressions of life's strong craving, and that the great forces of life are expressed in the same language, whether it is a matter of divine or human life, has for her nothing marvelous. The mystics again and again use the language of human love to express their high experiences (Cf. above p. 66f).

It was, however, for Cécile more than figurative speech and psychological analogy that was here at issue. She had indeed herself to experience time after time how deeply
[93] the sexual instinct is rooted in our nature, and her psychological confessor had indeed also sought to strengthen and console her in her struggles with nightmare by reference to the unavoidable natural drives we carry with us, even if we rise ever so high in spir-

[*)] An example of how one and the same image at highly different stages of culture can be used as an expression for the same religious type I have given in my Religionsfilosofi § 36 (the fish on dry land).

itual culture. From this it follows, as Cécile has clearly seen, that the more deeply an experience, even of an entirely different kind, takes hold of our mental life, the more will also the sexual side of our nature be set in motion. Often she had to experience that ecstatic experiences incited the sexual drives. What for reflection came to stand in the most glaring contrast, thus had a real, subterranean connection. The very opposition presupposes forces that work in the same plane. After having again experienced the glaring opposition between the high and the low, Cécile says: "J'ai peine à réaliser que je suis la même qu'il y a 24 heures, alors que mon être tout entier vibrait encore de t'attouchement du divin… Pourtant c'est bon d'arriver à voir quelques-unes des ficelles de notre pantin, comme cette connexion, qui semble si étrange, entre l'émotion religieuse très pure, très haute, et l'excitation sexuelle".

The relation between sexuality and religion is now not merely this, that the emotion aroused by religious motives, by way of organic diffusion, propagates itself to the sexual domain, but also the reverse, that sexual craving can undergo a metamorphosis, in that the energy it has released is transferred to psychical processes of an entirely different kind; the possibility of such a metamorphosis lies in the moment of self-surrender which is present as soon as the sexual craving and the sexual relation have more than a momentary and isolated character. The turning point is there when the object that is to satisfy the craving stands as more than a mere means, so that an image can form of it that points beyond the single moment and the isolated enjoyment. Drive and interest *[94]* then begin to be bound to something that has value beyond the momentary satisfaction, and which perhaps can even demand the sacrifice of this. It is such a metamorphosis, or series of metamorphoses, that Plato has Socrates depict in the "Symposium". By this road the erotic can pass over into religion, especially when the whole process of idealization is supported by the exalted character of religious ideas and images that meet the individual through tradition and worship. The erotic cannot from the first have produced religion, but the craving that stirs in the former can — especially through disappointment — be transformed into religious craving, in that self-surrender is now directed toward something more comprehensive, perhaps an Infinite. Energy can be conserved through the displacements.

As for Cécile, it was "the craving to be loved and to become a mother" that demanded satisfaction, and she herself thought that if this craving had been satisfied, she would have found rest within the circle that had then formed around her. She could be revolted that such happiness was denied her. But then precisely the struggle with unsatisfied craving into which she was led had given her life greater value. "Would the human soul",

she asks, "without suffering sense the thirst that can torment, but which conditions its royal dignity? What do they know at bottom, those who have not suffered?" It is through suffering that the craving is idealized, even if dregs remain behind. And here ecstasy, "the divine experience", has brought her positive help: "Each time the divine experience has unfolded in me, the glowing iron has touched my soul and has purified it." Even the fact that she could experience desireless states, which nevertheless
[95] captivated and inspired her, must have been of great effect. And what she experienced in the ecstasies was for her a continuation of what she had experienced in the half-somnambulistic states, in which she sensed the presence of the "Friend". In the first of her ecstasies the two experiences passed directly into each other. Also in the half-somnambulistic states she had found that there were other elements in her nature than the unruly craving.

Under all this the memory-image of her father too has exerted great influence. He had been an energetic, profound and independent man, who stood for her as norm and model, so that it was a craving for her to feel herself "her father's daughter" through self-control inwardly and independence outwardly. Flournoy has, however, perhaps laid too great weight on the effect of this "imago paternelle", partly because he is too strongly influenced by the theories of the Freudian school. I suppose, moreover, that Flournoy is not right when he holds that the ideal of a man Cécile saw in her father was the cause of Cécile's not marrying. There were suitors enough; but none could have measured up to the paternal ideal. It is, however, improbable that Cécile with her craving "to be loved by a man and to have a child in her arms" should not have taken up this side of life, if the right one, i.e. the one she could wish to be loved by, had really come, and there is not a trace of it in her notes. But the Eros that could have filled her did not come. —

The whole side of life which — not merely as natural symbol — but partly as resistance that had to be overcome, partly as contrast-effect that could humble, partly as motive that could be metamorphosed, plays so great a role in Cécile, seems almost
[96] entirely to be lacking in Teresa. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that she came so early under the discipline of convent life, so that the natural tendencies were given no time to unfold themselves. They have led a more subterranean existence, and when they stirred more strongly, confession in the confessional has formed a sufficient counterweight. Neither in the autobiography nor in the writings does one notice them directly. But in the symbolism they can be traced, for erotic images presuppose prior experience or consciousness of what the image means. Only in a single vivid description does the organic diffusion mentioned above appear distinctly. The possibility, however,

always remains that Teresa, despite her great capacity for observation and analysis, has not been able to match Cécile as regards this capacity. Cécile thus often notes announcements and omens of the onset of ecstasy, whereas with Teresa it mostly comes unprepared and unexpected.

The most important difference between the Spanish nun of the sixteenth century and the modern mystic of the twentieth century is, however, that the former very quickly, and without noticing the transition, passes over from experience to theological interpretation, whereas Cécile for the time being remains standing at involuntary symbolism.

3. *Ecstasy and Religion.*

One might wonder that Cécile, who paid homage to a pronounced confessional religiosity, and who had undertaken the religious direction of an educational institution, did not at once in the powerfully seizing experiences that fell to her lot see announcements from the God of the Bible and of the Church or revelations of Christ. As we have seen, there stirred in her first and foremost a craving for simple appreciation of what was experienced in its significance for her inner life, and next she involuntarily sought for images to make this significance intuitive. An image like that with the plank in the *[97]* sunlit billowing sea is a good image for the poetry of life that is an immediate expression of what has been experienced about the relation between the dark and the light, what weighs down and what lifts up within mental life. But any dogmatic application lies far from her. Whereas Teresa immediately recognizes Jesus in the figure that appears to her, first as merely present, later as object of hearing and vision, Cécile expressly declares that she has never conceived the "Friend" as one with Jesus, and that she also, when she prayed, had no impression that it was the Friend she came into relation with. The Biblical ideas were not at all brought into connection with that which procured her the best consolation and the deepest peace. She takes the experience as it comes. In the same way as toward the Biblical ideas she placed herself toward the spiritualist interpretations. It would indeed, she says, have been a quite simple explanation to assume spirits as origin, and it would have been a great joy to her if she could have believed that it was her father's spirit that visited her. But she had no occasion for it.

The difference between Teresa and Cécile in this respect is connected with the fact that in Cécile the involuntary plays a far greater role than in Teresa, and ecstasy stands from the first in definite opposition to her conscious religiosity; the significance that ecstasy acquires for her is perhaps, as we shall see, conditioned by the fact that her conscious religiosity at bottom did not satisfy her. In Teresa, by contrast, ecstasy was

prepared through prayer. "The door to the castle of the soul" is prayer, both that in words and that in the inner self, accompanied by the turning of the mind (l'oraison
[98] tant vocale tant mentale, accompagnée d'attention). The various forms of prayer are so many steps up to ecstasy. After the voluntary turning through prayer the highest state then comes involuntarily; "before we think of raising our thought to God, the powers of our soul are already inside the castle, without knowing how they have come in there." The voluntary thus belongs only at the lower steps; later it is precisely a matter of not doing violence to oneself; but voluntary preparation nonetheless plays a role that has no counterpart in Cécile.

Just as Teresa — in defiance of some of her confessors — found in her mystical experiences confirmation of the thought of God's indwelling in all things, so that it is not merely through grace but in a still more inward way that he works in the human soul, so too Cécile is convinced that "the divine experience" does not presuppose a breach of the laws of nature, but is an outcome of a natural unfolding of the inner life. But for Cécile this conviction acquired — at any rate for a period — a significance of principle that Teresa could not attribute to it. The point was that Cécile in the period in which "the divine experience" was of decisive significance for her could not use the Biblical and churchly ideas, however much she might wish to.

"I wished", she says, "that I could call forth my old Christian assurance again in its original form, take refuge in the thought of the atonement of my sins and of a redemption procured outside myself; but I no longer found strength or consolation therein; it was as if it no longer reached me… I have formerly been able to 'feel God' in my life or in my prayer, but it was a God I was familiar with, whose history I so to speak knew,
[99] and whose influence was more or less as I expected it. It was a God who had stepped forth in history, revealed through the life and teaching of Jesus. But that with which I have now come into contact surpasses every expression and all history, — and yet it is not merely an abstraction. … Now every formulated prayer, or at any rate every prayer that is formed beforehand to be performed at a particular moment, seems to me to be sacrilege. I probably go too far here, but it is now my conviction, against which I cannot act without having the feeling of violating my conscience… In the last analysis it must nevertheless be of little significance for me where the divine experience has its place among the realities that are registered under a particular label. It exists, and its value for my spiritual life is as beyond doubt as this spiritual life itself… For a person who, like me, has been brought up with piety and theology, it is difficult to accept a wholly new form of revelation; it does not happen without wavering. But one must learn not

to be afraid of the truth, whatever it may turn out to be!" —

In "the divine experience" there lay for Cécile the germ of a new concept of God. "Only now", she says, "does it really dawn upon me how narrow, dogmatic and human my concept of the Divine was. Led by an imperious craving everywhere to find again the character of something personal, I had evidently come to forge for myself a God who was wholly contained in the moral sanction and wholly and entirely revealed in the Father whom the Christ of the Gospels proclaimed… I feel myself on the border of a great, promised, but as yet unexplored land… In loftiness and in immediacy the divine experience surpasses everything I have hitherto been able to imagine… I feel such a spiritual renewal after the brief moments of 'divine touch', that it seems to me childish *[100]* and meaningless to go on seeking edification by hearing sermons and attending meetings… What does the whole Christian preaching and the immense edifice of dogmas mean in face of this direct revelation to a human soul?… It seems to me now that I stand on the shore of an immense ocean, and that God passes by in the mighty waves and in the rays of the setting sun. But it is not the small-cut and modeled God. It is the highest Real, the final end of all, the living and triumphant force, in which I finally find the fundamental being that is raised above time and space and above good and evil!" —

If one wished to say that Cécile here glides over from description to interpretation and even reads a whole pantheistic metaphysics into her experiences, it must nevertheless be answered that she has really only stated that what she has experienced does not allow her to let any opposition hold within that which in her highest, most strengthening moments has appeared to her. She asserts a docta ignorantia, which leads her to look with humor at dogmas and theological edifices of doctrine. "If this really is the way in which God reveals himself to a human soul, how could the theologians then have written so many thick books about it?" "For the future the thought of God imposes on me above all silence." — She has learned from experience that "our craving, especially our spiritual craving, always surpasses the expression we can give it."

From what operated in "the divine experience", disharmonies, misfortunes and crimes, as ordinary experience shows them to us, could not be derived. God cannot be the cause of evil. She found consolation in this conviction in face of the disharmonies she had to *[101]* experience in her own inner self. She had moments when she rebelled that she was created with such strong instincts, when they were not to find satisfaction. But especially when the World War broke out, the thought became a consolation to her that "God is not in this world".*) "Si je me sentais encore tenue de croire qu'il joue un rôle dans ce

*)Probably she has found this sentence in a posthumous work by Mme Flournoy, where it is maintained with great inwardness and emphasis. On this work see *Den store Humor* p. 91.

drame, j'arriverais au blasphème." —

The turn in Cécile's religious development that set in with "the divine experience" was conditioned by the opposition to the preceding period of her life, in which she had more and more entered upon a religiosity that had its expression in stiff dogmatic rubrics. "The experience" sprang then, she thinks, from a deep craving that this dogmatism could not satisfy, and from the spiritual distress which her confessional faith had not been able to help her out of. Never had the life of feeling stirred so strongly and inwardly in her. The inwardization which her religious life thereby won radiated over her whole conduct of life. Although she could not communicate the experience itself to others, it made it nevertheless possible for her to work with greater force and love. Since what she experienced was so highly different from what others experienced, she felt herself more independent than before and acquired more faith in herself than before. Now she had at last become a person (quelqu'un), and not merely a complex of the thoughts of others. She understood herself better, and therefore also understood others better. With greater patience and more inward sympathy she now stood in face of the sufferings of others, even if they were of another kind than her own. She had hitherto
[102] not had sufficient respect for her own spiritual development when it did not proceed in the accustomed dogmatic rubrics. She saw that she had no right to maltreat her soul in order to get it into a definite schema. Even the most authentic Christianity is — she now sees — not a spiritual medicine for all. A sermon she hears only increases her confusion. She felt a desire to become a Catholic in order to be able to kneel in silence in a church without being disturbed by what people say[*)].

4. *The Principle of Personality and Love of Humankind.*

The strange states that our modern mystic had experienced seemed bound to lead to a decisive change in her spiritual life, namely to a deepened understanding of herself and of others. She now felt herself as "her father's daughter". Her father was an outstanding pedagogue, who in religious respect was strongly influenced by Vinet and in connection with him maintained the right of the individual personality in face of all

[*)] It is surely not a few who, like Cécile, find that the liturgical part of worship can captivate them, while the sermon only disturbs. In a note from 1847 Kierkegaard says: "Unconditionally, the singing of hymns occupies me most of the whole service." William James told me that he did not belong to any confession, but liked to hear hymn-singing; sermons he could not bear to hear. J. N. Madvig says in a posthumous note that organ playing and singing awaken deep and lively emotion, longing, love and courage, — "but then comes the sermon with its so often halting and contradictory dogmatics, its obscurity and crooked inferences." A deceased friend of mine, a famous natural scientist, who was a constant churchgoer, was greatly absorbed by the hymn-singing, but as a rule behaved predominantly critically toward the sermon.

confessions and dogmas. His watchword to his children was: Follow your conscience, and immerse yourselves in earnest in the life and work of Jesus. Cécile had for a time denied this counsel. After her return from abroad, where she had felt herself much *[103]* tossed about, she had been strongly influenced by the orthodoxy and pietism prevailing in French-speaking Switzerland and had with zeal thrown herself into work for this tendency. She had then not been content with her father's standpoint, but thought to raise herself above it by headlong (à corps perdu) throwing herself into "this whole somewhat precipitate and superficial, but intoxicating Christian activity". Her zeal brought it about that she was appointed as teacher and headmistress of an educational institution for young girls conducted in an orthodox spirit. She found the orthodox basis convenient for exercising spiritual influence on her pupils. But now she felt in increasing degree the opposition between her inner life and the outer forms and formulas. Ecstasy had the significance of strengthening her in faith in the right of the inner life. She could now calmly let the whole dogmatics collapse. Her orthodox surroundings noticed, to be sure, that she no longer as before was absorbed in the forms and formulas of faith; but she was allowed to continue her work, since the heightened energy of the inner life brought new inwardness and force into it.

But all the while this process of spiritual liberation was going on, another current too asserted itself in her. She feared that the intensive inner life and its experiences would isolate her and gradually weaken the interest in influencing her pupils. "In a certain sense", she says, "the life of my own soul is more valuable to me than the souls that surround me and need my love". The "divine experience" had now become the center and sun of her life. She said to herself that if her spiritual force and wealth had been somewhat greater, she would be able to let both the inner and the outer life come to their full right. But here she felt her poverty. She could not feel satisfied with *[104]* something she had to keep to herself, and which could not be communicated to others. She constantly feels how much she owes to "the divine experience", and she will not throw stones into the spring from which she has slaked her thirst. She has won new force, and her religious ideas have been freed from narrowness, from dogma-faith and theology. But she felt her new wealth, as if she had received a 100 frcs. note she could not get changed, although it was precisely small change she now needed in dealing with others. —

This conflict is not what interests least in this modern mystic. From a standpoint in the psychology of religion, ecstasy and mysticism can be regarded as strongly marked (in the eyes of many half-pathological) forms of what in every rich inner life can be

experienced of high moments, bright and warming hours, which stand in sharp contrast to the scatteredness and externality of daily life. And the difficulty in which Cécile felt herself placed is therefore not something peculiar to the mystic, but can arise for anyone in whom the difference between an inner and an outer life makes itself felt at all. At bottom completely direct communication is impossible. Cécile has rightly said that the fullness of the inner life can far surpass the means of communication that are at hand. For those who know Danish philosophical literature, no closer pointing out is needed that indirect communication is the only bridge that can be built between independent and peculiar personalities. At any rate it is doing violence to personality to demand the same outer formulas acknowledged and the same mental development gone through by all. Cécile complains of the slight respect of religious circles for personality. One wants to push through one's dogmas, however it may go with the individual souls.
[105] And she herself learned, when she with great caution discussed her problem about the relation between dogmas and inner experiences with a pastor ("Pastor Z."), with what suspicion one also in Protestant ecclesiastical circles, regards experiences of the kind that had fallen to her lot. Pastor Z. established two things, first, that every experience that unfolds in the border regions of consciousness is of a lower, fleeting and illusory kind, — second, that every experience that does not lead to the assumption of a personal God is morbid and cannot be made the basis of the conduct of life. In opposition to this she placed — in her mind, for she would not express herself openly to a pastor — the experience [Erfaring] that nothing had taken hold so strengtheningly and purifyingly in her life as "the divine experience", although it could not be brought under the accepted dogmatic forms (clichés très connus et catalogués).

It was her own love of humankind and conscientiousness that caused her problem. She demanded that the plank she had so often seen rocked in the sunlit sea should become a lifeboat also for others than herself. And one cannot help asking whether she was not in reality on the way to build such a lifeboat of the plank. She holds constantly that despite the unutterability of the inner experiences, they had enabled her "to spread a little more spiritual force and divine love around her". Can one at bottom get further? Must one necessarily lower one's demands on one's most inward experiences and thereby degrade oneself in order to satisfy the demands of love of humankind? Will not precisely a full and thorough acknowledgment of the principle of personality in others
[106] as in oneself lead to a truer love of humankind than that which speaks to others the "catalogued" language, but a wholly different language to itself?

Sometimes Cécile had the impression that the moment might come when she had no

right to keep to herself that which she must be able to communicate, namely, that it was at all possible "to come into contact with the Divine without any intermediary whatever of speculation, dogma or form of faith." But she dared not draw all the consequences of it. She glimpses the principle of personality, but she lets it fall again. The craving for fellowship, and for the security that fellowship gives, was too strong. "Shall we get to see the time", she asks, "when true religious freedom will prevail? Sometimes, e.g. today, I wish it, but at other times I fear it and discover that I am still very tradition-bound. I am afraid of going too far. I let the dove out through the window of the Ark, but hasten then to shut the window again[*)]. To be sure, there is cramped room in the Ark; one gets stiff limbs, and one breathes an overheated air without sufficient oxygen; — but then one is nevertheless in the Ark, sure of being in safety, while outside the *[107]* waves and the strong winds rage."

Cécile was clear that if she spoke out completely about her inner experiences, she would lose her half-clerical position. It was surely not from fear of such a break, however, that she did not take the decisive step. Besides the craving to be something for others, which she thought was best fulfilled on the basis of the confessional ideas, there stirred more and more also a craving for definite images and personifications, a craving that so much the more easily gained the upper hand as the time came when the ecstasies ceased. This leads us over to the last step in that part of her development into which the documents give us insight.

5. *Cécile's "Seventh Mansion".*

It was not merely love of humankind, the craving to be something for others, that led Cécile anew back to churchly ideas. There stirred more and more in her a dissatisfaction with the unutterable, with that which cannot be expressed in any concept, or rather in any image. Her imagination has, to use Schleiermacher's expression in one of his letters, been "determined by a shudder at the obscurity of the indeterminately thought, not by a shudder at the contradiction that arises from lending the Infinite the forms of the finite." As I have pointed out (Religionsfilosofi § 95), there stirs here rather an opposition

[*)] One of the women of the 19th century who has done a great work in the service of love of humankind, and who was at the same time an independent thinker, *Florence Nigthingale*, sent a dove out into the world, and she did not shut the hatch against it. On the contrary she maintained with religious enthusiasm the conviction that it was every human being's task freely to bring the best possible out of his personality. She could not conceive God as an individual being, but as a universal being, a law. Of the churchly customs she used only what she needed. She was "very sure of God", but very sparing in defining his nature. (*Edwad Cooke*: *Florence Nigthingale*. Danish trans. 1917. I. p. 349—441; II. p. 188). — A following essay in this book will lead us to speak again of this remarkable woman. (See "Features of the History of Prayer").

between the tendency to hold fast to a certain definite kind of images and the tendency to let experience and mood involuntarily call forth the images that can symbolize them. This latter tendency can be connected with consciousness of the limitation of every
[108] image, and the mystic will be able to experience states that do not permit any image to emerge, before after-effect and reflection assert themselves. When Cécile more and more needed a certain definite circle of images, it was perhaps because she had been right when she declared that she was not really a mystic. More correctly it must be said, however, that she did not remain one. More and more she attempts to translate the experience in a personifying manner. The experience continued to be the same, and she does not efface the difference between experience and interpretation. The personifying interpretation did not succeed, either, immediately after an experience. "This morning", she reports, "I tried, from the powerful religious emotions I had experienced, to derive a worship, to translate it into formulated prayer, to centralize it around my love for the person of Christ by attributing to him an intervention in my inner life. It did not succeed much. It seemed to me to weaken and diminish the experience when I wanted to make it one with that which constitutes or constituted my Christian faith." Yet the translation succeeded better and better under the influence of a craving of which she became more and more conscious.

I do not think one understands this process of development in Cécile rightly if one does not notice that at the same time the ecstasies became rarer and rarer and ceased finally altogether, just as also her strong dreams (of which in a single case ecstasy developed) gradually disappeared. Possibly the connection of mysticism and sexuality returns here, since she was now at the age when menstruation, which often seemed to favor ecstasy, ceased. She herself does not think that age has had any influence. She thinks that the ecstasies ceased because they no longer satisfied her. The relation is rather the reverse: since "the divine experience", which according to her own say-
[109] ing gave rise to high ideals and comprehensive horizons, for one or another reason fell away, the standard for religious ideas that it had afforded her no longer made itself felt. — It went, as I have tried to show, in a similar way with Teresa. —

Added to this was that ecstasy — in the period when it was possible — only occurred now and then, and that it could not be called forth by resolution, although a certain involuntary composure and concentration could facilitate its onset. It was a comet, but there was need of a fixed star, which one could always find on one's horizon. A steady faith and trust is perhaps less marvelous, but is at bottom — thinks Cécile now — a better state than the brilliant but fleeting rays of the experiences. And she now sets

her will to fixing her gaze on the Pole Star during life's voyage. Thereby her return to confessional religiosity stands in a sharper opposition to "the divine experience", than she is herself aware of. The transition presupposes resignation. The relation is as when a strongly flaring-up emotion is replaced by a steady disposition. But it takes place in Cécile through a choice, a voluntary act, not through involuntary equalization. In the time of "the divine experience" she had breathed deeply and fully, and she will never again come to do so. But she takes her part and gradually finds calm and peace thereby. The dreadful World War, which, besides intervening in her economic circumstances, brought about concern and anxiety for the friends she had on both sides of the warring parties, contributed also to her needing a fixed abode that was common to her and her surroundings. —

Cécile's mysticism has thus, as she herself says, been only a passing phase in her spiritual life. Perhaps it is so with all mystics. The ecstatic moments have been few, *[110]* although they have been sufficient to stamp the contribution the mystics have made to the development of spiritual life. Concerning the causes of the ecstasies being tied to certain definite years, hardly anything can be said on account of lacking specific information. Cécile has, by her own and Flournoy's opinion, come out strengthened and enriched from the whole process, even if the transition to calmer waters after the inner storms has not occurred without resignation. —

The psychology of religion stands deeply in debt to Flournoy for his publication of this remarkable episode in the life of a gifted woman, as well as for — what was a precondition for this document's coming into being — the trust that his personality and his research have been able to awaken. He has sought to see this episode in its connection with Cécile's whole life and development, and he has attached illuminating remarks to the account.

