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[1]

SPIRITUAL CULTURE[1)].

All that in our day oppresses the human intellectual life can be derived from a single cause, which the development of intellectual life itself through the last centuries has brought with it. It is of greater importance to seek to find this cause than to complain of the externality of the age, its absorption in outward relations and tasks, of the excessive role that technology plays in all fields, or of the extravagant eagerness to get on in the world at any price. For the great energy that is unfolded outwardly need not lead to the inner life suffering harm. For my own part I must state that on my way I constantly meet many testimonies of spiritual sense, of an urge to immerse oneself in the tasks of the inner life and of earnest work to satisfy this urge, testimonies that in my eyes are of all the greater value as the conditions of intellectual life in many ways hamper the sense, the urge and the work alike.

The hampering cause I find, as I said, in something that spiritual development has brought with it, and which sets our time its most important problem. It is the intrusion of the division of labor into the spiritual domain that conditions the fundamental problem of spiritual culture in our day, just as its appearance in the domain of material
[2] culture sets the social problem in the narrower sense. In a wider sense the problem of spiritual culture too is a part of the social problem.

It is the dividedness within intellectual life that causes the difficulties. Science, art and religion stand more and more as independent, perhaps even contending powers over against one another, divide the mind in the individual and divide society into circles that often do not understand one another. Since the end of the Middle Ages this opposition has become more and more marked. In the great age of the Middle Ages thought, imagination and feeling worked together harmoniously, and the world of the spirit formed a whole that found its classical expression in Dante's great work. Such

[1)] Lectures in Kristiania, March 1912.

a work, in which all spiritual interests could at once find expression and satisfaction, is unthinkable in modern times.

Rousseau was the one who first saw the problem. It lay at the root of his watchword of returning to nature, a watchword to which he himself has given the best interpretation in the demand that man shall again become a unity: Rendez l'homme un! Schiller felt the sting of the problem, as is noticeable in his "Briefe über ästhetische Erziehung". Romanticism believed it had found the way back to the unity of intellectual life, in proclaiming that the highest science, the great art and the true religion were in their essence one, only different forms of one and the same spiritual content. This proclamation awakened in the various fields many germs to life and unfolding, but partly it moved too much on the dark paths of imagination and enthusiasm, partly it was quickly taken into the service of political and ecclesiastical reaction[1)]. And in the course of the nineteenth century the ways parted still more than before. Science — as natural science, historical research and philosophical inquiry — goes ever more surely and self-consciously its own ways, puts its questions more and more and demands its answers according to points of view that neither religion nor art knows. And art springs more and more from an urge to a life in contemplation and in mood, different from the life that is led where intellectual or religious interest rules. *[3]* Religion, finally, becomes more and more clear that it owes its existence neither to thought nor to the urge for images[1)], and since it nevertheless dare not give up its time-honored forms and institutions, it clings to these as an emergency aid, closing its eyes, consciously or unconsciously, to the other sides of intellectual life.

For my own part this problem has followed me since my youth. It was precisely in the last third of the nineteenth century — here in Denmark especially through Kierkegaard's appearance —, that the opposition between the various tendencies of intellectual life became so strongly marked. I dare not say that I have reached any solution that can have general significance. But there are thoughts that have ever more pressed forward and won confirmation for me, and which I shall here seek to develop. And there are tracks that I consider worth following.

Rousseau already saw that the opposition between nature and culture falls away

[1)]Cf. on various circumstances contributing to this: *Mindre Arbejder. Første Række.* p. 202—209.

[1)]The Catholic Church does not acknowledge this at all. It finds the most important cause of Modernism (the tendency that would rely exclusively on psychological motives and historical investigations in the treatment of the religious problem) in this, that in one's blindness one no longer acknowledges the validity of the proofs of God's existence as the great scholastics of the Middle Ages set them forth. An interesting and substantial account from the Catholic point of view is given by *Anton Gisler: Der Modernismus.* (Köln 1912).

when culture itself stands as an unfolding of nature. Thus all forms of spiritual culture, science, art and religion, must in the end point back to the human personality, its urge and its capacity. From this source culture is renewed again and again in the course of history, and there is no other source of renewal for it. It is personal powers that work in all three spiritual domains, powers that cannot work unless there constantly also stirs a personal urge to release them. It is then a standard for a tendency in spiritual culture whether it can demonstrate its connection with the capacity and the urge of personal life. I therefore consider the three forms of spirit from this point of view.

[4] In my Helsingfors lectures, which have appeared in Swedish under the title "Personlighetsprincipen i Filosofin" (Stockholm 1911), I have treated some of the questions discussed in what follows from another side, starting from the principle of personality and showing its relation to and significance for science, ethics and religion. I now seek in what follows, conversely, to show how science, art and religion point back to the principle of personality. The two modes of treatment supplement each other, and by the nature of the case related thoughts will emerge through them.

I

Scientific culture presupposes, like all true culture, independent, personal work with the problems of life and of existence, the great as well as the small. It cannot come into being through mere tradition and instruction. Strictly speaking it is only the great pioneers of genius who possess true scientific culture; they produce or discover the presuppositions, the foundation, on which the following ages work. To draw conclusions or make special applications of presuppositions that have already been laid down is not so original a mental work as laying down these presuppositions themselves at first hand. But it is nonetheless always a work that demands independence and into which personality must be put, a work that stands high above mere appropriation and assent. This last again stands above pure reception in trust in the correctness of tradition.

The further a piece of knowledge stands from the original source itself, the more it stands as something foreign to personality, perhaps even as something hostile, something that conflicts with what personality itself in its spontaneous yearning seeks to hold fast, and therefore as something it seeks to push aside or to forget.

Here lies a great problem. Not all can draw knowledge from its first sources, and yet knowledge has value only as self-won. It is incumbent on those who are to spread

[5] the knowledge they themselves have acquired in a more self-active way, to awaken a

work of thought that makes the appropriation as independent as possible. Only then does the great wonder arise that is not merely the beginning of wisdom, and only then can the significance of science for personal life become clear. For this significance does not rest on the mere results, which can perhaps be communicated quite apart from the ways by which they were won, and which are often valued only on account of their practical significance. But it rests first and foremost on this, that science is the human mind's own work, which it will not in the long run be able to deny.

The whole of modern philosophy is in a certain way a great labor to demonstrate the connection of science with personality. The question here has first and foremost been this: what mental powers does science lay claim to, — what presuppositions does it rest on, — and what demands does it make on us? — Kant became the real founder of the theory of knowledge by raising these questions. And he found that what is at work in scientific work is nothing other than what is at work in all mental life, from the lowest to the highest. Everywhere a striving manifests itself to gather and order the manifold influences to which a living being is subject. In the coming into being of the simplest sense-image as in the highest art, in elementary perception as in the most stringent inference, one and the same fundamental form asserts itself, in that coherence and unity are striven after. It is the spontaneous mode of working of intellectual life that we here confront, and it is the philosopher's task to become clearly conscious of it and to point out the more special forms in which it appears. It is then precisely the task of science to work at asserting the unity of personality over against the multiplicity that existence presents, and the demands that science makes on us therefore do not fall outside the domain of personality, do not come to it from there as from an alien power. It is a significant side of personality's own nature that is satisfied through scientific work.

While the philosophical tendency stemming from Kant, the so-called criticism, lays the weight especially on the forms in which the work of thought proceeds, *[6]* another epistemological tendency, the so-called pragmatism, emphasizes the interests and ends that at different times and in different domains set the work of thought going. All science develops first out of practical interests, out of a striving to find means for the preservation and development of life. Later a purely theoretical interest may arise, and it then determines which questions are to be raised and how they are to be formed. This tendency too, then, points back to personality, to its ends, its interests, and that, at least apparently, in a more direct way than criticism.

The difference between the two tendencies is chiefly this, that the one lays the

weight on the constant forms of the life of thought, the other on its constantly changing interests and tasks. The one is inclined to believe that there are certain forms of thought ("categories") that can be found once for all and that stand firm once for all; the other is inclined to believe that with the interests the forms too may without further ado change.

Interest and form cannot be separated in the life of thought. There is one great interest that sustains it, the interest in truth, and no other interest can in the long run oppose it or lead around it. And what truth is, the truth that a human being is to be able to attain, — that follows from man's own nature, from its necessary striving after unity and connection. What man seeks, when he seeks truth, is the greatest possible connection between the greatest possible number of observations. The work of knowledge therefore goes in two directions: to gather or produce as many observations as possible, and to demonstrate as intimate and law-governed a connection between them as possible. That is the great ideal that has once and for all appeared before the race, and which it cannot deny. It leads to ever renewed striving and work. Every claim to have found truth in one field or another is judged by the standard that this ideal contains[1)].

[7] Just as in ethical self-control we bend our momentary and elementary impulses under the law that is given with our ethical ideal, so in intellectual self-control we bend our favorite opinions, fancies and wishes under the great law of truth. As a great natural scientist has said: "Should we not be ashamed in our inmost heart, if we caught ourselves wanting a truth other than the real one?" —

But it is not thereby given that this standard can be applied to everything that stirs in personal life. The forms with which science can work at a given time do not contain everything that personality experiences and learns by experience. Science seeks a great, comprehensive connection, within which personality too is to find its place; but the content of personality can be so rich and manifold that that connection comes to stand as abstract and empty over against it. Content and extension here come, as so often, to stand in inverse relation to each other. Every distinctive personality has its own special, individual experiences, which no other can have, and is therefore

[1)] It is on account of this line of thought, which was first set forth in my program on "Filosofiske Problemer" (1902), later in "Den menneskelige Tanke" (1910) p. 257—265, that in the Catholic work mentioned above (Anton Gisler: *Der Modernismus.* 1912. p. 406 f.) I am counted among the "Modernists"; the decisive thing is "the fateful error" that truth is no longer defined as the agreement of knowledge with its object. Yet I am there placed closer to pragmatism than I in reality stand. Cf. "Den menneskelige Tanke" p. 270—273.

more than an example of a general law. There is that which we must experience and learn by experience at first hand in order to be human at first hand. Is there any other form of spiritual culture in which these purely personal experiences and practical experiences can find expression?

This question leads over to a consideration of art and of religion.

II

Science is a work of personal labor, and only in so far as it is so is it a link in true spiritual culture. Personal life itself, out of which science springs where it is practiced at first hand, is one of the objects of science, belongs within the great connection that *[8]* it is the task of science to explore; but here there is always something that cannot be wholly converted into scientific form. The most special and individual experience of life, the one that must constantly be had anew, by the same human being or in a new generation, always under new conditions, — it stands always with a certain independence over against the science that its own time is able to offer. Is there then any form of spiritual culture that can provide form and expression for it?

And besides — even if our experiences fully enter into the great world of truth on which science builds, there will still be an urge for a more immediate expression of them, an expression in which all sides of our being, hope and fear, longing and melancholy, joy and sorrow, come to speak and are allowed to stir over against what we have experienced.

By both paths we are led over to art. It is an essential side of its task that is indicated by them.

A very living and intimate relation to art cannot be said to belong to our time. Original production is not great and not profound. Great artistic powers are not noticeably in motion. And for the strenuously working and pleasure-seeking people of our time art is essentially diversion and relaxation, a means, not something valuable in itself that attracts and develops by the very demands it makes.

In a certain sense art is indeed to be a means. It is to satisfy the urge for images that show us life in its fullness, without the demands on thought and will that real life makes being directed to us. It is to present to us the purely individual moods, characters, situations and fates that science cannot let come into their full right. It marks a great advance when life can be enjoyed in an image; it is a sign that the blind urge of life is not autocratic, — that in any case there are pauses in its working. Whether rules or exceptions are expressed in the images presented, art itself cannot

decide. But it is precisely the sharp opposition between rule and exception from
[9] which we are for a while freed in art. There is nothing absolutely ugly. Everything has its characteristic side, by which it fills a place in the great connection. Here nothing is left out. Even the most fleeting is held fast, even the saddest is softened, even the extravagant is harmonized through a characteristic form.

Even more than for the beholder, art is a liberation for the artist himself. It presupposes, in the first place, a free use of mental powers, a release of energy, without the practical demands of life immediately occasioning it. And it makes it possible for the artist himself, even more than for the beholder, to rise above all that can oppress and ensnare. Through the series of great artists' works their personal development and struggle in life can be read. Modern literary psychology has the merit of having brought forward this point of view, on which, however, it perhaps lays too great weight.

But like science, art makes its demands, and without that it would not be a link in spiritual culture. These demands are made on personality itself, both the beholder's and the artist's. Work must be demanded, in order that it may be the real content of life that is converted into the image or rediscovered in the image. It is (as Poul Møller stated in his review of "Extremerne") a sign of the dissolution of an artistic period when poetry is cultivated and known at second hand, so that a mere spectator's life is lived, without real experiences forming the ore that is hammered out into the works of art. Later Kierkegaard, in what he called "the aesthetic stage", described a way of taking life that makes everything play, both life and art. And Henrik Ibsen in the great poem "Paa Vidderne" — the counterpart of "Brand" — has described how one can withdraw from life and see it as if in bird's-eye perspective, as a picture within whose frame even the fate of those nearest becomes merely an effective element, — and how a spiritual petrifaction, an abolition of all feeling and all striving, becomes the consequence. As in "Brand" the unbridled willing that merely follows the law of formal consistency leads up into the barren mountain desert, so here it is the will-lessness produced by losing oneself in mere contemplation that leads to the same place.

[10] Like science, art too is a domain that sets us great ends, in whose service we can grow. It is to open our eyes to what we do not like to see, — the bitter, painful and disharmonious in life, — as well as to what we cannot always catch sight of ourselves, — the great and lofty, which we perhaps did not believe was possible. In great art man does not run up onto the heights to escape being part of life, but has his sense

and capacity freed, purified, widened, so that a larger view and a firmer grip on life become possible.

But in the end everything rests on the art of life. Only when life is strong and great can art be so. The more vigorously and earnestly we take life, the greater possibility of poetry life will contain, a poetry that does not come from outside but is a resonance released by the great movement of life itself, and which we feel, if not in the midst of the work where it is born, then at least in the times when the after-swells of the moods of work and struggle fill the mind.

We must ourselves become artists if we would know what art is, just as we must ourselves think if we would know what science is. Life-poetry is the spring from which the great artists draw, and from which we can all draw when our mind is opened to it. It is no doubt only genius that can shape images and symbols that can become the property of all, but we can all — as surely as our personality and our life has its distinctive nuance, its particular fate — shape images and symbols in which our experience finds expression, and if we are wholly bereft of this capacity, we do not understand art. Aesthetic culture demands self-activity, like all true culture.

But now the poets complain that they cannot express everything, especially not the most glorious, — that they cannot draw life itself into their poems! There are, laments Schack Staffeldt, two worlds that cannot be united, and between which one must choose.

> None binds the image to the thing,
> None the ideal to its imprint:
> Between vision and possession life hovers;
> Choose, for only the one is given thee.
> (Den unge Digters Klage).

Guyau describes the poet's suffering (Le mal du poëte) at reality's being richer than *[11]* the poem:

> Je me sens trop petit pour l'immense univers . . .
> Je sens trop pour le dire, et pourtant le silence
> M'oppresse comme un poids.

Nietzsche places life above art, as he places art above science: the overflowing fullness and power of life can find complete expression neither in art nor in science!

But in such utterances lies precisely the experience that the deepest poetry is one with life itself and is therefore not felt as an element distinct from the conduct and course of life itself. If all the bound force were released, life would stop at once. We need not choose between vision and possession, when possession, life itself, gives birth to the highest visions.

Though our circle be small and the reach of our will limited, the conditions of human life nonetheless manifest themselves in the small as in the great. And often the greatest images of life, of its course and its worth, have sprung from human fates that were outwardly inconspicuous, to the astonishment of those who did not believe that anything great could come out of Galilee. In each of us life stirs — when there really is life in us — in a way in which it stirs nowhere else.

The master of all masters has this in view when he says (A. Winters Tale):

> Above the art
> That, as you say, helps nature on,
> There stands an art that nature has itself created!

It is this nature's own art that stirs in, or is spontaneously practiced by, everyone who lives life wholly and fully and in accordance with his inmost personality. — Can there be any spiritual form of life that surpasses this in value and in significance? Should it not be the case that our deepest personal experiences and practical experiences, as well as our highest thoughts, we can express only in poetic form? — Before we
[12] answer this question, we must examine the position of religion in relation to spiritual culture.

III

It is in the religious problem that the consequences of the division of labor for spiritual life appear quite especially. The independence that science and art have each attained in modern times they have won at the expense of religion. For there was a time when religion was the epitome of men's entire spiritual culture. Either it was so that it was the one thing needful, against which all else that, spiritually speaking, could lay claim to men's hearts stood as worthless or even as a hindrance to be pushed aside. Or else it was so that religion itself within its frame satisfied all spiritual needs, — at once satisfied the urge for knowledge and the artistic urge. So it is no longer. Religion has got science and art outside itself. From this comes precisely the dividedness in modern life. If religion is not now to have life outside itself as well,

it must ever anew proceed from life, from the personal experience of life in individuals. Just as little as one can have real science or art at second hand, just as little, and still less, can one have religion at second hand. Each must be his own priest, just as his knowledge and his poetry must be self-produced. Even the most venerable traditions are not enough. They stem, moreover, from times when quite other conditions of spiritual life prevailed than in our day. Religion must spring anew from the inmost of each single personality, from the experiences and movements of life that he alone, and no other in quite the same way, has gone through. It is uprightness and honesty that matter first and foremost, and they first become possible by going back to the inmost source, in personality, of all faith and all view of life.

I take religion here in the widest sense, as covering all personal faith or view of life. I speak of something that concerns every human being's personal relation to life, not merely of religion in the sense of a faith shaped in definite traditions, dogmas *[13]* and cultic customs.

But what, then, has philosophy to do with it?

Philosophy cannot produce faith, either in the wider or in the narrower sense. Faith is itself one of the objects of philosophy. The philosopher asks, in the first place, whether any faith or religion can solve the riddles of thought. He asks, in the second place, what mental powers and what mental urge come to light in religion. And he asks, in the third place, what significance religion can have for an ethical conduct of life.

Let us consider these questions each by itself.

* *
*

As soon as the philosophy and science of modern times were founded, their spokesmen declared, in the face of the attacks from the side of religion, that religion was not science and could not teach us science, and that from the religious side one ought therefore to let science go its own way and by its own paths. Utterances in this direction came from Giordano Bruno, whom they nevertheless did not save from death at the stake, from Galilei, whom they nevertheless did not rescue from condemnation and enforced recantation, and from Spinoza, whom they nevertheless did not rescue from persecution. What one would not hear then is now repeated again and again by the defenders of religion, when these do not belong to the Catholic Church. Only the

Catholic Church sees clearly what is dangerous, for all dogmatically shaped religion, in such a concession.

It is not, as is often thought, the results of science that are decisive here, however important they may be, as the names Copernicus and Darwin will already remind us. But the decisive thing is the manner of asking and the demands that are made on the answer. The answers religion gives do not fit at all the questions science asks. Properly speaking religion gives only a single answer, no matter what questions are asked. It solves all riddles by a reference to divine omnipotence. In his "Dialoger"
[14] Galilei puts such an answer into the mouth of the one of the interlocutors (Simplicio) who defends the old conception of the world. In the face of the difficulty in the old world-picture, that the whole world should revolve around the little globe of the earth, Simplicio says that it is after all easy for God to let the great move around the small as center. But to this his opponent remarks that in relation to omnipotence all difference between great and small falls away, and that it is precisely for this reason that the concept of God cannot be used in science. If one appeals to a miracle, all knowledge ceases; all differences and relations vanish before the infinite.

When we go beyond the domain within which our thoughts and our expectations can be confirmed or contradicted by strict observations, we build on analogies that can have only figurative, symbolic significance[1)].

If the value of religion rested on its theoretical or intellectual significance, it would soon vanish from the world of the spirit. For those who ask clearly it gives no answer to a single question. Therefore, too, (especially in the Protestant world) the discussion of the religious problem has passed over into psychological and historical research.

* *
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What keeps religion up, and constantly brings about new adherence to its traditional forms as well as new attempts at the making of religion, are motives that belong not in the domain of knowledge but in that of feeling and will. And the deepest motive consists in an urge to have assurance of the constant persistence and unfolding of what makes life worth living. What is the highest for a human being will, he hopes in his religion, also be the highest in the world, or it will at least have its firm ground
[15] in existence and will triumph, in us and outside us, however it may go with all else. Such a hope, held fast through life and with clear understanding of the course and

[1)] Cf. the essay on the concept of analogy in *Mindre Arbejder. Anden Række.*

fate of the world and of life, as the individual knows it or at least thinks he knows it, — is the religious primal phenomenon, which can take countless different forms, and which must take different forms in the different personalities.

When one calls one religion or faith higher or lower than another, the only possible standard is to be found partly in what it is that man attaches so great value to that he hopes for its persistence, but partly also in the weight and range of the experiences he has at his disposal, and in the energy with which the hope is held fast. — These are precisely the points of view that the historians of religion, without always being conscious of it, apply when they undertake a valuation of the various religions in relation to one another.

We saw, when we spoke of science, that there always remained individual and special experiences and practical experiences that were bound up with the individual's inner and outer circumstances of life, and that could not be exhausted by scientific points of view. To these belong now, first and foremost, the experiences that lie at the root of a man's faith. But it is of the greatest importance that man should have his experiences at first hand and not receive from tradition or dogma direction as to what he shall try to experience, which easily leads to one's forcing oneself into a spiritual form of life that does not suit the personality, and thereby shutting oneself out from bearing the witness about life that it is the task of genuine religion to bear. Echo is to be avoided, in the domain of faith as well as in that of art and of science.

* *
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Where religion (faith, personal view of life) has come into being as the fruit of a life in the service of great ideals and in the work of holding them fast through the course of fate, there we meet the image of a spiritual power and concentration, of an inwardness and a self-containedness that gives great religious personalities a place *[16]* among the greatest in the world of the spirit.

And here lies in my eyes the decisive problem. Can this inward and concentrated kind of personal life be preserved on the same conditions and in the same forms as in past times, and if it cannot, must not new forms arise for such a life, if spiritual life is not to lose in power and in depth?

In my view we stand only at the beginning of an unbiased, profound and purely human treatment of these questions. Dogmatics and criticism have each in its own way hindered such a treatment. The powers have been taken up partly with shaping

life after traditional models, partly with working their way out of traditions. Now life itself must first have its say and testify to its real urge, to what one needs in order to hold the highest values fast through the vicissitudes of fate. It is hardly the same that is needful for all.

On a railway journey in Jutland I once heard a peasant explain to another the difference between theology and philosophy thus: "Theology is superstition, philosophy is unbelief." — I answer this only on behalf of philosophy.

Philosophy is for me nothing negative, but a free inquiry into the nature and conditions of spiritual life. And it points clearly for me to what the conditions are for the continued persistence of a deep and vigorous spiritual life. But since the philosopher is not a prophet, he cannot guarantee that these conditions will actually come about. Since such a spiritual life itself belongs to what is of highest value, it is the philosopher's personal hope that it will ever anew unfold itself. Its greatest enemies are stubborn clinging to forms that belong to a vanished spiritual culture, and blasé indifference to what lies beyond the circle of the narrowest interests[1)]. But
[17] if it proves possible to preserve the inwardness and self-containedness of spiritual life, it will find its expression, not in dogmas or systems, but in the symbols of a great and genuine life-poetry. And then the unfortunate effects of the division of labor in the spiritual domain will be overcome. The divided powers will meet when they each in its own domain go back to the source from which in the end they all spring and are nourished.

[18]

[1)] What Tegnér said almost a hundred years ago still holds:

Det murkna gamla, det omogna nya
med blind förbittring kämpa nu om verlden.

A PHILOSOPHICAL CONFESSION.[1)]

In the program of the philosophical department of Harvard University, 1904—1905, it is announced that one of the philosophical professors [William James] will develop a theory of pluralism on the basis of experience, and that in the next term his colleague [Josiah Royce] will develop a speculative theory of the absolute; and it is remarked that "the student will have the opportunity of comparing two different views regarding fundamental problems: radical empiricism and absolutism."

It is not very often that philosophical differences are announced so openly and in so true a spirit of free discussion. As I had myself discussed the fundamental problems in a little book ("Filosofiske Problemer", university program 1902, translated into German 1903, later also into English), and as I, during my visit to Harvard in October, 1904, was very much interested in the discussion which was about to take place in American philosophy, Professor William James proposed that I should give a lecture for his students, in which I should describe my position on this question. The present paper gives the essential content of my lecture, but I have also found a place here for some parts of a paper which I read for the Philosophical Club at Wellesley College.

[19]

I

The importance of pluralism, i.e., of the tendency to accentuate the multiplicity and the difference of phenomena, depends on its power to raise problems. Both thought and sensations suppose difference, contrast, variation. In the psychology of our time Fechner's investigations especially, on the relation between physical impression and psychical sensation, point in this direction. And our thought starts with greatest

[1)] Combined from two lectures, at Harvard University and at Wellesley College, in the autumn of 1904.

energy when two judgments, each of which seems well founded, contradict one another.

I believe there is special reason for accentuating this point in the actual state of philosophy. There is much metaphysics in the air, and we are on the way to forgetting what we have learnt from positivism and criticism. The old English school had the mission to keep the attention of philosophers on experience, and it started the great movement against dogmatism. It is no accident that the great setter of problems, David Hume, belonged to this school. In evolutionism this school has said its last word—the widening of the concept of experience to connote not only the experience of the single individual, but the organized experience of the whole species. We may hope that a new, refreshing start will be made.

Pluralism makes the world new for us and necessitates a revision of our categories, our principles and our methods. A dogmatic sleep is too tempting for the human mind. We are inclined to suppose that we can develop—or perhaps already have developed—thoughts in which all existence can be expressed. But, as a Danish thinker, Søren Kierkegaard, has said, we live forward, but we think backward. Understanding comes after experience. Only when life is closed can it be thoroughly understood. This is our tragico-comical situation. Even a divine thinker could only understand the world when the life of the world was finished.

II

But pluralism as such brings no understanding. To understand is to connect one fact with other facts, to find a uniting principle. Multiplicity as such would only
[20] make description and classification possible, and even this only under the condition that the manifold phenomena were not only different, but also similar. The only meaning of "understanding" which pluralism can acknowledge is understanding as mere recognition, not as derivation or explanation.