It seems to me that he acknowledges too much the Freudian theory of the erotic-sexual origin of the ecstasies. As we have seen, and as Flournoy himself emphasizes, the ecstatic experience precisely stands in sharp opposition to the state of being sexually seized. The inner connection between the different forces, which here perhaps draw nourishment from a common root, is more intricate than the Freudians in their naive psychology think. And to this is added that the Freudians have given the sexual expressions (libido e.g.) a meaning so far extended that the whole theory is finally washed out. If Plato too has been a Freudian, then we are at bottom all of us; but then the special character of the theory drops away.

A question of more significance in respect of the psychology of religion is whether

[111] Flournoy is right in regarding the development Cécile goes through as harmonious and progressive. "She comes back", he says, "to her starting point; but as after an ascent in a spiral it is a higher stage to which she now returns". In her return to the Christian ideas he sees a symbolic expression of the victory of love and self-surrender over the spiritual egoism that was called forth by the self-absorption and self-preoccupation that ecstasy brought about. (Il y a eu abandon progressif de l'expérience divine, privilège égoiste et involontaire, pour en venir au don personnel de soi-même à autrui).

I cannot but see that Flournoy brings too much system into Cécile's course of development, in that he above all seeks to demonstrate the conclusion of the development in a higher unity. He commits here the same error as Delacroix and Pacheu in regard to Sainte-Térèse.

The spiral I cannot catch sight of. Cécile herself has undoubtedly found peace of mind, and quite especially harmony with her surroundings, by her return to her starting point. But it is an adaptation, which does not in and of itself denote progress. Yes, if being a teacher of religion for young ladies were an ideal that ought to be held fast at any price, it would certainly be a matter of working oneself out of everything that could hinder full self-surrender to it. Hopefully there are, however, other ways for love of humankind, which make it possible to be something for others without sharing their faith at the price of denial of one's own deepest, most penetrating experiences.

Cécile has undoubtedly also later preserved much of what her mystical period has taught her about the independence of the inner life in relation to all words and all outer forms. But her personal solution of the problem of the opposition between inner expe-
[112] rience and outer activity cannot be said to be the one right one. It would in any case be sad if it were so. She admits herself that she closed the hatch of the Ark, after she had for a moment been so bold as to let the dove out. And she admits that it was stuffy inside the Ark. Has the air been better now that she had settled down inside it? She has surely been able to contribute to an improvement of the air on the basis of her experiences. But would it not have been better to let the hatch stand open and then patiently wait to see whether the dove would come back — perhaps with an olive leaf? A new principle was dawning here, but tradition was stronger than the memory of the experience that had let the principle dawn. Only thereby did it become possible that a wholly different and opposite principle could be followed: that love of humankind is to show itself in adopting people's opinions.

[113]

CONCLUSION

The aim of this essay is to illuminate the relation between experience and interpretation by an investigation of the religious significance of ecstatic states at different times and under different individual and social conditions. This is naturally only a single example of the significance experience can have for the religious ideas, but it is an important example.

The relation between experience and interpretation raises both an epistemological and a psychological problem. For epistemology, when it does not fall back into dogmatism, all science must in the end stand as a great interpretation of experiences, each of which is described as exactly as possible, preferably through number, measure and weight. Also from the epistemological standpoint it is a matter of not confusing experience and interpretation. On interpretation it depends how the single experience enters as a member into the world of our thoughts. Through interpretation the single experience first comes to its full right. But it must again and again be tested whether interpretation exhausts the whole experience, both its quality and its quantity, both its successive unfolding and its typical peculiarity. And therefore it must be tested whether one can from the interpretation derive again the experience with its special character[*)]. Psychologically a more comprehensive concept of interpretation is used. Psychology *[114]* investigates not merely the interpretations that lead to a well-connected structure of thought, hence to science, not merely the clearly conscious and logically formed interpretations, but also, and especially, the involuntary and half-conscious way in which an experience can be brought into connection with the human being's remaining circle of ideas. The differences that here make themselves felt for a comparative view, from totemism through belief in witches to spiritualism, or from medieval mysticism to modern experience of a "divine" kind, are of great cultural-historical interest. When one follows the series of examples, there appears an ever greater difference between experience and interpretation, and an ever greater independence for experience itself, — in analogy with the difference the critical philosophy makes between observation and its scientific interpretation. —

As regards our special example, the ecstatic experiences, they lie at the basis of a significant conflict between the inner life and the traditions, under whose influence this inner life is led. In mysticism personality has for long times had its refuge against a firmly hammered-out dogmatics, which demanded to determine what was to be recognized as religious experience [Erfaring]. It is seen in the Israelite prophets, in the mystics of the Middle Ages and in particularly marked form in the modern mystic whose acquaintance

[*)] *Totalitet som Kategori.* (Vid. Selsk. Skr. 1917). p. 43—45.

we owe to Flournoy. There goes on here a quiet development right up to the time when it was proclaimed (here in the North by E. G. Geiger, Sibbern and Kierkegaard) that in the religious domain nothing has value that does not spring from personal experience, and when even the individual was declared to be nowadays "the only living thing in
[115] religion." It is not least the direct incommunicability of mystical experiences that is of significance here, in that it makes the individual himself and others aware that the most important thing in life takes shape peculiarly in every serious individual, and that everything common is of secondary rank. Many ironists — i.e. representatives of the great irony — approach in their inner life the mystics, insofar as they, like these, notice that there is an incommunicable fullness that unfolds in them. It holds, as I have sought to show, of Socrates. Also the great humor is conditioned for a substantial part by the incommensurability between the inner and the outer[*)]. However one then conceives or explains ecstatic states, — whether one calls them pathological or not, — whether one regards them as pent-up sexuality or ascribes to them a nobler origin, — it is a fact that there have been human beings, and not the least among them, who had in them the most important, the most decisive experiences, and this is, for the psychology of religion, the main point.

For the mystics, as for the totemists, the ecstatic experiences denoted the high points of their life. From these experiences radiates a splendor that determines the order of rank among all other experiences. It lies, as I have sought to show, in the nature of feeling that, when it is aroused by a single experience, it seeks to spread over the whole mental life and to color all other elements in this, whether they stand in connection with that event or not. Inner states that in and of themselves have nothing to do with one another can thereby acquire a common stamp, and a whole can arise out of the series of inner
[116] experiences, whether this be concluded or not[**)]. It is as determining elements in a total feeling that the ecstatic experiences acquire their significance. Even if the time of such experiences should be past, the problem that presented itself to the mystics will always present itself to us. For there will constantly make itself felt a difference, perhaps an opposition, between moments in which we experience what for us acquires the highest value, and the ordinary, everyday experiences, or even the low and animal states, and it then depends on what result the conflict between these different elements leads to, and what judgment about life is consequently passed. It is of great importance that the experiences are allowed to exert their involuntary influence, and that the interpretation is undertaken with full freedom. The history of mysticism has taught us that self-control

[*)] *Den store Humor.* § 16—17; 19; 25.

[**)] See, besides my Psykologi, *Religionsfilosofi* § 27.

and thinking for oneself are not thereby excluded; they will only be involuntarily determined by the element that appears as the most valuable. There will here, especially for marked personalities, be much that does not fit into any concluding concept and also cannot be "catalogued" in any dogmatics, and therefore, as we have a beautiful example of in Cécile, a poetic expression will be the only possible one. All poetry of life has here its origin. Cécile's favorite image of the plank, which is rocked and shone through in the sea glowing with the evening sun, has its great value not merely through its poetry, but also in that it is self-produced, immediately sprung from experience.

[117]

SOCIOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

LES FORMES ELÉMENTAIRES DE LA VIE RELIGIEUSE
Par Émile Durkheim. (Paris. Alcan). 1912.

In this work by the leader of the French sociological school a path has been opened, to a higher degree and with greater clarity than in any earlier work from that school, toward an understanding between sociology and the other parts of philosophy. Through the study of a special form of religious life the author not only casts light upon the religious problem itself, but also shows how one can acknowledge the special sociological standpoint for human life of the mind and yet maintain the legitimacy of other standpoints. Sociology has hitherto often, in Durkheim's own presentations too, laid claim to being the only science of the mind. Partly directly, partly also, and especially, indirectly, this claim is given up in the significant work now before us. True, social life, society and its institutions and traditions, is maintained to be the source of all human life of the mind; but through the closer development of the supporting ideas the critical reader is led, by the author's own hand, beyond the exclusively sociological standpoint. And what is significant is that sociology does not lose but precisely gains thereby. Just
[118] as society proves its force precisely by allowing the individual persons to move with freedom and to develop their peculiarity each for himself, so too the significance of the science of society will rise the more the different disciplines that investigate the life of the mind from different standpoints assert their independence. Comte himself in his last period set ethics up as an independent discipline beside sociology. And in the same way psychology, epistemology and the philosophy of religion will show themselves to mark independent points of departure in relation to sociology, however much they may learn from it. I know well that Durkheim will not acknowledge this fully; but I shall try to show that, besides all that we can positively learn from the work before us, which in its own special field marks a great advance, we learn more fully than before to see how sociology partly in fact makes use of psychological and epistemological presuppositions, and partly in its consequences leads to the acknowledgment of the importance of those other disciplines of the mind. It is from this side that a philosopher naturally comes to regard a work such as the one before us. For a sociological specialist it will certainly have a significance that I am not competent to give expression to. But in my conviction the work has a significance that extends far beyond the purely sociological field. For my own part I have in any case not only learned sociology from it, but have

found enlightenment and confirmation on other points as well. Ideas and standpoints at which I had arrived by a psychological route I have found, through the study of this thorough and masterfully executed work, both correction and confirmation of. By way of a characterization and a critique attached to it I shall try to substantiate this more closely.

[119]

I.

While the historian and the ethnographer study what has taken place at definite times, and what has been or is custom and usage in definite places, the sociologist, according to Durkheim, seeks to get to the bottom of things. He wants to find the forces that are at work in human life today, the realities that lie behind the events of history and the customs of peoples. As regards religion, it is then a matter not merely of describing dogmas and ceremonies, but of finding the real that lies behind them and gives them their proper significance, — the eternal and human in religion. The sociologist proceeds from the view that religion is connected with the reality of life, with a human need that stirs more or less at all times.

Most theories of the nature and foundation of religion stand powerless before the fact that religion, despite all resistance and criticism, constantly maintains itself. It must then correspond to a definite need, a definite force in human nature. If it were, as the animistic theory supposes, merely due to dream-ideas that are taken for reality, or if it were, as the naturistic theory supposes, merely due to a false explanation of nature, its time would long since have passed. But it is not a need to understand, it is a need to live, to attain strength and security in the struggle of life, that lies at the bottom. Durkheim thus declares himself decidedly against the intellectualist conception of religion.

To find the foundation of religion one must first and foremost be clear that the religious consciousness is not itself able to interpret the need and impulse that work in it and drive it forward. It is inclined to seek the cause of what moves within it outside itself. If one wants to become properly clear about this, it is expedient to seek out the *[120]* simplest, most elementary forms of religion. One cannot, to be sure, lay down as a general rule that the more elementary form of religion explains the more developed, any more than one can lay down the opposite rule. But the more elementary forms offer the advantage that the popular and priestly imagination has not yet allowed a luxuriant growth of myths and dogmas to arise. In the religious as in the social respect only the strictly necessary is found. And in particular no individual differences make themselves felt in the religious respect. All consciousnesses move in the same wake. The individual

and the social type coincide. Such an elementary religion Durkheim finds in the religion of central Australia, which in recent years has been so excellently described especially by Spencer and Gillen and by Strehlow. It is the simplest religion known. It has no proper concept of God. What makes it a religion is that it is dominated by the great opposition between the holy and the profane. And this opposition proves here to stand in the closest connection with the whole social organization. Like the religion, the social system too is exceedingly simple. The members of the clan are bound together neither by blood relationship nor by common dwellings; it is worship itself that unites them. They have the same name and emblem (totem) and perform the same ceremonies, hold the same conception of what is holy and what is profane.

It is the opposition between the holy and the profane that has to be explained. Whence comes the feeling of the sublime that man already at this stage has toward certain things? How does the opposition arise between a higher and a lower in and outside
[121] man? How is man led to acknowledge something that is greater, more comprehensive than himself?

Both the worship of souls and the worship of nature presuppose this opposition. And the religious system we here confront, so-called totemism, lies further back than the worship of souls and the worship of nature.

Totem is a name and an emblem that is common to the members of the clan and obliges them to mutual help, to avenge one another, to mourn with one another, and to observe certain ceremonies and certain prohibitions of marriage. Totem may be an animal, a plant or an inanimate object. Man feels himself one with his totem, and through it with his ancestor, from whom it descends, or who perhaps has himself changed into it. Just as little as the Australian distinguishes between the image and the thing, just as little does he distinguish between his totem and himself or his ancestor. And he feels himself thereby solidary with all who have the same totem. Through a peculiar, in part severe and painful process of initiation the young come to share in the clan's worship of the totem and thereby receive participation in the holy. A holy implement (churinga or tjurunga), which he receives at this initiation, connects him with his totem and his ancestor, and there issues from it a strengthening and encouraging force, for which reason the loss of it is a great misfortune.

The difference between the holy and the profane is maintained through worship. Negative worship enjoins, through fasting, wakefulness, pain, solitude, silence, that for initiation into participation in the holy the former man must be laid aside, so that new qualities and forces may be attained. Positive worship brings man under the influ-

ence of new forces that radiate from the holy objects, where they are contained as in a kind of permanent reserve. Through worship not only man himself is strengthened, *[122]* but the totem object itself is nourished thereby. It is a kind of sacrament or communion, whereby man at once comes to share in the force of the holy and by his offering strengthens and increases this force. That man needs such strengthening comes from his dependence on the powers of nature. The life of nature undergoes changes, rises and sinks in force and fertility, and man needs to have his confidence in nature strengthened, while he also believes that through the exact observance of the customs of worship he can himself help nature.

Behind the opposition between the holy and the profane there lies hidden, according to Durkheim, the opposition between society and individual. Totem is from the first a social concept, an expression of man's solidarity with the clan and of the solidarity within the clan. Not fear, but confident adherence, and at the high points enthusiastic adherence, to what can bring salvation and security, a salvation and security that only life in the clan can bring, is the foundation upon which the opposition between the holy and the profane unfolds. The presupposition of the worship of totemism is that there is a fund of force which the individuals can contribute to preserve and to increase. It is then not merely a play of association of ideas and hallucinations that is at work in totemism and in the powers and symbols that attach to it. The source of religion lies manifestly in other regions of mental life than the purely intellectual. Through self-surrender to the holy and the observance of the holy customs man feels himself in relation to something whose reach extends far beyond the existence of individuals and of single generations. Totem is in the simplest religion we know the characteristic symbol of this, and it is the clan's continued existence and welfare that is the real foundation of this symbol. Through worship is periodically strengthened and re-created society itself. *[123]* At the festivals celebrated in common and in the forms handed down from the fathers, particular interests and daily wishes and cares fall away. The individual feels himself gripped by something that is greater than himself. Through the customs of worship, which often have a captivating and exciting character, the mind is set in a motion that ordinary life cannot cause. It feels itself reborn, bathed in the source to which all life is owed.

The clan's continued existence and welfare are in many ways bound up with the course of nature and conditioned by its rhythm, depend on whether the fruit ripens, whether rain comes, whether the hunt succeeds. And through worship man believes that he can exert influence upon this; therefore it is of so great importance that the

holy customs be strictly observed. This faith is an outcome of the strong inner being seized that participation in the common worship causes. The periodic recurrence of the great festivals corresponds to the rhythmic course of nature, something that can be traced right up into the highest religions. In the intervals between the festivals the members of the clan are scattered and struggle, singly or in small bands, for their self-preservation. Only through the totem images do they then hold fast the memories of the great moments of being seized and enthusiasm, and they feel the opposition sharply. In their own inner life the opposition between the holy and the profane makes itself felt, corresponding to the opposition between participation in the common life through worship and the isolated existence in the intervening times. The living need to attain those great moments again and again is the foundation of religion. So too in the higher religions one can see men, among whom there prevails a more or less conscious doubt about the significance of religious ideas and customs, take part again and again in the old worship. The point is that the real justification of religious customs is not to be
[124] sought in the apparent purposes they serve, but in the invisible effect they exert on the mind, the way in which they attune the whole inner state.

When society in those great moments asserts itself as a power in the inner life of individuals, an involuntary idealization of it takes place. The totem symbol signifies something that reaches beyond what exists. Naturally man is not himself conscious what the ultimate ground is for the opposition between the holy and the profane, — what in the end awakens the feelings that overwhelm him. The cause of these feelings he finds outside himself — just as he straightforwardly transfers the qualities of his sense-perceptions to the objects themselves. —

Now religion and religious ideas, already at the most primitive stage, concern not merely human life, but acquire also cosmological significance. The force by which man feels himself seized in his worship, and which strengthens and nourishes him, he involuntarily finds again in the whole of nature. The opposition between the holy and the profane is extended to all natural objects that come within range of sight. It is a kind of contagion that is at work here. All that has any contact whatever with the holy or with the profane becomes itself holy or profane. The primitive man does not know our distinctions between different kinds of objects. Just as he finds no contradiction in conceiving himself and his ancestor as one with the totem object, so he conceives everything whatever as one, by which he is affected in the same way. This extraordinary contagiousness of the religious forces (l'extrême contagiosité des forces religieuses) is due not merely to associations of ideas. The character of holiness rests, after all, first

and foremost on the strong feeling of dependence and of being strengthened that is produced in the mind, and the more strongly this feeling expresses itself, the more will it *[125]* also spread to everything that, especially in moments of being seized, comes into contact with man. Hereby one understands the ease with which the primitive man identifies the most dissimilar things, however much they appear to the senses with different qualities.

Thereby a religion becomes not merely a view of life, but also a world-view, not merely a psychology, but also a metaphysics. —

The religious need is thus one with the social need of self-preservation, which stirs in all and binds them into a whole. It now leads involuntarily to faith in spirits. It is a misunderstanding to think that faith in spirits should lie at the bottom of religion, which has, as we have seen, a quite different foundation. But there is in fact no positive religion without faith in spirits. In the case of the Australians the concept of soul appears at once with the stamp of holiness. Through his totem the individual is connected with the ancestor, is a fragment of the great force that through the worship of the totem animates the entire clan. There is only a certain number of souls in existence, and the souls of newborn children are direct reincarnations of the souls of forefathers, or they are due to germs that forefathers have sown. The soul is nothing other than the incarnation of the totemic principle in a single individual. — Dreams and similar phenomena have given support to faith in souls, but do not contain the real explanation of its origin. Since the clan continues its life constantly in the same way through the new people who are born, it stands as a quite natural idea that the new souls descend from souls that have lived before. Faith in immortality has as yet here no moral significance. Both faith in souls and faith in mighty spirits, who in the past laid the foundation of all good, have *[126]* developed out of totemism. Proper gods the central Australians did not know. There is nevertheless a development in the direction of an ever greater distance between the great ones of the past, of whom myths and legends speak, and the other forefathers. Especially at the festivals common to the whole tribe, not merely to the single clan, the mythical beings acquired a more exalted and universal character. From totemism the development could proceed step by step toward ideas such as we find in higher religions. —

The study of elementary religion, of which central Australia gives so classic an example, is not merely illuminating with regard to the properly religious life itself. It also demonstrates in an instructive way how religion stands from the first as the only form of spiritual culture; in particular it contains the origin of science. And since society is the mother of religion, it is also the mother of science. The authority of scientific thoughts

derives from their being a work of collective experience, of the common labor of society. It is the observation and reflection of countless individuals and generations that lies at the bottom of what individuals can work out in clear concepts. Religion in particular has rendered thought a service by making possible the first idea of what relationships of kinship between things mean. It has taught men to place together what the senses separate. To the world of ideas the way could only be paved by an exertion of intellectual forces which first became possible in and through society, particularly through its worship. The first attempts at classification were made with the division of the tribes into clans as a model; thereby the foundation of all logic was given. The origin of the fundamental concepts, the so-called categories, finds its explanation neither through
[127] apriorism nor through empiricism; it is due neither to original inner dispositions nor to sense-impression from without. It is social states and relations that contain the explanation, just as already with classification. The idea of time is developed thus through the divisions of time that correspond to the rhythm of festivals and ceremonies. The division of space is originally connected with the different religious significances of the different directions and places. The encampment of the clans within the tribe's common meeting place also has furnished a scheme. The principle of causation, specifically the principle that like must be produced by like, is due to the strict demand of the tradition of worship that the ceremonies be performed in a quite definite way; otherwise the desired result could not be attained. Here, then, were norms according to which all had to form their ideas. The necessary demands of collective action were expressed in categorical forms. The authority of reason is of social origin. But society itself is a part of nature and has only the advantage over other regions of nature that the fundamental relations appear more clearly and lie closer to our lives. Therefore ideas that are worked out after the pattern of social things (sur le modéle des choses sociales) have been able to help in conceiving things of an entirely different nature.

As regards the future of religion, two considerations are of importance for Durkheim.

Religion, as it can be studied historically, has hitherto been essentially a social phenomenon. Religion and society belong closely together historically. Through society's effect upon individuals — within them by countless unconscious influences, from without by countless commands, prohibitions, habits and traditions — there arises in and
[128] for them the great opposition between the holy and the profane, between a higher and a lower, between the ideal and the sensuous. And through the great common acts at the festivals there arises the enthusiasm, the high flight, that is a constant source of religious feeling, and without which it cannot in the long run subsist. But nowadays

it has become different. We live in a time of transition. Individualism has spread together with the division of labor. We can no longer celebrate with a whole heart the festivals that inspired our fathers. We go each our own way. When it was characteristic of all religion hitherto, right from its most elementary forms, that it is common to a group which gets its vital force nourished and renewed through common festivals, then it stands as a great riddle how religion can subsist in the future, and how a new religion is to be able to form. If this riddle is to find its solution, we can in any case form no idea of this solution. There is, to be sure, a religious idealism in the form of inner, subjective religiosity, which takes shape differently in the different individuals. But sociology has only established and realized facts to deal with, and it is a question for the future whether religious idealism can come to acquire such a character of fact that it can become the object of objective study. In sociology we must keep to what religion has been in the past.

Besides the relation between the social and the individual the relation between religion and science also is of importance for the prospects of the future. Here it must be taken as settled that religion has long since lost its intellectual significance. Its cosmology can no longer be used. In this respect science is a complete equivalent, — science, which has itself developed out of it. But it is also only in a purely intellectual respect that *[129]* science is an equivalent here. It cannot replace religion in so far as this is a force that keeps man alive spiritually, a ground of courage and confidence. Life cannot wait till science becomes finished. Indeed, it never becomes finished. And life will therefore ever drive thought beyond the limits of science. It will therefore rather be a transformation than an annihilation of religion that the future will bring.

II.

Only an imperfect idea has the foregoing presentation of the contents of the work before us been able to give of the rich instruction that can be reaped from it. It is built upon a very special subject, the religion of the central Australian tribes, and this subject is discussed with thorough expertise and energetic analysis. I have gone back from Durkheim's book to some of the source writings, in particular to Strehlow's reports, and have found full confirmation of the book's conception. By its concise presentation it distinguishes itself from other writings on similar subjects, which weary by their breadth and repetitions. Frazer's famous and excellent "Golden Bough" thus often makes the reader stop from weariness on account of the repetitions and the lack of concentration. Moreover there is in Durkheim an instructive criticism both of particulars and of hasty

generalizations. But all the same the special subject interests him only as a basis for an understanding of the general nature of religion. He believes that in the religion that is the simplest of all we know he finds the essential in all religion. And by digging as deep as he does, — by carrying the analysis through to the end with the energy that distinguishes him generally as investigator and author, he has also, as far as I can see, come
[130] into contact with the central thing in religion. It has in any case been to me of great interest to see how here from a sociological standpoint a conception has been worked out that I in my "Religionsfilosofi" have reached by a psychological route. But in order that a closer understanding here may be possible, there is an account to be settled between sociology and psychology.

From the great opposition between the holy and the profane, in which Durkheim finds the essential in all religion, and with which all religion begins, in that it is fundamental in relation to all worship, all myths and all dogmas, he goes back to society, its continued existence and its welfare. But, as he himself hints, there is still a question to be asked: why is it precisely society that, without man becoming conscious of it, is the source of all that is holy? Durkheim gives the answer himself: It is because society is the source of the greatest values for man, — because it is the great support in the struggle for subsistence, and not least, because it is the origin of all that makes man more than an animal. Durkheim's thought here is analogous to that which lay at the bottom of his statements in the French philosophical society on "Morality as a Fact" (le fait moral).[*)] He there traced all morality back to society and based this on the ground that society is the source, preserver and transmitter of all civilization, especially of the goods of the spiritual life. It then depends on whether society also really fills this place. And here it turns out that there are presuppositions that lie deeper than the continued existence of society. When the holy presupposes the social, the social presupposes in
[131] turn the valuable. Society is, after all, to be the source of values, and only thereby can it lie at the bottom of the quality of holiness. By this route I come from Durkheim's definition of religion back to the one I have tried to carry through in my "Religionsfilosofi", namely that all religion rests on the presupposition of the existence of value. Only so long and in so far as the existence of society stands as a part of or means to the existence of value can it acquire a religious character. — I quite agree with Durkheim in his sharp distinction between the ultimate presupposition for or the ultimate motive of religion and the way in which men conceive the cause of what, as a consequence of this presupposition or this motive, stirs in their minds. The analogy with the qualities

[*)] *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie.* 1906. — Cf. my book *Den menneskelige Tanke* p. 353—357.

of sense is here completely apt. —

But from this it follows again that society's opposition to the individual and the latter's dependence on the former is not an absolute condition for religion. The significance of community and of association cannot be depicted more aptly than Durkheim does it, when he shows how society asserts itself in the innermost inner life of the individual, without its being itself conscious of it. But it does not follow from this that all experience of values and all faith in the existence of value is bound up with society.

The consciousness of society (la conscience collective) is, according to Durkheim, a synthesis, unique of its kind, of single consciousnesses. And the same may be said of society itself: la société est une synthèse des consciences humaines[*)]. But everywhere where in the field of the sciences of the mind there is talk of synthesis, we stand before a peculiar antinomy. Synthesis is a gathering together and presupposes to that extent a manifold of elements that are gathered together, a manifold that is given before the *[132]* gathering together. But in the spiritual field we know the elements only as members of the connection that is due to the synthesis. Psychologically we thus know sensations, ideas, feelings and impulses only as members of the whole life of consciousness: the synthesis itself is the constant presupposition, not merely a result. And in a similar way in sociology: we know individuals only as socially determined and conditioned, as members of a society. There is here, as indeed in all fields, a constant tension between continuity and discontinuity, which we can never get beyond. We have no right to lay exclusive weight on the one or the other of the members of this relation of opposition. The relation between society and individuals is only a special example of the relation between continuity and discontinuity. If society is a synthesis of individuals, these must nevertheless at every point have a certain independence in relation to it. Without such independence the value of the life of society could not be experienced by the single individuals or assert itself in their inner life, which nevertheless according to Durkheim is the presupposition of religion. The historical connection into which the individual lives himself is itself come into being as the result of the cooperation through the ages of manifold individual (though constantly socially conditioned) forces.

Durkheim answers to this that individualism is secondary. Thus, e.g., individual totemism, where a single person has his own peculiar totem, is derived in relation to the social. This holds, however, only when one thinks of a conscious and principled opposition between the individual and the existing society. But the talk is here merely of the individual forces in whose interaction society itself properly consists. These forces

[*)] *Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse.* p. 605; 615.

[133] cannot at any point be excluded from consideration. Every new element in the forms and traditions of society, holy and profane, — every new idea or custom, — must be due to one or more single individuals, after whom it has been taken up by the others. There is a constant tension between the individual and the common. Durkheim finds the study of so elementary a form of religion as the central Australian especially favorably situated, because here individual differences do not make themselves felt. But it is the now existing, fully and completely developed central Australian religion that is described in the sources. How can it have come into being? It must surely have had its history of development like everything else in the world, and here the sporadic, the beginning from several different points of departure may just as well have made itself felt as in organic growth and in the development of species. That one now cannot definitely demonstrate the sporadic and the individual does not justify assuming that it has been lacking before or should be wholly lacking now. We do not know who composed our old folk songs, but there must nevertheless have been single persons who first conceived them, be it in ever so imperfect a form. Later they have been repeated, altered and recomposed in many ways. Individual forces, partly receptive, partly productive, cannot have been lacking at any point, however far back we go. The very "human need" (besoin humain), to which religion owes its origin and its continued existence, stirs scarcely in the same degree and in the same way in all. And when it has led to formation in worship, myth and legend, this must have happened through experiences, combinations, displacements and postponements, thus through a series of psychological processes that must have taken place in the inner life of single individuals. Just as
[134] the gods nourish themselves on men's prayers and sacrifices, so society nourishes itself on the single contributions to the consciousness of society (conscience collective). Such contributions are made, partly receptively, through adherence to and participation in the worship established once for all, partly actively, through new experiences, impulses and wishes, which — through the need, also noted by Durkheim, to communicate and spread one's faith — seek to acquire social significance. Already the origin of individual totemism presupposes something of the kind. And when totemism among some Indian tribes in America appears more fully formed, in part also nearer dissolution, than in the elementary form known from the central Australians, this presupposes a series of changes that must have begun as individual variations, where in turn the cause of these variations would have to be found.

It is not even certain that individual deviations from common faith could not be discovered already at a stage like that of the Australians. Frazer mentions thus skeptics

among the Papuans on the island of Kiwai, who did not share the tribe's faith in "the land of the dead", whither the souls go after death. Likewise he mentions that within one tribe doubts could be cast on the correctness of another tribe's faith[*]. Had we more and closer knowledge of the spiritual life of the more primitive peoples, more examples of individual deviations and initiatives would probably come to light. They cannot ever have wholly been lacking.

What thus must not be denied, even in the case of the most primitive societies, naturally comes more and more to the fore in the course of development, more in the religions that we — precisely for this reason — call the higher than in those we call the *[135]* lower. But then it is also not merely justified, but a necessary task for the science of religion to follow the religious life into the inner life of the single individualities, where it has its real existence. It is an important material for the study of religion that can be obtained from the way in which especially outstanding personalities, consciously or unconsciously, have shaped the religious life, even if they in the end were governed by historically transmitted forms. It is on such documents that I have chiefly relied in my philosophy of religion[*]. I cannot but find it interesting that by this route results have been reached to which Durkheim's investigations also lead in their consequences. Because of the constant reciprocal relation between the individual and the social one could not expect otherwise than that from the two points of departure one would come to kindred results.

According to Durkheim psychology presupposes sociology. Thus the opposition between sensation and understanding, as well as that between egoism and duty, is to find its explanation in the socially conditioned opposition between the holy and the profane. But psychology is not content with this. It asks how then the opposition between the profane and the holy itself arises, and further, how the opposition between the social and the individual arises. And psychology has here an ally in biology. There must be an involuntary, instinctive foundation for this latter opposition. It has been fateful for sociology that its founder Auguste Comte eliminated psychology from the hierarchy of the sciences and distributed the psychological phenomena between biology and sociology. *[136]* When sociology now appears on its own account, outside the systematic connection with other sciences on which Comte laid weight, it easily comes to overlook the psychological conditions that biology already leads one to enjoin. Comte himself was in

[*] *Frazer*: *The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead.* I. London 1913. p. 213; 239.

[*] In my book *Den menneskelige Tanke* I have briefly stated at p. 385—392 my view of the relation between history of religion and philosophy of religion.

reality led, as is seen especially from statements in his letters to Stuart Mill[*)], to his doctrine of man's social nature through the study of Hume and Adam Smith. Here is seen sociology's debt to psychology. It is likewise through psychological analysis of the new documents that now stood at disposal that Durkheim has reached the results he presents in his book. The documents give in and for themselves only external facts. Only by a psychological route can one get back from the intellectualist conception of religion to the "human need" in which Durkheim rightly finds the real foundation of religion. It is, finally, only for a psychological conception that the distinction, so important for the philosophy of religion, between experience (religious experience) and interpretation can be carried through in so consistent a manner as it has been in "Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse".

In several places Durkheim builds directly upon definite psychological laws. Thus he explains the cosmological application of totemism by the fact that "the religious forces, which are due to ideas and feelings awakened by the influence of social life through worship, by virtue of their intensity have a tendency to spread to all that comes to hand or before the eyes of man, while those forces prevail." "Contagiousness" (contagiosité)
[137] Durkheim calls this. It is one with what I in my "Psykologi" have called "the expansion of feeling", which was first described by Hume and Beneke. Durkheim rightly remarks that the explanation of how any connection whatever can suffice to transfer the character of holiness to new objects cannot be sought in the laws of the mutual association of ideas; it is a more deeply lying law to which one must here go back. It is again a psychological law on which Durkheim builds, when he points out a tendency to identify all things that awaken one and the same feeling.

By paying attention to these psychological laws Durkheim casts light upon what Comte called the theological stage of knowledge, and in general upon the nature of primitive knowledge. He also corrects Levy-Bruhl's assumption that primitive men should have a wholly different logic from the civilized, because with them a "law of participation" (loi de participation) took the place of the "law of contradiction". For one understands, e.g., that an Australian can say of himself that he is a kangaroo, in that he identifies what affects him alike: the idea of his totem (the kangaroo) and the idea of his own person. The identification of being and signifying extends through the whole history of religion. It was the point of contention between Luther and Zwingli in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, and it is still a point of contention in the conflict of our own day between dogmatism and symbolism.

[*)] *Lettres d'Auguste Comte à Stuart Mill*, Paris 1877. p. 275.

When the difference between sensation and understanding is also to be traced back to religious-social influence, it must be remarked that this difference does not have the sharp character Durkheim attributes to it. Sensation contains understanding already in germ, in so far as it is the ability to distinguish and to recognize, and there are many gradually different intermediate links between this elementary thinking contained in sensation and what in a narrower sense one calls thinking. Psychology seeks to find *[138]* a continuity here, as in the other fields of mental life. In the discussion of Durkheim's theory in the French philosophical society Delacroix already pointed to this[*]. — In particular Durkheim supposes that the presupposition that like is produced by like, which marks an essential side of the principle of causation, should be due to the enjoining that the holy acts must always be performed in the same way, in order that they may produce the desired effect. But there has otherwise, in life, in the intervals between the ritual gatherings that are supposed to have so decisively determined men's way of thinking, been occasion to have that presupposition practically enjoined. When thus a man, of whom Strehlow[**] tells, threshed the plants he had gathered with a stick, cleaned the seed by sifting it, shook it, roasted it and crushed it on stones and then ate it, — here there is a whole series of actions that aimed at a definite end, and that had to be done in a definite way in order that this end could be attained. There is other practice than the religious, and worship is not the only occasion to learn that one must go quite definite ways to reach definite ends. Life gives manifold occasion to stand before the necessity that first meets man in the form of the fixed relation between means and end.

Durkheim makes a peculiar attempt to derive the basic forms of human thought (the categories) from religious-social influence. Naturally the development of thought goes *[139]* on under the constant influence of the discussion that is possible only in intercourse and communal life. And the forms and rubrics of social life, in particular the division into tribes and clans, have quite naturally furnished rubrics that were involuntarily applied when it was a matter of ordering and classifying observations and experiences. By way of analogy (sur le modèle des choses humaines) the social rubrics were transferred to all things that one came to deal with in experience. As little here as at so many other points is a distinction made from the first between analogy and identity. But this implies nothing other and nothing more than that social phenomena were the first objects to which comparison and division were applied with special interest. And the development that the categories have undergone, after that first analogy ceased to be decisive, is far more significant than that which took place in the period of clan and

[*] *Bulletin de la Sotiété Française de Philosophie.* 1913. p. 79.
[**] *Die Arunda und Loritja-Stämme in Zentral-Australien.* III, 2. Frankfurt 1911. p. 69.

totem ideas. The history of religion can, to be sure, yield an interesting contribution to the history of the categories, but a contribution that cannot in value measure up to that which can be yielded by the history of the sciences. It is through the development of the sciences in interaction with experience that the categories gradually receive their rational formulation, their justification and their limitation.

Even if the derivation of the categories from religious-social influences were historically correct, it would nevertheless not furnish any justification of their validity. Validity and authority by no means coincide. The first examples of the application of a form of thought have no advantage over the later. The decisive thing is the law that prevails in the whole series of examples. Religious thought must naturally present the same basic type as the scientific, since both are human thoughts. That the former to some extent
[140] precedes the latter gives it no special interest beyond the historical interest. There is an analogy between social and physical relations; but in this very analogy the peculiar character of human thought comes to light. For full consciousness of the essence of the categories a long series of examples from the most various fields is needed. Here there is constantly new work to be done.

As to the future of religion, or rather of the religious problem, finally, I see it in a similar way to Durkheim. I am convinced that religion, as we know it through history, is connected with an essential element, a deep need in human nature, and that it therefore cannot disappear without an equivalent, if the energy and concentration of the life of the mind are not to be weakened. The spiritual division of labor, the distinction between science, art, morality and faith, has made religion a problem. The difference between Durkheim and me is especially this, that Durkheim expects the new spiritual form of life from vigorous social associations and the enthusiasm they would be able to arouse, whereas I have the quiet hope that already now in the individual ways of living and views of life there are germs present that will one day be able to develop and take shape as models, represented by mighty personalities, such as the legends portray at the founding of the higher popular religions.

Already 70 years ago a Swedish thinker, Erik Gustaf Geijer, said that the individual was now the only living thing in religion. If that is true, the possibility of a concentrated life of the mind in the future — whether one will call it religion or not — must also rest on the principle of personality. One cannot get around this. But out of it, through the
[141] purgatory which every truth that has significance for personal life must pass through of unrest, doubt and seeking, there will be able to emerge new formations of the highest value. Whoever believes in "the existence of value" must in any case hope for this.

I part from Durkheim's book with the feeling of how much I have learned from it, both where my thoughts approach his, and where I have had to take distance. In my conviction it marks a great step forward, perhaps a turning point in research in the philosophy of religion.

[142]

ON CONSOLATION

I.

To go through what has consoled people at different times would be to write the whole history of religion, for consolation is always an element in religion, though an element that can occupy a very different place in relation to the other elements of the individual religion. And it is precisely this difference between the element of consolation and the other elements of religion that is of great importance for the characterization of a particular, given religion. In general it may be said that the element of consolation has, in the course of the history of religion, become more and more predominant. More and more human life is absorbed in the work on material and spiritual culture, and it is the progress or decline of this work, the limits it meets, or the new possibilities that are discovered for it, that determine the character and direction of human feelings and wills. Only when the mind feels its impotence and must let its hands sink does religion come into force and can then provide the satisfaction or refreshment that was sought in vain in the work itself. With the work itself religion has nothing to do directly; its tasks are set from a quite different region from the one in which religion is at home.

[143] In the classical periods of religion it is otherwise. In them the element of consolation does not come to the fore, but religion is a positive factor in life, itself sets the decisive tasks, in the end the only task that is acknowledged. To the classical periods belong first and foremost the great periods of beginning (as we know them in the higher religions). In original Buddhism and in primitive Christianity religion is the sum and substance of all spiritual culture, gathers everything about a single goal. To the classical periods belong also the great periods of organization, when religion is indeed not the only form of culture, but when it draws all spiritual culture in under itself, in that it stands as the highest measure of value for all human striving.

In the period of beginning, consolation is given in the very adherence to the one thing needful. There is only one need in question, and if it can be satisfied, all is as it should be. In the periods of organization there are several values to be safeguarded, and these will never be wholly conditioned by religion alone. There are many needs besides what one still holds oneself entitled to call the one thing needful. Medieval Christianity (in the 13th century) is the greatest example of such a period of organization. But already science and political life, indeed the external ordering of church life itself, emerged as tendencies that were subject to their own laws and had their own destinies. Modern

Christianity cannot be called any form of organization, although in the Romanticism of the 19th century one tried to conceive it so. It acknowledges, more or less, the cleavage between the different spheres of life. It is then not so easy to find consolation; if one is consoled with regard to what is essential, there is yet so much that was also a matter of the heart, and that continues to stand undecided and unfinished. In a correspondence between two Danish pastors around the year 1900 this emerges clearly; they long for the return of Christ, but if the great event now soon occurs, what becomes then of the *[144]* ecclesiastical and popular development from which a glorious fruit of human life was to issue? (See in what follows the essay "Two Pastors").

What thus appears in the history of religion holds also of human life generally. There is a consolation that is so inseparably bound up with what is life's main interest and main activity that one can really no longer speak of consolation, so long as this interest can be fulfilled and this activity continued. It will then depend on how inwardly all other interests and strivings that stir in individuals can become members or elements of the main striving. The more inward the relation is, the less will the individual partial interests require a special consolation. Consolation then signifies everywhere a rest, a refreshment, that is a condition for continued work. The necessity of consolation signifies the necessity of gathering and discharging force before one goes further. Consolation has then, one may say, an active, not a passive character. What is received is the basis for new self-activity. Consolation here stands only as an end, because it can become a necessary means. It cannot become the last end, only a member in life's great rhythm. Even the most energetic activity of life cannot run its course along one single straight line, but will be like a curve now rising, now sinking.

By a strange contradiction, passive consolation nevertheless stands, even in very energetic views of life and ways of living, as the highest, the definitive, the goal toward which one looks. In the Beatitudes in the Gospels this tendency prevails, more pronounced in Luke than in Matthew. "The Kingdom of Heaven" brings eternal consolation after the sufferings of the present time. In the popular religiosity, where the expecta- *[145]* tion of the great breakthrough does not determine the whole of life, and where the Last Judgment, which brings the decision, has been forgotten, "eternal rest" has become the current expression for the life beyond. There the thought of most people stops. Even for Kierkegaard, that man of struggle, it stood as the highest that the whole struggle had vanished at a stroke. And in more genial forms of belief in a hereafter people picture the other life as a continuation of the present life's holidays and meetings of friends. Some of the greatest spirits of modern times have spoken out against this kind of consolation.

Already Leibniz said that if blessedness did not consist in progress, the blessed would become dull and torpid. (Nisi beatitudo in progressu consisteret, stuperent beati). Kant's and Goethe's belief in immortality went in the same direction. On such a conception consolation can never become definitive. For where activity continues, new resistance is continually possible (to be active is indeed precisely to overcome resistance), and new destinies present themselves according to the relation between force and resistance. If what matters is absolute consolation and rest, then Buddhism, with its Nirvana and its striving for liberation from the world of deeds (Karma), is the most consistent.

But if it is so that true consolation is obtained only when activity can be discharged, so that only he who can be self-active can be consoled, then there lies here the possibility of a tragic disproportion. For then there is no true consolation for those for whom work is an impossibility. The infirm, in whom the memory of the time of activity has not wholly vanished, can then be receptive only to purely passive consolation. Or he must in any case content himself with a more elementary and meager activity, lead his life on a limited stage, perhaps in glaring contrast to the great arena of his earlier life.
[146] Such pain and disharmony often arise when life is checked without yet being wholly dissolved. Pain is indeed everywhere a sign that there is still vital force present, though not enough for normal functioning. In the face of complete infirmity the individual does not need consolation, since he no longer has the strength for sorrow and want; there it is the others who need consolation, especially because they can bring no help.

Even those who hold that consolation keeps, and ought to keep, the last word can yet insist that one is not to be consoled in every case, and that consolation may contain danger. The author of De imitatione Christi (On the Imitation of Christ) distinguishes between external consolation, which e.g. is obtained through conversation with friends, through travel or through music, and internal consolation, which consists in thinking about heavenly things (speculari coelestia) and in inward jubilation (jubilare interius). In his opinion one reaches far too quickly for external consolation. "When a man begins to grow dull, he fears a little exertion and gladly reaches for an external consolation." Internal consolation thus presupposes work. But the old mystic goes one step further. "It is", he says, "very great to be able to do without both human and divine consolation and for the sake of God's honor willingly to put up with spiritual exile (exilium cordis)." This is surely to be understood in the sense that the "exile" afterwards proves to be "to the honor of God", not in the sense that he who does without all consolation should at the same time be clear that it is "to the honor of God"; for in that case he does not do without all consolation, is not placed in full "exile". And even where man is not in

exile but feels the divine love, this feeling must not be made a mere means to his own consolation. One is to love Jesus for his own sake, not for the sake of one's own consolation. The mystic here indicates the possibility of a displacement in a sentimental *[147]* and egoistic direction, which can be precisely favored when the need for passive consolation gains power, and which is characteristic of many forms of modern religiosity. Often one expressly acknowledges that one accepts religious assumptions only because one cannot do without the consolation they contain. The thought of the Middle Ages is here more grand. The Divine puts its demands without regard to the individual's private well-being and sympathy. Thomas Aquinas could thus very well imagine that a single human being might become blessed while all others were damned, and that his blessedness would not be darkened by their fate. For blessedness consists in "having the fullness of one's perfection in God", — and in face of this fullness every thought of finite beings is impossible[*)].

Ethically considered, the task will be to hold fast to the active type as the ideal, and to see to it that passive consolation is not needed. The will is to be trained, as I have expressed it in my Etik (X, 3), to stand on its own feet.

II.

The boy in "Flugten til Amerika" had had a series of sorrows, but he "drowned his sorrow and found his consolation at the bottom of the sago soup", and Jeppe thought himself, in face of his great misery, entitled to "use the means nature gives us to drive away sorrow". But when consolation is not to have this passive character, but is to consist in the discharge of new activity, then it presupposes a spiritual growth. There must be possibility of a new release of force, now a more voluntary, now a more involuntary one. Perhaps with full consciousness a work may be chosen that has in itself nothing to *[148]* do with the sorrow and its object. Consolation then becomes, as with the boy and with Jeppe, consolation on the side. The sorrow is diverted by a concentration of energy in an entirely different direction, and the expansion of sorrow in the mind is checked or hindered. It may be travel or the tasks and duties of daily life that claim interest and energy. Or consolation is found in art, science or religion. The experience is sought to be displaced by new experiences of an outer or inner kind. One goes around the wounded spot. But it is also possible that consolation is won by directing reflection precisely at the loss and the sorrow themselves. Then one makes the value of what is lost vivid to

[*)] See my *Religionsfilosofi*. Note 105.

oneself, far from wishing to diminish it by self-surrender to other values[*]. Sorrow is deepened and pervades the whole mind, comes to run its line out to the end. It is not that one wants to enjoy sorrow (what Petrarch called dolendi voluptas, and Amiel called douceur mélancolique), nor does one find an honor in being especially unhappy beyond others[**]. Comparison with others need play no part at all, whether to give one's own sorrow a glorifying background, or to impress that others have had greater sorrows, or to see sorrow as a common fate. What prevails is a need to immerse oneself in what has happened. Only thereby can perhaps the petrifaction that is the first effect of loss
[149] be dissolved. Full discharge for the state is sought, a way is opened for the diffusion, the being seized of the whole organism, that may be necessary. In the Edda poem "The First Song of Gudrun" it is described in a moving manner how noble women, "the noble wives of earls", sat by Gudrun and sought to console her with telling of their sorrows. "Each of them told her own sorrow, — the bitterest she had borne… Yet Gudrun could not weep, so weary was she in spirit over the dead husband, so full of pain at Sigurd's funeral procession." "Gudrun sat over the dead Sigurd. She wept not like other women, but she was near to bursting with grief." But then "Gjuki's daughter" reproaches the other women that they did not know how "to console the young wife"; she uncovers Sigurd's corpse and lays Gudrun's head against his cheek. And then Gudrun wept.