Very often we must be contented with stating a single, isolated fact. But then this fact at once raises a problem—even by its isolation. We have an interesting example in the botany of our time. The Dutch botanist, Hugo de Vries, maintains that new types can arise suddenly. Great variations—not small, as Darwin thought—are, according to de Vries, the condition of evolution. But, if this is so, it ought to be[1)] the task of natural science to explain how this arising of a new type was possible, to find the

[1)] See *Hugo de Vries*: *Die Mutationstheorie.* I p. 366; II p. 662.

hidden conditions for that which was for our observation a sudden appearance, to discover a continuity between it and other appearances.

Now, it is a fact that we in many cases have found such connection or continuity in nature. It is the ideal of knowledge to find it in all domains of observation. Our mind can only understand by synthesis, and the principle of continuity is therefore the presupposition, the working hypothesis, of all science. Therefore we must also acknowledge continuity as a characteristic of reality. We have no right to suppose that the fact that we can not understand phenomena, if we can find no connection or continuity, should be without ground in reality itself. If we will build our philosophy on experience, we ought to give full importance to connection, unity and continuity, as well as to difference and multiplicity. Experience shows us both, and pluralism can, therefore, not be the last word of the philosopher. And there is an inner connection between continuity and multiplicity. All qualities, powers and characters which we ascribe to the single elements or beings which pluralism acknowledges are only known through the connection of these elements or beings with a whole order of things. We can, for example, only ascribe energy to a being because we experience that it actually does a certain work, that alterations in it or out of it have their cause *[21]* in it. If it were absolutely isolated, we could not ascribe any predicate to it, we could not know it at all.

Perhaps it is impossible to develop a metaphysical theory which shall give both facts their full right. But this ought not to lead us to forget the problem.

III

I, for my part, call myself a monist, because connection and continuity seem to me to be more important facts than multiplicity; it is, as I have shown, only through their connection one with another, that things can be understood. Every difference and multiplicity supposes a deeper continuity, which it is our task to discover. But as an absolute monism can not be carried out, I call myself a critical monist, the word "critical" being taken here in the same significance as when Kant called his philosophy critical philosophy. A perfect and universal synthesis is for us always an ideal which has to struggle for existence. Every totality we find in nature has always a history; it has developed through interaction of elements and supposes differences in the nature and the tendencies of the different elements. As a critical monist I say: If we can not carry out our monistic ideal, the reason could be that reality ("world", existence) is not finished, is yet in full development. Only if we could think this development

completed in any time, would the world be quite intelligible. There is at least one thing which is not completed: our thinking; and this is also an element in reality! It is the wonderful contradiction of the great rationalistic systems—Plato's, Spinoza's and Hegel's—that they can not explain the striving and struggling thought whose work these systems themselves are.

The incompleteness of thought, the necessity of always renewed striving after truth, has, perhaps, its cause in this, that new elements may arise in the world. It
[22] would, then, not only be we who discover something new, but it would be the world itself, which was renewed and had to bring its new elements into harmony with the older. And there would then be an inner connection between our struggling thought and the essence of reality. This is my metaphysics, if I have one. —

The problem also of mind and matter is perhaps conditioned by the incompleteness of our knowledge. There is no necessity for a choice between spiritualism and materialism, if mind and matter are not supposed to stand in a contradictory (two-membered) opposition one to the other. This contradictory opposition is often quite dogmatically assumed. But existence may, as Spinoza taught, have more forms, qualities or attributes than our experience can show us. Critical monism points to the possibility that we have not all conditions given for solving the problem.

IV

That an absolute systematization of our knowledge is not possible is no evil. The history of philosophy shows us that systems have more energy, depth and freedom in their first stage, in statu nascenti. According to that treatment of this science which of late years is more and more general, the history of philosophy is more and more the history of the starting, of the impulses of thought and of the leading experiences of great thinkers, not only the description of the completed systems. And even in its completed form a system is only a means to understand ourselves and the world. It is an essay which will try the strength and importance of certain ideas or certain experiences. The great systems are projections, electric search-lights, with whose help we try to explore the dark.

But the thought with whose help we find our way through the world is itself only a part of the world, and we do not know how important a part of the world it is. Can the whole content of the world be translated into thought? Can we, as metaphysical idealism would do, conceive the world in its innermost ground as an expression of thought? To me it is evident that all such idealism is founded on an analogy which

can not be verified. We can only use analogy scientifically when we apply it to throw light on one domain of experience with the help of another domain of experience. Here a verification is possible through the consequences to which the analogy leads *[23]* us; we can see if these consequences agree with our progressing experience. But when we maintain an analogy between a part of existence and existence considered as a whole, no verification is possible. Analogy transcends here very soon the limits of science, and has only poetical value, if it has any value at all. It may be sublime poetry, if the metaphysician is a man of genius—poetry of a more intellectual, though less emotional character than the poetry of the great popular religions, which also are founded on analogy.

I correct myself: we ought not to say "only poetry." Our deepest life-experiences can only be expressed in poetical form. There is a life-poetry which is a very serious thing, the most concentrated expression of the experiences which can be made of the value of life and of life's endeavors.

V

Our thought is both larger and smaller than reality. It contains forms and possibilities which never are fully realized. It develops hypotheses between which we have to choose, as only one of them can be true. In order to reach the aim of knowledge we must try several means, survey the possible ways. The progress of knowledge consists, from this point of view, in the reduction of these possibilities, perhaps in the exclusion of all except one. Existence or reality is in every single case one single definite thing, is one in opposition to our many possibilities. As Schiller says, Eng ist die Welt und das Gehirn ist weit. — But from another point of view the world is richer than our thought. It contains the possibility of experiences which have not yet been made. New discoveries and experiences lead again and again the thought on new ways. Thought is, as already said, only a part of the world, and there are always more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy. Here, then, we can say the reverse of Schiller, Weit ist die Welt, und das Gehirn ist eng.

This incommensurability, or this (in a mathematical sense) irrational relation, between thought and reality will always be experienced anew. Our intellectual labor *[24]* will always have to progress on the one side in simplicity and concentration, and on the other side in complexity and extension.

VI

My sympathy is more on the side of positivism and empiricism than on the side of speculation; and in methodological—in a certain degree also in metaphysical—respects I have a sympathy with pluralism.

I will now say a few words on the way in which my thoughts have developed in this direction.

In my youth the influence of Søren Kierkegaard was decisive for me. He waged a passionate war against speculation, with strong accentuation of the conditions of thought and of the value of the real, personal life. Later on the study of Comte and of the old English school gave me a new start in the direction of a philosophy of experience. And my own more independent studies have maintained me on this way. In this last respect three points have been of special importance for me.

My psychological studies led me to accentuate the differences between individuals in respect of the relations between psychical elements. Even if these elements could be said to be "the same" in all individuals (which only to a certain degree is true), the manner in which they are combined, the "timbre," will be different. The general psychological laws manifest themselves in many different forms in the individual cases. There is here a multiplicity which no analysis can exhaust. In my Philosophy of Religion I have more specially pointed out the great importance of individual and historical differences, and I have described the most important types of religious life. We still miss a comparative human psychology. The study of individual differences is only in its beginning.

Also my ethical studies have led me in this direction. The problems of scientific ethics are of two sorts. The first task is to find and establish the ethical principles, the standard we are to use in valuing human actions and institutions. Already, here in the
[25] starting-point, great personal and historical differences make a scientific foundation of ethics appear as a great problem. And even if this first difficulty is conquered, a second problem arises: how are the general principles to be applied in the special cases? Human individuals have different powers and dispositions and start their development under very different social and historical conditions. They can, therefore, neither qualitatively nor quantitatively have the same tasks and the same duties. How can we be sure that the right sort of work is chosen? And how can we be sure that sufficient work is done, that "the quantum satis of human will" has been applied? Also here new experiences are still possible, and with them new problems. —

The third point belongs to the theory of knowledge. I saw—what others had seen before me—that Kant has not solved Hume's problem, and that this problem is still

standing. It is a necessity for our thought to apply the law of causality; but this does not justify the assertion that this law is universal and metaphysically necessary. We may construct the concept of an ideal, complete and perfect experience, and for this experience the law of causality would have universal validity. But the experience which we really have is limited and imperfect. New observations are still made, which are to be connected with our earlier observations. This contrast between ideal and real experience—and with it Hume's central problem—was undervalued by Kant's speculative followers. At the end of the nineteenth century the problem was taken up, not only by philosophers, but also by men of science. It is now more and more admitted that the importance of scientific and philosophical principles consists in this, that they lead us in our striving after understanding. Their truth is their validity, and their validity is experienced in their power of leading us in our intellectual work. A principle is true if it can be applied, if we can work with it, i.e., gain understanding with the help of it. Truth is a dynamic concept; it manifests itself in the working of our thought. And it is a symbolic concept, because it only presupposes an analogy, not an identity between thoughts and events. This holds of the truth of our sense-qualities; they have objective value as symbols, but can not be proved to be images of things. It *[26]* holds, too, of the truth of our formal-logical principles, of the principle of causality, etc. We can not compare our sensations and our principles with an absolute order of things. Surely we have no right to regard it as a pure accident that just these special sensations and thoughts make it possible to gain a progressing knowledge; but neither have we the right to regard them as direct revelations.

VII

Where we can not apply the principles of our thought we end with a problem. And, so far as pluralism can and must be maintained, so far as the events and elements remain isolated and unconnected, so far we have unsolved problems before us. But pluralism would lead us to false supposition if its meaning were that the value of a phenomenon is diminished when it can be understood, i.e., brought in rational connection with other phenomena. If we specially consider personal beings we must admit that every personality is a little world with its inner order, its law of development and of interaction of psychical elements. No character without an inner continuity! And this little world can not maintain its value without standing in interactions with other personal beings as elements in a social totality. Our ethical endeavor is to produce greater continuity in the inner world of personality and in the greater world

of society, as our intellectual endeavor is to find a still greater continuity in the world at large.

And here lies for me the great importance of irrationalism or pluralism, so far as we must acknowledge it. The world is not complete, not harmonious, not rational; therefore there is a work to be done. A little American girl who had been told that God created the world once for all, asked her mother: "But in what business is he then now?" ("But in what business is he then now?"). This was a quite philosophical
[27] question. There is perhaps in the world at large a great work going on, through which it is developed to greater rationality and harmony. But for us it is of the greatest importance, that there is a work to be done by us, that our own work in thought and action is a reality, a real factor in a great process of evolution. There is here an analogy between the problem of knowledge and the ethical problem, which agrees with their standing as the two chief problems of philosophy.

[28]

THE CONCEPT OF WILL (1905).

THERE is a peculiar dispute about the will in the psychology of our time. On the one side it is denied that the will can be maintained as a distinctive standpoint for conscious life, a distinctive side of it, or an element in it, — however one may wish to put it. On the other side it is asserted that the will designates precisely the most fundamental standpoint from which conscious life can be viewed; conscious life is willing from first to last, so that sensations, ideas and feelings too become intelligible only in their connection with the will. The first school goes back historically to Hume and is represented in recent psychology by Münsterberg, Ehrenfels, Ebbinghaus and Lapie; the second is proclaimed by Fichte and Schopenhauer and is represented in recent psychology by Wundt, William James, Fouillée and Jodl[1]. I side with this latter school, and in this essay I shall try to give the grounds for my position.

The problem is closely connected with the position of psychology as an empirical science. It can be put thus: can a willing be the object of a single and immediate observation? And if this question must be answered in the negative, is it then justified to set up the will as an independent standpoint for conscious life? — My position is *[29]* that I answer the first question with No, but nevertheless answer the second question with Yes. I thus agree with the first school in its premises, but deny that it draws the right conclusion from them, because it overlooks certain fundamental facts.

When we keep to what immediate and single self-observation presents, we always find only sensations, feelings and ideas. What we call phenomena of will appears with peculiar sensations of unrest, of yearning, of a straining of force that we seem to put in, of energy that we seem to expend. They are sensations that are more restless,

[1] Cf. also *Ernst Mach*: *Erkenntnis und Irrtum.* Leipzig 1905. p. 21 f. (Later note).

less in equilibrium, than sensations of color and tone, but not different in kind from these in principle. They can be taken as sensations of movement. Sensations of muscular tension. As soon as we merely think of an action we have a mind to perform or are on the point of performing, various muscles are tensed and a corresponding peculiar sensation arises. In the moment of decision this sensation is especially strong. Alongside it there appear here ideas of aims and means, of ideals and norms, of obstacles and effects; but these ideas develop quite like other ideas and do not seem able to lay claim to a special chapter in psychology. Further, we observe feelings of pleasure and pain, of hope and fear, of enthusiasm and disgust, and so forth; but all such things belong to the psychology of feeling. — Is this analysis exhaustive, or could something have been overlooked?

In my view something very essential has been overlooked. It is correct that, if by analysis one understands the turning of attention upon single definite points, each of which can be considered in a certain isolation, we always find in psychological analysis only sensations, feelings and ideas. But we have then let abstraction begin too early. A fundamental fact has been overlooked which, to be sure, cannot be the object of a *single* observation. Our sensations, feelings and ideas never occur isolated
[30] in reality. In actual experience they are like drops in a stream, and it is the *direction and speed* of the stream that determine the mutual relations of the drops, and thereby also determine, more or less decisively, the nature of each single drop. What is really given is not a chaos of isolated elements, but groups and wholes which are always, more or less markedly, directed toward a certain aim, toward a definite point, whether this is itself an object of consciousness or not. In no state of consciousness whatever is this orientation lacking, this being set in a certain direction. But a direction cannot of course be apprehended by a *single* observation, only by holding several observations together. By counting the drops in a river and making a catalog of them we should not discover that the river has a definite direction. If psychological analysis is to bring out all the facts, it must not forget this most essential of all psychological facts. It was Hume's one-sidedness that he could not see the wood for the trees, and this one-sidedness flourishes among his modern successors. And yet, when we look closely, the growth and form of the single tree are understood only through its place in the wood. The analytic method must be supplemented by a genetic one, which is not content with what reflection can separate out at stages where growth is far advanced, and where the apparent independence of the single elements can therefore more easily deceive. If by a psychical element one understands everything

that observation leads us to distinguish as something that cannot be derived from anything else in consciousness, then the constant direction of conscious life is just as much an element as the single sensations, feelings and ideas in their isolation. There is a constant interaction between the direction of the stream and the nature of the drops, but the direction can no more be derived from the drops than they from it. The direction is the historical element in mental life. It determines from first to last what becomes end and what becomes means, — what is striven for and what is shunned, — what becomes aid and what becomes obstacle. Our various sensations, feelings and ideas stand at very different distances from the central determinateness of direction, or, as we may call it, the original and constant urge and striving; but their mutual *[31]* relations, their inner nature and often their very existence are determined by their relation to it.

Able psychologists naturally cannot overlook this. But when they acknowledge it, and yet deny the independence of the element of will, they fall into decided contradiction with themselves. Thus *Ebbinghaus.* As "special elementary forms of mental life" he assumes only sensations, feelings and ideas. Phenomena such as willing or striving are only "peculiar combinations of sensations, feelings and ideas" and offer "nothing new" in relation to these. (Grundzüge der Psychologie I, p. 168). But although he denies that acts of will are "fundamental phenomena of mental life in the sense in which sensations or ideas are so", he nevertheless admits that they are "the fundamental forms of the unities in which alone sensations, ideas and feelings originally occur in reality"; although "conceptually" they are not something ultimate and original, they nevertheless are so with respect to time and origin (zeitlich und genetisch). ib. p. 561; 565.) — To this I remark: 1) How can it be said that acts of will offer *nothing new,* when they nevertheless consist in *peculiar* combinations or unities? Whence does this peculiarity derive? 2) What difference can one make between *fundamental forms and elementary forms,* or between fundamental forms and *fundamental phenomena?* Must not the fundamental form in any case belong to the fundamental phenomenon, so that the latter can neither exist nor be understood without the former? And should not a fundamental form that expresses itself in everything from the simplest to the highest mental phenomena rightly be called an elementary form? 3) If sensations, feelings and ideas originally have *reality* only in the combinations or constellations that we call acts of will, then those three kinds of "elements" are mere abstractions when we consider them outside the connection in which alone they are real! Atomistic scholasticism is put in the place of empirical

psychology. An atomistic theory can have its methodical justification; modern natural
[32] science is a great example of it. But it must first be shown that any result whatever is attained by introducing this mode of consideration into psychology, and even if it is, one must always distinguish between a mere working hypothesis and an exhaustive explanation of what is really given.

According to the conception of the will that has been put forward in the foregoing, and that even Ebbinghaus, though an opponent of "voluntarism", acknowledges, the will is intimately connected with the whole nature of conscious life, provided it is correct that this nature shows itself in a synthesizing activity, a synthesis, which can be traced in all sensing, all remembering, all thinking and all feeling, as well as in all willing. If the will is the most marked expression of synthesis, and if on the other hand synthesis is an activity, a function, then it is even justified to say that consciousness in its innermost essence is a willing. It is this standpoint that I have taken as the basis of my Psychology. I have tried to show that sensing, thinking and feeling are not understood without this original and constant element of activity, so that the whole of psychology — even if in its form of presentation one follows the usual threefold division — is in reality a psychology of will. At every point within the psychology of knowledge and of feeling we come back to a fundamental activity and a fundamental urge as the ultimate presupposition. The concept of will implies in particular that this synthesizing activity always (from its very first beginning, which is one with the beginning of individual conscious life) goes in a definite direction, inasmuch as the kind and extent of the synthesis are conditioned by a single element around which the concentration takes place. The concept of will expresses conscious life more from the real side; the concept of synthesis characterizes it more from the formal side.

An analogy, which is perhaps more than an analogy, we have in the fact that, even from a purely physical point of view, the directions of motion in nature are just as original as the forces and atoms we presuppose. At no point in the development of nature have we the right to presuppose an absolutely resting chaos. Certain directions must always be presupposed in which the forces act and the atoms move, and these directions cannot be derived from the atoms alone. In every given or presupposed
[33] state the atoms move in definite directions and with definite velocity; this is the historical element in nature, which natural science since the time of Kant and Laplace has more and more acknowledged. And the very properties that it ascribes to the single atom we infer from the whole connection in which the atom stands, and from

the way in which it is supposed to intervene in this connection.

However one conceives the relation between consciousness and the organism, it is clear that it is through the nervous system that consciousness and will can exercise an activity in the material world. The significance of nervous life lies partly in its centralizing function: through it the organic functions can cooperate in a more perfect way than would otherwise be possible; partly it lies in its capacity to store up energy, which can then later be released under definite conditions and in definite directions. Already in a purely organic way, in growth and in the first involuntary movements, there is expressed here too an original direction of movement, which can be altered by the external conditions, but is not from the first produced by them.

To me it now seems the most natural thing to assume that what for self-observation is a process of consciousness is the same as what for physical and physiological observation is a material, organic process. We must take good care not to ascribe absolute validity in nature itself to the distinctions we must make in order to see clearly, although of course we cannot take it for an accident that we must make certain definite distinctions in order to understand nature rightly. And if what we psychologically call will should, in its innermost ground, be connected with the energy that acts in the organism, the originality of the element of will would be evident. But even apart from all speculation on this question, this originality will, I maintain, be clear already on purely psychological grounds.

Psychological terminology is unfortunately still so variable that it can sometimes *[34]* look as though psychological disputes were only a dispute about words. One might, e.g., say that I take the word will in a wider sense than various other psychologists, and that the settlement of the whole question rests on a definition. It is clear that the fewer marks a concept has, the greater the totality of phenomena for which it can hold. Content and extension stand in an inverse relation to each other. If, in order to assume a willing, we demand no more than what can be shown even in the most elementary phenomena of consciousness, it is a matter of course that the concept of will acquires a very great extension. About words I will of course not dispute. But the point is that the narrower, and still more the narrowest, sense of the word will entails arbitrary and unnatural distinctions in a domain where exact observation shows a continuity that reaches ever deeper. It shall now be my task to show this, beginning with will in the narrowest sense of the word and passing step by step to the more elementary forms.

Some psychologists — in the most extreme form *Paul Lapie* in his "Logique de la

volonté" (Paris 1902) — will speak of will only when an action is preceded by two consciously formed judgments, one of which declares an aim worth attaining, and the other that the means of attaining it can be procured. I will something when I am clear that I *should* do it and that I can do it, or, as Lapie expresses it: Une action est volontaire, quand elle est préjugée bonne et possible. The nature of the will depends entirely on the processes that precede it, and Lapie draws from this the consequence that the will is really only a special form of the intellect. Even psychologists who do not go as far in the intellectualist direction as Lapie would restrict the concept of will to such actions as are performed with clear consciousness of aims and means. Thus A. F. *Shand* in his excellent essay "Types of Will" (Mind 1897) and *Pierre Janet* in his work "Les obsessions et la psychasthénie" (Paris 1903), epoch-making for psychology and psychiatry.

[35] Now there are not many actions that are performed with full clarity about aims and means. The horizon of the will is always limited, and clarity in any case has many degrees. Both the range of the experiences that come to influence which aims one sets and which means one finds, and the degree of strength with which these experiences assert themselves, vary infinitely. But what I lay special weight on is that it does not always make an essential difference whether what asserts itself in us and determines our aims and our means appears in the form of conscious judgments or not. We are inclined afterwards to express in the form of a conscious judgment what in the moment itself appeared as an estimate or as an immediate perception (an intuition). That an explicit judgment is formed means only that a given content becomes the object of clear and distinct consciousness; it is the conversion of a mental content into a new mental form; — but no change in principle of the content necessarily follows from this. And besides there are — as I have shown in my essay "Det psykologiske Grundlag for logiske Domme"[1)] — intermediate forms between immediate perceiving (sensing, remembering, fantasy) and judging; especially to be stressed is what I have called articulating perceiving, where the bringing out of a single element leads to a shift or transformation of the perceptual image without the setting in of the dissolution and analysis that is the condition of judgment. Such perceiving can have greater value and practical significance than an explicit judgment, in which what is gained in clarity is often lost in energy. We really pass an explicit judgment only when we can no longer find vent in mere perceiving, or when there is a doubt to overcome, or when an urge to communicate with others stirs.

[1)] Det kgl. danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Skrifter. 6. Række. Hist. og filos. Afdeling IV, 6. (1899).

It is in any case not necessary that two judgments be passed. When I feel the value of something, a striving to acquire or produce it will arise, and when the means lie ready to hand, or when the recognition of the valuable involuntarily (as by a kind *[36]* of instinct) releases the movement in its direction, one judgment, the judgment of value, will be enough; the other (the one we may call the judgment of possibility) will not be necessary.

The next step will be to maintain that not even the judgment of value is necessary. It is not necessary that the recognition of the value or the setting up of the end take place with full consciousness. The valuable can stand before me in a great image or a thought that becomes the star I steer by, and that immediately, without any analysis and any judgment, gains power over my striving. In such cases the Danish word Drift applies. (The German "Trieb" is ambiguous, whereas the French désir and the English desire, as well as Spinoza's cupiditas, correspond to the phenomenon in question).

We see how many nuances there are, and how unnatural it is to point to a single point on this whole scale (two judgments — one judgment and an involuntary striving — the end given as an image) as the one where a wholly new concept should come into force.

But we are not yet at the end. The concept of impulse implies that an end appears before us, even if it is not formulated by an explicit judgment of value. Logically speaking, the concept of value does indeed underlie the concept of end, since we make something an end only because it has value; but psychologically speaking this positing of ends precedes the judgment of value, just as practice precedes theory. That we ascribe value to something we discover from the first only by having made it an end. There is, moreover, a still more elementary form of striving for something that proves to be valuable than impulse. There need be no consciousness of the end at all, but an obscure urge leads in a definite direction, inasmuch as it does not allow a halt before an aim not known beforehand has been reached. Through a series of involuntary releases of energy the individual is carried forward to a more or less valuable result. Such a union of urge and capacity without consciousness of an end we have in instinct. (Where the urge occurs without the capacity, it perhaps leads to action, but it then becomes more a matter of chance whether anything valuable is *[37]* attained, that is, something that, when consciousness awakens, can be set as an end). Such an urge (Spinoza's appetitus, Fouillée's tendance) would be the most elementary form of what we, in the widest sense of the word, could call will. I do not see that in this whole series — from the urge to the decision determined by the judgments of

value and of possibility — there is reason to set up absolute boundary posts.

Of the greatest psychological interest, but at the same time most enigmatic, is the transition from urge to impulse, or from the involuntary to the voluntary (if by voluntary action one understands an action that is conditioned by the idea of an aim). Here again there are many degrees of clarity as regards the idea of the aim, right down to the threshold. The more dim and obscure the idea of the end becomes, the more we pass over from impulse to mere urge. It can often be difficult to decide whether an idea of an end has been present at all, and great problems thereby arise for self-examination and for moral self-scrutiny. Read, e.g., in Søren Kierkegaard's journals (for 1849) his repeated deliberation, swinging back and forth, on the question whether his manifold activity as an author was preceded by the idea of a definite ethical aim that he meant to reach through it. But apart from this difficulty a psychological problem appears: how it comes about that something becomes an end for us, that is, how the transition from the involuntary to the voluntary takes place. This transition must of course take place involuntarily: the first end is not derived from any other end. Only later can it happen that we make something an end because it is part of an end set up earlier, or a means to its attainment. But the first end — what Dante has called "the first thought of the will", — cannot be derived in this way. It is at this point that we approach the original direction or tendency in our mental life pointed out in the foregoing, the
[38] ultimate foundation of the will. If our being, before the first idea of an end emerges, were entirely indifferent or neutral, it would be entirely impossible to understand how we could set ourselves ends. It is otherwise if mental life, even before it has the capacity to form ideas, has an original direction, a yearning or striving, that can be promoted or inhibited by the experiences it undergoes. The condition for anything at all being able to acquire value for us is that we will something even before we know what we will. Thus we must conceive the state of animals during instinctive actions (insofar as we can imagine it at all). The state need not be wholly unconscious. The urge can be felt even if what it aims at is not felt. Goethe goes too far when he says: "Der gute Mensch in seinem dunklen Drange ist sich des rechten Weges wohl bewusst." It is really a self-contradiction. What Goethe meant to express is the security with which one can abandon oneself to an obscure urge, without knowing whither it leads in the involuntary selection of means and ways. Helen Keller (the blind and deaf-mute American student), on the other hand, has aptly described her state before it dawned on her that other people had a means of communication other

than the finger language: "Before I knew that a deaf child could learn to speak, I felt dissatisfaction with the means of communication I already possessed. One who is confined to the finger language alone always feels a constraint, a limitation. This feeling began to make me uneasy; there came a painful, goading sensation of a gap that had to be filled. My thoughts often rose and would work their way up like birds against the wind, and I constantly used my lips and my voice" (Story of my Life, p. 58 f.). Two elements in the urge are brought out here in an interesting way: an indefinite feeling of a lack, and an involuntary, instinctive release of movements. Had these conditions not been present, the news that the method of speech could be applied would not have struck her like lightning, as she later relates. In an instant the end emerged into consciousness. When Schiller rightly says that man grows with his greater ends, it must be added that man must have grown in order to be able to set *[39]* himself greater ends, indeed, in order to be able to set himself ends at all. It is not only at the first stages of the volitional life that we are compelled to go back to the obscure world of the involuntary, if not of the unconscious. It may also become necessary in the midst of the development of the clear volitional life. When deliberation leads to a point where a choice must be made between two ends, each of which has developed and taken root in the soul, the issue can often be settled only by one of them having a stronger hold in the obscure urge that lies behind all values and all ends. If the struggle between the conscious ends has been fought out without a settlement, a new power must step forth and throw its weight into the scale. Perhaps man thereby makes progress in self-knowledge, as he now discovers elements in his being that he had not known before, or that only now had grown so strong that they could have a say. (Cf. on this my Psychology VII B, 1; 4—5). New formations can occur in the domain of the will, just as in the domain of feeling and of fantasy.