Not only in the face of a loss, but also in the face of what one never possessed but inwardly wished to win, the diffusion can be a need. This is what Goethe depicts as "Trost in Tränen" and "Wonne der Wehmuth".

If both the value of what is lost and the reality of the loss itself have been fully lived through, some natures may feel a need to think the two together and at the same time to think them into life's great whole. What one has wished for and striven for, what one has suffered of loss or disappointment, is then seen as belonging as natural, perhaps necessary, members of the great whole of existence. The total image, the "synthetic intuition", that thereby becomes possible can take hold of the mind and fill it with the satisfaction that spiritual activity brings where it succeeds. Spinoza and Goethe went, each in his own way, this road. Life is here converted into an understanding that will let both the value and its loss come into their own by making them elements in a whole.
[150] Spinoza emphasizes especially the joy that understanding itself gives, and this joy of knowledge stands with him as the equivalent for the sorrow that fades away through

[*] *Seneca* exhorts Marcia, whom he wishes to console over the death of her son, to lend an ear to the renown and remembrance of her son. (Apertos aures præbe ad nomen memoriamque filii tui. *Consolatio ad Marciam.* V, 3. (Dialogi ed. Gertz p. 170).

[**] *Seneca* warns Marcia against the reprehensible honor of wishing to stand as the most unhappy of all. (perversissima gloria, infelicissima videri). *Consolatio ad Marciam.* V,4. (ed. Gertz p. 170).

consolation. Such an intellectual or aesthetic consolation, as Spinoza has depicted it with genius and quiet enthusiasm[*)], and as Goethe[**)] has given expression to it in his great art, will nevertheless, although it does not go around sorrow, be consolation on the side. The world of reflection and of fantasy is after all not the whole world of the mind. And even if through ever such profound mental fusions and organizations a total feeling forms itself as the result of life, to which both the great sorrows and the great joys have contributed, there is yet no certainty that this whole cannot be burst asunder again, when fate knocks at the gate, without this knocking (as with Beethoven) being the introduction to a symphony[***)]. A definitive consolation can never be established, no more by the religious than by the philosophical road.

The fact is that the individual who is consoled is always a part of a greater whole, whose laws do not coincide with the laws under which his existence is conducted. Of every kind of consolation, — the passive and the active, the voluntarily chosen and the involuntarily grown, the melancholy or the despairing, the intellectually superior (through synthetic intuition) or the emotionally superior (through total feeling), — it holds that it has an individual character. That something affords consolation is a purely subjective phenomenon, a psychological fact, that says nothing about the objective connection of existence. Because the individual has come to rest, or sees a way open before *[151]* him, it is not said that existence has come to rest, or that a new way has really been opened.

But it is nevertheless a fact that in this particular place in existence, in the inner life of this individual human being, harmony has been reached, or the possibility of a new unfolding. And if full and honest use has been made of the force at one's disposal, then there has been achieved in this place what can be achieved, and what has been achieved has then also its objective significance. A flower has burst into bloom, whatever its fate may afterwards be. The world has then been so constituted that this flower could unfold in this place and at this time. —

What, the world being what it is, can console human beings can be learned only from experience. It is not abstract theory but the life-experiences of working and suffering human beings that is in question. And here is a large and little cultivated field for comparative investigation. A poet can contribute in this direction more readily than a philosopher, and in any case the philosopher needs a large and comprehensive material

[*)] Cf. *Spinoza's Ethica.* Analyse og Karakteristik. (Videnskabernes Selskabs Skrifter 1918). p. 73—77; 87—89.

[**)] Cf. my *Mindre Arbejder.* Third Series. p. 162—164; 166—169.

[***)] *Den store Humor.* p. 104,

from his own and others' experience in order to be able to see clearly here. The last task of science is not that of finding an objective theory that fits all the subjects at hand, but that of showing how different human beings, — different wanderers on life's labyrinthine ways, — must come to different conceptions of life[*]. And here belong also the differences in what has been able to console human beings. —

Illusions too can console. And when we see others console themselves with what would not console us, we are inclined to think that their consolation rests on illusion.
[152] But here it holds that if the illusion is the fruit of honest work, which under the given conditions could not lead to any other result, others have no right to intervene, unless they command abilities and means to lead the illusorily consoled person to an objectively more important result[*].

On the question whether illusions can console, Benedetto Croce rightly distinguishes between two cases. If the illusion is not recognized as illusion and yet affords full satisfaction, there must be grounds it rests on, and it constitutes then the part of the real truth that could be known under the given conditions. Illusion it can be called only from the standpoint of a more complete truth. It is otherwise when the illusion is recognized as illusion by the person himself. It must then awaken an anxiety and an eagerness that drives him to seek after the truth, and if it is nevertheless held fast as consoling, it must call forth unrest and a bad conscience, until a serious striving after truth arises. Moreover Croce denies that truth in the end could be sad. The full truth must surely comprise both the joyful and the sad and thus stand above both parts[**]. — To this last remark it must however be said that it will depend on whether a conception of the whole can be formed that assigns both joy and sorrow their definite place in existence. We come then in any case back to Spinoza's and Goethe's conception. And as before we must add that it also depends on whether, in the face of life's conflicting experiences, a total feeling can form itself that lets them all come into their own. Reality is never present fully concluded, and Croce's conception is therefore justified only against a dogmatic pessimism.

[153] H. C. Ørsted in his day (in "Aanden i Naturen")[*] objected to the proposition that our wishes are to be able to determine what is truth, and demanded that one should give the honor to truth: "the full truth always brings its consolation with it". In this remark

[*] *Den menneskelige Tanke.* p. 304.

[*] *Etik*[4]. p. 149 and 197.

[**] B. *Croce*: *Logica*[2]. Bari 1900. p. 346—347. — The whole chapter on "Consolatio philosophiea" is very interesting.

[*] I have previously discussed Ørsted's remark in my *Religionsfilosofi* § 115 and in *Danske Filosofer* p. 56.

the great investigator's love of truth and his optimism appear at one and the same time. But he did not see that the remark can be understood in two ways. If the weight is laid on its being the full truth that consoles, then the question may arise whether we ever reach it. In any case we must, until we have it, console ourselves with hope. Instead of having something to console ourselves with, we must then console ourselves with the thought that continued striving can bring consolation. That is the old meaning of the word Trøst, — confidence, faith, reliability, — that here appears again in contrast to the newer meaning of the word, which probably predominantly leads to the idea of something passive, of a receiving, a solace. — If, on the other hand, the weight is laid, not on the word "full", but on the word "its", the meaning is that truth consoles merely by being truth, and this can again be understood either to mean that the consolation lies in the inevitability that is revealed to us, or that it is won through the spiritual work required to find the truth, that is, in the form of joy of knowledge. Inevitability leads us back to the consolation of melancholy or despair; joy of knowledge leads us back to Spinoza and Goethe. Ørsted has hardly thought of any definite one of these different interpretations. He has most likely thought of truth as the disclosure of a reality in which everything shows itself in harmony, however often disconsolateness may seem to have the last word.

[154]

III.

Toward the end of classical antiquity (3rd cent. B.C.) a peculiar literature of consolation developed, which continued through the Roman imperial age and found its conclusion in a work by a man who has been called "the last Roman", Boethius (d. 575 A.D.), a high official under the Ostrogoth Theodoric the Great. Through Boethius' work on the consolation that philosophy can bring (De consolatione philosophiæ), a work that was much read and commented on in the Middle Ages, the influence of this literature extends into modern times.

The first renowned of these writers of consolation is the Platonist Crantor (at the end of the third century B.C.). His work "on Sorrow" has unfortunately been lost, but its content can be traced in later writers on the same subject, Cicero, Seneca and Plutarch. Cicero calls it "the golden book". Even in the consolatory addresses of modern preachers one thinks one can find again the same thoughts, though naturally without the source being known. What consolation is sought for is old age, exile, loss of those nearest, poverty. The philosophers, who in this field were soon outdone by the rhetoricians, set reflection in motion in order to show that what had happened was not sheer misfortune,

perhaps not misfortune at all. Many of these reasons strike us as prosaically sensible; but at a given time and place they may have had their effect, and often, no doubt, the will to console has made a greater impression than the reasons that were brought into the field*). In his Tusculans (III, 31) Cicero says that in a great sorrow of his own (the death of his daughter) he had collected all the different grounds of consolation he knew, since he sought at any price a remedy for the turbulence of the mind (tumor animi). He
[155] enumerates: reassurance or diversion from the sorrow, demonstration of its imaginary character, reference to the fact that one has done one's duty. And these different means must each be applied at the right time and place.

Already the fact that one came to think about other sides of what had happened, instead of circling around the misfortune itself, could serve for diversion and prevent the mind from staring at the irreparable. In his work on old age Cicero says that the very composition of this work of consolation (by which he wished to console his friend Atticus and himself) has been such a pleasure to him that it has swept aside for him the burdens of old age and made his old days gentle and agreeable. A characteristic expression of the fact that thinking about sorrow can divert it! It is a consolation that is naturally only possible so long as one still has strength for reflection. But, says Cicero then, infirmity and weakness can also befall young people, so that this side of the matter does not belong especially in a work on old age. For the rest he points out that old age is the last act of a play which nature, who is truly no botcher, has planned and carried through according to a definite law. "It could not, after all, have been otherwise than that something had to be the last, and just as it goes with the berries of trees, when they have reached their ripeness in due time, so the last section of life too had to become wizened, if I may say so, and ready to fall; this the sensible man must then put up with in meekness. Otherwise he makes war on the gods after the manner of the giants; for what else does this mean than precisely this: to fight against nature itself*)." This
[156] utterance may be said to be typical of ancient consolation. It rests on a naturalistic optimism, into which, however, for more emotional natures, now bitterness, now mild and melancholy resignation enters as incorporated elements*).

With the Stoics of the imperial age the grounds of consolation take on a more vigorous character. Appeal is made at one and the same time to the will as the one essential thing and to the great cosmic connection within which man with all his joys and sor-

*)Cf. Constant Martha: Les Consolations dans l'Antiquité. (Etudes Morales sur l'Antiquité 1863. p. 135—189.)

*)*Cicero*: *Cato den Ældre. Om Alderdommen.* Gertz' translation p. 19.

*)See my characterization of Marcus Aurelius in *Mindre Arbejder*. III. p. 115.

rows is only a vanishing point. Seneca first represents to Marcia, whom he wishes to console for her young son's death, that it accords best with her noble and fine character herself to overcome her sorrow and not to wait for the day when sorrow against her will leaves her. Sorrow, he adds, becomes so violent only because in our carelessness we do not expect misfortune, however often it passes us by to strike others. Precisely that which has the greatest value will as a rule be most exposed to destruction. — These considerations lead Seneca to develop how vanishing human fate is in relation to the great universe, within which instability and change prevail. How can anyone — he says in a similar context in another work (Ad Polybium) — dare to believe that he and those nearest him should be able to be exceptions within the great order of nature, to which everything is subject?[**)]

Epictetus stresses more strongly than Seneca that man's essence is contained in the inner life, in the will. The god would gladly have given man more than the will, but has not been able to, any more than he can rob him of this! But then the glory that man has in his inner life is all the greater. You regard it as a misfortune that you have not seen *[157]* Phidias' Zeus at Olympia — but in your own will there is something worth beholding, and which requires no long journey. And in there dwells the god and your genius, so that you will never be alone, even if you close the doors of your soul! One is then to be concerned only with the will, with having mastery over one's ideas. Everything else is not in your power. You are to love human beings, but remember that they are mortal. The misfortunes of other human beings, even of those nearest you, do not depend on your will. Sigh, when such misfortune comes, but take care that you do not sigh in your innermost being! You are a part of nature and must bow to its course. In all sorrow and lamentation there is expressed really a dogmatic assertion about what is good and evil. It must be combated, for at the world's great spectacle there is no use for a discontented spectator. If you are not satisfied, then go your way. Say that you are not playing any more![*)]

In Boethius Stoic and Neoplatonic thoughts meet in his remarkable work on "The Consolation of Philosophy", of which an excellent historian of literature[**)] has said that it reflects the radiance of antiquity's setting sun as a symbol of its rising in the future. The book was written in the prison into which King Theodoric had cast him, and which he left only to suffer death. There has been dispute whether he was a Christian or a pagan. From the content of the book nothing can be concluded as to his Christianity; it

[**)] *Seneca*: *Ad Marciam.* (Dialogi ed. Gertz p. 173—201); *Ad Polybium* p. 324.
[*)] *Epiktetus.* ed. Schmidt passim.
[**)] *Fridrich Leo* in Kultur der Gegenwart. I,8. p. 395.

gives a purely human view in the track of Stoicism and Neoplatonism. Since he is said to be the author of theological writings, whose spuriousness there does not seem to be ground to assume, it is now generally held that he was a Christian, "brought up in an enlightened and culture-eager Christianity, which at that time among the aristocracy
[158] formed the foundation of the world-view"[*)]. In any case in distress and mortal danger he was able to console himself without taking refuge in Christianity. Philosophy visits him in his prison and drives away the Muses, who are only able to nourish sorrow, not to heal it. The true consolation, she teaches him, consists in the knowledge of the universe, which — as Plato has shown in "Timaios" — is permeated by the spirit of the Divinity. Because misfortune comes upon us, the order of the world has not changed; rising and setting alternate now as before for all finite beings. But mortals seek happiness outside, not in their own inner life, where the highest good, which is one with God himself, has its dwelling. No dispensation of fate can rob this inner possession, and he who possesses it needs no external tribunal. We live in a world of division and imperfection; our earth is only as a point in relation to the whole universe, our lifetime only as a moment in relation to infinite time. But even in this imperfect existence man can preserve his unity with the Divine[**)].

IV.

It was reflection on life and the world that the ancient thinkers took refuge in when consolation was to be sought. They demanded a subordination of the life of feeling to the life of thought, whose harmony and strength were to be preserved through the course of fate. When in Boethius Philosophy drives the Muses away from the old man's bed in prison, a certain contrast between ancient thinking and ancient poetry is thereby indicated. In Greek tragedies mood and passion are often allowed to win full expression.
[159] Think of Cassandra's passionate lament, Antigone's wail at having to leave life and Medea's despairing outbursts. Here is expressed only the consolation that can lie in full self-surrender to sorrow. But there are also examples of mild solace in sensing the nearness of the Divinity. In the midst of his mortal agony Hippolytus hears the voice of Artemis, his goddess, and already that eases his pain:

> O fragrance of divinity that reaches me!
> I sense you, even in my suffering,
> and I feel relief![*)]

[*)] *Eduard Norden*: Kultur der Gegenwart. I,8. p. 412.
[**)] *Boëthii*: *De Consolatione Philosophiæ*. ed. Obbarius. Jena 1843. (Især II, 3—7; III, 8—10).
[*)] *Euripides*' *Hippolytos*. v. 1391 f. (Gertz' translation).

What poetry has put forward in these examples has surely often stirred in life. But the spokesmen of the age harbored distrust of the feelings, because they set the imagination in motion and tear man out of the inner freedom, man's firm stronghold, and make him dependent on things by tying the mind to them. Therefore warning is given against "sighing in one's innermost being", and generally against letting feeling have its full course, whether this led only to getting air, or brought positive relief. Such scruples Christianity did not have. It has saved the poetry of life by taking up life's most opposed moods, the highest jubilation and the deepest sorrow, into its worship and giving them expression in great images that represent the great drama of the race. The individual is led here under a great and comprehensive view of life and feels his lot as determined by the course of this drama. In the great expectation of fulfillment and judgment there was possibility of a rich and deep life of feeling, which could raise the mind high above all outer and inner vicissitudes[**)].

Deepening of the life of feeling through exalted images and thereby the foundation *[160]* of a great poetry of life is from a general human standpoint Christianity's contribution to the history of consolation. Yet it was not the proclamation with which Christianity itself came forward — as indeed no great spiritual movement has ever brought precisely the fruit it itself meant to bring. Christianity wanted to bring the highest truth, to put the demand for truth in a new and strict sense, and the fulfillment of this demand was set as an unalterable condition for consolation to be able to come.

The truth around which primitive Christianity gathers everything is that the breakthrough of the Kingdom of God is near, and that what matters is to be prepared to receive it. Consolation is granted only to those who with a full heart enter into the great expectation, let their life be inspired by it and esteem all else as small. Therefore the founder of Christianity could say that he had not come to bring peace on earth, but to kindle fire and awaken strife.

It could not be otherwise than that Christianity, in its interaction with the development of culture which primitive Christianity had neither expected nor foreseen, had to undergo changes and displacements. And the element of consolation has then decidedly pushed itself forward before the element of truth. And often consolation, the consolation Christianity proclaimed, came to stand far out on the horizon as a last refuge, while the immediate joy and security in life prevailed in the foreground. And people perhaps even found the truth that was revealed in Christianity to consist precisely in the consolation it brought. Had it been possible to show that the truth Christianity proclaimed

[**)] See my comparison between Stoicism and Christianity in the essay *Hedenske Sandhedssøgere* (Mindre Arbejder I) and *Epiktet og Kristendommen* (Mindre Arbejder III).

as the highest could embrace, or at any rate agree with, what human inquiry can recog-
[161] nize as truth, such displacement would not have been necessary. But it may be said to be basically admitted on all sides that the significance of religion, especially of Christianity, can no longer consist in satisfying the intellectual demands of the human spirit. Involuntarily one then, when one wishes to come to terms with Christianity, holds to other sides of it and puts them in the front rank. On this I have spoken at length in my Religionsfilosofi and therefore do not go further into it here. I have said in the book mentioned (§111) that it is a sign of religion's changed position in the life of the spirit that it more and more takes on the significance of consolation: "Religion was once the pillar of fire that went before the human race on its great march through history and showed it the way. Now it is becoming more and more the ambulance that follows after the march and picks up the weary and wounded." — I have been told that these words have been quoted from a Copenhagen pulpit and regarded as a vilification of Christianity. Whoever will read the words in the context in which they occur will see that this is a misunderstanding. It is a historical remark which one may try to contest, but which one will probably be obliged to let stand. — If truth is to be the first and decisive thing in Christianity, it can be maintained only from a standpoint like that which Pascal and Kierkegaard took[*)].

What for a time halted Kierkegaard and kept him from asserting his sharp and strict
[162] conception was precisely regard for the many who, undisturbed by intellectual and other scruples, had found their consolation in Christian ideas and images, — "the weak, simple, sick and sorrowful", "the many happy, lovable existences", whom he did not wish to terrify. But the halt could, for the prophet of intellectual and ethical honesty, only be provisional.

Meanwhile there lies a real problem in the consideration that caused the provisional halt. The right consolation requires, as we have seen, a spiritual activity, puts a demand to him who is to be consoled. In face of such a demand people will — as in face of ethical demands[*)] — meet with highly different presuppositions, and what is to be able to console them must therefore be of highly different kind and degree. What matters is to release the minimum of self-activity that must be possible as long as life lasts. Therefore it is an art to be able to console; it requires knowledge of human nature and freedom

[*)] For *Kierkegaard's* part reference may be made especially to his *Papirer* (ed. by Kuhr and Heiberg) VIII,1. p. 209. "Christ is not love, and least of all in the human sense; he was *the truth*, *the truth*, absolutely, therefore he could not merely defend, but he had to let men become guilty of his death, i.e. make *the truth* manifest to the utmost." The thought here expressed he has developed more fully in *Tvende ethiske-religiøse Smaa-Afhandlinger.* (Samlede Værker VI)

[*)] On this see my *Etik* IV,2; VIII,6 where it is shown that one cannot, fundamentally, put the same ethical demand to all either in kind or in degree.

from prejudice. The true consoler is he who is able to loose the living force and discharge it in a way and in a direction that accords with the individuality of the individual. Here no one is excluded from consolation, provided only that the right consoler (whether it be the individual himself or another) comes. Whether he always comes, or can come, psychology can say nothing. When it is asserted that consolation is always possible, this is perhaps well-meant rhetoric, but it is not thinking.

[163]

FEATURES OF THE HISTORY OF PRAYER

It is of great psychological interest when, with regard to a significant manifestation of mental life, a certain course of development can be demonstrated, at any rate within particular periods of culture, — a series of metamorphoses or displacements in a certain direction, so that in interaction with the different historical presuppositions there emerge types of more or less pronounced peculiarities. Not as if the final form of such a course of development were to signify a result attained once for all. There may always be a possibility of new beginnings, also of a repetition of types that seemed to belong to an earlier, supposedly surmounted stage. Different processes of development may also go on at the same time, different series of types may form, whose significance and whose mutual relation only a much later age will be able to make clear. A psychological and historical consideration must always keep an eye open for such possibilities. For the individual human being in the practice of life, on the other hand, the task is first and foremost to find the type to which he himself belongs according to his peculiarity and his experience of life. It is the greatness of the principle of personality founded by Socrates that it makes the same demand at all stages and under all forms of human development. Everywhere it is a matter of knowing oneself, one's ability and one's need
[164] in relation to the conditions of one's own life and one's own time. Such self-knowledge is the most important presupposition for honest and healthy development, hence for the emergence of new valuable types, and it also marks the point at which people of widely differing spiritual orientation understand one another best.

As an example, some features of the history of prayer within different periods of culture shall be given here. I arrange the examples I have at my disposal under three main forms. The arrangement follows a standard that presents itself naturally the more reflection is directed to this mental phenomenon's connection with personal life and its relation to it in general. But this does not mean, as already indicated, that such a mode of development is run through once for all in the history of the human life of the spirit.

A. Prayer and Incantation. Social and Individual Prayer.

a. There is a stage within otherwise widely different cultures at which prayer, like sacrifice, is ascribed a double effect, an effect on the god to whom prayer is made, and an effect on the praying human being himself. The god is strengthened and nourished by prayer, and his self-feeling is addressed by one's expressing one's dependence, one's fear, one's hope or one's admiration before him. Prayer can itself be regarded as a sacrifice,

in that man gives up his own power and pride. But man himself receives redress for what he sacrifices, in that prayer gives him power over the god[*]. Faith in the efficacy *[165]* of a solemn prayer rests on the presupposition that by the power of the word one can enchant the god, compel his will — if one only names him by his right name[*].

In two famous poetic works the incantatory power of prayer forms a decisive motif. In Aeschylus' "Eumenides" Apollo tells the goddesses of vengeance that he will deliver Orestes from their pursuit, because he has called upon the god in trust of his protection: "For dreadful is, to god and man, the wrath of him who prays." (Brøndsted's translation, p. 129). In the Indian drama "Sakuntala" the heroine's misfortune is brought about by her, captivated by the happiness of her love, not hearing a pious sage's message, and he then pronounces his curse upon her, a curse that he himself cannot lift without incantation. (Hammerich's translation, p. 44).

On more primitive levels, too, prayer and sorcery pass into one another without any clear distinction being possible. The belief in the power of the word is so great that the mere telling of an event can be regarded as a sufficient cause to bring about the event itself. Frazer supposes that many ancient tales which we are accustomed to regard as mere myths have been used in magical rites, it being thought that when they were recited in a definite, traditional manner, they brought about what they were about. A distinction can then be drawn between narrative spells (narrative spells) and imperative spells (imperative spells)[**].

The power of prayer can be dangerous. Among the Ainu of Japan the women must not pray — lest they gain power over the men! And for the same reason the Santals avoid revealing the names of their household gods to the women.

The power that in prayer and incantation is placed in the hand of man can give rise *[166]* to two different consequences. Through the omnipotence of prayer it can make man himself a god. Thus the Indian word Brahma denotes both the force by which the gods live and work, and the force by which man through prayer wrests from the gods the fulfilment of his wish. An identification of the two lay near at hand, and can be traced in the peculiar development that in ancient India led to monotheism[*]. But another consequence can also be drawn, by maintaining that only lower beings are subject to the magical power of the word, not the true gods. In various religions this leads to the

[*]Examples from Indian, Persian, Egyptian, Greek and Roman religion in *Westermarck*: *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas.* II. p. 653—659. *Westermarck* would even (relying especially on certain Moroccan customs) interpret the word religion as derived from religare, to bind: the god is bound by the prayers, wishes or curses of human beings (I. p. 584).

[*]*Usener*: *Gøtternamen.* p. 335.

[**]*Frazer*: *The Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild.* I. p. 105—106.

[*]Cf. Religionsfilosofi[2]. p. 151.

application of the distinction between gods and demons, which originally[**)] is due to the victory of a new religion over an older one.

b. Prayer and incantation, and the magical power that can be exercised through them, must of course always be acts performed by definite human beings. But are they performed by these human beings on their own account, as the expression of an individual ability, or is it a social work that is performed through them? It is the relation between magic and religion that we are facing here. Frazer has set up the theory that magic precedes religion. Before man recognizes his dependence, realizes that he is not capable of everything, does not have complete power over nature, there passes, according to Frazer, a period in which a single individual believes himself able by his formulas and actions to intervene in the course of nature. But gradually man learns that the hope of directing nature by magical means must be given up, and he regards the gods as the
[167] sole possessors and holders of the power that he himself believed he possessed. Only now does the difference between gods and human beings emerge decisively, and man no longer feels himself the equal of the gods. Prayer and sacrifice now become parts of a common ritual, and it is regarded as outrage and sacrilege when the individual on his own account and by his own way sets these forces in motion. Magic is therefore, according to Frazer[*)], older than religion, if by religion one understands a worship, sprung from dependence, of beings more powerful than human beings. As religion develops, magic becomes "the black art".

This theory gives a simple psychological explanation of the origin of religion through the experience of the limitation of human power and a feeling of dependence conditioned by it. I have therefore earlier laid weight on it. But historical development does not always proceed according to simple psychological formulas. And one must grant the French sociological school that, however far back we go, we always find religion socially organized. The individual frees himself only gradually from full domination by social custom and tradition. According to Durkheim and his disciples, religion therefore precedes magic, just as the social always precedes the individual. Special weight is laid here on the fact that in primitive societies the magician is trained and practiced through instruction and initiation, and the beings with whom he comes into contact through his often ecstatic period of initiation and from whom he draws his power are those whom the tribe worships. The young magician must in himself and for himself through visions experience the truth of the accounts that his tribe's tradition contains. He is thus
[168] himself, in his greatest fullness of power, a social product and a social representative.

[**)] See e.g. *Bezold*: *Die babylonisch-assyrische Religion.* (Kultur der Gegenwart. II,3,1). p. 44.

[*)] See especially *The Magic Art.* (1911). I. p. 233 f; 374. — Earlier in *Adonis, Attis, Osiris.* (1906).

Only later can magic enter into a sharp relation of opposition to religion[*)].

By virtue of its original close connection with incantation, prayer acquires a magical character and at the same time a social character. But just as it gradually sheds its magical character, so it also acquires more and more an individual character. The social forms become individualized. It is no longer enough that the individual in his personal experience [Erfaring] seeks to experience what is reported of the beings whom the tribe worships, but he has new experiences of his own, and his prayer thereby acquires a more personal character. In primitive religions (i.e. those lowest in our eyes) decisive examples in this direction can hardly be found, although there is no lack of examples of individuals who take up a doubting attitude toward tradition. In Egyptian religion, on the other hand, both the differentiation of prayer from incantation and the individualization of prayer come to light in a remarkable way.

The history of this religion shows us all the forms of prayer, from the magical stage, where prayer and sorcery are one, to the inward prayer that springs from personal disposition. At earlier levels hardly any distinction can be made between prayer and sorcery; it cannot be seen from the content of the prayer whether it is more than a spell; it depends on the use, not on the content. In the old rigid Egyptian state religion all could pray the same prayer, and the weight was laid on the words that were uttered. But later, in the remarkable movement in the direction of personal inwardness that marks *[169]* the religious development in Egypt in the thirteenth and twelfth centuries B.C., prayer became "a revelation of inner personal experience or an expression of an individual relation to God." There is an express warning against using too many words, since it is not at all the words that matter. "Be not of many words, for in silence you will gain what is good." "Pray then with a yearning mind, whose words are all hidden." And God is called "the God of the Silent." "You sweet fountain for him who thirsts in the desert, are closed to him who speaks, but open to the Silent."

The development in the direction of personality and inwardness that marks a high point within Egyptian religion was succeeded by a new stiffening under the dominion of a narrow-minded priesthood[*)].

There is an inner connection between prayer's liberation from the character of incantation and its transition to being an inward expression of the need of the individual personality. In incantations it will be a matter of using quite definite words and actions,

[*)] See, besides *Durkheim*: *Les Formes Elémentaires de la Vie Religieuse.* (1912). Livre I. Chap. 1. *Hubert et Mauss*: *L'Origine des Pouvoirs Magiques* (Mélanges d'Histoire des Religions). (1909). — Cf., on my position toward the French sociological school, the essay *Sociology and the Philosophy of Religion* in the present volume.

[*)] *James Henry Breasted*: *Development and Thought in Ancient Egypt.* (1912). p. 95; 272 ff; 349; 356.

just as one must everywhere use certain definite means in order to reach a definite goal. Through the process of liberation of which we have seen examples, prayer is led onto a path of inwardization that can lead ever further. —

When the weight is laid on the words and on their use for the attainment of external ends, it is natural that weight is laid on many and long prayers. It is characteristic that 1200 years before the Sermon on the Mount we hear a warning against using many words; it is a sign of a process of inwardization which, unfortunately, was interrupted
[170] by the power that has caused so many inward and personal mental processes of development to cease.

Lotze cites somewhere a German popular saying, which has evidently been called forth by the experience of an inverse relation between the quantity of words and the inwardness of mood: "Those who pray too much pray themselves straight through heaven and are set to guard geese on the other side." —

B. The Inwardization of Prayer.

When prayer does not stand as a magical force, and when it is not merely an involuntary or voluntary repetition of a formula given in tradition, the way is open for inwardization. Then the external ends of prayer can fall away, and prayer can more and more have its value in itself as a closed, concentrated state, a state of unity, in which in the end the duality of him who prays and of him to whom prayer is made can also fall away, not merely the duality of the prayer itself and the good that is prayed for.

A transitional form is prayer as an expression of praise, admiration or gratitude. The prayer of thanksgiving is nobler than the prayer of petition. The most beautiful and most sublime of the Old Testament psalms belong here. The eighth psalm, with its praise and thanks for the glorious place assigned to man in the world of creation, has been called the most beautiful that the religious literature of all times has produced in this direction[*)]. The Stoic Epictetus knows only the prayer of thanksgiving, not the prayer of petition, and his thanks concern, like those of the ancient Psalmist, the glory
[171] of man, — only that he as a Stoic finds this glory in the fact that man finds his true happiness in himself, not in anything that is outside it[*)].

Already when the prayer of petition concerns spiritual goods, which in the end depend on man's own mind and own will, it has lost its externality. Such a prayer is offered by Socrates in Plato's "Phaedrus", when after a profound conversation with his friends

[*)] *Wundt: Völkerpsychologie.* II,3. p. 665 f.
[*)] Bonhöffer: Epiktet und das neue Testament. (1911). p. 65.

in the sacred grove he proposes to them the following prayer before they depart: "O dear Pan and you other gods who are at home here, grant me to gain a beautiful inner self, and that the outer goods may be in harmony with the inner!" (Phaedrus p. 279 B). — In the dialogue "Alcibiades II" Socrates cites with approval a verse by an older poet, who prays Zeus to give us what is good, whether we pray for it or not, but to avert what is evil, even if we pray for it. (Alcibiades II p. 143 A). That this dialogue is hardly by Plato is, in this connection, immaterial. It betrays the influence of Stoic thoughts.

Platonism and Stoicism have had a very great influence on the later history of prayer. Neoplatonism carries through what Plato and the Stoics had begun. Plotinus taught that what is experienced in our highest states, which in his case took on the character of ecstasy, cannot be thought or said as long as they last; afterward one can try to interpret what was experienced, but it always remains patchwork. We can have the Highest in us, even if we cannot say what it is, just as the inspired and the seized only know that they have something greater in them, but do not know what it is. (Ennead. V, 3, 10; 5, 9). Prayer proper he laid no weight on, any more than on worship in general; the gods were to come to him, not the reverse[**)]. But there were those among his successors who swung back to worship and popular religion, in part in a very crass form. A testimony to this *[172]* is the work "The Mysteries of the Egyptians", which has been attributed to Iamblichus and in any case dates from his time (c. 300 A.D.). The opposition between philosophy and mythology falls away. The endeavor is to renew the old popular religion under the influence of the new oriental currents and to defend it against what was at that time the modern doubt. Prayer now has value only when it is offered in holy words, that is to say here, words approved by tradition — and preferably in words that derive from the holy peoples of the Orient (Egyptians and Assyrians), to whom the gods have revealed the mysterious language. Even if these words are unintelligible to us, the gods nonetheless understand them! Prayer thus becomes magic again. But it is also maintained, — what will prove to mark a significant turning point, — that it is not prayer that turns the gods' mind toward man, but that it is the gods' own gracious mind that shines down upon those who pray, in that it has already before prayer and address worked upon them. Three steps are distinguished in the effect of prayer, a threefoldness that often recurs in the later history of mysticism (thus among the Victorines and Santa Teresa). The first and lowest step consists in collection, concentration, address toward a single goal. The second consists in an inner connection with the gods. At the third step the unity with the Godhead is completed (the unity that Plotinus attained through the self-immersion

[**)] See the essay Experience and Interpretation.

of thought)[*].

Not all Neoplatonists went along with such a mixing of thought and magic. The last more significant Neoplatonist, Olympiodorus of Alexandria, lays the weight on the
[173] purely inward character of prayer. He develops in his commentary on the Phaedo, following a line of thought in Plato, that the highest human striving ultimately has its end in itself, and to him who will not concede this he points out that we do after all give ourselves up to prayer for the sake of prayer itself. This is thus for him a self-evident proposition. And in another context he returns to it. He shows that thinking is not something we can settle once for all; it matters not to have thought but to remain in thinking activity, and he illustrates this by prayer: since prayer is in itself happiness, it is something we will remain in[*].

The Neoplatonic thoughts recur in the mysticism of the Middle Ages, which everywhere seeks to translate the external relations that religious ideas denote into inner ones. That "the Kingdom of God is at hand" means for Master Eckchardt that it is in us, for God is nearer to us than we are to ourselves. As here the temporal relation falls away, so too the difference between prayer and the hearing of prayer falls away. God is moved as little by all prayers and good works as if there were no such thing at all. "In a first eternal glance — if we can assume a first glance — God saw all things as they were to happen… He saw also the least prayer and good work that anyone would perform, and he saw which prayer and which devotion he would hear." On the other hand, the right prayer is that which springs from a free mind that is not bound to anything here in the world, but is wholly sunk in the will of God. In inward prayer man at last becomes one with him to whom he prays, with God[**].

[174] Even as late as Kierkegaard's religious discourses we meet the same thoughts, rediscovered and personally experienced, but belonging to a great tradition that is connected with the most inward forms of religiosity.

According to the naive conception — says Kierkegaard — the main thing is that God gets to know what one has on one's heart. But the reverse is the case. What matters is that the one who prays continues his prayer until he gets to know what God wills. This thought is developed at length in one of the religious discourses, whose title is: "The one who prays rightly struggles in prayer and prevails — in that God prevails." The inwardness of prayer is the main thing, and prayer is not merely a means to attain

[*] *Harless*: *Das Buch von den ægyptischen Mysterien.* (1857). p. 73—79.

[*] *Olympiodori Philosophi in Platonis Phaedonem commentaria.* ed. W. Norvin. (1913). p. 19; 95.

[**] *Mester Eckehart*: *Prædikener og Traktater.* Translated and introduced by Aage Markus. (1917). p. 69; 78; 95.

something. Already the collection that prayer presupposes, — that man gathers his whole soul about a single wish, — already that ennobles, and it is the preparation for giving up everything; for only he who has but a single wish can give up everything. It is God's unchangeable will before which man bows, and thereby, — by not himself wishing to be anything, — he can be wholly shone through by God and come to resemble God. — In a later note Kierkegaard maintains that one must learn always to give thanks. "Otherwise all this childish nonsense arises, one moment one is to give thanks, because now this or that is good and this and that is so pleasant, the next moment one is to sigh and pray for patience, because now this and that was so bad. It is impossible to have a real relation to God and remain in one's merely human and earthly idea of good and evil, the pleasant and the unpleasant."[*)].

In Neoplatonism and mysticism it is the thought of unity that rules. The endeavor is to get beyond the opposition between prayer and that which is prayed for, and be- *[175]* yond the opposition between him who prays and him to whom prayer is made. In Kierkegaard's religious discourses it is the thought of the divine immutability, hence also a Platonic thought, that leads beyond the usual theory of prayer. — It is of course not Kierkegaard's definitive standpoint that we have before us here. In his most profound work ("Sygdommen til Døden") he says: "To pray is to breathe, and possibility is for the self what oxygen is for breathing.... God is this, that everything is possible, or that everything is possible is God"[*)]. Immutability, on the other hand, does not permit more or other possibilities than there have always been. —

It might seem that it was merely a terminological question whether one would use the word prayer of an act in which the mind is wholly one with its object, with the Immutable, and in which there is no difference between the act itself and that to which it is directed. Brøchner maintains accordingly that when one sees the effect of prayer in the indirect, subjective influence on the one who prays himself, the essence of prayer is in reality undermined by criticism. For prayer aims at the miracle, and only at the miracle. Brøchner assumes, on the other hand, that there is a rational equivalent for prayer, namely the mind's address to the infinite Being with which it is in its innermost ground one, and in the force that through such an address to the ultimate source of our being can be released in us[**)]. It is Master Eckehardt's standpoint that Brøchner takes up, except that he will not call the inward address that is possible at such a stage prayer.

[*)] *Kierkegaard*: *Samlede Værker.* V. p. 149—167. Cf. *Papirer* (ed. by Heiberg and Kuhr) VII,1. 24; VIII,1 p. 123.

[*)] *Samlede Værker.* XI. p. 153.

[**)] *Brøchner*: *Problemet om Tro og Viden.* (1868). p. 95ff. — *Det Religiøse i dets Enhed med det Humane.* (1869). p. 17.

In a French dissertation whose subject was a psychological study of prayer, the author
[176] (Segond) had precisely found the essence of prayer expressed, not among primitive people, whose inner life we cannot reconstruct, but among the mystics, in whom prayer is conceived with clear consciousness of its nature. His opponents (Durkheim, Delacroix and Delbos) pointed out to him the arbitrariness of this limitation and maintained that the relation between the prayer of silence and the prayer of the word ought to have been more closely examined[*)]. The opponents were evidently right that it is arbitrary to call a single type the essential one. A whole series of problems is thereby passed over.

The question is, however, not merely terminological. History seems to show that a successive transition takes place between the different types, even though, when they are each fully developed, they may come into sharp opposition to one another. This continuity is of great importance for avoiding waste of force; for through it a new type can draw nourishment from the stored-up force of the old one, and moreover it makes understanding easier, even though this understanding must essentially be won by way of analogy. Brøchner is right, however, that for the sake of clarity it is expedient to mark the difference between the different types by different names, even though it may become difficult to decide where the decisive line is to be drawn. The church has often drawn it where dogmatics is threatened by bold mysticism. From the standpoint of the psychology of religion one must draw it on the other side of mysticism, where the great problem of the psychological possibility and nature of the equivalent Brøchner mentions arises. — A question different from this is which type is the highest. For the time being
[177] everyone, no doubt, regards the stage on which he himself stands as the highest[*)]. What will be decisive is whether a single type can be shown to contain in itself everything that is valuable and justified in other types. It lies outside the present investigation to go further into this.

As already stated at the beginning of this essay there is not a single series of development, but several series at once, now ascending, now descending, as regards the relation between duality and unity. And in great personalities who have intervened deeply in the development of positive religion one will often find several different types asserting themselves. In Jesus of Nazareth, as the Gospels portray him, most of the types mentioned in the foregoing occur. Toward the demons he uses incantation, but toward God he uses the prayer of petition and the prayer of thanksgiving, and here too

[*)] See the interesting résumé of the discussion in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale Janvier 1911. Supplément p. 30—35.

[*)] Cf. the dispute between Baggesen and Grundtvig over whose stage was the highest. It could, according to Grundtvig, be decided only on Judgment Day. *Danske Filosofer.* p. 70f.

the prayer of thanksgiving stands as the more sublime, since it is the expression of the most glorious experiences. In the Gospel of John the prayer of unity rules, and it is this that has borne fruit in the development of church dogma. The high point is, however, the prayer in Gethsemane, — the most religious word that has been spoken on earth. Here Jesus struggles his way forward from duality to unity, from self-will to full absorption in the divine will, which expresses his calling. — In the greatest personality within the church, Augustine, we encounter (see Confessiones) also, partly successively, partly in the same period, several different types. As a child he prayed that he might not be flogged at school. In his youth, when oratory and philosophy occupied him, his prayers also changed with his mood (affectus), and now aimed at gaining wisdom. When the need to raise himself above his sensual passions began to make itself felt, he prayed for *[178]* chastity and self-mastery; but he confesses that he feared being heard too quickly. On the other hand, when the new faith was about to break through in him, he prayed for its victory in his mind, and now he says to his God: "Why not at once?" A childlike prayer of petition appears also after the conversion, when through his own prayers and his friends' he was delivered from toothache. But he prayed in vain to be delivered from the deep sorrow over the death of his pious mother, and he knows why he was not heard; God wished to impress upon him the importance of the persistence of an inward relationship, even after the other party's departure. The high point in the development of prayer was it for Augustine when he could pray: "Give me what you command, and command what you will!" —

In all its forms prayer belongs closely together with need and impulse, wish and longing. But there is a great religion according to which impulse and wish are precisely what is not to be, since they increase or ever anew bring forth the tormented existence which it is precisely a matter of bringing to an end. For Buddhism[*)] prayer is karma (existence), and conversely karma is the source of the yearning and striving that find expression in prayer. This is the most radical standpoint toward prayer as a mental phenomenon. Prayer is the expression of a craving for life, an impulse to hold fast to existence, even if it is to be under quite different forms from those hitherto experienced, and even if it is not one's own individual existence that is sought to be maintained. There is a possibility of metamorphoses into new mental phenomena, which one perhaps will no longer call prayer, into a free spiritual and material urge to development. But Buddhism takes this whole basis and all the possibilities it contains away from the root.

[*)] *Warren: Buddhism in translation.* (1906). p. 177. 189. 245.

[179] In the characterization I have attempted in my Religionsfilosofi to give of Buddha and Jesus, I have precisely laid weight on this point. Buddha rejects all yearning and striving, Jesus awakens a great expectation and thereby lays the weight on striving and work.

C. Prayer as Gift — and as Symbol.

On several occasions in the foregoing the thought has emerged that it is a gift to be able to pray, thus among the Neoplatonists and in Master Eckchardt. If this thought is carried through, we stand at a turning point in the history of prayer. It then becomes not, or not merely, nourishment, but effect, and it is this that becomes the essential thing. And then in the end the form of prayer, that something is prayed for and to someone, becomes symbolic, a poetic expression of yearning and longing for something that fundamentally already lies in our own being. Prayer then works not merely as releasing force, but it is itself the consequence of a release of force which at the given time it was not in the individual's conscious power to bring about. — This viewpoint reappears with different grounding. I believe one can distinguish between a supernaturalist, an idealist and a naturalist grounding.

a. It is told,[*)] that to the Persian prophet Jelaled-din Rumi there came a man and complained that Allah never answered his prayer, — that he never sensed Allah's presence. Then the Prophet said: "God commands me to say to you: You sorely tried man, was it not I who drove you to worship me? Your very invocation of Allah was an expression of my presence, and your sorrow, your longing, your zeal were my messengers!" — Prayer itself, that prayer is made, is thus a revelation of the Godhead.

[180] A similar thought emerges when Paul writes: "The Spirit comes to the aid of our weakness; for we do not know what we should pray for as we ought, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with unutterable sighs. And he who searches the hearts knows what the Spirit's yearning is." (Romans VIII, 26). And thereupon there is talk of divine predestination and calling. — In prayer man is thus not the giver or the one who sacrifices, but essentially the recipient. In the very unformed prayer, "the unutterable sighs", a divine spirit stirs in man's interior, without man being conscious of it[*)].

Prayer seems to be directed forward and upward; but for a deeper conception there is thus behind prayer as forward-yearning a force that (like a vis a tergo) pushes and drives forward. This conception becomes the diametrical opposite of the stage where prayer

[*)] Tiele: Elements of the Science of Religion. II. p. 133.

[*)] Cf. on this remarkable passage *Bernhard Weis*: *Lehrbuch der Theologie des neuen Testaments.*[6] p. 343.

and incantation merge into one, and where prayer as a magical force gives man power both over God and over the world. We cannot expect to find this deeper conception except in individual outstanding religious personalities at different times. But it must be a strange standpoint from which this should diminish the value of the conception.

It is shown in the essay on Experience and Interpretation how this conception emerges in Santa Teresa in the decisive opposition she sets between the prayer of reflection (oraison de méditation) and the prayer of quiet (oraison de quiétude). To the prayer of quiet one cannot raise oneself up, but must wait until one is drawn up, just as a garden must wait for its best watering, the lovely rain that falls quietly down from above. *[181]*

Pascal, for whom it was certain that he could not have sought Jesus if he had not already found him, maintains outright that prayer is a gift that God gives to whom it pleases him, and he rejects definitely the assumption that one has prayer from oneself. It is a Jansenist proposition that Pascal here maintains. It goes back to Augustine in his polemic against Pelagius. Even Bossuet therefore adheres to it, in saying that prayer, by which everything is given to us, is itself given to us[*)].

b. When, in contrast to the supernatural explanation of the origin of prayer, which starts from a duality between divine and human nature, I set the idealistic explanation, it is because here the divine nature is thought of as working in and through the human nature, just as it works through nature in general.

In the Indian poem Bhagavadgita both faith in gods and prayer to gods are explained as the effect of a power that does not itself come to man's consciousness and cannot be observed, — of the absolute, unchangeable, supreme Being itself, which stirs in everything. Krishna, who is an incarnation of Vishnu, says in the said poem: "Those whose knowledge has been taken from them by one desire or another approach other gods than me, and bound to their own nature they take upon themselves all manner of religious duties. When now one of them wishes in faith to serve one of these gods, then I make this faith unshakable in him. Filled with this faith he then worships this god with care and attains the good that he wishes; — but it is in reality I who grant it to him"[*)]. *[182]*

In the European world such a thought has, through Neoplatonism and medieval mysticism, passed over to modern theologians who do not feel bound by confessional ideas as final. That prayer is made, and that something is attained through prayer, stand as two experiences, which both spring from one source of which human beings themselves have no inkling when they do not follow the path of reflection to its end. Accord-

[*)] *Pascal*: *Pensées.* ed. Brunschwicg. II. p. 408; 438, with the editor's note. — Cf. *Sibbern*: *Gabrielis' Breve*[1]. I. p. 100: "To be able to pray is true, full grace."

[*)] *Bhagavadgita* VII, 20—24. (Garbe's German translation).

ing to Schleiermacher a theory of prayer that presupposed a reciprocal relation between the Creator and the created would mean a regression to the standpoint of magic. Prayer and the hearing of prayer are fundamentally one, and in right prayer passivity and activity are united. Prayer and its fulfillment or nonfulfillment are only parts of one and the same divine order[**)]. In the same direction goes later Auguste Sabatier's conception[†)].

c. As examples of what I mean by a naturalistic conception in its application to prayer, I will adduce statements by two spirits widely different from one another, one of whom is the founder of the modern conception of nature, the other one of the greatest figures in the history of philanthropy.