Philosophers have laid different weight on the transition from urge to impulse, from the involuntary to the voluntary. Some, such as *Spinoza and Schopenhauer,* lay no weight at all on this transition. "Whether man is conscious of his urge (appetitus) or not", says Spinoza (Eth. III, def., expl.), "the urge remains one and the same". And according to Schopenhauer "the will to live" is unalterable and the same in men and animals, although man can become conscious of it and the animal cannot. This conflicts with experience, since it is often a significant turning point when the direction of the urge is recognized, and when aims and means can be represented. Extension or limitation, alteration or consolidation thereby becomes possible; perhaps even a whole metamorphosis of character is initiated. It is inconsistent of Spinoza and

Schopenhauer to deny the significance of that transition, since they both, each in his own way, lay so much weight on the metamorphosis, the spiritual deliverance, that can take place precisely through the influence of the conscious life of thought and
[40] feeling. In sharp contrast to them J. G. *Fichte* has ascribed an absolute significance to the transition from the involuntary to the voluntary. It is a miracle, a transcendence, when the first end is set. "The urge (Trieb) itself is not my product, but the product of nature… But the urge comes to consciousness, and what it is to effect in this domain lies in my power… Here lies the transition of the rational being to self-activity; here lies the definite, sharp boundary between necessity and freedom… The form as urge *with consciousness* is due to the free act of reflection; but that an urge exists *at all* is due to nature" (Sittenlehre 1798, p. 159 ff.) With what right the transition from urge to impulse is called "a free act of reflection" is not easy to see; before this transition there is, after all, no reflection present at all[1)]. The transition takes place involuntarily, as Aristotle and Dante already saw. The enigma does not thereby disappear, but one does not solve the riddle with the catchword of a free act, and one has no right, at this point of the development of the will, to posit a gulf between two domains as opposed as "necessity" and "freedom" are supposed to be according to Fichte. There is no reason to assume a break in continuity here. The enigma that remains concerns not only the psychology of the will, but also, and in quite as high a degree, the psychology of ideas.

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It would be wrong to divide the phenomena of will into two mutually exclusive kinds, involuntary and voluntary. For not only does the transition from the involuntary to the voluntary take place involuntarily, but in the so-called voluntary actions a greater or lesser fullness of involuntary moments always co-operates. It is not least here that the intellectualist theory of the will shows itself in all its insufficiency. With
[41] full clarity we never act, and what conditions the outcomes of our will can never be exhausted in definitely formulated judgments. From this derive the many problems of the volitional life, which will constantly give both the thinker and the poet new work. Even in our most conscious actions, then, the urge to release stored-up energy

[1)] Fichte states (Sittenlehre p. 35 f.): "Der schlechthin angefangene Zustand wird nicht schlechthin an Nichts angeknüpft . . . Nur wird er nicht an ein anderes Sein angeknüpft, sondern an ein Denken." — But surely there exists no thinking before the first thought has arisen! And if there existed a thinking, it would surely have to concern something definite, and so be an actual "being"!

co-operates. Without a surplus of energy no action is possible, and the direction in which the release takes place is determined partly by sense impressions, as in reflex movements and instinctive actions, partly by ideas, as in impulses, partly by judgments, as in deliberate decisions. And all these forms of will act together in our conscious actions, with all possible degrees of clarity and strength, all possible relations between the central and the peripheral in us. The involuntary can exist without the voluntary, but not conversely. The development from the elementary, involuntary willing to the willing founded on deep self-understanding often takes place amid great conflicts and fluctuations, and it takes place in different forms in different individuals. There are many dangers on this road, many possibilities of morbid and one-sided development, but on the other hand there also shows itself here the great wealth of variety of human mental life, which is still so little acknowledged — or known — by our ordinary morality. Only a comparative psychology of will, when we once get one, will be able to do full justice to the actual volitional life. To one point only shall I refer here: the inverse relation between strength, certainty, concentration on the one side, and fullness of content and a comprehensive horizon of will on the other. Every time the horizon is widened, the possibility of a crisis arises at this point. Here the volitional life stands in the closest interplay with the other sides of mental life.

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The will stands in intimate connection with the feeling of pleasure and pain. The relation is not only that pleasure and pain determine the direction of the will, become its "motives", but also the converse, that we feel pleasure and pain at what respectively promotes or inhibits the fundamental direction of our life. And this latter *[42]* relation is the most primitive. It gives us the only possibility of understanding in some measure the biological significance of the feelings. Just as sensations of sense have their biological significance as signals of what is going on in the surrounding world or in our organism, so feelings of pleasure and pain are symptoms of whether our striving is advancing or receding, in the simplest case a striving to live, to persist, the one Hobbes called conatus primus. Through our feelings we thus come to know our innermost willing. Tell me what you rejoice over or grieve over, and I will tell you what you will! An evolutionary mode of consideration leads us to divine, if not fully to understand, the significance of the feelings. In the most elementary beings neither

symptoms nor signals are available. For them it is a matter of being or not being, of living or dying, without their feeling beforehand in which of the two directions their life is moving. The rise of the feeling of pleasure and pain marks a higher type of life, since the symptoms make it possible to alter the direction, or to hold to it and quicken the pace, according as the demands of life require. As an English investigator has put it: substitution of pleasure and pain for life and death as the sanctions of conduct! *(Hobhouse:* Mind in Evolution. London 1901. p. 388). This consideration can, by way of analogy, be applied to all levels of life, the highest as well as the lowest, the most ideal as well as the most material. Everywhere the presupposition of mental life is a fundamental activity in a definite direction, and with it the possibility of furtherance or hindrance. What can become food for the mind is determined, just as much as what can give us bodily nourishment, by the urge and direction of our nature, which is not the same at every level, but whose history is the real history of our life. Spinoza has expressed this most clearly of all when he says: "We do not strive for, will, desire or wish for anything because we deem it good, but we deem it good because we strive for, will, desire and wish for it" (Eth. III, 9. Schol). But it is an old truth, which Aristotle and Augustine already knew.

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To what degree the original direction of our life (our temperament, our talent, our character) can be shaped and altered when a consciousness of aims and means has been awakened in us, that is the great question that leads beyond psychology to ethics and social hygiene. But every theory must admit that we begin at a level where we have not placed ourselves, and with qualitative and quantitative presuppositions that we have not given ourselves. Our first willing is to such a degree one with ourselves that it cannot be regarded as our own work in the sense in which a later willing can. And this first willing can be traced, through many shifts and metamorphoses, right up into the highest forms of will. It will give these a distinctive stamp, determine their timbre. Fichte maintained a psychological impossibility when he admitted indeed that "the point at which we find ourselves when we are first able to use freedom does not depend on us", but added that "the series which we describe from this point depends, for all eternity, in its whole extent, entirely on us". (Wissenschaftslehre. 2 Aufl. p. 266.) In so external a way one cannot keep the involuntary and the voluntary, the given and the self-produced, apart from each other. We come into being as active beings, and even in our highest activity the conditions of our coming into being co-operate in determining it.

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On the conception I have put forward here, it is a long series of different phenomena that come to stand as the object of the psychology of the will. But the question then naturally arises whether a general concept can be set up for such different phenomena that can hold for them all.

Every concept that is to hold for a series of different phenomena rests on analogy. From example to example the relations vary, the more exactly we examine them, to such a degree that it will not be possible to "extract" marks that recur everywhere in quite the same way. But although all single features can vary, a similarity can be present in the relation between them, and it is such a similarity of relation that makes *[44]* the formation of concepts possible[1)]. In the phenomena I have brought forward in the foregoing, degrees of consciousness and forms of consciousness vary as much as is at all possible. Even psychologists who narrow the concept of will in advance more than I consider possible and necessary despair of forming a typical concept of will[2)]. I believe, however, that it is possible to find a point of similarity among them which at the same time makes it possible to characterize the element of will in its difference from the element of knowledge and the element of feeling. From the involuntary urge to activity and urge to self-preservation up to the willing that chooses with clear consciousness, there are two features that constantly recur under different conditions, namely 1) that the direction of activity is determined by preferring[3)], and 2) that what is preferred is essentially determined by the individual's *own inner nature.* On this *[45]*

[1)] Cf. my essay *On analogy and its philosophical importance* (Mind. April 1905) p. 202). (In Danish in Mindre Arbejder II).

[2)] Thus *Shand* says (*Types of Will.* Mind. 1897, p. 325): The more closely the typical forms of will are studied, the more we shall appreciate the difficulty of embracing them in any one supreme type . . . The profoundest introspection will not show us the universal character of will. — It is of interest to me to see that for Shand the difficulty consists not only in the diversity of the phenomena of will, but also in the way in which unconscious and involuntary processes co-operate, even at the higher levels of the will: Those deep forces within us which work for the most part unseen, their tendencies unforeseen, whose object only rise into clear thought at times, . . . seem to us the real and abiding will, and their conscious expression an accident or momentary phase, the more play of thought upon their upmost surfaces., ib. p. 306.)

[3)] Already *Charles Bonnet* has this definition: Un être qui préfère un état à un autre état, et qui agit conséquemment à cette préférence, est un être qui a une volonté. (*Essai analytique sur l'âme.* Copenhague 1760, p. 114.) Bonnet adds (p. 115) that a being that throughout its whole life had the same sensation, and in the same degree, would have no capacity to will, would have no will at all. — In most recent times the same definition is found in *Fouillée*: La force inhérente à tous les états de conscience a sa dernière raison dans l'indissolubilité de ces deux fonctions fondamentales: le discernement, d'où naît l'intelligence, et la préférence, d'oú naît la volonté. (*Psychologie des idées-forces.* I. p. IX). Les discernements en apparence indifférents sont un résultat ultérieur (p. X).

rests the analogy among all phenomena of will. The equilibrium must be abolished, and a difference of direction, determined by the relation to the individual's nature, must assert itself. Since now, as long as life lasts, there is never perfect equilibrium in us or around us, an uninterrupted willing stirs in us, and it is only where the differences become of a more intensive kind that our preferring takes place with consciousness[1]. Urge to activity, reflex and instinct all presuppose a difference in inner and outer conditions, and consist in an overflow, an expansion in one direction or the other. In impulse the difference is conditioned not only by impression and sensation, but by an idea of an aim and by the opposition between this aim and the present state, an opposition that can be felt quite immediately. In decision there occurs a conflict between two values, each of which may be formulated in judgments, and by this conflict the outcome is determined, inasmuch as the value that has its strongest hold in our nature is preferred, and precisely thereby comes to stand as the greatest value.

As preferring, as practical positing of differences or active differentiation, the will comes under the law of relativity, the chief law that holds for all sides of conscious life, and that is evidently connected with the fact that we live in a world full of differences and oppositions. An existence raised above all opposition and resistance could neither will, feel, think nor sense. The chief law of conscious life points back in turn to the fundamental form of consciousness, synthesis, the synthesizing activity: there can be distinguishing and preferring only when two elements can assert themselves at once and be held together as closely as possible; only then does the difference, and
[46] perhaps in the same moment the preference, spring forth. And, as already remarked, since this fundamental form is an activity, the will is more akin to it than any of the other sides of conscious life. We are the more active, the more the causes of our states and our actions lie in ourselves, in our own nature, the original nature and the nature acquired through experience and action. The standard for the development of the volitional life is thereby given. —

Addendum (1912). If by a psychological element one understands a side or a quality of mental life that can *immediately* be observed as something single, in a certain difference from other such sides or qualities, then there are no psychological elements

[1] An involuntary preferring takes place in every instinctive action, as when an animal rushes at the definite object and leaves others alone. Likewise in involuntary attention, as when the eye, on a many-colored surface, dwells on certain definite places but passes lightly over others. Here distinguishing and preferring are one, as Fouillée says. (1912).

other than sensations, ideas and feelings of pleasure or pain. But it is unnecessary and unjustified to stop at such a definition. And it is more natural to let the word element in psychology designate a side or a quality of mental life that asserts itself in all mental states, whether it can be the object of immediate observation or not. And something of this kind is, for every coherent consideration of mental life, precisely what the word will (or better: willing) in the widest sense is an apt designation for.

It was established long ago that will is not an object of immediate observation in the way the other sides of conscious life are. Berkeley is the one who first saw this. Only through its results is our activity known, and we have no simple idea of what is designated by the word will, he teaches (Principles of Knowledge § 27). Hume extends this consideration to hold for every causal relation, within mental life as within the material world; nowhere can causality be apprehended by immediate observation. And Fichte, that pronounced philosopher of will, says expressly that one was quite right in denying that freedom could be an object for consciousness. "Ich habe Kausalität, heisst bekanntermassen: das, was ich mir als Zweck vorsetzte, trifft in der Erfahrung ein" (Sittenlehre p. 272 cf. p. 175). "Das Ich", he says further (Wissenschaftslehre. Neue Ausg. 1802. p. 413), "wird seines Handelen unmittelbar sich nie bewusst, sondern nur in dem Produkte, und vermittelst des Produkts". *[47]*

This clear demonstration was not adhered to by the psychologists. Schopenhauer made willing one with urge and yearning, with emotion, and thereby obliterated the difference between feeling and will; this made it possible for him to assert that willing could be observed immediately. And Maine de Biran, the author who next to Schopenhauer has had the greatest influence on the psychology of will of the nineteenth century, found willing immediately given in the sensation of effort or straining, a sensation of which he then gave a spiritualistic interpretation[1)]. Søren Kierkegaard, too, wanted to demonstrate the will, the "leap", as he called it on his indeterminist presuppositions, as a distinctive object of psychological observation. But he is too clear a thinker not to see that the act of will itself is not a state, but expresses itself through the relation between two states, and so in "Begrebet Angst" he embarks on the impossible task of showing how that which is itself not a state and does not fill a moment, but for every sharp analysis always lies between two states or two moments, should be able to become an object of observation. As if, besides what we call the cause and what we call the effect, one should also be able to observe the

[1)] See on Schopenhauer and Biran "*Den nyere Filosofis Historie*" II. p. 221—223 and p. 300—302.

causal relation itself![2)]

A closer analysis of the actual states of mental life proves Berkeley and Fichte right. And they are right also in this, that the circumstance that willing cannot be observed immediately by no means excludes that will can be a constant and original element in mental life.

When we examine more closely under what conditions our sensations, ideas and feelings arise, and what nature they acquire in the different states owing to the
[48] difference of the conditions, it turns out that it is a great and misleading abstraction to speak of sensations, ideas and feelings as if they were the same, quite alike, under all circumstances. Not only is it of decisive importance with which other elements they appear together, but it is also of quite particular importance what direction the whole course of our sensations, ideas and feelings has in a given state. A sensation of sense acquires a different character according as it stands as occasion and introduction to a reflex movement or an instinctive movement or not. If it corresponds to an influence that releases or tends to release such a movement, it stands otherwise in consciousness than when it corresponds to an influence that has no essential motor effect; in the latter case it becomes more resting, in the former it acquires, figuratively speaking, a direction forward, an unsteady character, which is removed only when sensations of the released movement and of its effects appear. This is even clearer with ideas. An idea can have a resting character, inasmuch as its content holds the interest in and for itself. But this is not the original state, and hardly the usual one. The first ideas, the "first thoughts", are ideas of ends, ideas of something that has proved to bring satisfaction and that therefore becomes the object of impulse, or at least of expectation. Expectation is probably secondary in relation to impulse; from the first no ideas arise except as motives, as occasions and introductions to movement and action. Expectation is already a more resting, contemplative state. If impulse meets obstacles, it either falls away or leads to the idea of means. But an idea acquires a different character when its content is a means than when its content is an end. And here there is an order that cannot be altered in the single case. One cannot simply let the idea of the means and the idea of the aim change places within the given state. The idea of the aim conditions the idea of the means. Later, during the action, the idea of the means precedes the idea of the aim. In both situations, each taken by itself, the
[49] two ideas stand in a definite relation to each other. The relation of direction comes out clearly here. "One and the same" idea thus acquires a different character according

[2)] Cf. my book "Kierkegaard som Filosof". p. 70—81.

as it appears as a member of a motive or not, and where it is a motive (a member of a motive), it acquires a different character according as it concerns means or end. The relation between motive on the one side, and impulse, wish, intention, purpose or decision on the other, cannot be better designated than as a relation of direction. And the word direction is here at bottom no more figurative than all psychological expressions whatever. — As for feeling, finally, it is originally, and at bottom always (since absolutely resting feelings hardly occur), either a symptom that an unconscious movement is favored or inhibited, or a member of a motive that forms the occasion and introduction to action determined by an end. And feeling acquires a different character according as it is a symptom or is a motive or is of a more resting nature, and further according as it is attached to the idea of an end or to the idea of a means.

The difference between motive and aim (or satisfaction) appears, as Sibbern already remarks, only in voluntary (i.e. idea-determined) action. Involuntary action runs its course so continuously that only by way of analogy can we apply that difference in describing it. It is precisely in involuntary action that the greatest difficulties for description and analysis lie. There is no transition here from one clearly appearing member to another; rather there occurs a series of pulsations, a progressing, more and more concentrated process.

Characteristic of the states in which the stamp of direction is strongest is a peculiar condensation or concentration, for which the word attention is a good expression, although it stresses the intellectual element too much. Taught by experience, we can judge from the concentrated character of a state that it points in a certain direction, will give rise to consequences of importance, even if we perhaps cannot at once make out in which direction it points. By analogy with this we must also conceive the state *[50]* of an animal when an instinctive movement is about to be released. We then speak of an urge asserting itself. The concentration can itself be motivated, as when we exert ourselves to call up a memory or to solve a problem. It is in this sense that one can say that the will can act on itself, inasmuch as preceding motives (concentrations) determine later motives (concentrations).

The more elementary mental life is, the more it holds that every sensation, idea and feeling is determined by direction, that is to say, has the character of occasion and introduction. Animal psychologists lay quite particular weight on this. It is in any case difficult to demonstrate free ideas in animals, and with them also ideas of ends proper. But in connection with this it is also maintained, with full right, on the side of animal psychology that it is an entirely mistaken conception of mental life to

think of it as built up of independent elements of sensation, feeling and idea, as one still all too often finds it, even in authors who believe themselves raised above the one-sidednesses of the old "association psychology". In the development of mental life, THORNDIKE maintains (Animal Intelligence. New York 1911. p. 154; 240), there is not a progress from the small and simple to the large and complicated, but from direct to indirect connection, from undifferentiated states to distinguishing or generalizing, and we must therefore turn our usual human psychology upside down and make what was mentioned only in a special chapter on the will into a general psychological law. — It is this conception that I put forward long ago in the fourth chapter of my Psychology, and that is entirely decisive for all talk of the psychological reality of the will. Pure sensations, ideas and feelings are abstractions, nothing else.

Comparative human psychology leads to the same result. The mental life of more primitive men does not permit the clear difference between different mental elements that that of the adult European does. LÉVY-BRUHL has recently illuminated this
[51] relation in an interesting way in his work "Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures" (Paris 1910). He even goes so far as to ascribe to primitive peoples a logic quite different from ours, inasmuch as their ideas are from the first so infiltrated into one another, and so interwoven with emotional and motor elements, that they do not admit of clear comparison. The ideas are from the first members of connections (participations), from which they can only slowly be separated out so as to acquire a truly intellectual character (p. 442). And in his masterly characterization of the involuntarily formed "community" of earlier times, in contrast to the "society" of later times, shaped by conscious agreement, TØNNIES (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. 2. Ausg. 1912, p. 109 ff) describes what he calls "essential will", an involuntary life, a striving in which there is an immediate transition from state to action, in contrast to the voluntary action guided by free ideas. The former is characteristic of the primitive "community", the latter of modern "society". — Sociology thus warns us, just as much as animal psychology does, against operating with abstractions taken from a more differentiated stage of the history of mental life as if they were eternal and original principles that could be found again at all stages. It must even be maintained that differentiation is never so far advanced that those abstractions express the full truth. They always hang in the air.

Neither experimental, descriptive nor analytic psychology can do without the genetic standpoint. Mental life has, in the single individual and in the whole race, a history without which it is not understood.

From pure elements of sensation, feeling and idea one can never in the world derive the living, definite, practical character that the actual states of mental life always present in a lower or higher degree. But conversely one can, starting from these states, hand in hand with experience, show how mental elements can step by step lose their original, practical, motivating and motor character and approach a relative state of rest, which is the one that many psychologists find easiest to observe, and which language, which always has difficulty in expressing life, the dynamic, *[52]* misleads us into regarding as what is really given.

I take the occasion to remark that the conception I have put forward here is already presented in the first edition of my Psychology (1882) (see sections IV, 7 and VII B, 4). As early as when the first German edition (1887, corresponding to the second Danish edition) had appeared, Christoph Sigwart expressed in a letter to me his interest in my regarding the will so decidedly as the fundamental element of consciousness. In later editions and in other writings I have developed this conception further and made it more precise. But from the very first my presentation of psychology was laid out in such a way that I first tried, within the psychology of knowledge and of feeling, to show that neither of them could be understood without presupposing elements of will, and then, in the special section on the psychology of the will, collected and ordered these constantly presupposed elements of will and thereby found the ultimate foundation for the understanding of mental life.

Recently Schmied-Kowargik (Analytische Psychologie. Leipzig 1912. p. 192) has stated that when I assume that the direction of mental life can be felt, I thereby at bottom admit that the will can be observed. But direction can everywhere be apprehended only through comparison of different observations, not by a single observation. Direction is always apprehended by a kind of construction, which is carried out more or less consciously. It is only the *immediate* apprehension of willing that I deny. A direction in mental life can assert itself already in and through the very growth of mental life, in which unconscious and conscious elements work together. Thus when instincts awaken, e.g. at the transition between childhood and adulthood, or when, already earlier, the instinct of self-preservation takes on special forms, or when habits develop. In all such cases an involuntary willing expresses itself; later, when free ideas have arisen, which from the first also happens through involuntary growth, a voluntary willing, determined by ideas and ends, can arise and take on the various forms that descriptive psychology distinguishes as impulse, wish, intention, purpose and decision. But at all these stages it is the definite succession of states

[53] and elements, and the impossibility of interchanging the members of the series, that furnish the mark of the reality of the will. There is here, as I have shown in my Psychology, an analogy between the conception of the will and the conception of reality, which is of great interest. No more than the will does "reality" correspond to a single element or a mere sum of elements. The will is the inner reality within which in the end all the elements of mental life find their definite place, determined directly or indirectly by the energy and direction of the whole mental striving.

[54]

HUMANE ETHICS.[1)]

MEN at all times pass judgments on good and evil (ethical judgments), which are called forth by the feelings and ideas awakened in them by the contemplation of human actions, traits of character, endeavors and orders of life (institutions). *Ethics* inquires whether such judgments can be justified, and whether there is a standard by whose help a distinction can be drawn between valid and invalid ethical judgments. When the justification and the standard are sought in human nature and in the conditions of human life, we have an attempt at *humane* ethics, in contrast to such attempts as start from authorities (religious, social or political) as the ultimate source.

There is an inner connection between human actions, traits of character, endeavors and orders of life, so that they cannot be discussed exhaustively each by itself. Here, however, we shall keep chiefly to the traits of character. We begin by setting up the hypothesis that one single definite trait of character is the most valuable, and by giving a *description* of it (I). Next we try to show how this trait of character can develop in man (the *psychological possibility)* (II), and on what its *ethical* value is grounded (III). The attempt to give such a justification leads naturally to a discussion of *the conditions and limits to which every scientific ethics is subject* (IV): We then compare the ethical point of view with other points of view on human actions and *[55]* traits of character, and compare at the same time the different main types of ethics which history presents *(comparative ethics)* (V). Finally we cast a glance at *the most important oppositions which in our time assert themselves in the ethical domain* (VI).

I

Among the traits of character which have at different times been regarded as valuable (as virtues), *justice* has as a rule held a prominent place. We shall here try to

[1)] An outline for use in lectures at the Folkeuniversitet (1901).

show that from an ethical point of view it is the most valuable of all qualities, and we begin, then, by describing it.

In civil life he is just who gives everyone his own, keeps his promises and does not encroach upon the property and freedom of others (as property and freedom are ordered at a given time and in a given place). Where the individual will not act in this way, he is compelled to do so by the power of the state or by public opinion. — A certain likeness to this kind of justice is borne by the consideration for others and the self-limitation and self-control which decorum and courtesy demand.

Characteristic of these forms of justice *(elementary justice)* is, 1) that *limitation* (the negative) is more prominent than the free unfolding of personality, 2) that *outward* action or omission plays a greater role than disposition and the inner will, and 3) that *regularity,* uniformity in the manner of acting, is demanded without regard to the individual peculiarities and circumstances of the different personalities.

Elementary justice proves insufficient for two reasons in particular. — *The inner and outer circumstances of the individual* may be so peculiar that the same manner of acting cannot be demanded of him as of others. One then applies "mercy" or "equity"; but if these are not to be unjust, they must be the expression of a higher justice. — Where it is not merely a matter of maintaining an existing order of life and the distribution of rights and duties that follows from it, but where *a new order of life* [56] is to be founded, a new distribution made, one must go back to the free unfolding of personality and to the inner disposition. The new springs from the inner life of personality.

Through such experiences there develops the thought of *an ideal justice,* which demands not merely a limitation of the individual's self-assertion out of regard for the self-assertion of others, but demands that the individual's development shall positively further that of the others, and conversely. This comes about through self-assertion and self-surrender (sympathy, altruism) entering into a harmonious relation to one another. Just as the individual's self-assertion benefits the others, so his self-surrender benefits himself by developing faculties and impulses which would otherwise lie fallow. While elementary justice on the whole regards the individual as a means for the persistence of society, according to ideal justice no personal being comes to stand as a mere means, not even where limits are set to it and burdens laid upon it. The external relation between means and end here falls away. Elementary justice abolishes only the outward, literal struggle between men, and secures against brutality and encroachment by compelling men to observe certain limits and forms, however

remote from one another they may stand in disposition. Ideal justice lets individuals feel themselves as organs of a living whole, free and dependent at once. They draw nourishment from the common life, and through their peculiar conception of life and conduct of life they in turn react upon it and determine its further development. Self-surrender is not extorted, and self-assertion is not seized by force.

II

Psychologically considered, justice can develop predominantly either from the urge to self-assertion or from the urge to self-surrender. We briefly describe these two types of development.

1) Just as, according to the law of inertia, every material point remains in its state of rest or of rectilinear motion where no external cause acts upon it, so every living being has *a striving to keep itself up, to assert itself, to act and to spread itself in existence.* This striving is necessary for the persistence of life, but if it ruled unconditionally and in elementary form in all, it would make life a struggle between egoisms. In reality it *[57]* is broken, damped and modified more or less, and on this rests the possibility of a development in the direction of justice.

a) The difference between itself and others the individual learns to know by experience, and the very idea of itself it forms under the influence of others. It learns from others to say "I" of itself, and involuntarily sees itself in the light of their praising and blaming judgments. It has a strong urge to imitate others and a great receptivity to suggestions from others. In different natures *imitation and receptivity* will assert themselves in different degrees, but always sufficiently for an altogether isolated individual to be an impossibility. Both by social heredity and by physical heredity the individual is bound to the species. When the urge to self-assertion becomes fully conscious of itself, it has already been bent in definite directions under the influence of the social surroundings. And this influence goes on acting in the course of life. Just as involuntarily as music awakens our moods, our intellectual, emotional and volitional life is influenced by the models, traditions and orders of life under whose dominion we live. There are those whose whole view of life and conduct of life are predominantly determined by the involuntary way in which they have thus lived themselves into the species.

b) But the urge to self-assertion can grow so strong and conscious that the individual makes his own enjoyment and power, in general his own isolated welfare (wherever he places it), his chief end, perhaps his only end. Other beings and other

endeavors then become for him only means or hindrances. Since the others now go on existing and asserting themselves in their own way, it comes to *a trial of strength and cunning between the individual and society.*

Even where this struggle ends in a victory for the isolated individual, unconditional self-assertion will nonetheless undergo *refractions and modifications.* It has had to go by roundabout ways, to use cunning and to sacrifice strength. Scars remain after the struggle. — But the struggle may also end with the individual learning to limit its
[58] unbridled urge to self-assertion. It finds its account in *recognizing certain limits once for all,* so that it can then move all the more securely as it pleases within these limits. Elementary justice has then come into being. — There is perhaps even a possibility that the other personalities and endeavors come to stand as something other and more than means or hindrances, — that they acquire immediate value. Partly they often act in the same direction as the individual himself, so that a union and mutual completion becomes possible. Partly a kinship in nature and fate is experienced which makes it easy for the individual to put himself in the place of the others and to view life from their point of view. Partly the individual's strength may be so great and overflowing that it is able not only to bear his own life, but gives rise to an urge to perform a more comprehensive work by acting also for other personalities and endeavors. By different ways the individual may thus come *to stand as a member of a whole whose welfare he more or less consciously makes his own* welfare. Within this whole, this realm, each single personality stands as a peculiar end, and each single endeavor unfolds according to its nature and according to its significance for the whole. Elementary justice has then been widened into ideal justice.

2) The urge to self-surrender too can at first stand in opposition to justice and yet be developed into justice. — This urge can express itself toward persons (in family feeling, friendship, love of mankind) and toward endeavors (art, science, charity, politics). In both cases that to which one surrenders oneself stands as immediately valuable, not merely as a means for one's own self-assertion.

For several different reasons the urge to self-surrender needs a development through which it can develop into an urge to justice. — a) It expresses itself most strongly in narrow circles, toward a single being or a single endeavor, perhaps even toward a single moment or a single side. By its limitation and its blindness it can hamper the welfare of its very object, or it can injure human life in wider circles no less than unbridled self-assertion can. *The removal of the limitation and the blindness* takes
[59] place through experience, since, the more the connection and the kinship between the

different personalities and endeavors dawn upon consciousness, the more it comes to stand as a self-contradiction to set absolute limits to self-surrender, even though its kind and degree must be different in the different relations. In this way love of mankind has historically developed from narrower to wider circles. — But it is not merely a matter of the eye being opened through experience to *what is common.* It must also be sharpened for *the peculiarity of each single object (personality or endeavor),* so that the task can become to work at once for the single object according to the demands of its particular nature and for a harmony among all personalities and endeavors. — Justice thus arises here through a cooperation of clear understanding and deep sympathy. But only he can have justice in this sense who is himself a strong and marked personality. The urge to self-surrender would come into contradiction with itself if it led the individual to make himself nothing before his object. For then there would be nothing to surrender! *Only a strong self-assertion makes self-surrender fruitful and comprehensive.* Self-surrender must, where it has developed into justice, stand as the expression of an overflowing strength which is able to bear more than its own burden and to take full account of the peculiarity of other beings and endeavors. Otherwise justice toward others becomes injustice toward oneself. —

Two types of development have here been depicted, between which there lie many nuances. — Although the goal of the two processes of development may be said to be the same, the difference of the ways will nonetheless influence the character of what is attained. *Justice will acquire a different stamp, a different timbre in the two types,* just as a tone sounds different when it is produced on different instruments.

III

Every value presupposes an urge that is satisfied. The urge need not be felt beforehand: the satisfaction may surprise us (like an unexpectedly kind word or a beautiful view) so that only from the joy we feel do we infer that there must have *[60]* been an urge. But the urge can also stir with consciousness, often with longing or with pain. And whether it is bound up with consciousness or not, it can lead to an involuntary striving. — What satisfies the urge has *immediate* value. Where this can be attained only through work, it is made an *end,* and what helps us to attain the end then acquires *mediate* value. — For one and the same man there may be many values, and a coherent, consistent valuation will therefore be possible only if there is a *fundamental value,* which conditions all other values, and on which it depends what ends man sets himself in the particular case.

The recognition of justice as the most valuable trait of character presupposes as fundamental value *the welfare of society or of the species.* The welfare of a society is the greater, the more inwardly its members are bound together, while at the same time each of them develops his powers and impulses as freely, peculiarly and many-sidedly as possible. Even elementary justice makes this possible to a certain degree, though in a mediate and external way. In ideal justice, on the other hand, the persistence of society and the free self-unfolding of individuals go hand in hand in the highest degree. Each individual stands at once as end and as means, both in relation to the other individuals and in relation to society as a whole.

If we presuppose a fundamental value other than the welfare of society or of the species, the valuation too becomes another, and it is then not certain that justice comes to stand as the most valuable trait of character. For the egoist his own isolated welfare (wherever he places it) is the fundamental value; if he can attain it, it must be indifferent to him how things go with the others and with society as a whole. It is similar with those whose fundamental values are limited by family, class, sect, nation or race. History shows us a struggle between these different fundamental values. It is a struggle between as many ethical systems. The struggle may lead to a change of the fundamental values, and the thought of justice has arisen during this
[61] struggle, especially at such times when a clearer understanding and a deeper feeling of humanity became possible. For European humanity, Greek antiquity, Christianity and the Enlightenment and humanity of the 18th century mark turning-points in this respect. —

To point out the ideal, and with it the standard, that corresponds to a certain fundamental value, has not merely the theoretical interest which clarity about the relation between premises and consequences always has, but gives us at the same time a guiding thought (a principle) by which development in the individual and in society can be valued and regulated. Involuntary development proceeds blindly, one-sidedly, scatteredly and slowly. A clear consciousness of ideal and standard can remedy this. And in particular the involuntary ethical judgments can be tested with regard to their validity. A conduct of life or an order of life is the more perfect, the more self-assertion and self-surrender become one, and the more the single personality in its relation to society comes to stand both as end and as means. (The ethics of economic life, of the relation between the sexes and of the penal system may furnish illuminating examples of this.)

IV

Ethics as a science is subject to a twofold limitation. The one has already been indicated: the dependence of all valuation on the fundamental value. Besides this limitation, which rests on the *foundation,* a limitation will always also assert itself with regard to the *content:* no theory will be able to exhaust the wealth of life and in strictly scientific form justify tasks and duties for the wholly special and individual circumstances. Work of thought must constantly be applied to reduce this twofold limitation to the least possible; but it is important always to keep it in view.

1) One cannot refute him who rejects the very foundation on which one builds one's reasoning. And in ethics the foundation is the fundamental value which determines the ends one sets oneself or recognizes at all, and with them in turn the laws and norms that are assumed to be valid. The fundamental value cannot be changed except when the character, the whole stage of life, is changed. Every living being's *[62]* pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, love and hate are conditioned by the stage of life on which it stands. The caterpillar does not feel pleasure and pain at the same things as the butterfly. The savage does not recognize the values of the European, and a Greek of antiquity would not recognize the values of modern man.

The different fundamental values which succeed one another in the individual or in the species naturally stand in inner connection with one another. It is a growth, a historical development, that leads over from the one stage of life to the other. It is the business of psychology and of history to describe and explain this development. It is the *whole* man and the *whole* of human life that undergoes this development, not merely the life of thought. It is therefore a process of life, not merely a process of thought, that leads from a certain stage of life, and with it from a certain fundamental value, to other stages of life and fundamental values. The justification of the development can be fully established only when it is completed. Ethical development in history is therefore a constant struggle, not merely a struggle between thoughts, but also between feelings and passions. *Every single attempt at scientific ethics corresponds to a definite stage in the great struggle for life of the fundamental values.* Its scientific character rests on the degree of clarity and consciousness with which the foundation is stated, on the consistency with which conclusions are drawn from this foundation, and on the wealth of individual and social circumstances that are illuminated by these conclusions.

Immanuel Kant, the greatest modern philosopher, held that ethics must be a pure

science of reason. He built on the principle that in our action we should follow a rule which under the same circumstances can hold for every other spiritual being. This is, to be sure, a great and significant proposition; but it is not recognized by standpoints for which one's own self, one's own family, one's own class, one's own sect or one's own people is the highest. Its recognition has become possible only through a long historical development (as Kant himself has also shown in his philosophy of history). And even where it is recognized, it is motivated differently (e.g. now more from the urge to self-assertion, now more from the urge to self-surrender).

[63] 2) That the historical circumstances to which ethical propositions are to be applied constantly vary and are difficult to survey is as a rule willingly admitted. One is less inclined to admit that the single individuals come with very different dispositions and possibilities in ethical respect, and that therefore the task, as regards both kind and degree, must be set differently for each individual. *When men have different capacity and strength, the same cannot without injustice be demanded of all.* A trait of character which the one displays without needing to summon up special effort or self-control, the other can perhaps acquire only through strenuous work. The strength which the one spends on producing works that benefit the whole species is perhaps consumed by the other in the labor of keeping his own head above water. Ethical judgments are so difficult to pass because they presuppose a deep knowledge of the individual's inner presuppositions, of his whole character. One does not notice much that men are conscious of this difficulty.

This twofold difficulty (which, moreover, in different form and degree holds for every science) is an expression of the great multiplicity and ramified development of life, which means that man must find his way practically in life without being able at every point to support himself on a theory. The art of life precedes the science of life. The individual does not, however, practice this art entirely on his own. He lives himself, as we have seen (II), involuntarily into the experiences and traditions of the species. How far he gets beyond what he has thus involuntarily lived himself into will depend on the strength and peculiarity he possesses and on the particular experiences he has. He who breaks new paths must venture. The earlier experiences of the species and the ethical theories can support him, but not lead him completely, since he is precisely engaged in producing the foundation for new experience and new theory.

V

Ethical valuation is not the only way in which we can view human qualities, actions and orders of life. — We view them also psychologically and historically: *[64]* describe them and try to understand them in their connection with the characters, the peculiarities of race and the conditions of life. Such a description and understanding is possible without any valuation (at any rate conscious valuation) being made, and it can be set in sharp opposition to ethical valuation. But in reality it is so far from conflicting with the latter that it is precisely a necessary condition of thorough valuation. What one would value, one must first know and understand. With better understanding, valuation will gain in thoroughness. The decisive difference between the psychological-historical way of viewing and the ethical consists in this, that the former turns toward the past, toward what lies before us completed and can now be surveyed in its development, while the latter turns toward the future, since the ultimate purpose and proper justification of valuation lies in its becoming a means for actions and orders of life to come in the future into greater agreement with the fundamental values. — We view actions and orders of life *aesthetically* or *artistically* when we merely see them as characteristic pictures, abbreviated and clarified expressions of what life can bring. In a picture we enjoy even what we turn away from in life. Art does not value (at any rate not consciously). It can give only the single picture, the individual situation or fate; but whether it has thereby given an example or an exception it cannot teach us, since it can set up no general propositions. The living picture has its immediate value whether it contains an exception or an example, and the aesthetic or artistic way of viewing has also a mediate value of an ethical kind, since it teaches us to view the scenes of life without egoistic preoccupation. — The *religious* way of viewing sees in the development and fate of human life an expression of the struggle of values to persist in the world of reality. The religious feeling can be described as man's fundamental mood after the experiences he has had of the relation between value and reality.

These different ways of viewing stand in constant interaction with one another: science, art, religion and morality influence one another mutually. In every ethics this interaction will appear in some form or degree. Chiefly, however, the peculiarity *[65]* of a particular ethical conception will rest on the relation it establishes between self-assertion and self-surrender, and on the relation in which foundation (fundamental value) and content (the special goods, tasks and virtues) stand to one another. — Historically there appear here (for European humanity) three main types.

In Greek ethics the chief task was the limitation and harmonizing of the unbridled

promptings of nature. Hence great weight was laid on moderation, self-control and self-knowledge. The single elements in human nature were not to be cowed or extirpated, but to enter as members into a living whole. Each single free man was to be a little work of art, and the state a great work of art. The relation between these two works of art (the individual and the political), and with it the relation between self-assertion and self-surrender, was in the end left unclear. The foundation was predominantly intellectual, and the perfection of knowledge became for the thinkers the highest virtue and the highest good.

Christian ethics emphasizes strongly and inwardly the universal love of mankind, although obedience to God's revealed will becomes the highest virtue and the ultimate foundation. The relation between self-assertion and self-surrender is not made clear here either, since obedience (faith) is grounded in the wish for one's own salvation. The intellectual and the aesthetic are altogether subordinate, in so far as they are not regarded as sin, and there is a lack of interest in, and of positive motives for, work on the development of human life through spiritual and material culture.

Modern ethics (from the time of the Renaissance on) demands a development of human life such that all elements come into their own. In particular it strives for a harmony between self-assertion and self-surrender and demands room for both within social life, since only so can all powers be released and work together. Evil here is neither unbridledness (as in Greek ethics) nor pride (as in Christian ethics), but sloth, which hinders unfolding and expansion. The demand for justice as the condition for
[66] all personal powers being able to develop in harmonious cooperation sounds ever more strongly both in practice and in theory. At the same time a clearer consciousness of the relation between foundation and content asserts itself in scientific ethics. — In all these respects modern ethics has learned much both from Christian and from Greek ethics, although modern European social life and the experiences gained within it have exerted the most decisive influence.

VI

In our day significant oppositions assert themselves in the ethical domain which more or less directly point to the problems that have been discussed in the foregoing. These oppositions can be brought under three groups.

1) The old opposition between *theological and humane ethics* constantly asserts itself, since the possibility of an ethical view of life and conduct of life on a purely human foundation is often denied. This denial, however, is not supported by new

reasons, although it appears in a sharper form than in the preceding age. There is the further peculiarity that the opposition concerns rather what is set up as the foundation of ethics (the fundamental value) than the content (the single tasks, goods and virtues).

2) In literature the opposition between *self-assertion and self-surrender* is sharply prominent, since two brilliant writers (Fr. Nietzsche and Leo Tolstòy) energetically maintain each one of these tendencies in its strictest form. It is a symptom that the age needs both ideals, which it is naturally easier to unite in pure theory than in the practice of life. The task of ethical theory can only be to point to the direction in which the practical solution must lie.

3) Within scientific ethics (where both the oppositions mentioned can naturally also be traced) the chief thing to note is the difference between a tendency which — like the English doctrine of utility (utilitarianism) — mainly emphasizes the results of *actions* in their influence on men's weal and woe, and another tendency — essentially represented by German thinkers —, which mainly emphasizes *the inner foundation of actions* in disposition and will. At the beginning of the 19th century Bentham and *[67]* Kant stood as the chief representatives of these two tendencies, and the discussion between them extends through the whole century. A similar opposition appears in all scientific domains, since in every science it is a matter both of objective confirmation by experience (verification) and of subjective work of thought (in the setting up of principles and in the founding of new points of view). Man lives both in an outer and in an inner world, and the decisive proof of how ably he lives in the inner world he can give only through the effects his inner life leaves outside him.

[68]

ON THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND ETHICS[1)].

1. The task of sociology is to study social life in all its manifold forms of manifestation. Ethical ideals and ethical endeavors, therefore, are objects of sociological research. They are working factors in social development, while they are themselves symptoms of social conditions or results of social development. They have their roots in the inner world of individuals; but this inner world itself is not indifferent for sociology, which traces the interaction of individual and society in all its finest ramifications. The inner world does not develop itself independently of the outer. Social conditions determine directly or indirectly that which the individual conscience adopts as ideal or as true. Very often the character and the direction of ethical life are determined by physiological or social heredity. And even the fact that individual initiative is at work sets no definite limit to sociological research, any more than biology gives up the right to investigate the organic variations which are the prerequisites of all natural selection.

From this point of view, sociology is a more comprehensive science than ethics, which is a more special and limited science. Sociology stands in a similar relation to ethics as does psychology. Ethical ideals and endeavors are not only sociological, but
[69] also psychological phenomena; they are, therefore, objects for psychology as well as for sociology, and psychology is, in its turn, a more comprehensive science than ethics.

2. Sociology is also a necessary foundation for ethics. The ethically right must

[1)] Lecture to the Sociological Society in London, 11 Nov. 1904.

be sociologically possible, must be consistent with the conditions and laws of social development. Ethics is not a system of castles in the air, but a doctrine of the means and ways for developing human life, individual and social, to greater richness and to greater harmony. Ethics ought then to be founded on a study of the nature and the conditions of the actual social development. Only with the help of this study can new values be discovered and old values be maintained.

Since ethics is dependent on sociology, it follows that it cannot be the same at all times, but must vary as its historical foundation varies under different historical conditions. Ideals and motives, aims and means, are subject to change. The historical development may lead to ethical turning-points or to ethical dilemmas without any breach of its continuity. There may be ethical discontinuity, though there is historical continuity. I will give some examples.

Very often ethical development consists in this only, that what has been done involuntarily, or even unconsciously, under the influence of social heredity, is afterwards done with clear consciousness or as a result of deliberate choice. Aristotle says that involuntary working precedes voluntary and conscious working. It is, he says, by playing on the zither that we become good players, and it is by acting justly that we become just; in this way, the young are through education and tuition introduced to ways of acting and thinking which later on can be followed out with consciousness and free choice. When the time of involuntary imitation and exercise is over, it remains to be seen whether the same direction will be followed with full consciousness. But even if the young generation breaks off and adopts quite other ideals and endeavors, yet the first direction remains of great influence, both directly, as an element, and indirectly, through an effect of contrast. The sociological continuity is not broken, though new ideals and aims are acknowledged. The Aristotelian principle (so I name *[70]* the law here spoken of) shows us a deeper connection, while from a purely ethical point of view there might seem to be only disharmony and opposition.

But social development may also in a more positive way be the condition for ethical development. A thing which at first only had value as a means may later on acquire immediate value — value as an end in itself. Social conditions make certain actions necessary, which the individual would not undertake if they were not favorable to his own interests; for instance, he must respect the liberty of others, if he will have his own liberty respected. But later on he may adopt as his immediate end the liberty of all. There is here going on what I will call a subjective transformation of value. What is value at first only as a means has become value as an end. An objective

transformation of value is going on when an end is so closely connected with the whole order of things that it cannot be isolated. The original end may then become a means to the acknowledgment of greater and higher ends, and perhaps it may itself be swallowed up by them.

This concatenation of means with ends and of ends with other ends is in great measure due to the social life and its institutions. By means of these the individual who wills something is drawn into a great process through which a whole series of transformations may arise. When such a transformation has taken place, ethical ideals and aims are not the same as before. New ethical formations have been produced through the continual social processes. It is the task of sociology to show us the conditions to which these transformations are due, and it is the task of ethics to give form to the new ideals and to develop the consequences of the new standpoint. All ethics has so far an empirical character. Every step of evolution has its own ethics, and the ethics of one period cannot be deduced from that of the preceding one without knowledge of the whole intermediate social evolution.

The relation of sociology to ethics is here again similar to the relation of psychology to ethics. The ethically right must be psychologically possible, and there may be psychological continuity, though from an ethical point of view it must be admitted that a wholly new movement has been initiated.

[71] 3. Though ethics is more specialized than sociology, and though it is in essential points dependent on sociology, yet it is an independent science. This independence manifests itself in the fact that social data, the results of historical development, are the objects for ethical valuation. In ethics these data and results are examined in their relation to an ideal, a standard; and their value depends on their harmonic or inharmonic relation to this ideal. The main difficulty of all ethics consists in the establishment and the justification of the ideal which is to give the standard of valuation. The great struggle between ethical systems concerns this establishment. Ethics has here problems which sociology, as such, as a purely descriptive and causal science, does not know. Sociology looks backward to discover the course and the laws of social evolution. Sociology comes after reality. A social process must be to a certain degree finished, before its law can be determined. We may say of sociology, what Hegel has said unjustly of philosophy in general, that the bird of Athene first begins its flight in the twilight, when the labors and the struggles of the day are over. But in ethical thought the goddess herself appears on the field of battle. She does not forget what she has learned of the struggles and labors of former times, but she

applies this knowledge in her war to lead the ideal she has won to victory.

Historical data are the foundation on which ethical development is based. The great question is, in what manner and in what direction the conscious continuation of what history has won is to proceed. Here individual stands up against individual, individual against society, society against individual, and society against society. We have here all the four sorts of war which Hugo Grotius long ago distinguished. Ethical valuation must always be the work of individuals who start from certain definite social and mental presuppositions. How, then, can a universal ideal be formed, and how can the validity of a definite standard be justified? Here we have the real sting of the ethical problem. It is the greatest war in history, which here is carried on in the quiet world of thought. This war has also interest for the sociologist; but he is here only a spectator. The moral philosopher takes his place in the battle itself. The sociologist examines what is going on, and how it is going on; but the moral *[72]* philosopher asks on which side the highest value is to be found, and how he can get a standard to test this value. The moral philosopher can as little set himself above sociological laws, when such laws really exist, as the agriculturalist can set himself above chemical laws. But as the agriculturalist can make use of chemical laws in order to make the earth produce the profit he looks for, so the moral philosopher can make use of sociological laws in order to produce ethically valuable results.

The independence of ethics manifests itself in the selection of ends and means within the manifold possibilities which sociology presents. The farther we advance on our way from sociology to ethics, the more the field of possibilities becomes narrowed. There are more possibilities in the marble block than in the sculptor's artistic plan.

The relation of sociology to ethics is here again similar to the relation of psychology to ethics. Psychological possibilities present to ethics the same problem as was presented to it by the sociological possibilities. In both respects what matters is to find a determining principle for the choice.

4. But not only is there a difference between sociology and ethics, but there may be a sharp contrast between them, and it is important to lay stress on this contrast — the contrast between valuation on the one side, and description and explanation on the other.

If we efface the distinction between the sociological and the ethical points of view, we are led either to regard the results of development as valuable in and for themselves, or to presuppose the full realization of the ethical ideals as given. In the first case we lower the ethical demand; in the second we give an idealistic misinterpretation of the

actual. In the first case, sociology swallows up ethics; in the second, ethics swallows up sociology.

But it is quite possible to maintain the difference between ethics and sociology,
[73] and yet to assert the intimate connection between them. Sociology leads us on to ethics by the application of the comparative method. The comparison of social forms or social states naturally leads us to characterize some as "higher," others as "lower." This characterization necessarily presupposes a certain standard. We call a form of society higher than another, if it more than this other makes it possible to attain two ends at once, namely, the free and rich development of individual peculiarities and differences, and the realization of unity and totality in social life. In sociology, as in biology, the standard is this: the intimate connection of differentiation and concentration. This has led to a comparison between society and an organism, and great scientific profit has been expected from this comparison[1)].

There is certainly also an analogy present, when we call organisms higher and lower, and when we call societies higher and lower. Every science whose objects present both unity and multiplicity must in its comparisons make use of such a standard as sociology and biology exhibit. So is it, for instance, also with psychology. We call a personal life high if it exhibits at once richness (of endeavor, emotion, and ideas) and firm concentration (character); we call it low if it is poor and incoherent. The task of biology, psychology, and sociology is only description and explanation of facts. Comparison is here only a methodological means. Though comparison presupposes a standard, and this standard can be constructed as an ideal, so that beings or species are called higher or lower according to their relation to this ideal, yet such a manner of view has in those three sciences only the character of a working hypothesis.

But in ethics this manner of view has not merely methodological value. Here the standards and the ideals have also a positive and practical significance. The most
[74] intimate connection between unity and multiplicity in the life of the single individual and in the life of society is in ethics an end which ought to be reached, and it is the task of ethics to find means and ways which can make an approximation to this end possible. The highest aim of social ethics would be an empire of humanity in which there is the greatest possible multiplicity in the development of personal life and, even by this very means, the greatest intimate union of personal beings. If the single individual in developing himself in his own peculiar way gives the best possible

[1)] Cf. the essay on the concept of analogy in *Mindre Arbejder. Anden Række* p. 40.

contribution to the whole life of society, and if, on the other side, society is organized in such a manner that a free and full development is possible for all individuals, then we are approaching to the ethical ideal. Ethical imperatives are only logical and psychological consequences of the acknowledgment of this ideal[1)].