Thomas Hobbes seeks to show that prayer may very well find its place, even if one assumes that there are definite natural causes for everything that happens. "Prayer," he says[††)], "is God's gift just as blessing is … And prayer to Almighty God is only
[183] thanksgiving for God's blessings. Even if it precedes the special things we pray for, it is yet not the cause or means thereto, but a declaration that we expect nothing other than what God wills, not what we will."

Florence Nightingale was not only one of the greatest and wisest friends of humankind who have ever lived, but she was an independent thinker. Stuart Mill's Logic, Jowett's Plato scholarship and Quételet's statistics constituted the basis from which she built her own thoughts. The wonderful thing about God is, according to her conception, precisely that he is inexorable: if he were to change his mind according to people's prayers, we would be delivered over, at their mercy or disfavor, to those who prayed to him! The true idea of God, which alone is compatible both with the deepest morality and with the most comprehensive view of nature and history, is the idea that shows him, not as an individuality, but as a universal being — as a law. What the particular laws are, we must find by the aid of science. And on the basis of the lawfulness of nature, a basis, in which God's being is given, there then arises for every human being the task of making the best of his own personality. More beautiful than any sentence in the church rituals was in her eyes the prayer of Socrates in Plato's Phaedrus, already mentioned above: grant me to gain a beautiful inner self, and that the outer goods may be in harmony with the inner! Characteristic of Florence Nightingale is it also that figures such as Andromache and Antigone stood in her eyes above the women the Bible mentions[*)].

d. When now prayer — with one or another motivation — is regarded as gift, hence

[**)] *Schleiermacher*: *Der christliche Glaube.* § 47.

[†)] See my characterization of Sabatier's standpoint in Mindre Arbejder. Anden Række. p. 75—78.

[††)] *Hobbes*: *Tripos*[3]. (1684). p. 293.

[*)] *Edward Cooke*: *Florence Nigthingale.* Danish translation. (1917). II. p. 432—442.

as effect in man's mind, not merely as sprung from man's mind as cause, it becomes a *[184]* symbolic act, poetry, and if it is earnest and honest, poetry of life. Already the prayer of unity brings this consequence with it. For if one is certain of having God in oneself, of being one with him, so that his will is our own will, then there is nothing to pray for, just as little as God himself can have anything to pray for. The duality of prayer and that which is prayed for falls away with the duality of him who prays and him to whom prayer is made. But when prayer and the hearing of prayer become one, it shows itself quite clearly that the formulation of prayer in words is not necessary, or has only poetic significance. The need for formulation, with address to a being different from the one who prays, will rather be connected with a need for pictorial ideas than with the very need that seeks satisfaction. In some people there prevails a dread of the indefinite, a shyness of the unsurveyable; they need definitely formed ideas, preferably such as have, through the succession of generations, acquired the character of spiritual homeliness. In other people there prevails precisely a shyness of the limited, a dread of narrow ideas; they discover at once where every simile limps and where every image proves inadequate. A genuine poetry of life points beyond this opposition; for in it every image that is used is the expression of a personal experience of the conditions and fate of the inner or outer life and of an endeavor to hold fast to its model. It is an ideal of life that the mind here turns toward, — exemplar vitæ, as Spinoza called it, an ideal socius, as James has called it. Even the founder of positivism, Auguste Comte, directed the "solennelle effusion des sentiments généreux", as he called his prayer, to Humanity, which was for him represented by a woman who had been for him what Beatrice was for Dante[*)]. For many it will be natural to give such a deep mood, which *[185]* is called forth by the endeavor to hold fast to the ideal of life, whatever conditions and fates we may struggle with, expression in words. When a thought breaking forth with inwardness and force gets air in words, when others are present, why should this not also be able to happen in solitude? A Master has indeed said that one should shut one's door when one prays. In common prayer, which is formulated beforehand and is to be held at a fixed time and place, there is always something artificial, which repels many natures, not least such whose inner life unfolds in a peculiar and deep way. In their best thoughts, in their most inward feelings there stirs for them the Highest they know, and they can very well hold fast to the faith that something corresponding also stirs in the interior of other human beings, without needing common formulas to establish it.

[*)] Cf. *Auguste Comte*: *Catéchisme positif.* p. 105 f. La vraie nature de culte intime consiste dans l'adoration journalière des meilleures personifications que nous puissions assigner à l'Humanité — In *Politique positivs.* (IV p. 114) priere is defined as commémoration suivie d'effusion.

That prayer is effect does not of course exclude that it is cause. It is not merely itself a sign of a release of energy, but it itself leads to a new release. It is seen from this side that prayer, which is often called the central religious phenomenon, cannot disappear from the spiritual economy without an equivalent. And we have seen the possibility that the naive prayer of petition, through the prayer of unity and through prayer regarded as gift, may pass over into becoming a free expression of courage, trust and enthusiasm or of inward holding fast to an ideal of life. There are certainly not a few who in their lives
[186] have run through this series of types. Whether in the concluding poetry of life they can find full compensation for what at the earlier stages was granted them through prayer, may be a difficult matter for them to decide, and even more difficult for others. And whether such a series of types as we on the basis of comparative consideration can set up will also be run through by the race as a whole, or whether the different types we have described will not be present simultaneously at all times, that too is a difficult thing to decide. —

When the talk is of equivalence for earlier religious forms of life, there is one thing one must not forget. The prayer of petition, in its naive forms, is no doubt that of the types mentioned above for which one will find it hardest to imagine a replacement. It also belongs especially in times when religion stood as the only spiritual power. There had not yet occurred any division of labor in the spiritual domain. It is different now. In divided labor religion (whether one takes the word in its widest or its narrowest sense) cannot enter in as a single member, but it must either be everything, or stand above everything, or be the deepest presupposition in all special work without itself having a field of work of its own. Outside these three possibilities no way will be found. — To be sure, an attempt is sometimes made, indeed perhaps quite often, at a peculiar division of labor between religion and culture, so that they go side by side without having anything to do with each other. Thus the well-known astronomer Father Secchi is said to have said: "There is a staircase leading up from my oratory (the prayer chamber) to my observatory. When I have come up above a certain step, I think only of the observatory; before I have come to this step, I think only of the oratory." So external the relation
[187] cannot in the long run continue to be. One cannot of course think of all things equally energetically at the same moment. But one must nevertheless set oneself the task of uniting the experiences from the oratory in connection with the experiences from the observatory. And even if one cannot and will not set oneself this task, experience will show that there is a subterranean connection between the two groups of experiences, which one fine day may make itself felt in and for conscious thought. —

The most inward collection upon and self-surrender to what is for us the Ideal must show its force at our very place of work, just as it is itself fruit of an inner work of which we perhaps do not become conscious.

Postscript. — After this sketch was written down, there came into my hands Friedrich Heiler's book: Das Gebet. Eine religionsgeschichtliche und religionspsychologische Untersuchung (1918). In this book a great material is gathered for the illumination of prayer and its history. It does not occur to me to compare my little sketch with Heiler's detailed presentation. I have in it only wanted to put together some examples I have in the course of the years collected, in order to demonstrate what changes prayer can undergo, until a stage sets in at which one can no longer speak of prayer in the proper sense. The author characterizes excellently the two great types, which he calls the mystical and the prophetic prayer, and he considers the prophetic the highest. He demands that prayer be measured by its own (religious) norm and rejects the "philosophical norm" that applies ethical and rational points of view. But he declares that it is a "coarsening" of prayer when it is connected with faith that God's will can be changed, a faith that lies at the ground not only of primitive prayer, but also of prophetic prayer, thus still of Luther's *[188]* prayer. Should it not be a "philosophical norm" that makes itself felt in him here? From the nature of the prophetic prayer itself the corrective cannot in any case have been taken, for for it the hearing of prayer is an essential moment, and it signifies a great crisis when the hearing of prayer does not occur. Would prayer without the influence of ethical and rational motives have been able to develop from primitive to mystic and prophetic prayer, not to mention the highly idealistic form the author (moreover without closer grounding) places highest? — It is continually the influence of the mentioned motives that finally leads to a stage like that I have indicated at the end of my sketch.

[189]

TWO PASTORS

Otto Møller and Skat Rørdam. A Correspondence. Copenhagen 1915—16.

The correspondence presented here between two significant and earnest ecclesiastical personalities of our own day is of interest both for the psychology of religion and for the history of religion. At every time a religion has a greater content, a greater sum of doctrines and inherited ideas, than individuals make use of, or can make use of. It is therefore of great interest to see which elements of a given religion, at a given time and in particular personalities, prove to exert the greatest influence, — which of them are in reality lived by. What first aroused my attention in this correspondence and made me want to write a little study was the two men's relation to a problem which in my young days gripped me so strongly that it became decisive for the whole course of my life, and with which I have since tried again and again to come to terms. It is the question of the relation between "the Christianity of the New Testament" and "modern Christianity." Yet there are also other questions which this correspondence can set one thinking about, such as the relation between self-experience and tradition, and in connection with this the relation between the individual and the ecclesiastical society to which he
[190] belongs. But in a purely human respect too the correspondence offers interest through the beautiful and warm impression one gets of the two men's friendship, which endured with inwardness and fidelity from their young days until death parted them. The correspondence runs from 1859 to 1909, and the friendship was founded before that. There were reefs enough on which it might have run aground, and it is attractive to see how a deep harmony in that which for them both was the essential helped them over the difficulties. It cannot be denied that the readers here have most reason to admire Otto Møller's magnanimity and peaceableness. The conservative and orthodox Rørdam often expresses his displeasure at his friend's heresies in a very sharp manner. One is led to think how difficult it must be for people who stand at different stages to come to an understanding, when one sees how near a split may lie even for people who in the main wish to build on the same ground.

I.

Otto Møller characterizes himself as a melancholic, who lives in something that is far removed from all that stirs at the moment, and who easily feels confused when the age and its movements press in upon him. All his life, apart from his school years and

his student days, he lived in Gylling parsonage, where he succeeded his father. He was a brooder and a scholar. "I have far too much time to go about chewing on my own thoughts," he says himself. And his studies made him one of the most learned pastors in Denmark, — which, by his and Rørdam's common opinion, admittedly meant not very much. He has been a spiritual center to which many resorted to win peace and clarity on ecclesiastical and religious questions. An enthusiastic and faithful adherent of Grundtvig he was; but it was the Grundtvig of the earlier period that was for him the *[191]* real Grundtvig. In Møller's eyes the Master, when from the forties on things went downhill for him, was inclined to see everything too brightly and to make things easier than they were and ought to be. He did not think that Grundtvig's last period corresponded to what his strong years had promised. In any case most Grundtvigians now came to it too easily. There were too many meetings, too much singing and clamor. "There is a disgusting fooling around with Christianity… God save us from the cheerful Christianity; it can become worse than spiritual death," he writes in 1860. And much later (1892) he writes: "The older I grow, the more I get a sense of the one-sidedness and softness of the old 'genuine' Grundtvigian… Grundtvig himself was a peculiar personality, all of a piece in his kind; but in his disciples it became something mannered."

Compared with the springtime of promise that he had experienced in his youth, he felt poor in his old days when he looked about him at the age. The pastors of his time he had, like his conservative friend, very little respect for. The bishops are "muddleheaded," — and the pastors are "a lot of riffraff everywhere." "The clergy is always the same and grants the congregation no real freedom." And as his political conservatism unites with his radical church policy, he says (1906): "I have little taste for being governed by parish clerks, but still far less by pastors." — It is not only the Grundtvigians that this strikes. The High Church (the third tendency) and the Inner Mission he also speaks out strongly against.

His despondency and feeling of sharp opposition to the tendencies of the age, even those that like himself wished to stand on the ground of the Church, are explained in part by his temperament, by his lonely life and by his ill health; but only in part. In *[192]* a brief characterization of the two friends the Bishop's wife Rørdam (Tilbageblik paa et langt Liv, p. 118) speaks of Otto Møller as "the man with the pronounced critical sense and the heavy gaze." He is more of a thinker, more consistent and sharp in his thinking than his friend. And his critical attitude is conditioned not only by his inner and outer circumstances, but first and foremost by his ever wakeful reflection. Of course the reflection moves only within his own ecclesiastical circle of ideas, but here it leads him

to a position on various theological and ecclesiastical questions which draws constant disapproval from his more limited friend, who was bound by authority.

Both friends are pronouncedly ecclesiastical natures. They both have their last resort in "the congregation," a concept to which it proves very difficult to give a definite content and extent. They are both deeply convinced that in the tradition into which they had lived themselves in that part of their youth which they called "the springtime," there is given the one thing needful for human beings, but also in itself rich in content and profound, expression of the highest truth. The difference between them emerges partly in their conception of the constitution of the Church, partly in their position on the right which personal experience has in relation to tradition, partly, finally, in the extent to which they permit freer reflection to unfold in the religious domain.

Skat Rørdam was, by his wife's testimony, a more sanguine nature than his friend, with a brighter gaze and greater cheerfulness. The brighter outlook expressed itself not least in his having greater confidence in the existing ecclesiastical institutions and, especially after he had become Bishop of Zealand, greater faith that they could work for
[193] good. He is also, partly because of his optimism, partly because of less critical sense and need, more orthodox than his friend, as is often told him in the letters. But one gets the impression of a man who lives wholly and fully in the tradition into which he has once for all been led. The conclusions to which his reflection leads him agree involuntarily with the conclusions which his Church had long since drawn.[*)] Otto Møller, on the other hand, has a greater latitude between the ecclesiastical foundation and the lines of thought that can be struck up from it, and he both saw and followed more possibilities than his orthodox friend entered upon.

Very sharply Rørdam often expressed himself, indeed as a rule, about Møller's authorship. Of Møller's book on the Gospels Rørdam says, after having read it in manuscript, that it can only be a joy to the Lord's enemies, and it is on the whole a very harsh letter that he sends his friend; one understands that the latter, when he read it, had the feeling of getting a bucket of cold water over his head. When Møller, despite Rørdam's urgent admonition, published it nevertheless, Rørdam wished that it might be read as little as possible, so as to do as little harm as possible. The matter was that Møller had expressed himself very strongly about Mark and Luke, whom he set far below Matthew. So decisive an opposition Rørdam in his opinion thought one ought not to assume between authors who were all inspired by the Holy Spirit. — In a later book Møller attacked the orthodox doctrine of atonement, according to which God could show grace toward

[*)] See my characterization of "ecclesiastical natures" in my Religionsfilosofi § 96.

human beings only through a bloody sacrifice that had to be brought by his own Son. In place of the doctrine of atonement he put the doctrine of redemption, which presupposed no change in God from wrath to love, but only a constant divine will to help and *[194]* deliverance. When Møller sent Rørdam the book, he was sure that his orthodox friend would "shake his old head over it." And so it proved. Rørdam was greatly offended that Møller will not concede that "something was rendered to God by the death of Christ," and that he at bottom regards the orthodox doctrine of atonement as heathen. Møller shows himself here too as the most consistent. For a God with whom there is no change or shadow of turning cannot of course by any event or act pass over from wrath to love. Naturally Møller too cannot here draw all the consequences. — Of a following book by Møller on a related subject Rørdam is likewise "so exceedingly dissatisfied"; Møller, namely, will not concede that God is angry with sinners; he relegates wrath to the Day of Judgment and conceives Christ's death as testimony that God has never been angry with human beings. — The opposition that appears on these points between the two men is not new in the history of the Church, but reaches far back. The strife between the views designated by the words redemption and atonement came forth in antiquity in the opposition between the Eastern and the Western Church Fathers (Athanasius and Augustine), in the Middle Ages in the opposition between Abelard and Anselm, and in the time of the Reformation in the opposition between Zwingli and Luther.

Møller takes the repeated rebukes with great meekness. "I see more and more that you cannot understand me, and you are not alone in that; but it cannot help me to see otherwise than I have once come to see these things."

In the conception of Jesus' personality and fate too the two friends disagree. Møller has written an account of the gospel history, in which he seeks to show that Jesus in his *[195]* public appearance suffered a whole series of disappointments, since neither the learned in Jerusalem nor the common man in Galilee recognized him, indeed not even the Apostles understood him. Rørdam is scandalized. Is it supposed to have fared with Jesus as with a human reformer, who must pass through so many bitter torments because of resistance? How can he then be the Lord and the Savior? It is modern talk, by which Møller has let himself be captivated, and which must lead to regarding Jesus as a mere man! — Møller finds it distressing that he must give up writing anything that suits his older friend. But he declares that he has taken the matter purely historically, and that he regards the great disappointments as belonging to Jesus' suffering. Jesus had wishes and hopes that were not fulfilled. Can one be a true man without that? That Rørdam calls this conception modern does not touch Møller: for "how much looks new that is

nevertheless true?"

Everywhere it is confirmed, what Møller says somewhere, that Rørdam has a peculiar love for what has been handed down, while he himself has a drive to go behind what has been handed down. This could easily have led them away from each other, and perhaps also had done so, had not oral companionship and conversation from time to time replaced the discussion in letters. —

II.

In close connection with the points of difference already mentioned between the two pastors stands their different conception of the relation between self-experience and tradition.

It is a dangerous matter, says Otto Møller, to speak much of what one has not yet experienced oneself. But most people live by faith in authority, not by the full certainty
[196] of self-experience. They believe what the Pope or Luther, the Church or Scripture says, that is, at second hand. It works only in calm weather. What one can know at first hand is admittedly not much, — really only the opposition between sin and grace; but more may prove to be contained therein. Of decisive importance it is to begin from the right end, namely from consciousness of sin. But whether self-experience can lead to faith is conditioned by revelation's having been proclaimed to the human being. — Here Møller's ecclesiastical standpoint collides with his approach to a purely psychological consideration. Even consciousness of sin in the sense in which Møller sets it forth is nevertheless a historically conditioned phenomenon and presupposes proclamation. It is not a universally human experience. Faith is really already a presupposition for consciousness of sin; there must be faith in a supernatural authority, before which the human being's striving can show itself as sin. Møller is here himself too trustful of authority toward the Lutheran doctrine of "the order of salvation," which incidentally was already opposed in the time of the Reformation. Can a self-experience not begin with admiration and enthusiasm for an ideal, and will the feeling of one's own distance from this ideal not become the deeper, when self-knowledge is awakened by the thought of the ideal? When one appeals to self-experience one must also acknowledge that both its beginning and its course may be highly different in different personalities. Lutheranism has fixed a single type, into which all were to be pressed, more or less violently[*)].

With his sense for problems Otto Møller now also acknowledges that here for a
[197] pronounced ecclesiastical conception there lies an insoluble riddle. Can there not be

[*)] See on various religious types in my Religionsfilosofi § 36—44 and 94—96, and the essay on some works in the philosophy of religion from the most recent time (Mindre Skrifter. Anden Række).

the most inward need and striving present, without the proclamation that alone can lead to faith being granted to the human being? He admits that when faith in external authority has been swept away entirely, there is no remedy any more. — Indeed, Møller ought to have been more of a pessimist than he is; for if one has no faith, or rather some hope, that there can arise new ideals by a purely human way, and that they can awaken the self-knowledge without which life gets no truth, then all channels are closed.

Skat Rørdam is now from the first apprehensive about his friend's strong emphasis on self-experience, because it seems to him to lead to building on bare ground. The human being, he says, begins with faith in authority and remains with it all his life. And even in the greatest human distress the human being must still be able to glimpse and sense the value of faith and the power of authority. The presupposition is that the human being lives in a Christian country. How it goes when this presupposition is not present, Rørdam does not speak of. His more sharply thinking friend sees here an insoluble riddle, because he so decidedly stresses both the personal moment, self-experience, and the objective moment, revelation and proclamation.

Rørdam trusts more in the congregation's influence on individuals than Møller. In the congregation as it now exists there lives, according to Rørdam, a testimony which goes back to the apostolic congregation and to the writings of the Apostles, and this apostolic congregation is the beginning set by God. But Rørdam admits that within the apostolic writings, which come to individuals through the congregation, as "the congregation's inheritance," it is not possible to distinguish once for all between what is of God and what is human; every Christian must draw the boundary according to his Christian consciousness nurtured through life in the congregation. And yet, as Rørdam *[198]* maintains in opposition to "modern theology," the Church is "the pillar and ground of the truth."

Otto Møller seems not to harbor the confidence in the congregation's influence that Rørdam does. He thinks that "when the congregation is not directed to it, it does not take offense at very much, but prefers to let everyone sweep before his own door." And he is against a church constitution, because under such a one it would at bottom be pastors and theologians who came to rule. — If one asks what then becomes of "the congregation," I suppose that Møller would refer to the sacraments. He is not afraid to give thought a certain latitude, provided only the essential in worship, the sacraments, is protected. If only this is observed, "various capers" may be allowed in other respects. — A solution naturally does not lie in this, for the sacraments themselves presuppose, both as regards their tradition and their interpretation, a dogmatic foundation — and

where does that come from? —

Only the Catholic Church can here bring the matter to a real conclusion. For it there is here no riddle. Neither is there any insoluble riddle, though certainly a problem, for those who stand outside all confessional religion. For them the criterion of truth consists in the most comprehensive and most coherent experience [Erfaring] that it is possible to attain, and there arise here, as regards the relation between individual and society, ever new questions, which must find their answer through historical and psychological investigation of how the individual develops under the influence of society to greater or lesser independence, and how the individual on his side can react back upon society and become co-determining for its further development. Nowhere do we here stand before
[199] anything absolutely first or last, though it may be difficult to follow the ways by which the social influence asserts itself in individuals, and to trace the first origin of individual initiatives. An "insoluble riddle" there is only when one proceeds from the necessity of an absolute authority and yet will not be a Catholic.

III.

Hitherto I have dwelt predominantly on questions in which the two friends stood against each other. There are of course many points, quite apart from their common Grundtvigian stage, in which they stand together. If their disagreements have an interest for the psychology of religion by showing how differently a view of life can be found in people at the same stage, then their agreements have an interest by showing how earnest pastors in our day look upon the spiritual movements that may have consequences for their Church, and upon the very historical foundation of their Church.

They agree in their view of Neo-Grundtvigianism, in which they see partly an effect of people's having come too easily to their religious stage, partly an expression of an immature need to bring the ecclesiastical conception into connection with tendencies in the literature and politics of the age. They both feel aversion toward the Inner Mission and display an unequivocal contempt toward "the third tendency" and the ruling theology. They also look alike upon the more recent investigations into the origin of the books of the Bible, the literary history of the Bible, or, as it is usually called, because in much and many things it rejects the traditional opinions about these books, Biblical criticism. They are both very apprehensive about this whole movement, but it must be said to their credit that they see clearly that here are questions which cannot be put
[200] aside. They both hold that if one first concedes the grounds that lead to placing "the books of Moses" in a time far later than that of Moses, then it will be only a question of

time when the same method is applied to the books of the New Testament. If Judaism is not of divine origin, Christianity, which builds on it, cannot be so either. As Møller puts it: if Wellhausen gets in among the people, Christianity gets out! It is a work of undermining that is going on. But gradually they both perceive that here is something one cannot get away from. Møller expresses their common standpoint in his forceful manner: "The painful thing is now that I am convinced that there is something to this Old Testament criticism; but it has fallen into some damned hands." They both feel that they lack the knowledge to take up the matter, and hope that the right scribe will come who can help the congregation over the difficulties. — Whether it will help that the investigations come into other hands, when the method is the same, time will show.