The so-called social problem is also an ethical problem, and this gives it its own particular sting. A social problem arises when multiplicity — by progressing division of labor, for instance — prevails in such a degree that the free development of individuals is checked. There would not be any sting in this problem, if our ideal did not claim that every man shall be treated, not only as a means, or as a part of a machine, but also as an end in himself. If this ethical principle is not presupposed, social factors may be interesting objects for science; but such science will be sociology, not ethics.

5. I have already said that the difference between ethics and sociology cannot be said to consist in the fact that ethics has for its object the development of single individuals; sociology, that of society. There is nothing in the life of individuals which may not be of interest for sociology; and, on the other hand, ethics is not only individual, but also social. But it cannot be denied that the point of view of ethics causes it to accentuate, in a higher degree than sociology has occasion to do, that which is going on in the inner world of the individual. Even if a system of ethics maintains the social point of view, it cannot forget that society consists *[75]* of individuals, and that the welfare of society is the welfare of these individuals. Only in the consciousness of individuals can the value of life be experienced. The concept of society does not, therefore, lose its importance. The importance of this concept is similar to the importance of the conception of potential energy in physics. It notes conditions and possibilities for the unfolding of human life which are more comprehensive than the horizon of any individual — forms and germs of life by which many generations can profit. It contains the heredity of the past, organized results of the experiences of former generations — and at the same time dispositions and possibilities for the future. It expresses that which persists and continues, in opposition to the shifting interests of single individuals, groups, and generations. But these potential values can be actualized only when they are appropriated and worked out by particular individuals. —

Not all ethical theories give this point of view its full right. For Hegel the main point was what he called "the ethical substance," which works itself out in the different

[1)] See on this ideal my *Etik* XIII, 6., and on the possibility of proving its validity III, 8—15. — Cf. also the essay "Humane Ethics" above.

forms of society, most typically in the state. In comparison with this social substance, the existence of the single individual is indifferent. The perfection of the individuals is to live and breathe in the great whole of society; but the essential in the ethical world is something which transcends the consciousness of any single individual. Though Wundt accentuates the importance of individual will more than Hegel, a similar view is found in his ethics. For Wundt the total will, "der gesammte Wille," which manifests itself in the existence of society, is the mightiest of all facts. It is imperishable, and it is always right. The single individuals are perishable; with all their endeavor and all their capacity for happiness, they are only drops in the ocean!

Such theories overvalue potentiality at the expense of actuality. It is true that actuality always lives on potentiality, and that individuals live and work in virtue of social conditions. But that potentiality exists is known only from the fact that it can be transformed into actuality, and on this depends its value. The value of Hegel's
[76] "social substance" or of Wundt's "total will" consists in their making a rich personal life possible in great groups of individuals, and only through the study of what is going on in such groups is the construction of these concepts possible.

For Hegel and Wundt sociology and ethics are ultimately identical — a consequence of the absolute subordination of the individual point of view to the social. The same may be said of August Comte in the first period of his philosophizing. In his "Cours de Philosophie positive" he did not regard ethics as an independent science which has its special place in the series of the sciences; ethical ideas are here to be found partly in the biological, partly in the sociological, chapters of his work. But later in life Comte regarded ethics as an independent science, the seventh and last in the series of the fundamental sciences. The principle on which Comte arranged the sciences in a series was that the following science shall always be more concrete in its object and more inductive in its method than the preceding. When, then, in his later work he puts ethics after sociology, he presupposes that ethics is the more concrete and inductive science of the two. Now, Comte's reason for this view is that in sociology the individual motives and tendencies neutralize one another; it is the average results which are of sociological importance; while in ethics the character and the tendency of the inner life and the individual realities in their multiplicity have the first place.

I do not myself believe that Comte deduced all the consequences of the position which he finally assigned to ethics, nor that he gave a complete concept of the relation between the individual and the social points of view in ethics; but he points in the right direction. It is the strength, but it is also the weakness, of ethics that it is the

most concrete of all sciences. It stands almost at the boundary between science and art.

To conduct life ethically is the greatest of all arts. And, like all arts, it develops itself spontaneously. All that theory can do at first is to learn from this spontaneous development, to find its moving forces, and to formulate the thoughts which it presupposes. Later on, the art can be exercised with greater consciousness, and there *[77]* can then be an interaction between thought and life. And such an interaction cannot be established if ethics does not — all the differences in point of view and in methods notwithstanding — remain in indebtedness both to sociology and to psychology[1)].

[78]

[1)]Since this essay appeared, the relation between sociology and ethics has been the subject of much discussion, occasioned especially by the position of the new French sociological school on this question. Of great interest here are especially *Durckheim*'s statements in "Bulletin de la société française de Philosophie" (Vol. VI) in a discussion of the concept "le fait moral" (1906), and *Levy Brühl*'s book "La Morale et la Science des Moeurs" (4. éd. 1910). On the basis of my conception of the ethical problem I have treated the question anew in "Den menneskelige Tanke" (1910) p. 350—369. (1912).

A CASE HISTORY.

Hannah Joël: *Hinsides.* En psykologisk Redegørelse. Copenhagen 1900[1)].

It is neither a novel nor a religious treatise that lies before us here, though from the title page one might be tempted to expect either the one or the other. It is a suffering human being who tells of her struggle with mental illness, of her defeats and of her victory. Rarely, no doubt, does one, outside the circle of psychiatrists, form any living idea of what inner struggles must be fought by those whose mental life has come out to the border of mental illness. The dark moods, the violent effect of all sense impressions, the rising hallucinations and the sudden impulses to movement must constantly be held down by the explicit idea, consciously held fast, of where reality lies and what reality demands. What ordinary, healthy or normal people learn to know only exceptionally from their own experience, the difficulty of distinguishing between the world of dreams and the world of reality, becomes for such people a constant task, and a task that makes it impossible to solve other tasks; indeed, that very task they are perhaps not able to solve.

In the present book such a case history is told in great detail and with no small psychological and literary talent. On a first reading the book perhaps puts the reader's
[79] patience to the test; but the second time he will admire the wealth of single observations and the delicacy of description which the author commands. The book will, better than any scientific treatise, be able to further the understanding of the sick life of consciousness, and that is something that is needed in a high degree. For even if it should not be true that mental illness is increasing, it is nevertheless more frequent than had formerly been believed. And moreover the book teaches not only about things that concern the mentally ill. All can know from their own experience the

[1)] Hannah Joël was the pseudonym of Helga Johansen (the sister of the painter Viggo Johansen). († 1912).

power of melancholy, of cares and of illusions, and it is therefore no wholly strange world into which the book leads.

Hannah Joël did not regard herself as mentally ill when, on the advice of those around her, she took refuge in the mental hospital. Her condition she characterizes especially by the violent way in which all sense impressions act, both the impressions from the outer world and those from her own body. She had to struggle to collect her thoughts. She wished only to be able to close her eyes and ears to everything and only "look inward," so as to be able to have done with what was working in her thoughts. Even when all is quiet around her, the heart still beats and destroys the peace. To get rest she has used opium, and she praises this remedy because it does not, like wine, call forth "a stream of the feeling of life," but merely damps the painfulness, so that thought may be allowed to live its life in peace. From various hints one can infer that she has pursued a study, and that it is in order to be able to concentrate on this that she has taken refuge in the dangerous remedy. Now it no longer helps her, and although it is not said in plain words, it is nevertheless an opium withdrawal cure that she undergoes at the hospital.

At the hospital she wages a long double struggle, — a struggle against the inner disturbances and a struggle against the systematic treatment which doctors and attendants would force her under. The inner chaos threatens to overcome her, and from the other side she meets the firm will which demands that a definite order be observed. In her delirium she understands neither the one nor the other; both seem to her equally to threaten her personality, and against both she appears with a feverish *[80]* self-assertion, from which she sinks back again and again into torpor, fits of rage or hallucinations.

She feels an aversion to being placed, as a patient, under a definite heading. Her case and condition have for her such a peculiarity that she resents the ease with which they manage to classify her. She thinks that the doctors make the personalities conform to the headings, instead of, conversely, making the headings conform to the personalities. It is a struggle that is no doubt fought again and again. The patient feels wronged at having merely to stand as an example of a generic concept which has been formed beforehand, and which perhaps is not even now enriched by a new nuance. A rebellious mood, a constant irritability and irony were the consequence.

No less hard was the other struggle, the struggle against the uneasy moods, against hallucinations and impulses. Attempts at suicide and fits of rage alternate with restless agitation and chaotic fantasizing. The description of the fits of rage surely belongs

to the best in the book. The impulse comes so quickly and overwhelmingly that the patient first discovers what she is doing by seeing her hands clasped around the throat of another person. There is no particular ill will toward the one it falls upon; during the fit the victim does not exist at all as an object for the patient's consciousness. — Excellent, however, is also the description of the hallucinations. There are voices that speak; — could these be hallucinations? she asks herself, but rejects this possibility because the sound is so distinct, although she also heard voices of people who were demonstrably not present. Sometimes it is a single word or a turn of phrase that has been used to her and that now goes on echoing in constant variations, accompanied by hallucinations of sight and hearing. The hardest struggles are fought against a host of figures that press forward from behind. It is then a matter of having one's back free, up against the wall or the stove, and of getting the figures out in front of one in order to fight them better. The agitation and restlessness of the patient arise from her having at any price to get the better of "what is behind."

[81] The turning-point in the illness comes suddenly and surprisingly. Whether this is grounded in the natural course of the illness, or whether it is connected with an imperfection in the presentation, I cannot judge. Just after severe fits the conviction of being well emerges, and a walk is used to flee from the hospital. Hannah Joël feels that she must now take her fate into her own hands and tear herself out of the irresponsible condition which life in the hospital, this "living grave of self-abandonment," brings with it. Neither the doctors nor her nearest are to bear responsibility for the step she takes: "I must bear the guilt alone. The step that must be taken, and that the others do not dare to let me take when I merely ask, I must quickly take myself, myself take and give myself freedom." — But a hard struggle still remains after she has returned home. Through long sleepless nights there must be struggle with shadows and voices. And even by day it is only "in jerks" that the full reality of the surroundings can be held fast. Yet it goes forward foot by foot. On a lonely Christmas Eve the last struggle is fought to keep herself up. The bright points of life and its dark points can each be gathered into stripes; healthy people see bright stripes; in mental illness the dark points gather into ruling stripes; — it is then a matter of holding the bright stripes together, although the dark points threaten to dissolve them. "I choose to try life in the light again, and yet remember what I learned beyond! Whether I can manage to get through, I do not know. I must only try humbly, let go all former arrogance, venture forward dot by dot." Now there stirs also the urge to give and receive love, to feel oneself in living relation to people. Thus she captures "one by one the elements of

life," builds her house anew, the house that had collapsed through sorrow and illness. —

Perhaps, as already remarked, the transition from illness to health, from "the beyond" to present reality, from the dark to the bright "stripes," should have been depicted in greater detail. But the author has not wished to give transitions and explanations where her own observations showed none. And this is also what one can especially learn from this book, that the will to hold life together must be born, come into being through a process of life which for a great part runs its course in *[82]* hiding, in the unconscious. That what builds the world for us, — the world which the healthy and normal readily take for an all too self-evident thing, — lies in the end in our own inner self, is experienced in earnest by him in whom the foundation tottered and sank, so that it had laboriously to be joined together again, stone by stone. And this whole process, both the dissolution and the joining together, could only be depicted as it has been done here by one who was a thinker and an observer, and who after the dark experiences had the ability and the urge to give new birth to what had been experienced in a recollection full of mood and understanding.

[83]

PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM

Lecture at the first meeting of the "Græsk Selskab" [Greek Society].

With great misgiving I take the floor here this evening, and for a twofold reason. How can one in a worthy manner open the first gathering of a circle that meets in order to be strengthened and renewed in understanding and admiration of some of the greatest works the human mind has brought forth? And how in particular can one speak worthily of one of the most brilliant of these works, a work in which the splendor of poetry, the plastic power of the portrayal of character and the profundity of thought have entered into a unique union? The art of interpreting the works of art, and of making them vivid through interpretation, stands high in this country; I need only mention names such as Julius Lange and Georg Brandes. I know that I do not command this art. If I have chosen to speak about Plato's Symposium, it is because this work is a classical expression of Greek thinking and can at the same time serve to illuminate the kinship and the opposition between ancient and modern intellectual life. The subject is thus in itself well suited to open our gatherings. It is to be the task of our Society, after all, to immerse itself in antiquity in such a way that its lasting significance through the ages, beyond its national and historical limitation, is also brought out. — It is also a debt of gratitude that I am paying off in honoring, in my own way, this work of antiquity. It is now 45 years since I first read it, but it has
[84] accompanied me on my way, and I have returned to it at very different points in my life. Often it has called up in me the memory of the dark, low-ceilinged schoolroom in which, in my last school year, weighed down by reading for examinations, I worked my way through it. It was the bright spot of that winter. I was far from understanding it fully; but there were thoughts and impulses in it that have accompanied me through the years, and that I have understood more clearly with each new reading. If only I may now succeed in making clear to others what the work has been for me!

First of all I must attempt an account of the content of the work, of the frame in which the development of the thought is set.

A young Athenian, an ardent follower of Socrates, tells of a banquet that he had attended several years before at the house of the tragic poet Agathon, and in which Socrates, the comic poet Aristophanes, the physician Eryximachus and several others took part; toward the end Alcibiades joined them. Agathon had won a victory in a dramatic contest, and on the day after the great feast he had given for the actors, he gathered a few friends for a smaller celebration. Several of the guests had been present the day before and were feeling its after-effects; it was therefore easily agreed not to hold any real drinking bout, but to discuss a subject, and it was arranged that each in turn should deliver an encomium on Eros.

The rhetor Phaedrus, from whom the idea of this subject came, was the first speaker. He recalls that Eros, according to the account of some poets, was one of the oldest gods, and then dwells on the inspiring influence of the urge to love and to friendship. The Greeks knew, between men too, a relationship of love of a passionate and intimate kind, and it is above all the significance of this relationship that Phaedrus stresses. The urge to win honor and to avoid degradation in the eyes of the beloved is the source of the greatest things in public and in private life. No other feeling is able to such a degree to create enthusiasm for great deeds. No man is so wretched that Eros could not inspire him to action and to measure himself against the best, even should it cost him his life.

Pausanias, one of the following speakers, maintains that there is both a heavenly *[85]* and an earthly Eros, just as there is a heavenly and an earthly Aphrodite. Praise can apply only to the noble, the heavenly Eros, which is not ensnared in the sensuous but is able to call forth lofty thoughts and to found an ideal friendship that can last throughout life, because it is first and foremost built on admiration for character.

This distinction between a noble and an ignoble Eros is approved by the physician Eryximachus. But he adds that they contend not only in the souls of men but in all that lives, indeed in the whole of nature. It is the task of the art of medicine to search out the noble Eros; it is only with its help that the art of medicine can do its work: to bring agreement and harmony between the different elements of the body, just as music seeks to tune the elements of the soul to harmony. In great nature too there is found now a harmonious, now a disharmonious relation between the elements; here too the noble and the ignoble Eros contend: the former sends fertility and good

seasons, the latter bad years and failed harvests.

Aristophanes has this objection to make against the preceding speakers, that they have not explained how the erotic urge came into being. His explanation is given in a myth: We human beings are not now constituted as we originally were. Originally men were twice as large as now, but their mighty figures rose in arrogance against the gods and threatened to storm Olympus. The gods were loath to exterminate men — for then there would, after all, be no one to pray to them and bring them sacrifices. So they hit upon the expedient of splitting them lengthwise — as one cuts eggs through. Since that time the halves now go about in longing and search for one another, and great is the rejoicing when they meet. Eros, then, is the urge to completion, to become a whole again. But we must be pious, lest the gods divide us anew, so that we become like figures in relief! There is good reason, then, to praise Eros, who takes away our unrest and stills our want!

After the comic poet comes the tragedian Agathon, who thinks that the preceding speakers have rather called men happy for the gifts of the god than portrayed the
[86] god himself. And so he praises in flowery words and rhetorical turns the glory and beauty of the god.

Now at last the turn comes to Socrates. He turns at once to Agathon and asks whether he is sure that Eros is so glorious and beautiful, indeed, that he is a god at all. Eros means, after all, urge or impulse, and we have need of what we do not have. Eros, then, is not beautiful and is not a god, but is the urge toward the beautiful and the divine. Thus the intellectual urge expresses itself neither in those who have wisdom nor in the wholly ignorant, but in those who stand between. No god philosophizes, i.e. strives after knowledge, but men philosophize as soon as they feel their ignorance with pain. Eros is the son of Poros and Penia, of plenty and want; hence his two-sided nature. He moves between the two opposites, but coincides with neither of them, and always begins his course anew from the one to the other. This holds of all urge and impulse. Not only in love and friendship and in sensuous passion does Eros express himself, but in all human striving. And he knows no final limit. He wants to reach his goal not merely for a time but eternally; therefore the urge is born ever anew. No single object can satisfy it. In order to understand his nature rightly, we must consider that a finite being cannot become eternal. How, then, can the urge toward the eternal be satisfied in a finite being? Through the production of a work in which its life is continued. In the passion that expresses itself in all living beings in propagation and in the care for offspring, the urge toward the eternal is at work: if the single being

cannot go on persisting, it can still leave behind another being of its kind. Even the single being, after all, persists only under a constant change of all its elements; this holds of the thoughts of the soul as well as of the substances of the body. But in nobler natures the urge toward the eternal does not express itself in this way only. It is at work also in the urge for honor and for producing works in art, in wisdom of life, in statecraft, that can endure beyond the limits of the individual life. And in its highest form it expresses itself in thought, when thought rises above everything particular and sensuous and forms great ideas in which long series of observations are summed up, ideas that also stand as exalted models of what observation always *[87]* shows us only in an imperfect way. Eros as the urge of love and as the urge for honor is only a preparatory school for this highest urge, which step by step leads us up into the world of ideas and ideals, to thoughts that cannot be expressed in images or sensuous forms. The possibility of this ascent is what gives life its highest value.

Just as Socrates has reached this summit, a knocking is heard at the street door, and the sound of voices is heard. It is Alcibiades with a following of drinking companions, who is coming from another banquet. He is very drunk and shouts to know where Agathon is; he wants to get in to Agathon to crown him on the occasion of his victory. He is then received among the guests and lies down at table, but starts up at once when he discovers Socrates. After some jesting words he crowns him too: Socrates was, after all, a greater victor than Agathon. He is then set the task of delivering an encomium on Socrates. But how is one to portray Socrates, who resembles no other human being? Why, one can compare him to the cabinets that the sculptors have in their workshops, which are shaped in the form of satyrs or sileni and are used to keep images of the gods in. This fits Socrates exactly, whose outward form is as ugly and bizarre as his inner self is noble and glorious, and whose seemingly insignificant talk contains, on closer consideration, the deepest thoughts. And just as the satyr Marsyas enchanted men with his playing, so Socrates does with his speech. Alcibiades himself can bear witness to this: "When I hear him, my heart beats harder than the Bacchants', and my tears flow. I feel disgust at my accustomed ways, and since I nevertheless cannot desist from them, I shun Socrates, indeed sometimes wish that he did not exist, and yet that would be the greatest grief of all to me! What am I to do with this man, the only one before whom I feel shame!" — Not least does Socrates' satyr character show itself in his irony, especially in his relation to the young. It looks as if he were taken with them for their beauty or other outward advantages, and yet he feels contempt for all such things. It looks as if he were jesting and playing,

[88] and yet there is the deepest earnestness in his thought. Alcibiades himself makes an unreserved confession that he had thought he could ensnare Socrates, but testifies that it was just then that the man's purity and loftiness appeared in the clearest light. Then he truly caught sight of the images of the gods within him in all their wonderful beauty. And this loftiness and self-mastery Socrates showed in all the circumstances of life. Alcibiades dwells especially on scenes from wars in which Socrates' hardiness and fearlessness showed themselves in an admirable way.

When Alcibiades had finished his speech, more drinking companions arrive. The feast now takes on a more chaotic character. Soon some leave, while others fall asleep, among them the narrator himself, who does not wake until toward morning. The only ones awake now are Socrates, Agathon and Aristophanes, who are discussing the relation between comedy and tragedy. Socrates maintains the claim that comedy and tragedy are akin, and that it lies within the power of the same man to create works of both kinds. Agathon and Aristophanes soon fall asleep, but Socrates settles them comfortably and then goes out to take his bath, whereupon he goes to his day's work.

It was of Eros that there was to be speaking at the banquet, and then it was revealed, when Alcibiades, inspired by the wine-god, arrived, that Eros was in their very midst in the form of the great seeker after truth, who was more worthy of the wreath than the poet to whom the whole people had given the prize. It was precisely through his lofty urge toward truth and greatness that Socrates had become the model for the young, the object of their love and their longing. To these young men Plato himself had belonged. He, like Alcibiades, has seen the images of the gods within his great teacher, and from that moment on he has dedicated to him all the best fruit of his thought, has ascribed it to him, however much it was owed to his own inquiry. In almost all his books he lets Socrates do the speaking. Never has one who was himself a master so made himself the instrument for the glorification of another great mind.
[89] But it was also a new ideal that in Socrates' personality dawned upon the world. Alcibiades was right that one could not compare him with any known figure. He stands by himself — and precisely thereby he became a model through millennia for everyone who puts his personality into lofty striving and has his life in the constant yearning from the finite toward the infinite and in the endeavor to awaken the same striving in others. To be sure, very little is known of Socrates' own thinking and teaching. It has gone with him as with an angel in Dante's Paradise, who is hidden by the light he himself sheds. Plato has caught this light and sent it to us in a multiplicity

of rays (the richest here in the Symposium), and even if all we knew of Socrates were that it was he who inspired Plato to the portrayals he has given in the "Symposium" and in other dialogues, we should really know enough.

And yet there is one thing that can with certainty be ascribed to Socrates, a discovery that was ever anew the object of Plato's enthusiasm. It was the quite simple thing that general concepts can be formed, in which, as in a collected expression, the essential content of long series of observations is comprised. It was the possibility of gathering observations into concepts that gave Plato the impetus to his distinctive philosophy, the so-called doctrine of ideas. Thus the "Symposium", after all, treats of what is common to all urge, all striving, all Eros, from their lowest to their highest forms, and the highest form of striving became for Plato precisely the one that leads up to the idea from the single observations.

The ideas were for Plato not merely thoughts that we form in order to orient ourselves in the world; they are themselves the true reality, the constant, the fixed, the abiding, in contrast to the constant change of all sensuous phenomena. The world of ideas was the true reality, and the world of sense only an imperfect copy of it.

It was owing partly to Plato's poetic nature, partly to the connection of incipient thinking with mysticism and mythology, that Plato conceives the ideas as fixed, eternal beings, unchangeable, raised above the world of experience. Properly speaking, he here came into conflict with his own doctrine of Eros: for if constant seeking is the *[90]* highest, if the urge can never be fully stilled, how then can the final goal be placed in an eternal and unchangeable being such as the one ascribed to the ideas? Is that striving, then, only illusion? In the doctrine of Eros and in the praise of Socrates we hear a constant Excelsior! — but the world of ideas stands eternal and unchangeable, like the old Olympus. It is characteristic of Greek intellectual life that it so quickly comes to rest in plastic, calmly reposing forms, and ascribes higher value to the unchangeable than to the changeable. —

Both the doctrine of Eros and the doctrine of ideas have their counterparts in modern times, but it is of great interest to see what changes they have undergone.

Eros, the constant urge, the eternal striving, we find again in modern times especially in such periods as those in which the horizon is widened and the barriers to development are cleared away. And it then appears freed from the ancient limitation, but often also with a knowledge of resistance and pain, a tragic element that accorded well with Plato's theory of the inner connection between tragedy and comedy, but for which he found no place in his doctrine of Eros itself. On the ground of the Italian

Renaissance Giordano Bruno expresses the thought of the eternal striving, now in purely philosophical form, now in poetry. For him it has its value in itself, even should it not lead to the goal: "Even if the goal is not reached, and even if the soul is consumed by the intense yearning, it is enough for it that so noble a fire has been kindled in it". Heaven is farther off than it was in antiquity —, but this has not quelled the urge to ascend. On the ground of the German Renaissance at the close of the eighteenth century we find the great Eros in philosophical form in Lessing and Kant, in poetic form in Goethe's "Faust". Lessing's choice of the constant striving after truth, even with the possibility of going astray, if only the powers of the soul are constantly enlarged, contains, like Bruno's words, a consciousness of the possibility of disappointment and of the seriousness of the struggle, which Plato's young, sanguine Eros does not yet have. And Kant concludes his mole's work in the investigation of the nature of human thinking with the result, which in him calls up the memory of
[91] Plato, that from the nature of our thought there arises an ideal that no experience can satisfy, but that for that very reason leads us on to ever new and enlarged experience. Goethe's "Faust" finds happiness in constant striving, although no single moment brings full satisfaction, and it is this constant striving that makes it possible for the heavenly hosts to save him.

A corresponding change has come over the doctrine of ideas. In place of the "idea" there enters in modern times — already in Baco and Bruno — the law. It is no longer a resting concept, a fixed type, that is to contain our experiences. Galilei, the founder of modern science, expressly maintains that it is unjustified to ascribe greater value to the unchangeable than to the changeable. The word law means the rule for the changes in the world; it concerns what is to be expected when certain conditions are present. The idea leads only to classification, to the ordering of unchangeable phenomena, but the law gives an explanation, a How and a Why, not merely a What. The task of seeking the constant, the eternal, in the midst of the world of change has become greater, but it is nevertheless a continuation of the task that Greek thinking set itself.

Of both of Plato's principal thoughts it may be said, then, that they have the fate that they shall not die, even though they must undergo thorough metamorphoses.

But there is yet another thought that comes forward in the "Symposium", and that still lives. Plato shows how the one Eros, the one urge or impulse, can be transformed into the other: the urge of love, the urge for honor, the poetic urge and the urge for knowledge — they form for him what with a modern expression one might call

psychical equivalents. It is displacements of motive that he describes in his doctrine of the great Eros. There is an ideality in every urge or impulse, insofar as it points beyond the given state, beyond what has been attained, and makes a demand. And in this Plato sees the possibility of a metamorphosis from one impulse into another. Eros can here become the great teacher, in that the impulse, once it has been awakened, can be transformed into new and perhaps higher forms. Thus spiritual development becomes possible, not through asceticism or laborious self-compulsion, but through an inner transformation. The earthly Eros can pass over into the heavenly. They are *[92]* not such complete opposites as some of the speakers thought.

It is surely a personal trait of Plato's that reveals itself to us in the ease with which this metamorphosis of impulse takes place in his portrayal. It is not in all his dialogues that the metamorphosis is so easy; but it is perhaps Plato at his height, the real Plato, that we have before us here. It seems to me that Gomperz is right in maintaining this. In the dialogues that precede, a one-sidedly intellectualistic conception prevails, and in later dialogues a more mystical and dualistic conception prevails. In the "Symposium" he does not dwell on the struggles and sufferings, the crises and catastrophes, that can arise from the conflict of the impulses or from the power of single impulses. It was, after all, only after the portrayal of Eros was concluded and the banquet over that he had Socrates speak of the connection between tragedy and comedy; the tragic element he did not, as I have already remarked, take up into his doctrine of Eros. For Plato himself the intellectual Eros, the urge to ascend to comprehensive thoughts, was surely the highest. This Eros had been awakened in him by Socrates in his young days, and it accompanied him throughout his long life. It cast a radiance over life even when life darkened before the old thinker's eyes as he looked at the course of things in the world. Never has anyone been able to give so brilliant and so profound an expression of what for him gave life value.

The idea of psychical equivalents plays a significant role in modern psychology as well as in psychiatry. In human development feelings and impulses may arise and disappear; but on closer investigation we may find that they arise as a new form of preceding manifestations of life, and that they live on in new, apparently quite different manifestations of life. Plato himself remarked, after all, that a man persists under a constant change of the elements of the soul as well as of the parts of the body. It is in any case, then, a task that presents itself, whether the new stages can be explained from the earlier ones through displacement and metamorphosis.[1)] *[93]*

[1)] Cf. my "Mindre Arbejder". I. p. 226—230.

What significance this acquires for pedagogy and criminology, when they want to be something other and more than instruction in outward drilling, I need not specify more closely. Plato has shown here that, however much he wandered in the ideal world of thought and art, he nevertheless had his footing in the world of reality.

[94]

SOME REMARKS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN PLATO AND DEMOCRITUS

Attention has been drawn to this relation by Mrs. Hammer-Jensen's doctoral dissertation *Den ældste Atomlære*. The author seems to have succeeded in showing that the conflict that appears in Plato's *Timaeus* between teleological and mechanical explanation of nature is due to an influence of Democritus' writings, an influence that makes itself felt in the dialogue from a definite passage onward (p. 45), breaking the connection in a strange way. The detailed investigation of this is the contribution that the dissertation mentioned makes to the illumination of the relation between the two Greek philosophers. One may agree with the author on this point, as well as in her great admiration for Democritus, even if one, as I for my part must do, keeps a very great distance from her account and her assertions on other points.

It is by no means the case that — as is asserted in the dissertation — philosophers should be inclined to regard Democritus merely as a physicist. In all the accounts of the history of philosophy that I know, he is regarded as a philosopher, and with full justice, even if by a philosopher one understands a metaphysician, a thinker who wants to solve the riddle of existence, to explain to us "what holds the world together in its inmost being". For that is precisely what Democritus wanted, and believed he had done. He by no means presents his atomic theory merely as a method or as a hypothesis, but as an exhaustive explanation of the world. He believes he has found *[95]* the real in contrast to the sensuous, and the truth in contrast to mere opinion. He

is a metaphysician, a systematizer as much as anyone. And his system has a special interest in that it is the first consistent materialistic system ever set up. In the older natural philosophers animistic ideas constantly played a part; these Democritus has separated out, and he has thereby attained a greater purity of execution than his predecessors. If we had had his writings, whose loss is one of the greatest losses of ancient literature, it would have been a great intellectual pleasure to see how his train of thought was worked out in detail; he is, after all, highly praised as a writer in antiquity and is even placed on a level with Plato in this respect. As regards the train of thought too, there is — precisely by reason of the great opposition — reason to put him together with Plato: they had worked out their systems at about the same time, the one in a decidedly idealistic, the other in an equally decidedly materialistic direction. For Plato the idea, thought, for Democritus the atom (and space) is the absolute. They had each seized one side of existence and built their world-view on it. Two of the great possible principal systems thereby appeared for the first time in European history. — Windelband has therefore rightly placed Democritus parallel to Plato in his *Geschichte der alten Philosophie* (p. 206), as both the analogy and the chronology justify. He thereby gets a more correct place than in earlier accounts, in which he appears among the "pre-Socratic" philosophers, as a rule as a superseded standpoint in relation to the line Socrates—Plato—Aristotle.

That Democritus was a metaphysician does not, now, exclude his having also been a physicist. On the contrary. All physicists, right up to the most recent times, have been both. The physical explanations were regarded as definitive. Beyond that, people arranged matters in various ways. Either one took matter (the atoms) for that which lay at the ground of everything, and so paid homage to materialism, or one assumed that God had created the atoms. In those who held this latter view (e.g. Gassendi and Newton) there can then be shown a conflict between a mechanical and
[96] a teleological conception of nature similar to the one the author mocks in Plato. There is in this respect only a difference of degree (to be sure an extraordinarily significant difference of degree) between Plato's "Timaeus" and Newton's "Principia".

Already in antiquity analogies were found between Plato and Democritus, without any historical connection between them being assumed. — Aristotle puts their atomic theory side by side (Phys. I p. 525 b). — And in the theory of knowledge a likeness was found between them in that they both took only what is accessible to thought (τὰ νοητά) as true. Sextus Empiricus, in whom this remark is found (adv. *Mathem.* VIII 6), adds that this was a natural consequence of the fact that no sense

qualities could hold for Democritus' atoms, and that for Plato only the unchangeable, not the changeable that the senses show us, could be the true. This remark points to the fact that the two philosophers, so different in their results, were agreed in this, that in the end it is thinking that must decide what is true and what is not. They are both rationalists. It is another matter whether it is as consistent for the materialist as for the idealist to be a rationalist. — In the field of ethics too an analogy was found between them in that they both place blessedness in "the soul", and not in sensuous enjoyment. Both Democritus and Plato maintain the intellectual joys as the highest, in contrast to the sensuous joys, which are built on unstable ground (Stobaeus, after Didymus Arius, see Diels: *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker.* 55 A 167). —

In modern times one has not stopped at mere comparison, but has assumed not only an influence of Democritus on Plato, but even an express reference to Democritus on Plato's part. It is an entirely incorrect assertion, made in the dissertation, that no one hitherto should have supposed that Plato had let himself be taught by Democritus.

After Hirzel (in his work on Cicero's philosophical writings) had first sought to show that Plato's ethics is influenced by Democritus', Natorp has taken up this question for detailed investigation *(Die Ethica des Demokritos.* Marburg 1893. p. 155—175. Cf. already his Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblemes im *[97]* Altertum. 1884. p. 200 ff. and his article in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.* III p. 521 fl.). Two passages are decisive. In the *Philebus* (p. 44 B) mention is made of some who have a great name in physics (μάλα δεινοὶ λεγόμενοι τὰ περὶ φύσιν), and who have combated the hedonists, and who thus stand here as Plato's allies. In the *Republic* (IX p. 583 B ff.) Plato, as he seeks to establish that there are joys that are more than the relief of a physical urge, has Socrates say that he has heard from one of the wise that only the joy of thought is pure. In these two passages, which concern the same subject, hardly anyone other than Democritus can be meant. Natorp further finds references to Democritus in the *Protagoras, Gorgias and Phaedo,* in that, besides the fundamental thoughts, he also points to a series of expressions that recall Democritus' ethical fragments, e.g. γαλήνη (calm) and analogous expressions for the peace of the soul. The famous passage in the "Republic" (496 B) about the one who is born with a great soul in a small state Natorp also interprets as referring to Democritus. Whether he is right in everything must be left to closer investigation. But the Philebus passage one will hardly be able to get away from. —

As regards the *Timaeus* itself, too, an influence of Democritus was found long ago. Already Stallbaum says *(Prolegomena ad Timæum* p. 37) that Plato has made

use, among other things, of atomisticorum decreta, but complains that the relation between the various sources is not clear. Windelband says in his *Geschichte der alten Philosophie* (p. 234), in discussing the "Timaeus": "Es ist gut, auch hier die Parallele zu Demokrit im Auge zu behalten", and he expresses himself still more definitely in the book on Plato that he has written for "Frommanns philosophische Klassiker", when he says in connection with the "Timaeus": "Hier sind die Lehren der jüngeren Physiologen, besonders auch diejenigen Demokrit's sehr sorgfältig benutzt." And Natorp finds it (in the works mentioned as well as in *Platons Ideenlehre* 1903) "beyond doubt and evident" that Plato took account of Democritus' physics.

[98] A point that in my eyes is very interesting, and that has not come into its own in the dissertation, is the influence that Democritus' physics came to have on Plato's theory of knowledge in the "Timaeus". Moreover, Plato, without being aware of it, has come to criticize the atomic theory in the dogmatic form in which it was set up by Democritus and, with some modification, adopted by Plato himself. And it is a criticism that would correspond entirely to the one that would be made nowadays from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge.

Democritus has two kinds of knowledge (Diels 55 B 11): the obscure (γνώμη σκοτίη), to which all the senses (sight, hearing etc.) belong, and the genuine (γνώμη γνησίη), which is entirely separated (ἀποκεκριμένη) from the former, and which, by virtue of its finer organ of thought (ὄργανον τοῦ νῶσαι λεπτότερον), can conduct a finer investigation where the former must stop. It is with genuine knowledge that we discover the qualityless atoms, while obscure knowledge stops short at the sense qualities (color, sound etc.), which have only apparent (νόμῳ), not real (ἐτεῇ) validity (cf. Diels 55 B 9 and 125). In reality only the atoms and the void exist[1)].

Plato in his other dialogues also has two kinds of knowledge: sensation, which apprehends the qualities in their diversity and in their change, and thinking, which from the sensuous and changing qualities ascends to the general concepts (the ideas). What again and again awakens his admiration and enthusiasm is that it is possible to ascend from the world of the senses to the world of the ideas. His whole philosophy is

[1)]Democritus' theory of knowledge is very naive and unclear. Genuine knowledge is supposed to be wholly different from obscure knowledge, and yet the difference is said to be only relative; the former can perceive more finely! Evidently Democritus imagined that if our senses were somewhat sharper, we would be able to sense the atoms. It would be interesting to know what they would then look like. (Even in Dalton, the founder of the modern chemical atomic theory, there occur, moreover, statements to the effect that with more perfect microscopes we would be able to perceive the atoms.) — In agreement with this, the view is ascribed to Democritus that thinking and sensation are the same, that they spring from one and the same faculty (Diels 55 A 105). — Plato has seen more sharply here than Democritus.

such an ascent. Mathematics, especially geometry, to which he attached great weight, *[99]* is a station on the way.

But now — in Timaeus p. 52 A and B (not yet 27 D!) — he is compelled by the adoption of an atomic theory to set up a third kind of knowledge. For the atoms can neither be "sensed" nor "thought": they have, after all, no qualities, and yet they are single, determinate! Plato now distinguishes, then, between three different objects of knowledge and corresponding modes of knowing. "One is that which always keeps in the same state, ungenerated and imperishable, never receiving anything into itself from elsewhere, nor itself passing into anything else, invisible and altogether insensible (ἀναίσθητον); it is that which it is the task of thinking (νόησις) to investigate. Another is that which bears its name and resembles it, and which is sensible, in constant motion, appearing in some place and vanishing from it again; it is that which can be grasped by representation together with sensation (δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως περιληπτόν). A third is everlasting space, which is not subject to destruction, and which provides a place for everything that has a becoming; it must be grasped without the use of sensation, by means of a kind of spurious thinking (μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἁπτὸν λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῳ), but is hard to believe in."

What Democritus in his naive materialism found no difficulty in, and what most natural scientists right up to the most recent times have not found any problem in either, is where Plato stops short. Hardly has he accepted the thought of atoms before he asks: of what nature, really, is the knowledge we have of the atoms? He is clear that atoms cannot be sensed. And we do not think them — he holds — in the same way as when, by comparing mutually similar phenomena, we form a general concept. By "spurious thinking" Plato means (as is seen from the end of 52 B) inference by analogy. That third, he says, is the same as what we mean when we assume that everything is in a definite place and fills a space. It is clear that what Plato calls spurious thinking corresponds precisely to Democritus' genuine thinking, just as his sensation corresponds to Democritus' obscure thinking.

It is a stroke of genius on Plato's part to have seen that the atomic theory rests *[100]* on an analogy. Nowadays one would say roughly this: We conceive the material phenomena as if they consisted merely in motions of small particles in space. In that way we can find definite laws for their changes. But then we disregard all other properties than mobility and divisibility, thus all qualities in the narrower sense. We regard all changes in color, sound etc. by analogy with motions in space. It is a model that we form. We cannot, of course, avoid imagining the atoms with certain colors

etc., but we take no account of that.

Now on closer reflection it will appear that Plato need not have changed his theory of knowledge for the sake of the atoms. For the concept of motion and of movable particles is, after all, a general concept (an idea)! When Plato himself speaks of "the idea of likeness", he demands that we disregard all other properties of things than precisely this, that they resemble one another. Such an abstraction is required by all general concepts, and it is required by the concept of the atom too. That concept, too, is formed by thinking on the basis of sensation. But because of its clarity we use the analogy with it in all the fields of sensation.

I will only make a few further remarks on the significance of Plato and Democritus for the science of modern times. Democritus' idea of atoms was taken up in modern physics and chemistry because it was suited to serve as a basis for exact conception and calculation. After Bruno and Basso had taken it up in the period of the Renaissance, it was especially Gassendi who brought it en vogue. From Gassendi it came to Newton, and from Newton to Dalton. But it is a question whether Plato's fundamental thought, that definite logical and mathematical relations prevail in existence, has not been fully as fruitful. Both Galilei and Kepler were Platonists. It was in the confidence that
[101] definite mathematical relations must hold for the orbits and motions of the heavenly bodies that Kepler carried through the great work that led to the establishment of the laws that bear his name. —

The world of thought is great, and opposing forces can find work within it, indeed, are necessary for the work to go forward.

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EPICTETUS AND CHRISTIANITY

ADOLF BONHÖFFER: *Epiktet und das Neue Testament.* Giessen 1911, Töpelmann. XII + 412 S.

The author, who is known through several fine works on Epictetus, especially "Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet" (1894), continues in the present work his study of the Stoic intellectual movement and its significance through a many-sided and penetrating comparison between it and the New Testament view of life. The same qualities that made his earlier works so attractive, the great thoroughness, the open and free outlook and the great enthusiasm for the noble figure around whom his studies have so long gathered, will be found again in the present book as well. And they stand out here all the more strongly as he has here arrived at an investigation of so great an interest for intellectual history as that which a juxtaposition of Stoicism and the New Testament conception of life presents. — The author rightly distinguishes between what belongs to the New Testament and what is Christian; the latter is a more comprehensive concept. Underlying this distinction in the author there are not merely purely historical reasons, but one also notices a certain influence of Kierkegaard, who precisely in the author's homeland, Würtemberg, has exercised a quite special influence.

The author begins by criticizing the attempts that have been made from the theological side to demonstrate Epictetus's dependence on the New Testament, either in such a way that he is supposed to have taken up thoughts and impulses from it (Zahn), or that he is supposed to place himself in conscious opposition to Christianity (Kuiper). The author shows that the thoughts that are Epictetus's fundamental thoughts had *[103]* already come forward before the New Testament writings were composed, and that Epictetus himself, who alludes to the Christians in only a single place, had no real knowledge of Christianity and its source writings. Epictetus has his root in Stoicism,

as it had long since been founded and had, in the first century A.D., been renewed, especially as a practical direction of life. His own thoughts he develops from few but fruitful principles, in the application of which a rich experience of life, psychological depth, a lively mode of expression and, first and foremost, a mighty personality come to light. Neither adherence nor opposition nor rivalry with respect to quite different directions of life and thought are here of decisive importance.

While from the theological side one has wished to find New Testament influence, of a positive or a negative kind, in Epictetus, from another side it has been thought that Stoic elements could be found in New Testament writings. The interest here attaches especially to Paul, of whom it has often been supposed that he must have had a certain Greek cultivation. In the genuine Pauline epistles the author finds, as far as vocabulary and style are concerned, nothing that necessarily presupposes Stoic influence. Paul draws, like Epictetus later, on the Hellenistic common language (κοινή), though in such a way that Paul's Greek is also influenced by the Septuagint. When Paul and Epictetus come to related subjects, similarities in style and manner of argument can then quite naturally arise. There is, however, no reason to assume that Paul had a thorough knowledge of Greek popular philosophy. — A special interest is presented by the famous passage in the Epistle to the Romans (II, 14 ff.), where Paul says that the Gentiles do by nature (φύσει) the works of the law. The author thinks that this utterance comes forward in that particular context in order to shame the Jews; it is a sacrifice that Paul, in spite of his religious theory, makes to sound human understanding. But the sentence is not Stoic; for according to Stoic ethics only insight (λόγος), not natural instinct (φύσις), can lead to truly good action. —

Concerning the speech that the "Acts of the Apostles" (XVII) attributes to Paul in
[104] Athens, the author agrees with Wilamowitz-Moellendorff's remark that with whoever can assume that this speech is by Paul, "mit dem ist nicht zu reden", and he adds: "Im übrigen finde ich in der Rede nichts spezifisch Hellenisches oder Stoisches, was den Philosophen sonderlich imponieren konnte". — As regards the concept of the Logos in the Prologue of the Gospel of John, the author strongly emphasizes the difference between this concept and the Stoic concept of the Logos, and joins the view that maintains the Jewish origin of the Johannine concept of the Logos and requires λόγος to be translated by "Word", not by "Thought" or "Reason", although he concedes that Hellenic thoughts have had an influence on Philo and through him on the Prologue of the Gospel of John. —

In the book's second main section the relation between Epictetus and the New

Testament is investigated partly through a consideration of the vocabulary, partly through a systematic comparison of the two worlds of thought.

The section on the vocabulary, and a section attached to it on particular expressions and thoughts, contain many interesting contributions to clarity about Stoic terminology and good examples of shifts of meaning, just as they also show how the two different directions of thought determined a difference in vocabulary. But it is also shown how on several points an analogy nonetheless holds between Epictetus's ideas and those of the New Testament. —

The most interesting section of the book is the last, which gives a systematic valuation of the two conceptions of life. The author's great learning here works together with his open sense and his personal experience of life.

According to the author there is a certain spiritual kinship between the two conceptions of life. What the Christian possesses in his faith that God can be moved by prayer and penance to save his soul, the Stoic has in his conviction that man, through the working of the deity, has once and for all been so constituted and endowed that he has the source of strength and happiness within himself, a source that can ever anew well forth, even if it seems to have dried up. — But Stoicism falls short of Christianity in being philosophy, not religion; therefore its influence was limited to a *[105]* small circle, and it did not have the gripping and captivating power that a positive religion can exercise. — On the other hand it stands in a more positive relation to human culture, while the New Testament religion, in which the expectation of the kingdom beyond was all-dominating, took an ascetic attitude toward everything earthly. It is eschatology that here sets primitive Christianity apart from Stoicism. — The Stoic concept of God was indeed more abstract than the Christian one, but in return it did not present the difficulty of how an absolute and unconditioned being can have ethical attributes when it has no inner and outer resistance to overcome, and thus no work to perform. — Finally, Stoicism has the merit that, even before Christianity, it maintained the unity and belonging-together of the human race.

An objection against both conceptions of life is that they lack the idea of a great, progressive improvement of human conditions and do not see the great importance that outer reforms can have for spiritual development. Stoicism worked for the abolition of slavery as little as Christianity did, although it, like Christianity, taught that all men were free in their inner selves. In neither of the two conceptions of life was the criticism of slavery grounded in the idea of social justice. —

In the author's conviction the influence of Stoicism is not over even today. Anyone

can still experience the strengthening and consoling power of Epictetan idealism. If Stoicism fell in the ancient world, it was because there was no longer any soul brave and proud enough to feel attracted by the stern and lofty greatness of its teaching! —

I believe that I have herewith rendered the train of thought of this interesting book. I permit myself only to mention further that I myself at one time (see Mindre Arbejder I p. 158—179) expressed a similar view of Stoicism and its relation to Christianity. But I could not make use of so comprehensive a learning as that which is at the author's
[106] disposal, and I had besides already gained much instruction from the author's earlier studies of Epictetus. When the author therefore refers to my treatise, he refers to a work that stands in debt to himself. — The author ends his book by joining in the remark in my Ethics that our ethics is Greek ethics, deepened and enriched by all later development in the various spiritual and social spheres.

But whatever view one may oneself hold concerning these things, one will gain rich instruction in Bonhöffer's book about one of the most important episodes in intellectual history.

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MARCUS AURELIUS[1)].

Greece succumbed to the Roman legions, but in return conquered Rome through its culture, its art, its science, its philosophy. The Greek culture that thus came to rule the world was, however, not the one that flourished when Greek political life was free and vigorous. It was a culture that had burst the national barriers and led to the development of a general consciousness of humanity, at the same time as it stressed the inner, peculiar life of the individual personality. Both by its universal and by its individualistic character it stood in contrast to classical Greek culture. And while Greek culture proper succeeded, in a way and to a degree that perhaps no culture has ever managed, in gaining expression in great works, rich in content and perfect in form, later antiquity was not able to gain such an expression. In particular the two tendencies, the universal and the individual, often came into sharp opposition to each other, insofar as they did not go their separate ways. There came to be lacking the harmony, the union of fullness and strength, that was the distinctive mark of classical Greek culture. In the philosophical sphere it is the Stoic school that takes the lead, and it is characteristic that the leading Stoic thinkers came from wholly or half barbarian lands. Of the school's founder Zeno it was said in antiquity (by the *[108]* Academic Polemo) that he had clothed Plato's Ideas in Phoenician dress; Zeno was from Cyprus, colonized by the Phoenicians. Later on, in the imperial age, the Stoic school was recruited not only from the barbarian lands of the East but also from those of the West. Epictetus, the most remarkable and the profoundest of the Stoics of the imperial age[1)], was from Phrygia; but Seneca and Marcus Aurelius were of Spanish stock. Yet Marcus Aurelius wrote his diaries, which after his death were published under the title "Self-Contemplations" (εἰς ἑαυτόν), in Greek, and he belongs to Greek

[1)] A lecture in the "Græsk Selskab", 22 Oct. 1912.

[1)] Cf., on the Stoics of the imperial age, especially with regard to their relation to Christianity, my *Mindre Arbejder.* Første Række p. 158—179 ("Hedenske Sandhedssøgere").

literature through language and thoughts, through his intellectual content, even if the significance that this intellectual content has in his personal life is very different from what we would find in a Greek of the classical period. He feels himself a citizen of the world, the word "world" taken both in the sense of the world of men and of the great world of nature; but his notes concern exclusively what stirs in his mind in the course of life, in his work and his doubt, in his antagonism to his surroundings, or at the thought of his connection with the whole of nature. The thoughts he has appropriated get their essential significance for him as a help to keep himself up, to be himself and to assert his personality in spite of outer opposition and inner trials. His notes are one of the first self-confessions that literature has to show. We are led into the inner world of a personality that cannot be counted among the great, but who with honesty, strength and inwardness reflected on the conditions of life as they took shape for him. Not as a scientific thinker but as a philosopher of life is he of great interest. And in spite of all that the ages have brought, we can still see in him a fellow combatant and learn from the thoughts that he wrote down in his diary in the privy chamber of the imperial palace or in his tent in the camp up by the Danube.

[109] Marcus Aurelius[1)] was born in Rome in the year 121 A.D. His family came, as already remarked, from Spain; under Vespasian it had been admitted to the patrician order. As a boy he attracted the attention of the Emperor Hadrian by his gentle, serious and pure disposition, and when the emperor adopted Antoninus Pius, it was on the condition that the latter in turn adopt the young Marcus. It was with his adoptive father as his model that he prepared himself to govern the Roman Empire. With great reverence and with a gratitude that only significant personalities can feel, he has described not only what he owes to his imperial model and his other relatives, but also what he owes to his teachers, the grammarians, rhetoricians, jurists and philosophers who directed his studies. He thanks especially the Stoic Rusticus, because he led him to serious absorption in philosophy and kept him away from sophistry, rhetoric and belles-lettres, and instead laid the weight on what could serve the development of character. And not least he thanks him because he made him acquainted with the writings of Epictetus. For Marcus set Epictetus highest of all philosophers; the philosophical emperor is the disciple of the philosophical slave. The Peripatetic Severus, with whom he entered into brotherhood, he thanks for the idea of a free republic governed according to the principles of equality and justice, and of

[1)] His first name was Catilius Severus, but after being adopted by Antoninus Pius he received the name Marcus Aurelius (*Capitolinus*: Antoninus Philosophus. I; V; VII.

a monarchy that honors the freedom of all. One sees from this how the philosopher himself conceived his position as emperor in Rome. The gods he thanks for his not having come to follow the unfortunate inclinations that might lie in his nature, and for the good relatives they have granted him, especially for his good wife Faustina. This last thanks seems, according to what is known, to be less well founded[2)].

At forty years of age Marcus was drawn out of the quiet, inward-turned life he *[110]* had led until then. Antoninus Pius on his deathbed named him his successor and had the image of the goddess of victory carried from his own bedchamber into that of the new ruler.