From "the Biblical critics" to "the freethinkers" there is in the two friends' eyes no long step, and yet their judgments here fall far more sharply. As the ecclesiastical natures they both are, each in his own way, living themselves in on all sides into a way of thinking that never wholly frees itself from authority, however much the one of them stresses self-experience and reflection, they can see in free intellectual work nothing but wickedness, when its results conflict with their faith. Rørdam sets up the principle that "what we as God's children have to ask about is not the cause, but the aim." He applies this principle to the unhappy war of 1864 and twenty years later to the burning of the Palace. Both misfortunes were to be understood as God's threatening speech to the people. (What the cause of the Palace fire was he knows moreover very well: that the Palace — as he himself saw with his own eyes — burned so quickly, made it evident *[201]* enough that it was God's will that it should burn!). It is clear that when one has access to knowing God's purpose with what happens, or with the coming into being of certain writings, the interest in finding the cause of these things becomes very slight, or rather, the causes must be given with the purposes, lie in the same will that sets the purposes. From such a standpoint it is hard to arrive at an understanding of the love of truth that can lead to the abandonment of traditional assumptions in the religious domain. For Rørdam freethinkers are "deniers of God and conscience," who regard the congregation as their real enemy, and all Christianity that is not the purest individualism as hypocrisy. When such people work for civil freedom, it is only in order to use it to suppress Christianity, which they hate because it condemns them. Their ultimate aim is to make man a thrall of nature, to enjoy instead of obey, to make man like the dumb creatures. (One sees that Rørdam knows not only about divine but also about human purposes). Otto Møller makes some reservations toward this forceful characterization; but he too holds that what is really the matter with the freethinkers is that they love darkness more than

light, and that the fault lies in the will, not in thought. At bottom there are no excusable freethinkers.

It would surely be easier, however, to get along with the pastor at Gylling than with the Bishop of Zealand. He has a sense for the significance of self-experience and reflection, and he has the need to go "behind what has been handed down." At bottom he would be obliged to admit that it is not the right to free inquiry and independent
[202] conduct of life that is to be grounded, but rather the right of authorities to set a limit to this right. This principle for the distribution of the burden of proof in the spiritual domain is based on this, that only in free self-surrender and on the basis of personal experience can truth become the human being's real possession.

IV.

I come now to a question that is of quite special interest for the relation between modern Christianity and primitive Christianity, namely how the representatives of the Church take up the expectation of Christ's imminent return, and with it of the close of the whole course of the world, which is one of the fundamental thoughts of the New Testament, without which in particular one does not understand at all the ethics of the New Testament. For an old Kierkegaardian there is special reason to draw attention to this point. For when Kierkegaard ended by declaring that the Christianity of the New Testament does not exist, it is the ethics of the New Testament he has in view. In dogmatic respect he thought that nothing was the matter. Yet Kierkegaard did not see that the ethics of the New Testament is determined and conditioned by that great expectation which is the real content of the faith of primitive Christianity. He was even inclined to reverse the relation and to regard the expectation as a psychologically necessary illusion, without which the strict primitive Christian ethics could not be maintained. This is of course incorrect. It is the expectation of the imminent "Kingdom of God" that lies at the foundation, and of which the ethics, which under these conditions could only become an "interim ethics," as a more recent investigator has called it, is a necessary consequence. Let one try for once to read the New Testament through with
[203] the constant thought of the immediate, literal nearness of "the Kingdom of God," and everything will become quite otherwise intelligible than it otherwise is. But the whole Church, the Catholic as well as the Protestant, here goes the ways of rationalism, and this from a natural instinct of self-preservation, since the Church's own continued existence becomes inconceivable and unjustified on that presupposition of an early close. And the whole significance one attributes to Christianity for human culture and for the

development of the life of peoples comes to lack a foundation. Rationalism begins early, already in the Second Epistle of Peter, with the proposition that for God a thousand years are as one day, and conversely. But if God had precisely promised something for a quite definite point of time? The God of rationalism has eternity on his side, and differences of time dwindle to nothing; but the God of the Bible acts in time and brings his Kingdom to completion at definite times. One cannot appeal to Jesus and the Apostles on all other points and reject their statements on a point of such decisive significance as this. For two wholly different views of life here come to stand over against each other. For the one, all human cultural work must be put in abeyance before the one thing needful, which is to prepare for the imminent close of all. The other lives and breathes in the work for the human unfolding of life in social conditions, in science and in art; here work is done for the long term, and a close or interruption stands only as a remote possibility. Between these two views of life one must, or would have to, choose. The difference between them became clear when the living expectation paled or in any case lost its immediate practical significance. Then one had time for many things, and could have one's heart in many places, which within primitive Christianity there could be no thought or talk of. It is this difference that makes modern Christianity into a different *[204]* religion from primitive Christianity.[*)]

If one comes with this problem in view to the correspondence between the two pastors, one finds indeed some hints that they have glimpsed it, but they have not put it in a decisive way and therefore not answered it either.

Rørdam is in embarrassment over the interval between death and judgment. This embarrassment does not exist for the New Testament, since the interval of time is presupposed to be quite short, and for many of the dying generation not to exist at all. There is, says Rørdam quite rightly (and Møller agrees with him in this), nothing said in the Bible about what happens in that interval, in particular nothing about a possible development of what was not completed in and with the individuals before their death. — But, it must be added, there was indeed also no reason to say anything about it, when no longer interval of time was presupposed to exist.

Sometimes there stirs in the two pastors, under the impression of the many ungodlinesses of the age, a presumption that the end is near. They agree that the signs of the times point strongly to the end, and that the world has grown old. But as good Grundtvigians they are then disturbed about what is to become of the Master's prophecies of the mighty development of the life of the people. There seems indeed to be growth; but

[*)] I have previously expressed myself on this question, first in the concluding section *Kierkegaard som Filosof* (1892), later in my *Religionsfilosofi* (1901). (§ 14. 59. 99. 123).

there is still a long way ahead, and at bottom it looks black everywhere now (1873). Hence it must seem that it is a long way to the end. Otto Møller declares also that when he agrees that the signs of the times point toward the end, it is only the head that con-
[205] cludes thus; the heart has no faith in the Lord's speedy coming, and it is also for his part the season of growth that Grundtvig inaugurated that he hopes must lead to something despite all obstacles.

To the life of the people, for whose future the two pastors hope in their hearts, so that it is only with their heads that they can hold fast to the great, all-conditioning hope of primitive Christianity, they undoubtedly reckon the life of the Church as well. They do not speak, however, of the ecclesiastical development too being broken off, if the Return occurred now. Not only culture and the life of the people, the Church too has arranged itself for the long term. There would be consternation among bishops, pastors and theologians, if the end came now. Thor Lange has in a little story ("Kommet igen." "Ude og Hjemme" 1882) shown how Jesus' return would cause disturbance in the existing Church. The Church has once for all stepped into Jesus' place and is not at all arranged for his taking the helm himself directly. Lange has set the scene in the Middle Ages, but the depiction fits just as well the Protestant Church, which has even arranged itself quite as cozily as the Catholic.

Some 30 years later the two friends again come upon the problem without noticing its sting. They wonder that no special ethics is set forth in the New Testament. Everything turns on awakening and nourishing faith in Jesus; then it is presupposed that with this the manner and direction of the conduct of life is also settled. Rørdam in particular occupies himself much with this. "There is here a good deal to think about, which I am far from having come to the end of, but which I toss about with on my morning walks."

The question finds its simple answer when one holds fast that faith in the New Testament is faith in Jesus as the one who will soon bring the consummation. That "the
[206] Kingdom of Heaven" is at hand is to be taken in the literal sense, despite the ecclesiastical reinterpretations. If so, life is borne by a great expectation, in comparison with which everything else pales. Inward solidarity among those who live in this expectation, and striving to spread it are natural consequences. But concerning social order, art, science one cannot expect to find anything in the New Testament, and one also finds nothing. The ethics of the New Testament, which Kierkegaard could not find in modern Christianity, and which Bishop Rørdam could not find in the New Testament itself, is the ethics of the expectation, which naturally could subsist only as long as the expectation was actual. The problem of the episcopal morning walks finds here its simple,

historical solution.

In his own way the pastor at Gylling comes upon the same side of the problem. He has brooded over the parable of the wise and the foolish virgins, which deals with those who wait for Jesus' return, and he has been halted by the feature that all the virgins, both those who had oil in their lamps and those who had none, fell asleep. This he expounds in the following way: "It is quite certain that no one can endure to live in uninterrupted expectation of the Lord's coming; it leads only to unhealthy and unnatural overstrain." Otto Møller starts here from the supposition that it is to be a long time that is waited in. Even a short waiting-time, when it is something great and absolutely decisive that is awaited, can seem long, since "hard times pass slowly." But the time until the return is presupposed precisely in itself to be short. In the short interval, of which there is talk in the New Testament, the expectation might very well hold out, and it did hold out in the first generation. Otherwise it must naturally go, when thousands of years pass, unsurveyable stretches of time, beyond which perhaps the head, but not the heart can see. But besides — one thing is to sleep, another is what the Church and human *[207]* beings have done in that interval, which indeed continues, namely to put force and interest into wakeful and living cultural work and human development and to have both one's heart and one's head occupied by it. Sleep is a rest that the first Christians needed like all human beings; they could very well from it, or from other rest, wake up to the expectation in which their whole spiritual life had gathered. More difficult is it to wake up from the cultural work in which Christians and non-Christians often take part with equal zeal. The duality, the opposition, and finally the contradiction between original Christianity and human culture could not be illuminated more clearly than by Otto Møller's exposition of the virgins' sleep. This duality is modern Christianity's real problem, however little consciousness of it there may seem to be among the Church's representatives.

The Catholic Church holds fast in its way to the ethics of expectation through the conduct of life of its monks and nuns. Therefore it sounds both from Saint Teresa in the 16th century and from Cardinal Newman in the 19th century: "What would the world become, if there were no monks!" And according to Pascal Jesus' agony lasts right to the end of the world, and one dare not sleep all that time![*)]. Only the living expectation's involuntarily transforming influence is here replaced by conscious asceticism. —

All ideal life is a life in expectation, and it has certainly (as I have already remarked in my Religionsfilosofi) been of great importance that the religion which got such great

[*)] Jesus sera en agonie jusqu'à la fin du monde; il ne faut pas dormir pendant ce temps-là! *Pensées*, éd Brunschwicg. Paris 1904. II. p. 435.

influence on Europe's spiritual life and the life of its peoples was from the first a religion of expectation. But in order to become the foundation for free human conduct of life
[208] the expectation must be tied to tasks on which one can work within the world that is accessible to human experience. It is a great, and often difficult shift of motive that must take place in the transition from Christian to human ethics.

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The reading of the two pastors' correspondence is of no small psychological and historical significance in the light it casts on modern churchmen's attitude, partly to their own doctrine, partly to connected circumstances. — I do not doubt that the most modern churchmen present other character traits. Time will show whether they will come to stand otherwise toward the problems than their predecessors.

It should still be mentioned that the two friends in their old age experienced something which, by the explanation of one of them, was connected with their life's work. — In Rørdam's last letter it says: "It has not gone with me as I had expected in my younger days, that as I grew older my capacity to rejoice in God and to look upward and forward with a living hope would grow… But of this I experience so little, not to say nothing." And Otto Møller answers: "I am no richer in it than you are… I feel so poor, tired and powerless, as surely no one can, and moreover it even seems to me that I am dull and do not feel it as humbling as I ought."

It is perhaps an experience which many old people must have, and which finds its natural explanation in declining vitality. But Otto Møller hints at an explanation that gets special significance by coming from a man who laid great weight on self-experience
[209] and serious appropriation: "Have we not perhaps talked and written ourselves tired?" — When it belongs to one's profession to speak again and again of things that have value only as objects of living feeling, the time will easily come when one notices that the inner life cannot keep pace with the forms that have been laid out for it, and disappointments of the mentioned kind will lie near. A Greek author has rightly said that from human beings we learn to speak, from the gods to be silent. A little holy silence might perhaps also do our most modern churchmen good.

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MADVIG AS A PHILOSOPHER

J. N. Madvig: Livserindringer (1887).
Supplementer til Livserindringer af J. N. Madvig. Udgivne af J. N. A. Madvig (1917).

It was of great interest to me to read the great philologist's autobiography, and no less the later published "Supplementer," which contain, among other things, his philosophical ideas and characterize his position on the religious problem. I never belonged to his closer circle, but in my younger days I repeatedly came into contact with him and had conversations with him about philosophical and religious questions. The hints he gave on such occasions have been confirmed and made clearer by the notes now available.

My first acquaintance with Madvig came when, like so many schoolboys, I studied his Latin grammar. It was naturally not always pleasant reading, but I remember from the later school years how, with great profit and with what I would now call logical and systematic interest, I gained an overview of his presentation of the syntax of the Latin language. It was, along with mathematics, the most instructive in formal respect of anything I came into contact with at school. And when I sometimes, tired of going from paragraph to paragraph, turned to the Preface and read his remark that "this grammar is written with a mind that allows the present life its full due, while it turns toward the *[211]* past as that whose rich inheritance we are to preserve," — then I caught a glimpse of a larger context, into which my school studies could fit, and to which they were to give me access. It is touching to me now in my old age to read that it was only reluctantly that he had undertaken to write a school grammar, "to attach his name to the school bench"; he no doubt knew how most schoolboys regard the author of the grammars they must be tormented with. He overcame this reluctance in recognition of the significance the work could have. But it was connected with something that even once led to a crisis in his spiritual life. The philological study, which he cultivated so fruitfully and so brilliantly, nevertheless stood before him as "the greatest and most deeply felt one-sidedness." Even in his older days he could not "bear to die leaving behind an unrectified idea of himself as an essentially exclusive philologist," — he wrote in the year 1869 (65 years old). But already as a young professor he felt (most acutely in the years 1830—32) in a painful way this one-sidedness. His poor circumstances in childhood and youth had not left him time for a free and general orientation in the domains of the life of the mind, or, as he expresses it, "for working upon the personality while surveying the

various interests of life and aspirations of life in relation to the particular calling and the particular task." There arose in him a strong feeling of the "inadequacy of his general-scientific and philosophical education," and "only slowly and gradually did he succeed in uniting the eager special study with a quiet occupation with more general questions."

There is hardly any doubt that this crisis was closely connected partly with his con-
[212] ception of classical antiquity, partly with the direction in which, according to his gifts, he could above all cultivate classical philology. He could not regard classical antiquity as the great model, "as a rule-giving, unattainable world of models," as the preceding age had conceived it, and as many of his fellow practitioners have later regarded it. In contrast to this he set a more sober conception. The culture of Greco-Roman antiquity stood for him as primitive in relation to ours; but precisely thereby it stood as simple and clear and as a significant foundation for later European development, a foundation that ought to be known at first hand by those here at home who were to have a more thorough education. This foundation required, in his eyes, supplementation, and he was one of the first here at home who demanded room in the school for a more extensive natural-scientific and mathematical instruction than earlier times have considered necessary. — But nevertheless it was not, in his work in the field of classical philology, particularly the cultural-historical side that he laid weight on. His epoch-making work went in the direction of critical examination of manuscripts and of text-critical studies. This work of procuring genuine and faultless texts, a work that is so necessary for a fruitful use of the old authors, was the chief work of his life, and his fame rests on it. Only to a relatively small extent has he contributed cultural-historical investigations, although it was essentially on this side of the classical studies that he grounded the necessity of a considerable place for them in the school. Men like Boekh and Wilamowitz, who quite especially occupied themselves with the literary and cultural history of antiquity, have hardly to so high a degree as Madvig felt the one-sidedness that so
[213] long tormented him. On account of the direction of their studies they have been better able to find points of attachment in the culture of more recent times, and thereby more directly to see the general significance of their special activity.

But apart from this, something stirred in him which, owing to the division of labor in the intellectual domain, must assert itself in every researcher, — a feeling that the subject one cultivates brings one into relation only with a single side of existence, — a need for a more many-sided content of thought than one's own subject can yield. Naturally such a need stirs more strongly the more specialized the subject is. But it can stir in all, in the philosopher as well as in the grammarian or the entomologist. In Madvig's case this

need led him first and foremost to philosophical studies. The Hegelian philosophy's speculative procedure did not satisfy him, although he himself at certain points had occasion to take an interest in Hegel's points of view, especially those of the philosophy of law and the philosophy of language. But he undertook a coherent study of Spinoza and Kant, and in his later years, when moreover his weakened sight made philological work more difficult for him, he occupied himself thoroughly with philosophical reading, or rather with hearing philosophical writings read to him. And he regarded it as a happiness that he could thereby "conclude and complete the spiritual content of his life," and that he had gained "peace to give himself up to contemplation of the deeper questions of life and existence." Also in other scientific domains he sought to orient himself. He heard lectures on chemistry with Zeise and let his friend the mathematician Jürgensen introduce him to the foundations of higher mathematics. These studies stood him in good stead in his activity as inspector of education at the higher schools and gave him a many-sided view of school questions. I once heard one of his mathematical *[214]* colleagues say that "only a colossus like Madvig" could have a judgment about all sides of the work of the higher school.

It was, however, not merely a need for a more comprehensive content of thought that stirred in him. What is perhaps most interesting in this universal researcher is the need for a formation of the mind that could permeate his whole personality — the need for what he himself has called "working upon the personality while surveying the various interests of life." In very many men of science, not only does the special subject stand isolated in relation to other subjects, but the whole content of thought stands remote from one's own personal life, as this is led outside the study or the laboratory. This duality Madvig wanted to get beyond. He wanted his thought-life also to develop his personality. He strove "to unite the need of thought for clarity with the inwardness of feeling and the demand of love." And this striving did indeed set its stamp on him, in the mild and truth-loving mind that revealed itself in his conduct. —

Let us try to gain an impression of the direction in which his reflection has moved. His notes are brief and fragmentary, composed in his heavy, but as a rule clear language. They give his provisional drafts. But a definite direction of thought can be traced clearly[*)].

Madvig's philosophizing led him early to dissociate himself from the speculative philosophy's attempt to derive everything from pure thought. The task of philosophy was for him to shape what is found in the world of observation into coherent concepts, *[215]*

[*)] In the following summary I have as far as possible retained Madvig's own expressions.

so that our own consciousness forms the starting point. Philosophy is clarification of our consciousness's undeniable content and pursuit thereof in all its consequences. And we never find consciousness without a definite content. The difference between our I and its content is not original. We find from the very beginning consciousness as double-sided, at once subjective and objective, and the task is then to go back to the most general form by the way of analysis.

We can sense or apprehend nothing without its appearing in difference or opposition to something else within the given, and it is precisely owing to such differences in the given content that we can become conscious of ourselves as comprehending these differences in unity. The ruling subject becomes conscious of itself as a unity over against a mobile and changing limitation. But within the changing content Nothing can be apprehended as really having happened except in connection with something Other that has previously happened, and in continuous connection with this. Such a continuity between every single fact and other facts is expressed in the concept of cause, which has its origin in the subject's basic consciousness, whereas each single cause and effect must be found by the way of experience. The first germ of the law of causality shows itself in involuntary movements, e.g. such as ward off an intervention; thereby it is presupposed both that a change can occur and that it can be prevented. All that thus asserts itself as a link in a continuous connection we attribute existence, the "to be." Thus everything we can know stands for us as part of a whole and becomes reality for us only thereby. And all becoming in the particular gets, through the connection in everything, influence on the whole.

[216] What we call possible or contingent is only that of which we have incomplete knowledge of all the conditions. Error proves itself practically by a contradiction between the action that certain ideas lead us to undertake, and its result, in that the expectation we cherished is not fulfilled. In error, but especially in doubt, we have the strongest proof of the independence of the life of the mind. The acknowledgment of something can be in conflict with reality, or we can even wholly deny or suspend our acknowledgment.

The law of causality holds also in the domain of the will. In every state in which one acts, the personality itself is a definite factor, which never becomes zero over against the influences coming from outside. The outcome of the decision is determined by the relation of strength between the personality and the influences. But perhaps not my whole nature comes to exert its influence on the outcome; in that case I can afterwards possibly react against it, which is expressed by the conscience making itself felt. True freedom consists in the ability to fight for the inner conviction about one's goal against

obstacles from other quarters. —

The mental and the bodily differ in that the former is observing, the latter only observed. There is no transition from the bodily to the mental, although the latter is throughout bound up with the former. But the mental comes not from outside into this connection. The mental and the bodily are two sides of the same. By way of analogy we find ourselves in continuous connection, not only with other organic beings, but also with what goes on in the chemical processes under the opposition of the substances and their interaction. In all chemical combinations there must, together with the combination of the elements, occur a combination of the elements of mind resting in these elements, and something of the kind occurs especially at the coming-to-be of the soul *[217]* in the formation of the organism.

Throughout the various forms of nature there can be traced, especially when we take Lamarck's hypothesis as a basis, an ascending series of stages from inorganic matter through the multiplicity of organic beings to the life of mind and love that can develop in the human world. And through all matter, bodily form and life of consciousness there unfolds a great will to existence. It is no violation of the high value of the mental as the innermost in man that the whole of nature is regarded as a striving toward this culmination. —

To these epistemological and natural-philosophical ideas is joined a series of thoughts on the foundation of the ethical.

Nor in this domain is pure thought sole ruler. A morality of reason can have significance only as clarification and rounding off of the life-drives that lie in human nature; in itself it would have no content. There manifests itself in man a willing, a drive to existence, not only to one's own existence, but also to the existence of fellow-living individuals. Both in sharing joy and in compassion it shows itself that the individual feels connected with other beings, especially those standing nearest. And when the understanding of the nature and circumstances of others develops, mere fellow-feeling becomes a total feeling, which manifests itself as justice. The law for the individual, which arises from this, is the expression of a divine will, of God's nature flowing into us; for this law indicates the definite direction of development for the whole within which man has come to be. Only in a developed social state can the sense of duty become firm and clear. It develops in interaction with the various forms of life that humanity through immemorial times has groping and tentatively formed and constantly forms *[218]* for a harmonious life together. Every moral judgment is grounded in the individual's relation to race, people and humanity, thus to the whole to which it belongs. What is

at issue is a harmony between the drive to self-preservation and the sympathy, both of which lie in man's nature. —

These epistemological and ethical reflections bear witness in all their brevity and provisionality that Madvig's thoughts on the whole moved in the direction of what, at the end of the 19th century, asserted itself in the philosophical field. The interest and goodwill he on so many occasions showed younger philosophizing researchers becomes thereby understandable. The younger man who in conversations with him came upon philosophical questions, got the impression of standing before a man who thought in an independent way. Publicly he did not express himself on questions of this kind, and especially not on his position on religious questions, the one which we will now seek to characterize.

In the autobiography he indicates clearly enough that his religious opinions more and more diverged, not only from the church's doctrine, but also from Christianity itself. As a schoolboy at Frederiksborg he discussed with comrades the difficulty for faith in revelation that lay in the fact that the revealed content had come down to us with the contingency and uncertainty that is bound up with all historical tradition. Especially emphasized are the critical and philological doubts concerning the text of the Bible. As a mature man and researcher he came, after he (in November 1848) had taken over the Ministry of Worship, to stand before preparing the fulfillment of the new Constitution's
[219] promise of a constitution for the Danish church. But he felt that he could not with confidence, firmness and seriousness lead negotiations in this direction, because he, although in his own way inwardly religiously disposed, did not stand on the standpoint of the whole faith in revelation. It was his duty to consolidate and build up; tear down and weaken he did not wish to; — and he feared to waver or to play the hypocrite. These scruples increased with the years. He was elected a member of the Church Commission of 1868, but thinks he would have done most rightly not to accept this election, because in the intervening years he had removed himself farther and more definitely from the firm ecclesiastical foundation. The consequence was that within the Commission he acted more conservatively than earlier, as he thought he ought to uphold the right of what exists.