He does not belong among Rome's great emperors. But his reign is marked, in internal affairs, by a series of humane measures, such as the establishment of a chief office of guardianship and the laying down of the rule that every doubt should benefit the accused. During the great calamities — plague, earthquake, war, — that afflicted the empire, he brought relief to the best of his ability. And although he is said not to have had any special talent as a general, he nevertheless acted with strength, prudence and consistency against the Germans storming forward from the north, and it was only a rebellion in one of the provinces that prevented him from protecting the borders of the empire in a lasting way. For almost fourteen years he, whom Mommsen has called "the warrior prince against his will", lay at war up in the border lands against Marcomanni and Sarmatians. In the camp he wrote down some of his most interesting aphorisms, and it was in the camp at Vindobona, the present Vienna, that he died in the year 180, 60 years old. —

Thought, philosophy, has for Marcus Aurelius the significance of being a stronghold, something that stands firm while everything else is vanishing, fleetingly streaming away. The things in the world are in constant motion; to attach one's heart to any of them would be like falling in love with a bird flying past, which is at once out of sight. And so it goes with the whole of life; the time between the first breath drawn and the last breath given out is at bottom as short and fleeting as the time each breath fills. But reflection helps us to a firm standing amid all this change. In it our genius (daimon) expresses itself, the god within us. Through it we can assert ourselves against all toil and all allurement, and receive what meets us with the consciousness that it stems from the same source from which we ourselves have our origin, the great,

[2)] After Faustina's death he asked the Senate to pay her honors and to build her a temple, praising her, although she — whether he did not know it or pretended not to know it — was notorious for her debaucheries. (*Capitolinus.* XXVI).

all-embracing nature whose laws determine everything, and which reigns not only in the outer world but in our own inner selves. "There are many who seek out solitary
[111] places, country regions, the shores of the sea or mountains; and you yourself, too, long for such things. But it is at bottom foolish, since you can, at whatever moment you will, withdraw into yourself! No quieter and more undisturbed refuge can a human being find, especially when he can sink himself, within, into thoughts that can restore the harmony of his being, so that he can again meet the wickedness of men (which is really folly), meet the changing fates and the bodily discomforts, and master the urge for outward honor! Look within! For there is the source of the good, a source that can ever well forth anew, if only you dig! You shall hold yourself in awe and not let your happiness depend on other souls than your own. Let the god within you come to rule over a manly, venerable human being, a citizen, a Roman! This god or daimon, whom Zeus has given to each one as overseer and guide, a spark of Zeus' own being, is nothing other than each one's own mind and thought[1)]."

Marcus Aurelius seldom mentions his work as a statesman and his imperial dignity. He warns himself against chasing impossible ideals. Do not expect Plato's state, but be glad of a little progress! — He is ironic about his own warlike career: A spider is proud when it has caught a fly; there are others who rejoice at having shot hares or bears, or at having caught sardines in a net; others again at having conquered Sarmatians; — but are they not all robbers, when one looks closely? — and he warns himself against taking on the color of his position: See to it that you are not Caesarified; it happens
[112] so easily, after all. But keep yourself such as accords with your striving for wisdom, and live in all respects as befits the disciple of Antoninus! —

Court life has not pleased him. "If you had at one and the same time a stepmother and a mother, you would doubtless honor them both, but you would always return to your mother. So it goes with you with the court and philosophy. Return often to your spiritual mother, and rest there; then court life too will become easier for you to bear, and you yourself will become easier to bear there!" — He feels himself constantly an object of slander, criticism and backbiting. Then he consoles himself with the words of Antisthenes, that it is a king's lot to do good and to be spoken ill of for it.

[1)] The Stoics took over the idea of daimons from popular belief, where it denotes a kind of momentary gods, by whose intervention sudden turns and inspirations are explained. The transition to the Stoic idea is formed by the belief that each human being has his daimon. See *Usener*: *Götternamen* p. 290—297. — In Marcus Aurelius the daimon is made one with man's mind or thought (see II, 6. 13, 16; III, 4—6; V, 27; XII, 1. 3. 26), as E. *Rohde* remarks *(Psyche.*[2] II, p. 317). Moreover, Heraclitus had already said that a man's temper (ēthos) is his daimon. (*Diels*: Vorsokratiker p. 82).

He knows very well that there are those who long for this schoolmaster, who has indeed done them no harm but whose conduct was a silent accusation against them, to depart by death. And when even those who stand close to him, and for whose sake he has endured so much struggle, nourished so many wishes and had so many cares, will feel relief at his passing, then it must be easy for him himself to leave a life where things go on in this way. Yet without bitterness. That experience shall not be allowed to change his character! He knows, besides, that even if he bursts with vexation over them, they will go on acting as they do. And he neither esteems nor fears their judgment. Just try once, he says to himself, to think your way into what stirs in these people. They flatter one another and yet despise one another! They seek to raise themselves above others and yet bow humbly to the very ones they wish to surpass! — There must, after all, be shameless and faithless people in the world. It is your fault when you are surprised by it. And when you are disappointed at meeting ingratitude, should that not be because you expected another reward than the one that lies in acting according to your own inmost nature?

Even those who wrong us we can love, when we consider that they are akin to us in their being, — that they act from ignorance, — that they, as well as we ourselves, will be dead in a short time, — and above all, that no harm has been done to us, for our mind has not become worse than it was before. The jewel remains a jewel, whatever one may say or do. Let them only throw dirt into the pure and clear spring: *[113]* its vigorous welling will wash it away, and its water will not take color from it! In spite of everything you can keep your thought pure, understanding, sober-minded and just. You will have in you an eternally flowing spring if you always assert your freedom in league with a kindly, simple and modest disposition. —

Marcus Aurelius's contemplations do not form a coherent book. His thoughts and moods are expressed in short and often broken sentences, occasioned by experiences that as a rule are not even hinted at, but which one must infer. What kind of people, e.g., it was who called forth the utterances last quoted, we are not told. This constant lack of motivation is explained by the fact that the initial ideas or the initial moods filled his mind in a living way, and that it was only the thoughts they occasioned that he needed to write down. Therefore one cannot read long at a time in the book, and in the first readings there is much whose significance is not understood. But then it may happen that, by opening the book at random and fixing on particular sentences, one calls up the whole corresponding mood and with it the understanding. It goes here in a similar way as when one reads a collection of poems. Each single little piece

demands its mood and must be read by itself.

It is not always merely moods, however, that must find vent. The imperial philosopher moralizes to himself, scolds himself, or urges himself to have his thoughts ready for situations to which he would otherwise easily succumb. One can see, e.g., that it has often been hard for him to begin his day with zeal and confidence. At times he has difficulty waking up fully and wishes to prolong his stay in the arms of sleep on the soft and warm bed. Therefore he says to himself: "In the morning, when you have difficulty getting up, you shall have the thought ready at hand that you are awakened to do the work of a human being; it is for this that you have come into the world, not to lie warm between soft blankets. Your work is to act for the good of society, and
[114] how can you hold this work in low esteem?" At other times he resolves, first thing in the morning, to be prepared to meet ungrateful, brutal, treacherous and envious people; what matters is to hold fast to the knowledge that they act from ignorance, and that in spite of everything they are of the same kin as he himself, destined like him for a great, common work.

One sees here how he uses his philosophical ideas to strengthen his zeal and to make it possible ever to take up the struggle of life anew. These ideas he owes to Stoic philosophy, as it had taken shape in the Stoics of the imperial age, especially in Epictetus. We gain an insight into how this philosophy is used in the spiritual economy of a serious human being living amid great affairs, as a defense against everything that can dull, ensnare and disquiet.

The Stoics laid great weight on the great, lawful connection in all things, on the thought of nature as a great whole, to whose law everything individual is subject. This thought also forms the background of Marcus Aurelius's view of life, although at times he seems to move away from it. His thoughts oscillate, use different points of view, but always return to that central point of view.

In order to free himself from what might ensnare and beguile, he will see things in their nakedness and dissolve them into their elements, separate them out from the whole connection. He analyzes at times in a crude and cynical way that which is an object of enjoyment or of pride. When we thus strip things bare, we rise more easily above them. In contrast to the crude and the material there then appears that loftiness of mind which is grounded in the consciousness of being a citizen in the great world community, the highest state, in relation to which all other communities are what the houses are in relation to the city.

Above all there are two apparently opposed thoughts that come back again and

again. Everything changes — and yet nothing new happens! Existence is like a river in constant flow. Without interruption the passage takes place from what stood as future, through present, to past. Where now are the famous and mighty men of the past? A court like the one you yourself have was had by Alexander, Caesar, Hadrian. They are long since gone, after having filled a brief moment in infinite time. But in *[115]* spite of this change you need not expect or fear anything new. If you have looked about you in the world and gained an overview of what happens, you can be at ease about the future. Everything will repeat itself. The same rhythm in the course of the world will ever anew make itself felt. The events of the future will in all essentials resemble those of the past. If you have only reached your fortieth year, you can, at everything that happens, say with good heart that it is something you have often seen; it is the old that comes again in new forms; it is the same drama that is played, only the actors are different[1)].

But here too the feeling of unity with nature again and again gains the upper hand. The very repetition and the rhythm bear witness, after all, to the great world law that reigns through all vicissitudes. All things cooperate in maintaining the world order. Everything forms one world; one god works through everything, one being, one law, one thought common to all things and all men. His mood, which took on a bitter character from seeing things in their nakedness, their change and their repetition, alters the more he immerses himself in thoughts of this kind. He no longer needs the cynical contemplations, but lays his fate securely and confidently in the hands of the great order of nature. "Everything that is harmonious for you, O Nature (Kosmos), is also in harmony for me. Nothing that is timely for you comes too early or too late for me. Everything your seasons bring is fruit for me. From you comes everything, in you everything subsists, to you everything returns!"

This feeling of unity, which in the face of the course of nature becomes mild, wistful resignation, and in the face of men heartfelt sympathy, marks what is central in Marcus Aurelius's view of life. He is not concerned to fix wholly definite ideas about the ultimate grounds of things. He seeks only to show that, however that may *[116]* be, man is master of himself and has the task of asserting himself according to his own peculiar nature, a task that can always be accomplished. If there is a providence that determines my fate as well, then I am well provided for; if providence concerns

[1)] At times the repetition causes disgust and weariness of life. "Just as you have grown tired of the games in the amphitheater and similar places, because one always sees the same thing there, and the monotony leads to disgust at the spectacle, so you will find it the whole of life through. From first to last things are the same and spring from the same causes. How long, then, is it to last!"

only the general order of things, then it is of no use, surely, for a single part to find fault with the whole; if there is no world order at all, but everything is only a play of atoms, and chance reigns, then see to it that there is at least connection and meaning in yourself! If there is no one who cares for me, then I can care for myself. And to my nature belongs thought, and belongs participation in a community. As Antoninus, Rome is my fatherland; as a human being, the world is my fatherland! It is conduct and action in the single moment, in the particular, given situation, that matter. Everything else is indifferent. — Yet, as is seen from the train of thought just cited, Antoninus always comes back to the conviction that the concentration of will that makes us independent of everything external is itself an element in a world order; the genius (daimon) that expresses itself in our willing is an emanation of the force that works in the great connection of the world.

Death too is a link in this connection, as natural a link as birth and growth. It too is something that nature wills. One should be neither too preoccupied with it nor impatient or presumptuous toward it, but wait for it as one waits for the birth of a child. Whether death is merely a dissolution into elements, or whether it is a transition to another life, or perhaps an absorption into the great unity of the world, we do not know. You have gone aboard; you have sailed; you have reached the end of the voyage; so leave the ship. If you then pass over to another life, you will find gods there too, if it is true that there are gods everywhere. If it is to an unconscious state that you pass over, then you are at least set free from bondage to the material, from the constant opposition between your mind, your genius, on the one side, and earth and dirt on the other. The only thing that could make us hold fast to life would be if we lived together with people who looked on life with the same thoughts as
[117] we ourselves. But now you see yourself what torment disharmony in living together causes, so that you must cry out: Come quickly, O death, lest it go so far that I forget myself!

And when, now, a given situation becomes unbearable, in that it demands more than the strength we have to put in? — Then leave life by your own decision, not in bitterness and anger, but in the same way as you go out of a room because there is smoke. You should not imitate the beast fighters in the arena who, though badly wounded, beg to be spared until the next day, but neither the Christians who in blind zeal rush into death[1)]. It must be your own reflection that prepares your departure,

[1)]While Marcus Aurelius (XI, 3) derives the Christians' craving for a martyr's death from "blind zeal" (or "love of contest", parataxis), Epictetus (IV, 7, 6) derives their fearlessness from mere "habit", in

and this departure should take place, not theatrically, but thoughtfully and solemnly.

Even if in one way or another you are called away from the stage before you have played in all five acts, but only in three, your life can nonetheless form a whole; it is not you, after all, who composed the whole drama. Go away, therefore, with a kindly mind. The power that leads you out of life is, after all, kindly minded too. — These are the last words of the book. And the gentle tone that expresses its author's inmost mood sounds in them as well. —

I have sought to render the thoughts that one of the noblest human beings of the ancient world formed about life and the world. Free from the Oriental mysticism that spread more and more over the lands, he strove to look clearly and soberly at things and yet keep his mind open to everything that makes life noble and high. And there reigns in his contemplations an inwardness and a richness of mood that hardly have their counterpart within ancient literature. It is not weariness or inner division that brings him to think about life as he does, and to find rest in the thoughts he forms. From youth on there was, in the words of one of his first historians, "gravity *[118]* without sadness"[1)] characteristic of him. It is through this that he has felt the urge to live himself into the world of thought that one of the last independent Greek schools of philosophy had built up. He has taken from it what he could use for spiritual self-preservation under the circumstances in which his position and the conditions of the time placed him. Such an individual urge to self-assertion, to understanding of oneself and fidelity to oneself, had developed in Greek antiquity from the turning point marked by Socrates. But it has hardly anywhere found so unreserved an expression as in Marcus Aurelius. It is hardly even a literary work proper that we have before us. The emperor surely never imagined that what he wrote down would be read by others. It is a sanctuary into which we have perhaps by chance been initiated, — one of that kind of sanctuaries that endure however many temples fall. Precisely through the personal character of his thoughts he belongs to all times.

And yet he stands clearly and definitely on ancient ground. This shows itself especially in the limitation of his picture of the world. In spite of all change there is a certain number of possibilities that will ever be realized anew in rhythmic succession. Experience is for him closed. And this limitation gains decisive importance for him, because he builds his trust and security on his knowing what the course of things

contrast to the rational reflection that according to him is the condition of true courage. By "habit" Epictetus is presumably thinking of its having become a tradition in the Church that the martyr's death was to be coveted.

[1)] Capitolinus IV: sine tristitia gravis.

could bring. However great the oppositions he has to struggle with, none of them was so strong and deep as the one that arises from the possibility that life should come to be led under wholly new conditions, — that the rhythm known until then should be only a slight ripple in the great stream of the ages. With this possibility all the problems of life are sharpened. What we may miss in Marcus Aurelius is courage and confidence in the face of the new and uncertain; they are lacking for the simple reason that he did not believe in anything really new. Memory had consumed hope and fear, and the world of memory was not to be enriched by new experiences. Greek
[119] intellectual life is essentially built on memory; on this rests its great significance as well as its strange limitation.

Marcus Aurelius breathed his last in his camp during the struggle against the barbarians storming forward, whose appearance in history was precisely to mark the beginning of a wholly new period in the history of the human race. Here he stood face to face with new forces and new possibilities, although he himself probably regarded the attacks as repetitions of the many border storms that the empire had had to contend with ever since the time of Marius. This time, however, the storm was, even if it took three centuries more, to lead to the downfall of the Roman Empire and of ancient culture. But although the swell in human intellectual life has since become stronger than the Greeks imagined, there is such depth and truth in the Greek thoughts that they have ever anew made themselves felt, and moreover, under the new conditions, have proved to contain possibilities that did not come to unfolding, and perhaps could not come to unfolding, in antiquity itself. And where it is a matter of testing thoughts with regard to their carrying power in the course of life, Marcus Aurelius's ideas too, closely bound up as they are with his personality, will ever anew awaken attention and win understanding.

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ROUSSEAU AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

Rousseau's influence extends through the whole of the nineteenth century. In an immediate way he acted upon the people of his own time, and among them in turn especially upon a series of eminent minds, through whose works his influence makes itself felt in large circles that know nothing of him, and perhaps do not want to know anything of him. We must therefore distinguish between a mediate and an immediate influence.

Throughout the whole century, however, both his personality and his thoughts are objects of strong sympathies and antipathies. He stands continually as a psychological problem through the contradictions of his personality, and the value of his thoughts is assessed differently according to the different positions the assessors take toward the ethical and social problems that Rousseau had posed. The visitors' book at Les Charmettes bears witness to this. When George Sand visited Les Charmettes in the year 1861, she found the pages of the visitors' book "filled with coarse abuse or foolish accusations against Rousseau", "with dirty taunts, with judgments and hypocritical curses or pedantic reprimands", — and in contrast to this "tributes from democratic and socialist workers".[1)] The battle over him still goes on. It is now Conservatives *[121]* and the Orthodox, now Liberals and Freethinkers, who fall upon him.

That the battle remains joined over his personality and his work has its reason in their typical character. His position toward the "Enlightenment" of his time and toward

[1)] *A propos de Charmettes.* (Revue des deux mondes. 15 Nov. 1863.) — When I visited Les Charmettes in the summer of 1909, I unfortunately neglected to study the visitors' book, so I cannot say whether such opposite testimonies are still given.

the orthodoxy and conservatism of his time presents analogies with standpoints that arise in the course of the nineteenth century. One can point to a series of men who are not all influenced by him, nor all sympathize with him, but whose stance in religious and social questions, partly because of their personalities, partly because of the situations confronting them, comes to show a kinship with his and therefore serves, in the history of ideas, to illuminate and confirm its significance.

An inquiry into "Rousseau and the nineteenth century" must concern both his mediate and his immediate influence, and must bring out not only this influence but also the confirmation his ideas receive from the stance of more or less kindred persons in analogous situations. To this must be added a look at his anticipation of certain more special points of view that have come to be developed in the course of the nineteenth century.

Rousseau's main problem was conditioned by the division of labor in the mental as well as in the material sphere, and by the one-sided development of particular sides of personality that was thereby brought about, to the detriment of the healthy and integrated unfolding of life. His chief demand then became: Rendez l'homme un! In order to satisfy it he sought down to the immediate and involuntary forms of life, to the life of feeling in contrast to the life of the intellect, to life in free nature, to the mood and the urge that the changing fates of life call forth in men's minds. That was what he meant by "returning to nature". It was, if one keeps to the clarification his first paradoxes received in his later writings, by no means his intention to deny culture. He demanded only that culture should grow forth out of nature, correspond to the stage of development of the individual or the people, and preferably arise through their self-activity. These were thoughts that pointed far beyond the eighteenth century.

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I

Most direct, naturally, was the influence on French literature. Chateaubriand was in his youth intoxicated by Rousseau's works; both his religious and his poetic tendencies were born of this influence[1)], which does not become less significant because other influences came later, or because the young romantic was himself placed face to face with great nature, learned in the school of solitude and poverty, and thus had experiences like those by which Rousseau had been guided. Madame

[1)] Cf. *Giraud*: *Les origines du Génie du Christianisme* (Compte rendu de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques. 1911, p. 43).

de Staël, who in her youth wrote an enthusiastic and understanding little book on Rousseau, was likewise led by his works onto the romantic path. Lamartine too was a worshipper of Rousseau in his youth; although his mother burned Rousseau's books when she found them in his room,[2] their effect was strong and lasting. Both in his nature poetry and in his religious poetry after-effects of it are stirring. Lamennais was influenced by Rousseau's democratic and social enthusiasm; it can be traced both in his youth, when in the struggle against rationalism he pointed to the immediate faith accessible to the simplest, and later, when in the name of religion he demanded the social transformation of which Rousseau had been the herald. "Paroles d'un croyant" (A Believer's Words) has been called "the Contrat social presented in the form of a parable".[3] There was, however, one important point on which Lamennais (like so many of the nineteenth century's social reformers after him) corrected Rousseau's position. It was the weight he laid on the combination of the workers in small and large associations. He says to the poor: "Join together, and be a mutual support and shelter for one another. As long as you are divided, and each thinks only of himself, you can only expect suffering, misfortune and oppression.... When you are asked how many you are, you shall answer: We are only one, for our brothers, they are ourselves, and we are one with our brothers".[4] George Sand remained true all her *[123]* life to the enthusiasm that the reading of Rousseau's works had awakened in her. Let us hear her own words: "Jean Jacques's language and his manner of thinking captivated me like a music heard while the sun was shining brightly." She found again something of her own nature in him. René Doumic calls the first chapter of his book on George Sand: "Psychologie d'une fille de Rousseau". In her later years she has (in the already mentioned article on Les Charmettes) expressed in warm and beautiful words what she herself and others, who perhaps would not admit it, owe him: "For my part I remained true to him, true as to the father to whom I owe my life. For even if he has not left me his genius, he has, in me as in all artists of my group, awakened love of nature, enthusiasm for truth, contempt for an artificial life and distaste for the vanity of the world". "The most powerful geniuses of our time as well as its gentlest talents owe him, however much they might wish to deny it, their decisive initiation .... Rousseau's influence will continually spread further, even to those who have not read him".

[2] Cf. Annales de la société J. J. Rousseau. III, p. 271, 283.
[3] Charles Adam: *La philosophie en France.* Paris 1894, p. 103.
[4] *Paroles d'un croyant.* (Paris 1833), Chap. VII.

Even a critic who has very little sympathy, and one may add, very little understanding, for Rousseau must, half a century after George Sand, confirm her words: "Partly through himself, partly through the authors who have been influenced by him, he still acts upon many of us, without our perhaps knowing it ourselves".[1)]

On English literature Rousseau's influence has hardly been considerable. Yet Southey and Wordsworth are strongly influenced by him,[2)] and in splendid stanzas Byron has glorified the poet of the new Héloïse.[3)]

On the other hand, his influence on German literature and intellectual life has been exceedingly great, and it is especially here that the mediate effect is clearly seen to proceed from the immediate. Through Herder and Lessing, Kant and Fichte, Goethe and Schiller, the great founders of German humanism, he has acquired decisive
[124] significance for the whole intellectual life of the nineteenth century. The men named[1)] are the real creators of the intellectual content with which so-called Romanticism appeared, and in their development Rousseau intervened strongly. Here as everywhere it is immediacy in contrast to the reflection of the intellect, life in the whole instead of the divided life in the parts, the great understanding of the simple and of the sublime, that conditions his influence. It is above all through what he has been for the men named, and through them for the whole European intellectual development, that, as George Sand and Lemaître said, his influence has been able to extend mediately to many who do not suspect what they owe him.

II

Toward the middle of the nineteenth century there arose, in the sphere of spiritual culture, a situation that in several respects recalls the conditions under which Rousseau appeared. The romantic movement, which had had such great effects in the spheres of art, religion and thought, was slackening or stiffening. It was the age of the epigones. There was need, as in Rousseau's time, of a new infusion of "nature". At the same time the view was asserted that all spiritual needs must and could find their satisfaction in the forms of systematic thinking. Even the striving and yearning that lead to the great problems in the sphere of the view of life were now to be

[1)] Jules Lemaître: *Jean Jacques Rousseau*, p. 352.

[2)] Cf. Annales de la société J. J. Rousseau. III, p. 270.

[3)] *Childe Harold.* III, 76—104.

[1)] Cf., as regards Kant, my work *Den nyere Filosofis Historie.* 2nd ed. II p. 32 and p. 73 f., where I have tried to show that a Rousseauian influence made itself felt in Kant at two different points in time. — Cf. furthermore *Rich. Fester*: *Rousseau und die deutsche Geschichtsphilosophie.* Stuttgart 1890. — H. v. *Stein*: *Die Entstehung der neueren Aesthetik*, Stuttgart 1886, p. 266.

only an obscure and self-contradictory form of what appears in full clarity in the form of pure thought. This view reached its height in the Hegelian philosophy. But from quite another side too it was maintained that personal life could be wholly absorbed in intellectual forms. The great upswing of natural science certainly led to a reaction against abstract speculation, but at the same time led not infrequently to the *[125]* view that now a human being's personal relation to life, every urge and every faith, could be determined through and through by means of the results of natural science. The great question Rousseau had raised was, seen from an essential side, precisely whether man's immediate experience of life, won face to face with the conditions of life themselves and deposited in a deep and original life of feeling, should not be of some significance, indeed, be the really decisive factor. What Rousseau meant by "nature" was precisely the original, spontaneous and immediate in man's life of feeling.[1)] The value of a culture, an intellectual culture too, depends on whether it has its root in such a foundation or has at least struck, or can strike, root in it. From general scientific points of view man's purely individual and immediate captivation by life and its course cannot be derived. Pure deductions are not decisive here when they do not meet with the results won through individual induction.

The analogous situation in the middle of the nineteenth and in the middle of the eighteenth century called forth analogous problems and an analogous attitude in those who seriously felt the significance of the situation. In temperament and gifts too there was a certain kinship between Rousseau and the men who now came forward. We shall bring forward a few of these men as typical examples.

Thomas Carlyle is not essentially influenced by Rousseau, but proceeds from Goethe and from the poetry and speculation of German Romanticism. But on the basis of these presuppositions, and driven on by his melancholy and by the after-swell of Scottish Calvinism in his soul, he arrived at a position toward the spiritual and material culture of his time that forms a striking analogy to Rousseau's position toward his time. Against science, which in its speculative form made everything into logic, and in its naturalistic form made everything into mechanics, he demands that a distinction be made between the outer garment of existence, which must continually be woven in new forms, and its inner core, which reveals itself in man's inner being. *[126]* He demanded the great wonder and the great reverence before life and its powers. "He who cannot wonder, who does not continually wonder (and revere), — were

[1)] Cf. on Rousseau's concept of nature my book Rousseau og hans Filosofi. Second ed. (1912) p. 97—103.

he president of innumerable scientific societies, and did he hold the whole of the Mécanique céleste and Hegel's Logic together with an epitome of the results of all laboratories and observatories in his head, — he is but a pair of spectacles behind which there are no eyes."[1] — And as he set the living inner being of personality against the forms of science, so in the religious sphere he set the inner subjective conviction, won in silence and perhaps inexpressible, in contrast to all dogmas. — Like Rousseau he points beyond the culture of the time and its warring oppositions to a new spiritual culture, to be reached through the unfolding of the innermost powers of personal life itself. — There is a great opposition on many particular points between Rousseau and Carlyle. To mention just a single point: Carlyle approaches a cult of power as justified in and for itself; but Rousseau declared precisely the proposition "force ne fait pas droit" (might is not right) to be the main proposition of the "Contrat social". But they meet in their conception of the relation between personality and culture. — Akin to Carlyle's stance is that of Emerson and of Ruskin, and what has just been said holds for them too. —

In the Scandinavian North Kierkegaard's stance forms an analogy to Rousseau's and Carlyle's. In his paradoxical proposition: "Personality is the truth" he, like his two kindred spirits, sets the struggling yearning of personal life in contrast to objective science as well as to ecclesiastical institutions and traditional faith. He too felt himself in sharp opposition to his age, which he accused of having forgotten what it was to exist in earnest. "What good would it do me", he wrote in his youth in his journal, "if I discovered a so-called objective truth, when it had no deeper significance for myself and my life". He belonged to the kind of thinkers he himself has called "subjective
[127] thinkers". A subjective thinking proceeds from personal life and permeates it. It does not dissolve life into abstractions or let it be absorbed in fantastic ideals, but works to hold fast and carry through the knowledge won in the midst of life's reality. The subjective thinker is more artist than scientist; his thought and his will go together as one, and since life, with its changes and with the many finitudes and externalities, constantly resists inward concentration, there arises a relation of tension between life and thought that can bring suffering and pain. Hence the deep pathos in the subjective thinker's life.[1]

Kierkegaard is so far from being influenced by Rousseau that he would rather have felt antipathy toward him if he had known him more closely. But their position

[1] Sartor resartus. Book I, Chap. 10.