What held him back he has clearly stated in the posthumous notes. He raises thus the question how a spiritual companionship between man and wife is possible in relation to religion, where the man is a philosopher and man of science. And when he felt the unhappy position between the recognized truth and the fear that to express it to others could work destructively without possibility of replacement and rebuilding,

he thought here especially of "near and dear beings, in whose feeling one ought not to intervene, because one does not know whether one can lead them consolingly and satisfyingly along new paths." What we here meet in Madvig is connected with the mild and soft in his character. And he has no doubt also felt that for a thinker the grounds are more important than the results, and that the results by those who do not understand the grounds are readily conceived wholly externally and dogmatically and are associated with the ideas that through centuries have become attached to heresies. He behaved searchingly and could only be understood by seekers — and how many are *[220]* they? It cannot be denied, however, that it would have been of great significance if a man with his scientific and social authority had freely and openly stated his views. Toward those nearest him it must nevertheless have been possible for him to procure respect and recognition for his personal conviction. There manifested itself here in him an anxiousness, which also marked his attitude during the great political struggle in the '80s.

In conversation he concealed neither his religious standpoint nor what held him back from expressing himself. When I in the year 1874 had given a lecture in the Students' Association on Darwinism and Philosophy, which was printed in "Nær og Fjern," he expressed in a cordial way his sympathy for my line of thought, adding that the thought of a Fall seemed to him absurd. Then he said with a sly smile: "But I dare not say that to my daughters!" Some years later I turned to him to propose that he sign an appeal to contribute to a statue of Spinoza, which with funds from all countries was to be erected at The Hague, and I reminded him that he had often spoken of Spinoza with great sympathy (a sympathy that now, through the posthumous notes, is fully understandable). He answered then that he had a scruple on account of the prejudice that was still harbored by many against Spinoza, and that there were considerations he was obliged to take. In order not to be misunderstood he explained that it was consideration for his home he was thinking of. Later he nevertheless decided to sign and got considerable contributions collected.

His great considerateness toward those nearest him has also been one of the reasons that he constantly went to church, which had the consequence that he was counted one of the Church's pillars. Yet the need not to separate himself from those nearest him was *[221]* not the only reason for his churchgoing. He had a need for fellowship[*)], and he was strongly captivated and felt strengthened by the organ-playing and the church singing,

[*)]When he (according to the funeral oration) also went to communion with his family, this too was out of a need for spiritual fellowship. He could have said what Rousseau said when he went to communion in Neufchatel, though for him it was a mere ceremony: Je suis avec mes fréres!

— just not by the sermon, as one sees from the following note.

"In church. Organ-playing and singing, well led and well executed, lift me into a mood in which there is at once a feeling of the life of humanity, longing, love and courage and a participation in the human life together of all times and places in spirit and love. But then comes the sermon with its so often halting and self-contradictory dogmatics, its obscurity and crooked conclusions. Only the purely ethical exhortation appeals."

Also in a statement, as it seems, written down later he sharply emphasizes the opposition between the mood-filled liturgy and the dogmatic sermon.

After reading these statements one gets a strange impression of the speech that was held at his funeral, and which the editor of the "Supplementer" has printed at the back of the book. He is praised here as the Church's faithful son. "Sunday after Sunday he sat here in the church in his accustomed place, while the Gospel was proclaimed." The preacher has lived in happy ignorance of what his most eminent hearer thought of his "proclamation."

Now it is indeed so that the great, often mighty poetry, which is formed in the ecclesiastical worship, is not the Church's property, but belongs to us all. It is the work of humanity, as all poetry is. Everyone has here, as in other spiritual domains, the
[222] right to take what he can use in his spiritual household. And it is likewise a natural need that one wants to share with those nearest what gives life loftiness and value for them. But misinterpretation lies near when one tries to take the kernel without making it evident that one is cracking the shell; the consequence is that one confirms others in thinking that shell and kernel cannot be separated. In any case one must hope that respect for the individual personality and its right to take its own standpoint in the questions of life will be acknowledged in earnest, not only in larger circles, but also in the most inward relations between people. Then an accommodation that conflicts with what personal truth requires will become impossible in the eyes of all parties. The more woman develops to be able to take an independent stand toward the questions of life, the more will also Madvig's anxious question, how a philosopher and man of science can have spiritual companionship with his wife, find its answer — of itself. —

Let us now see what thoughts were fostered about the religious problem in the great philologist's secret chamber.

The idea of God is due to a need for conclusion, for a last ground or cause, a dissatisfaction with the multiplicity of existence and its constant changes. But thought realizes that the concepts ground and cause only find justified application within the existence

given in experience. God can then not be sought outside the world, but must be conceived as the very unity and totality of existence, — as that which stirs in everything, in all thinking and willing, as in all movement. Only through its forms of manifestation and its activities do we know the Deity. To call it personal is unjustified, since the concept of personality presupposes a relation of interaction with something external and therefore fits only finite beings. The right concept of God is found only by seeing *[223]* the inner connection among all laws of nature and forces of nature and by heeding the direction of development that makes itself known in existence. He who is a link in the progressing development feels himself a participant in a great, universal striving, and this feeling is the religious feeling. Through it the sap of the whole tree of life streams into every bud and every blossom. But when thought tries in a graphic manner to express what lies at the ground of this feeling, it has only images from the finite world at its disposal. Thereby are understood the opposite impressions that the ecclesiastical liturgy and the dogmatic sermon make.

It is possible that most people cannot do without mystical and dogmatic forms of religion. But it is not certain that the Christian faith in its dogmatic forms has to a very high degree penetrated into the real consciousness of congregations and individuals; people lived and live rather in a general, more or less pure feeling of self-surrender to God and confidence, and only at certain times was fanaticism created for uncomprehended formulas and names.

This was a quiet man's quiet thoughts, sprung from deep longing for truth, but held back by tenderness toward those who thought differently, who stood near him. It must not be forgotten that the distinguished man's real strength found application in faithful work in other domains, and it is no wonder that he did not wish to let these fragments of thought come forth, he who otherwise with critical seriousness considered every line he wrote. He had the view that very few think things through on this point. Also in the thinkers and poets of the 19th century — Kant and Hegel, Schiller and Goethe — he *[224]* found unclarity in their relation to the Church. What has been — he asked — the real conviction and feeling among the thinking people who at all in the last century have dared to fix their gaze on this point? We go about disguised among one another.

By this last sentence (a quotation) I assume he means that when the great common symbolism that the Church has developed is given up as insufficient, there is no common language in which serious people, who deeply feel the riddles of life, can communicate with one another. In the negations one can meet; but they are, after all, not enough for a language. —

For my part I think that we owe Madvig's son thanks, because he has resolved to publish these "Supplementer," which are a new testimony that more brooding and thinking goes on in the secret chambers than is often believed. Behind the outer forms of the spiritual life there stirs in the best an inner life, which perhaps some day will be able to procure for itself forms of expression and forms of life. Yet there is hardly any possibility that the opposition between the outer and the inner life will ever disappear, and it was not to be wished either.

[225]

ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP

I.

The most discussed and at the same time most frequently misunderstood thought in Aristotle's Ethics is his determination of virtue, i.e. the sum of valuable traits of character, as the right mean between opposites. One has found a superficial middle-way theory therein and has not noticed that Aristotle by mean does not understand a mechanical average, so that, if e.g. 6 is too much and 2 too little, 4 should be the right. Since human individuals come with highly different need and capacity, the mean, that is, properly speaking, the harmony of the mental life's different elements, will get a different character for each individual. What is rashness in the one, can be cowardice in the other. It depends on what inner conditions the individual meets with. Just as the director of bodily exercises does not prescribe the same diet for all participants, but takes account of their bodily constitution, so one must in fixing valuable traits of character take account of the mental constitution. Ultimately it holds for each one to find his own right mean.

This thought has seldom found recognition in philosophical ethics, perhaps because it makes ethical questions much more difficult than most care to think them[*]. *[226]*

This regard for individual differences stands in peculiar opposition to the pronounced social character of Aristotle's Ethics. It is, after all, not said that because the individual succeeds in harmonizing his drives and capacities, he is therefore equipped to satisfy the demands that society and the state for their part make on him. It is perhaps for this reason that Aristotle in the closer carrying-out of his doctrine of the right mean involuntarily leaves the individualistic standpoint and applies a socially determined average.

But also from another side the question can be raised whether the individual can really be a closed, harmonious little world for himself. There could be elements in his very nature which pointed beyond this inner world. In Plato, who also will assert a doctrine of harmony, though not with the far-reaching recognition of individual differences as in Aristotle, there stirs decidedly such an element, namely Eros, the need to attach oneself to other beings or endeavors and thereby merge into a more comprehensive whole — a love relation, a life in social activity or in a world of thought. Where Plato, as in the "Symposium," lays such a need at the ground, he presents a quite different type than

[*]Cf. *Holberg*: *Moralske Tanker* (1744) p. 539: "One who has no gall cannot be praised for composure. To ride a feeble ass is no merit, but to govern a wild and spirited horse, that deserves applause and clapping of hands. This, however, people commonly do not take into account."

where the standpoint of harmony rules, as in the third and fourth books of the "Republic." In a more subdued, but equally principled form an analogous element appears in
[227] Aristotle. In the eighth and ninth books of his Ethics he speaks about friendship (filia), treating, on the whole, of a sympathetic relation to other people. It is a somewhat different ethical type that appears here than in the books that deal with the "mean." In the need for friendship, the sympathetic need, there is something that points beyond the individual and can hinder harmony, in that it ties man to other people, their weal and woe, their fates. Is it now certain that the inner harmony can be preserved when the individual is thus drawn out into a larger circle of interests and fates?

In the first book of his Ethics, which deals with happiness, Aristotle has noticed the problem and expressed it in a naive way, in that he, after having established that happiness presupposes a certain completeness and self-sufficiency (autarky), adds that this self-sufficiency does not mean isolation; it holds not for the individual in a solitary life, but also for his parents and children and wife, furthermore for friends and fellow citizens, since man by nature is a social being. But — now he becomes uneasy. A limit must be set here, for otherwise it goes on to infinity, since we should have to count ancestors and descendants and friends' friends in! — Aristotle stands here right at the problem. The question is, by what principle the limit is to be set — starting from the individual himself or from a larger circle and its conditions of life. Unrest enters the closed concept of happiness. — As we shall see, Aristotle returns to the problem in another connection — and precisely starting from the nature of sympathy itself.

I mention here in passing that the problem is sharpened in Stoicism, which will make the individual independent of others' wickedness and misfortune, and in Christianity, in that faith (as condition for one's own salvation) and love come to stand as opposites.
[228] Already among the Indians the problem stirs. The sage Bharata was just about to reach the highest perfection — but he missed it, because he pitied a little sick gazelle! — We need not go far to feel the sting of the problem. Who can feel happy when the greater part of mankind mutually destroy each other? —

Even if it is correct that there appears in Aristotle an opposition between sympathy and individual harmony, it is yet natural to ask whether there is not a standpoint from which Aristotle's conception of harmony among the elements of mental life as the highest trait of character can be seen in connection with the weight he lays on the relation of friendship in its different degrees and kinds. And such a standpoint Aristotle himself gives, and one that places us before one of the deepest thoughts in his philosophy and before one of the most beautiful and finest traits in his personality.

II.

Precisely the happy man needs friends, says Aristotle. And that not merely because having friends is the greatest of all external goods, but because the able and serious man needs someone to whom he can do good deeds. Man is, as Aristotle again in this connection declares, a social being, and happiness consists in activity, not in enjoyment. What a living Danish poet says: "I adjure you, friends, to love your happiness!" — agrees entirely with Aristotle's line of thought. Happiness was for the ancients a serious matter, a matter of will, one with the assertion of personality against the external and internal forces that could split life or make it one-sided. It must not be forgotten that the Greek harmony was won through struggle with chaotic forces, just as the Olympians had had to fight the Titans, and just as the Greeks had had to fight with the Orientals *[229]* before Greek clarity and harmony could come into being. Also in the individual great characters this must have been so. In his characterization of Socrates Professor Heiberg has shown how much indicates that the Socratic self-mastery was won through struggle.

And as happiness consists in activity, in the unfolding of the soul's powers, so friendship too reveals itself in an activity. Friendship is a virtue, or it presupposes virtue. It shows itself more in loving than in being loved. What use is wealth, power and honor, when one does not use these goods for an activity fruitful for others? And to this friendship gives the most beautiful occasion.

In the thought that friendship, like happiness and virtue, consists in activity, Aristotle finds the explanation of the fact that benefactors so often love those to whom they have shown a benefaction more than they are loved by these. The reason for this could, he thinks, lie in the fact that in him to whom they have done good, and in his welfare, they see their own work, in which they have laid down something of themselves. Our work is indeed a part of ourselves, a realization of our possibilities. We love our work because we love to act, and this again, because to be is to act. Therefore, Aristotle adds, artists love their works more than they would be loved by these, if they became living. And poets especially! They have an altogether excessive love for their productions. — Especially when the work has cost trouble, it will be an object of love. Therefore mothers are apt to love their children more than fathers do. Birth has cost pains, and mothers have a more emphatic knowledge that the children are theirs. So much, says Aristotle in another connection, can mothers love their children that they can hand them over to others, if it is best for the children. —

Already this whole line of thought shows that there is a connection between love *[230]* of others and love of oneself. One does for one's friend the good one can, and that for

the friend's own sake. But quite so stands the able and serious person toward himself, especially toward the best in himself, the life of thought. He wants to live in and with himself, in his memories and in his expectations, and he feels at home in this inner world. And quite in the same way he lives in his friends' thoughts, their joys and sorrows. The friend is an other I. One can conceive the relation to oneself as an analogy to the relation to one's friend, or conversely friendship as an extension of love of oneself.

When one blames love of oneself, it is because one thinks only of the self-assertion that manifests itself at the expense of others. But there is a love of oneself that consists in care for the most beautiful goods, for the development of our spirit and our character. Such a love of oneself can even lie at the ground of the sacrifice of life and property. One will then rather perform one great deed than many small, and in that one for one's country or for one's friends wins what is necessary for them, one wins the beautiful for oneself. (Necessary Aristotle calls what has value only as means, beautiful what has value in itself). Yes, a good man will even be able to renounce coming to perform a beautiful exploit himself, in order that his friend may come to perform it. He can find it more beautiful that his friend gets the honor than that he himself gets it.

A closer ground for this line of thought Aristotle finds in this, that we can better form a graphic image of others than of ourselves. We wish to see ability and energy, because life and happiness consist in vigorous unfolding, — and that we can see in our friends
[231] in common life and cooperation with them for human tasks. It is namely not enough to graze in the same field, as cattle do, side by side. Cooperation in theoretical pursuit is probably what Aristotle especially thinks of, but he sees that human cooperation can have many forms, and whatever common interest then operates, it can ground a relation of friendship. One can hold a feast together with one's friends, or play dice with them, or exercise gymnastically with them, or go hunting with them, just as well as one can philosophize with them.

He who is not a friend with himself can, according to Aristotle, not be a friend with others in the true sense either. There must be harmony in a person, in order that he may be able to come into harmonious relation to other people. And harmony here means in particular agreement between what man is and does, and what he wishes and wills. Without such an agreement life becomes split and restless, and a firm relation to others impossible. Only the "able and serious" person can enter into a true relation of friendship. In contrast to such a character Aristotle sets the "bad," who cannot be a friend with himself, because his life is split; he wills one thing and does another; from cowardice and sluggishness he never comes to carry out what he wills. Therefore

he finds no pleasure in himself and does not like to dwell in his own inner being, his memories and his expectations. If he seeks company with others, it is in order to forget himself. Real friendship he cannot enter into.

It is perhaps characteristic of Aristotle as a Greek, that in this connection he knows only two types, the harmonious and the disharmonious, and has an inclination to let the opposition between them coincide with the opposition between goodness and badness. He proceeds from the assumption that the bad man is always disharmonious, and turns it then without more ado around, so that the disharmonious person also must be bad. *[232]* But there are disharmonious, depressed, wavering and irresolute natures, who are indeed unhappy, but not "bad," and who may very well enter into a relation of friendship, when the other party has the right understanding. Although such a person finds nothing lovable in himself, has no sympathy with himself, cannot be a friend with himself, he can nevertheless, precisely on account of the contrast, understand, admire and love a composed and harmonious nature, especially when this meets him with understanding. Shakespeare has depicted such a relation of friendship. Hamlet loves Horatio, this firm, in spite of all suffering harmonious nature, and Horatio understood his friend and had discovered the noble heart in his split inner being. Therefore Hamlet also in his hour of death charges him to explain him and his cause to those who do not understand. An example from real life is Schleiermacher's relation to Friedrich Schlegel (in the latter's young, pre-Catholic time). In a letter Schleiermacher states that everything that seems erroneous, self-contradictory and wrong in Schlegel is connected with his circumstances, and that as the innermost in his poetry and striving something great, rare and beautiful constantly stirs. — The presupposition for a friendship between a harmonious and a disharmonious nature will precisely be that in the midst of the cleavage and contradictions in the latter there is discovered a striving, a working will, even if this is not able to reach up to the harmony that rules in the inner and outer conduct of more fortunate natures.

Had Aristotle held fast to his doctrine of the dependence of harmony, of the "right mean," on individual presuppositions, he could have extended his doctrine of friendship with an interesting section. It is not always the meanest and poorest natures that lack *[233]* harmony. It may be precisely the fullness, the many possibilities, the rich powers, that hinder unity and closedness. Perhaps this kind of nature is more frequent in modern times than in antiquity.

Aristotle has, moreover, himself in another section of his Ethics depicted a disharmonious nature, whom he in any case does not call wholly "bad." It is people who

lack self-control. Either they follow every impulse, without reflecting, or they do not hold fast the result of reflections at the moment of action. And yet they constantly acknowledge the right; the goal of their striving is good, but cannot break through in the individual moments. — Here was in any case a starting point for an understanding and a relation of friendship present, namely for him who could catch sight of the again and again repressed goal.

Moreover Aristotle himself comes to hint at a peculiar reason why unhappy natures so often are not suited for friendship. Manly natures, he says, do not want their friends to share their misfortune and grieve for their sake; it is enough for them that they themselves are unhappy. Thus also, we may add, disharmonious natures will shut themselves up within themselves, unable or unwilling to open themselves to others, and that precisely out of sympathy with those with whom they otherwise could have come into the most inward relation. In Søren Kierkegaard's Papers one can study this type, which presupposes self-control outwardly, though this is lacking toward the inner chaos.

III.

The noblest kind of friendship is according to Aristotle friendship of character, and in what precedes we have kept to this type. It has the firmest ground, in contrast to
[234] the friendship that is due to utility or pleasure. Utility and pleasure can change, and the friendship will fall away when the one no longer has any advantage from the other (just as the friendship of states ceases with the mutual advantage), or when charm, and with it infatuation, has vanished. Yet Aristotle holds that the friendship that is grounded on infatuation can more readily pass over into friendship of character than that which is grounded on utility.

A condition for perfect friendship is longer living together and cooperation, whereby the characters can stand their test. One does not know one another before one has eaten a certain amount of salt[*)] with one another. All that can bring about living together and cooperation can give occasion to a relation of friendship. Thus kinship, traveling company, relation of fellow citizenship etc. In the particular case friendship will get its own character according to the different social and political relations. —

Relations of friendship between unequals require a special investigation. A very great inequality in nature and circumstances, with excessive superiority on the one side, will make friendship impossible. Thus between gods and men. Although one therefore

[*)] Aristotle alludes to a well-known saying, which the Greeks already used. Salt was an expression of guest-friendship. In a later Greek author the expression occurs "to have eaten a bushel of salt together."

wishes one's friends all good, one will therefore not wish them to become gods. As regards men, the powerful man will easily obtain relations of friendship for the sake of utility and pleasure. But an able and serious man will not readily become a friend with one standing higher in power, unless this one possesses quite special traits of character, so that the admiration and love these awaken can counterbalance the inequality in the external circumstances.

Other relations of inequality — between older and younger, parents and children, man and wife, master and slave — nuance the relation of friendship in manifold ways, *[235]* in analogy with the relation between the powerful and the lowly. The relation between man and wife is thus compared with an aristocracy, where power is exercised for the benefit of the lesser party. The man rules by virtue of the dignity of his nature, but he grants the wife the influence that belongs to her; if he rules merely for his own advantage, marriage becomes comparable to an oligarchy. As regards the relation to slaves, Aristotle teaches that one can be a friend with one's slave, insofar as he is a human being, but not insofar as he is a slave. In his doctrine of the state he defends expressly slavery as an institution grounded in nature. —

Not least in this whole section one detects Aristotle's personal experiences. In the Platonic school, to which he belonged for twenty years, he was able to experience how friendship can be built up through common interests and labors, and how living together and cooperation can lead to mutual understanding of the characters. Also the relation between older and younger he was here able to see the significance of, and when he himself became head of a school, he has learned to know this relation from the other side toward his disciples. The relation to the more powerful he lived through in his position toward Alexander, whose teacher he had been, and Hermias, the ruler of Atarneus, who took him under his protection. From his will it is seen that he was a good husband and a good master toward his slaves.

Just as living together can call forth friendship, so duties and rights within the relation of friendship follow from the nature of the relation of living together. They are not the same within a traveling company, within a family life, within relations of fellow citizenship, within guest-friendship etc. Justice and friendship both come into being within relations of living together, and justice grows in refinement with the relation of *[236]* friendship, both as regards degree and form. A higher right holds between friends than between those who stand farther from one another. And at its culmination justice takes on the stamp of love.

This last utterance is probably to be understood so, that the perfect understanding

of individual character and individual circumstances, which the relation of friendship partly presupposes, partly conditions, makes possible a consideration of the individual personality's character and circumstances, which the justice formulated in general rules is not able to exercise.

Just as Aristotle here passes from sympathy to justice, so he conversely comes in the fifth book of his Ethics, which deals especially with justice, to the thought that the general laws can never exhaust all the individual circumstances and conditions of an action, but formal justice is supplemented or corrected by understanding of this individual side of the action, and the quality by virtue of which such a supplementing or correcting becomes possible, he there calls equity (Epieiki).

IV.

When perfect friendship shows itself in cooperation and in sympathy, it must be limited in extent. We have already seen how Aristotle from a quite different side, namely from the individual's happiness, comes to the necessity of a limitation of human sympathies. But the ground for this in the books on friendship is of special interest. Aristotle has a clear eye for the fact that in the domain of the life of feeling a law of inverse relation between intensity and extent holds. Therefore the number of friends must be limited.
[237] The individual cannot split himself, and at its culmination friendship can concern only a single person. To this it is added that our friends should preferably be friends with one another, and this becomes more difficult the more of them there are. This consideration Aristotle applies also to the number of citizens in a state, although there it is only a question of political friendship, which has a greater extent than personal friendship. There too there is a limit, and 10 myriads (100,000) Aristotle thinks are too many for a state. He lays in his doctrine of the state great weight on all citizens knowing one another. Furthermore he applies this consideration to a critique of Plato's communistic ideal of the state, according to which family life and property are abolished, for the ruling class, so that all who belong to this class can regard one another as brothers. The sympathy that can rule among men when all family bonds fall away will, thinks Aristotle, become very thin, like when one mixes a little bit of wine into a great quantity of water! —

We see here the Greek thought of the necessity of limitation from its most beautiful side. And we understand better Plato's and Aristotle's zeal for asserting the opposition between Hellenes and barbarians. It is through life in the narrowest and most inward human relations that human beings can develop to live with warmth and strength in the most comprehensive relations. If the general ideal of humanity is to lead to more than

slack sentimentality, it must work its way forward step by step. The ancient thinkers were right that the way goes through, not around, the nationalities.

Yet the decisive step beyond the national limitation was already taken in classical antiquity. In guest-friendship and in humaneness toward strangers, which already in Homer stands under Zeus's special protection, there lay from ancient time a germ that could later be unfolded. Aristotle recognizes the possibility of friendship between the *[238]* free and slaves, and since he grounds slavery especially on the fact that the barbarians are slaves by nature, this recognition leads beyond national limitation on an essential point. There developed toward the end of antiquity, under the influence of the social conditions that the conquests of Alexander and the Romans had called forth, a universally human fellow-feeling. It seems to have been the Stoic school through which this development came to consciousness, whereby it became possible that the Greeks' Latin apprentice Cicero could speak of caritas generis humani.