[1] Cf. my book Kierkegaard som Filosof, Chap. III, 6—7.

toward the time in which each of them lived is analogous, just as is their attitude toward the problem of life they had come to see. And the same can be said of a man who felt himself to be Rousseau's antipode, and would also have felt himself to be Kierkegaard's antipode had he known him, — Friedrich Nietzsche. He too did not find life exhausted by rational knowledge, by the "Enlightenment".[2)] His antipathy toward Strauss forms a parallel to Rousseau's antipathy toward Voltaire. In his cult of Dionysus Nietzsche found expression for the overwhelming enthusiasm, the captivating stirring of feeling, that for Rousseau too marked the high point of life.

As Nietzsche sets Dionysus above Apollo, and Apollo above Socrates, so he sets life above art, and art above science. This thought is entirely Rousseauian. And yet Nietzsche despised poor Jean Jacques and saw in him one of the worst representatives of "slave morality". He counts him among those he calls "meine Unmöglichen" (whereby Rousseau, by the way, comes into quite good company). "Rousseau, oder die Rückkehr zur Natur in impuris naturalibus" was an abomination *[128]* to him. Everything that stems from Rousseau was in Nietzsche's eyes "false, contrived, bellows, exaggerated".[1)]

What is interesting about the figures analogous to Rousseau in the nineteenth century is precisely that in many respects they at the same time stand as his antipodes. It is against their will that they come to bear witness to the value of Rousseau's stance and to the justification of his problem.[2)]

In authors such as Guyau, William James and Henri Bergson too one could find motives and courses of thought that present analogies with Rousseau's, without there seeming, however, to be any influence. —

In Leo Tolstoi, on the other hand, both influence and analogy can be demonstrated.

In the letter by which he enrolled in the "Société J. J. Rousseau", Tolstoi stated (1905): "Rousseau has been my teacher since I was fifteen years old. Rousseau and the Gospel have been the two great and good things that have determined my life. Rousseau does not grow old. Just recently I happened to read some of his works again, and I felt then the same elevation and admiration as when I read him in my youth".[3)]

[2)] After a disappointment in his relation to two rationalist friends he said to the faithful Overbeck and his wife: "er müsse doch immer wieder etwas anderes haben; die reine Aufklärung genüge ihm nicht; die beiden verstanden davon nichts". C. A. *Bernouilli*: *Overbeck und Nietzsche.* 1908. I, p. 338.

[1)] *Götzendämmerung.* Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen.

[2)] In a work by Seillière noticed in the Annales de la Société J. J. Rousseau (II, p. 284) there is even talk of Nietzsche's "Rousseauisme".

[3)] Annales de la Société J. J. Rousseau, I, p. 7.

What Tolstoi has stated here is confirmed by his biography, as Paul Birukof has presented it and Tolstoi himself has looked it over. In a list of the books that have been of significance for his development, he adds at "Confessions" and "Émile" that their significance has been "enormous", a predicate which among the other books only the Sermon on the Mount and "David Copperfield" receive. "I have read the whole of Rousseau," he says, "and there was a time when I more than worshipped him.... ..... Many pages in his books are so close to my being that it seems to me that I have written them myself."

Tolstoi's relation to the literary circles in Petersburg and Moscow presents a
[129] resemblance to Rousseau's relation to the Encyclopedists. And like Rousseau he gave up urban civilization and went out to the country to save his soul. Tolstoi stood, like Rousseau, facing a circle of authors and publicists who regarded themselves as the apostles of true culture, the leaders and teachers of mankind, who were in possession of the highest enlightenment. He found that they lacked self-criticism, that they were wanting in nature and originality. Among the people with whom his life as a soldier had brought him into contact he had found greater humanity. And toward the great question of the aim and meaning of life, the question that posed itself for him in ever sharper form, the literary circles stood indifferent. But it was precisely brooding over this question that led Tolstoi onto new paths.

The opposition in which Rousseau and Tolstoi stood to the literary circles of their times will repeat itself again and again. It is an opposition between the two directions of intellectual life, the centripetal and the centrifugal, unity and multiplicity, inwardness and outwardness. With passion Rousseau had taken his place in one of these extremes, and from it he set forth his paradoxes. He and the minds akin to him stand as prophets who address admonishing words to the generation not to sacrifice the kernel for the shell and let life be absorbed in externality. —

A significant opposition between Rousseau and Tolstoi appears in the fact that the fundamental thought of Rousseau's ethics is self-unfolding, expansion, which springs from self-assertion (amour de soi, distinct from amour propre), whereas Tolstoi preaches an absolute altruism and tries to take up again the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount. The distinction between amour de soi and amour propre Tolstoi does not know. "If you work for yourself alone, for your personal future, then you must know that what awaits you in the future is death .... Everyone must remember that when he strives to preserve his life, he loses *life*. Jesus repeats this again and again. The true life is that which increases the good that earlier generations have accumulated, makes

this inheritance greater in the present and leaves it to future generations. In order for man to have part in this life, he must give up his personal will".[1] — Rousseau is far *[130]* more an individualist than Tolstoi. But he shows in an interesting way that it is only through comparison with others, their circumstances and their happiness, that amour de soi can pass over into amour propre. When, on the other hand, self-unfolding has its free course, compassion and love of humanity arise as expansive extensions of self-assertion. Rousseau gains by this doctrine[2] firmer ground under his feet than Tolstoi, since he demonstrates psychologically the possibility of harmony between self-assertion and altruism, whereas Tolstoi, through his rationalistic interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, introduces altruism as a mystical power. With this is connected the difference which Benrubi has aptly brought out in his essay "Tolstoi continuateur de Rousseau",[3] that Rousseau lays the main weight on the education of the child, whereas Tolstoi, who had after all tasted more of worldly life than he, sets his trust especially in the conversion of adults. Rousseau's men are "once-born", Tolstoi's "twice-born".

III

Besides through his influence on modern poetry and through his position on the problem of culture, Rousseau also has significance for several more special philosophical questions and their treatment. A philosopher in the strictly scientific sense he was not, but the conception of human intellectual life that he expressed with such great warmth in his writings came to influence the position of later philosophers.

a. Here belongs first and foremost his influence on psychology, especially his assertion of the originality and independence of the life of feeling in relation to the other sides of mental life. As predecessors here he has partly English psychology, which especially influenced him through Diderot, partly the mystical tendency within *[131]* Cartesianism (Malebranche, Fénélon). But his glowing enthusiasm, his sense for the sublime as well as for the idyllic, for spiritual beauty (belle-âme in contrast to bel-esprit) as well as for natural beauty, awakened the sense of and interest in the life of feeling, so that one may rightly date a new epoch for this part of psychology from his appearance. In the nineteenth century, it is true, attempts have been made from

[1] *Ma Religion.* 2e éd. p. 141, 144.

[2] Cf. my book Rousseau og hans Filosofi. 2nd ed. p. 101—104.

[3] Annales de la Société J. J. Rousseau, III, p. 104 f. — The Norwegian literary historian Chr. *Collin* has also presented Tolstoi as one who takes up again Rousseau's problem of culture. See *Leo Tolstoi og Nutidens Kulturkrise.* Christiania 1911.

various quarters to reduce the life of feeling to a secondary side of mental life, — now (as in Hegel) to an obscure utterance, appearing in the form of "immediacy", of what in clear and reflected form comes forth in the life of thought, now (as in Herbart) to an effect of the mutual friction of ideas. But these attempts have not acquired any lasting significance. In modern pragmatism, on the other hand, the life of feeling is asserted as determining the life of thought, in sharp contrast to the view of those intellectualist philosophers.

In Rousseau not only is great weight laid on the life of feeling, but it is often isolated from the other sides of mental life, and it becomes an object not only of contemplation but also of enjoyment. Hence the sentimentality that Rousseau not only shared with his age but himself helped to increase. Yet it must be held fast that this isolation conflicts with his own psychology. The life of feeling that conditioned the happiness he found in life was not the blind state, untouched by all thoughts, that he glorified in his first writings; it was a life of mood that gained in inwardness and in scope by — now as cause, now as effect — being bound up with thoughts. Nor, on his own view, could feeling be isolated from will, for he laid (in his later writings) great weight on the instinctive foundation of mental life, the involuntary striving he called amour de soi, and from which the most diverse mental processes of development can proceed. When Schopenhauer in his concept "Wille zum Leben" comprised feeling and will under one, this was in accordance with Rousseau's opinion (in his non-sentimental moments).

The influence Rousseau has had on modern psychology has for the most part
[132] been mediate, with KANT as intermediary. But even where he merely stands as a predecessor, later development has shown that he had an eye for an essential side of mental life and gave the decisive impetus for its being recognized and understood.

b. What is interesting in Rousseau's ethical conception is the way in which in his later writings he shows the possibility that the urge of self-preservation (amour de soi) can develop into compassion, love of humanity and justice. Earlier (in Discours sur l'inégalité) he had, on the contrary, set up the urge of self-preservation and compassion as two original, mutually opposed tendencies. In this first phase of Rousseau's ethical conception SCHOPENHAUER found a confirmation of his ethics built on the originality of compassion. He certainly did not arrive at this conception through Rousseau. It is due to his own experience, and it stands moreover in close connection with his general philosophical view, which asserts the unity of all beings in spite of individual differences, whereby it becomes possible for the pain of others to be felt as our own.

But Schopenhauer was very glad to find his thought again in Rousseau. And although in another connection, namely when he thinks of Rousseau's optimism and of his faith (his "Pastorentheologie")[1], he speaks very disparagingly of him, he praises him in high tones as an ethicist. "My grounding", he says[2], "rests on the authority of the greatest moralist of all modern times. For this is without doubt J. J. Rousseau, the profound knower of the human heart, who drew his wisdom not from books but from life, and destined his doctrine not for the lecture chair but for humanity, — Rousseau, this enemy of all prejudices, this foster-son of nature, on whom she had bestowed the gift of being able to moralize without being tedious, because he hit upon the truth and moved the heart."

In relation to Rousseau's later doctrine Schopenhauer (as an ethicist, not as a psychologist) stands in a relation of opposition similar to that of Tolstoi (who, after all, is also strongly influenced by Schopenhauer). This later doctrine, which brings *[133]* the life of feeling and volitional life into close inner connection, nevertheless certainly marks an advance that cannot be taken back.

c. Rousseau's strong emphasis on immediate and involuntary mental life was bound to acquire quite special significance in religious respects. Against the outward customs of the church and the dogmatic doctrines, against books and speeches, he set the heart's captivation, the feeling for life in its greatness and its smallness, its happiness and its suffering. It was an open-air religion he taught. But since all religion must have begun as open-air religion, springing from the involuntary experiences of life, he worked toward a renewal of religious life. He pointed back to the source from which every serious view of life must stem. He maintained that religious ideas can only be interpretations of experiences, and he thereby initiated a revision of the traditional forms of religion. To be sure, he himself made an easy and rapid transition to dogmatics, — not to the church's dogmas, but to the dogmas of so-called "natural" religion, and he was not free of fanaticism in his zeal to maintain this "natural" theology. But here too, as on other points, through his appeal to "nature" he points beyond the warring oppositions of the time, the ecclesiastical repose in authority on the one side, the scorn or blasé indifference of the Encyclopedists on the other side.

In the nineteenth century these oppositions appear anew, even if it happens in new forms. But again and again the appeal to "nature" is heard. Schleiermacher's assertion of the life of feeling as the real foundation of religion, while all dogmas

[1] *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.* II, Chap. 46.
[2] *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik*^{2}, p. 246.

are only interpretations, is certainly not due to the influence of Rousseau, but to the after-effect of a Moravian upbringing. But Rousseau's problem is thereby posed anew. And the same must be said of Ludwig Feuerbach's philosophy of religion, which is marked by psychological sympathy with immediate religious life and its involuntary manifestations. The whole of modern psychology of religion is due to a resumption of Rousseau's point of view. By the help of the history of religion and by the study
[134] of the religious life of the present one seeks to get sight of the mental motives that sustain religion and continually make it a spiritual power.

It is a certain special kind of religious experience and faith that Rousseau describes. It cannot be otherwise, since the description is drawn from his own experience. Here again it is self-assertion (amour de soi) that lies at the basis. It can give birth to an urge to live wholly and fully, to strive beyond all limits, to surrender oneself in admiration and enthusiasm. Then it becomes religious feeling in Rousseau's sense. In spite of the disharmonies of his life and the narrow circumstances within which it moved, the source of expansion and enthusiasm did not dry up in him. That this type of feeling is not the only possible one, he did not see; only a comparative consideration could show that. And it is especially in this respect that the nineteenth century, with its greater spiritual horizon and more comprehensive historical knowledge, has corrected and supplemented Rousseau's thought.

The type in the psychology of religion that Rousseau describes, the expansive one, recalls, as has been said, the one that English and American authors in our day have called "born once" (once-born), in contrast to the type that develops through crises and catastrophes and can be called "born twice" (twice-born)[1)]. It was characteristic of the age of the Enlightenment and of Romanticism that the former type stood in the foreground. It was through the sharp oppositions that the nineteenth century partly brought with it, partly revealed, when the age of great hopes was over, that the disharmonious type was properly noticed. This latter type had, however, been the one the church had especially inculcated and favored, and Rousseau's psychology of religion was a justified reaction against the church's one-sidedness.

It is, however, not only Rousseau's psychology of religion, it is also his theology, that is of interest in this connection. While, as regards the psychological side of religion, he stood in the sharpest opposition to Voltaire, the two opponents were
[135] really agreed in their theology. Both maintained that the evil in the world made

[1)] William James has given a brilliant description of this difference. See my *Mindre Arbejder.* Anden Række, p. 134 f.

it impossible to assume a God who was both almighty and all-good. Significant thinkers in the nineteenth century have arrived at the same result, without there always being any question here of influence. Since the problem has been treated under the same presuppositions and from the same point of view, the result has quite naturally become the same. Stuart Mill was indignant at the sophisms by which one sought to justify the deity in the face of the suffering and injustice found in the world. On the other hand he finds it possible to believe in a divine being, to whom all good in nature is due, while the material forces hinder its working. We may then in our ethical striving stand as the deity's fellow workers[1]. Charles Renouvier too assumed that the power of the deity was limited, and that therefore the development of disharmonious conditions in the universe cannot be ascribed to it[2]. Renouvier is altogether a great admirer of Rousseau and on several points strongly influenced by him, especially as regards the basis for the treatment of the religious problem[3].

Much suggests that not only philosophizing theists but many people from practical life arrive at such results on account of their experiences of life. One often meets in life with a faith of this kind, especially in people in whom clarity of thought is united with a living and warm love of humanity. Love of humanity is angered at the attempts to veil the misfortunes, and thought sees through the sophisms in such attempts. It is a sign of the times that a faith such as the one mentioned so often occurs, and one of the signs of the times that give occasion to remember Jean Jacques Rousseau.

d. What is interesting in following Rousseau's modifications and reshapings of the paradoxes he put forward in his first writings on the relation between nature *[136]* and culture lies in the fact that he gradually worked his way forward to a modern concept of development in the spirit of the doctrine of epigenesis. His protest against culture in the name of nature he later modified in such a way that he distinguished between a culture that is a natural fruit of individual or social development, and one that does not stand as the result of natural growth and self-activity. He denied that culture could without further ado be transferred from one people to another. In his pedagogy he emphasized the qualitative difference between the different ages of life, especially between childhood and adult age. The child is not an adult en miniature; but childhood is a peculiar form of existence that makes its demands and has its rights. At about the same time C. F. Wolff, the founder of the doctrine of epigenesis in anatomy,

[1] *Den nyere Filosofis Historie.* 2nd ed. II, p. 433.
[2] *Moderne Filosofer,* p. 75. — Cf. *Les derniers entretiens de Ch. Renouvier.* Recueillis par Piat, p. 62 f.
[3] See *Esquisse d'une classification des doctrines,* I, p. 276 ff.; 459, II, p. 306 f.

maintained that the transition from the germ to the fully grown organism takes place through successive changes, without the earlier stages needing to resemble the later. Growth is something other and more than enlargement.

Rousseau's conception of development led him to lay weight on what he called negative education, which essentially consists in keeping obstacles away so that natural growth can take its course, and in seeing to it that influences come only, and tasks are set only, when this natural growth is sufficiently advanced.

It is through the clear and sure application of this concept of development that Rousseau stands as the founder of modern pedagogy. All significant thoughts in the pedagogy of the nineteenth century point back to him.

IV.

Through his criticism of the one-sidednesses of modern culture Rousseau also stands as the one who posed the social problem that since his time has followed the generation on its way. Against the isolating and mechanizing effects of the division of labor he demands that every human being shall have the opportunity to develop wholly and fully, according to his individual peculiarity. His worth does not depend merely on his being a link in a machine. It was this line of thought that led Kant to
[137] set up what has since been called the principle of personality, the demand that every human being shall be regarded as an end, never as a mere means. This principle is tacitly presupposed in modern socialism, as in Karl Marx, as well as in the modern attempts to ground morality on the principle of solidarity[1)].

Rousseau could of course not foresee the ways by which this thought was to be carried over into reality. He still stood polemically opposed to social formations, in his fear that natural freedom and immediacy would suffer. Social formations such as craft guilds and fraternities his time knew only as obstructive factors, degenerate forms of the past. Turgot, that great admirer of Rousseau, in his suspicion of all associations[2)], forbade as minister all combination of workers, and this prohibition was repeated during the Revolution. Here faith in "natural" development had an obstructive effect. For it has turned out that only by way of association, through the great combinations of workers, has it been possible to achieve progress for the fourth estate and a share for it in the goods of culture. As we have seen above, Lamennais expressed this in

[1)] See my *Etik.* 3rd ed. p. 390 (on Marx). — *Leon Bourgeois* in *Essai d'une philosophie de la solidarité,* Paris 1902, p. 38.

[2)] *Vie de Turgot* (par Condorcet), Londres 1786, p. 81; 228 f. Of interest here also is Turgot's judgment of the clique that the Encyclopedists formed (p. 28).

clear words, ahead of the English trade-union movement and ahead of the program of Marxism. — Development has, however, not entirely shown Rousseau's and Turgot's misgivings to be unjustified. The great question of the rights of minorities shows this.

Rousseau is therefore not a socialist in the modern sense of the word. A certain state socialism he does, however, advocate in his article "Économie politique" in Diderot's Encyclopedia. But he is a predecessor of the socialism of the nineteenth century through his whole conception of the problem of culture and through his demonstration of the disadvantages of the division of labor. Far beyond the limits of his own century the words, animated by indignation and enthusiasm, with which *[138]* he has pointed to the Achilles' heel of modern culture, have their effect. One of the modern historians of socialism[1)] says of this: "Not since Luther's voice was heard, indeed, hardly since the words of the Gospel were proclaimed, had words sounded so charged with far-reaching consequences, words that awakened thinkers and poets, the middle class and the common people, words that have been the source of all later revolutionary, communist and socialist literature, and whose influence will be felt as long as the earth circles in space."

Whether this mighty word has acted most directly or indirectly in the course of the nineteenth century is difficult to decide. For a large part, here too it has been the analogy in the situation that has called forth kindred thoughts. But the main thing is that he was the first to see, with clarity and with feeling, the great problem whose sting continually sets thoughts and passions in motion. —

In relation to the political thoughts and movements of the nineteenth century, too, one is led back to Rousseau. He is the first consistent champion of popular sovereignty. The natural-law movement, which had already begun in the Middle Ages, found its conclusion in *Contrat social.* Whereas all earlier teachers of natural law[2)] distinguished between two "pacts", one by which society was founded, another by which power was transferred to a ruling authority, Rousseau excluded this latter "pact" and thereby completed the theory of popular sovereignty.

This Rousseauian doctrine has in the nineteenth century been attacked from two very different sides.

The so-called historical school, which stood in close connection with Romanticism, conceived the state as a divine order grown up through the ages, against which

[1)] *William Graham: Socialism new and old,* London 1890, p. 55.

[2)] With the exception of Hobbes, who, unlike Rousseau, let the "pact" of the formation of society be absorbed in the "pact" of submission to an authority.

[139] particular individuals could not set their accidental experiences, ideas or wishes. The state is the organized conscience of society, in relation to which the conscience of the individual is of vanishing significance. The present cannot be isolated from the past, nor the individual living for the day from the eternally persisting state. Hegel stood in close relation to the historical school, insofar as he too could not see in particular individuals living points of departure for the sense of right and the formation of law. He acknowledges it as a merit of Rousseau that he made will, and thus an ideal principle, the principle of the state, but reproaches him that by "will" he thinks partly of the will of individuals, partly of what is common to these wills, not of "das an und für sich Vernünftige des Willens", which holds whether the individual acknowledges it or not[1)].

It is not only from the conservative side that Rousseau is attacked for his individualism. From the socialist, especially the syndicalist, side he is attacked as an anarchist and put on a line with Stirner, Reclus, Kropotkin and Tolstoi. These "bourgeois" regard, in their fantasy, the individual as something absolute and do not see that the individual means something only through his productive labor! While socialism would have the state take over all production and thereby take all individuals into its service, syndicalism hopes to be able to make the state superfluous and impossible through free organization of labor and through the joy in work that thereby becomes possible. This latter tendency therefore attacks Rousseau both as an anarchist and as one who believes in the state's continued persistence[2)].

It cannot now be denied that the Contrat social invites criticism. Rousseau himself was not satisfied with it. "As for my Contrat social", he says[3)], "those who boast of
[140] understanding it are cleverer than I. It is a book that must be rewritten." — Three different principles clash in the book: the individual wills in their multiplicity, — their interaction and crossing, — and finally the fundamental will that represents the people's self-assertion through the ages, and that Rousseau calls la volonté générale (the people's fundamental will) and definitely distinguishes from la volonté de tous (all the wills of the individuals taken together). The first principle is anarchistic, the second mechanical, the third mystical. He did not succeed in getting an inner connection among these three principles. And in a certain sense no theory of the state has yet succeeded in getting such a connection. But it is nevertheless Rousseau's clear

[1)] *Die Philosophie des Rechts*[2], Berlin 1833, § 258 p. 314.

[2)] Cf. *Challaie*: *Le syndicalisme revolutionaire* (Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 1907). — *Guy Grand*: *Le procès de la démocratie* (ibid. 1910).

[3)] Reported by *Dusaulx*: *De mes rapports avec J. J. Rousseau,* Paris 1798, p. 102.

endeavor to distinguish between the interest of the people as that which is to persist through the ages, and the particular individuals or generations of individuals, none of whom may arrogate to themselves the right once and for all to speak in its name. When Rousseau says (II, 3. 6) that the fundamental will does not err, it is precisely because the people or society cannot will its own dissolution, however many illusions may prevail among particular individuals and in particular generations. But on the other hand the fundamental will expresses itself in particular cases only through particular individuals and in particular generations, — and here the problem comes in.

Whether this problem can be solved or not, Rousseau is right that a faith in the people's ability and will to persist lies as a hidden presupposition behind all politics and all political arguments[1]. And Rousseau saw clearly that the life of the state cannot at any point in time begin absolutely afresh. He expressly insists (III, 8) that the people's past and its conditions of life must be determining for its constitution, and it was for this reason that he answered dismissively the naive requests he received from several countries (Poland, Corsica) to write a constitution for them. If he, he answered, had lived for ten years in their country, he could perhaps write its history; but even then he would not be able to write its constitution[2]. Rousseau thus does *[141]* not lack, as has often been thought, historical sense. He does not place the individual or the individual generation outside the historical connection; in this respect he can very well be regarded as a forerunner of the historical consciousness of which the nineteenth century has been so proud. The zeal with which, in the various countries of Europe, in the course of the nineteenth century and in remarkable contrast to "the historical consciousness", new state constitutions have been fabricated, Rousseau criticized in advance. Just as little as he agreed with the Encyclopedists that a spiritual culture could without further ado be transferred from one people to another, just as little did he consider it possible that a people could fetch its constitution from another people. His doctrine of the connection of culture with nature has found its confirmation through a series of fateful experiences in the course of the nineteenth century.

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[1] Cf. the brilliant discussion of democracy in *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie,* VII (21 Dec. 1906). It was in large part a discussion about Rousseau.

[2] See my book Rousseau og hans Filosofi. Second ed. p. 87.

ROUSSEAU AND RELIGION.

1.

Rousseau's psychological conception has sprung from his own personal experience. When he wrote his "Confessions", one of his motives was that he wished to present his own mental life as a psychological example. And — so far as we can rely on his account[1)] — we see how the fundamental psychological traits on which he builds in his theory, especially in his conception of religion, are generalizations of what he has experienced and found in himself. To the Confessions are joined his letters, La Nouvelle Héloïse, Émile, Dialogues (Rousseau juge de Jean Jacques) and Rêveries d'un promeneur solitaire.

There appears in Rousseau, not only in his self-characterization, but in his whole conduct, a great opposition between feeling on the one side, cognition and will on the other side. His urge is to live out along one straight line. Circling and compound movements are unnatural to him. Every mood that emerges spreads and rules over the mind until its energy is exhausted, — and its energy is exhausted the more quickly, the more vivid it is. When, then, a new mood replaces an earlier one, perhaps a wholly opposite one, the memory of what was thought and resolved in the earlier one is not preserved. Therefore he can go from extreme to extreme without noticing the
[143] inconsistencies that thereby arise. The involuntary moods and the self-surrender they make possible are the most valuable; but what he resolves in them is often not carried out, because the whole force of the will is exhausted in the resolution, and no force remains for the execution, since he sinks back into the dreaming state which is now a kind of idleness, now a poetic rapture, but which in both cases is his favorite state. Through this passive character of his emotional life he became highly dependent on his surroundings. "Je suis ce qui plaît aux hommes", he says himself. Others could

[1)] Cf. my book: Rousseau og hans Filosofi. p. 13—22.

win him over, or tease him, or put him in embarrassment. He lacked presence of mind for reply and counterattack. Only in one period, — when the problem of culture had dawned on him, — when he had undertaken the "moral reform" of his way of life and thereafter felt himself the prophet of his age, — did indignation make an energetic bearing possible for him, which astonished his whole circle. But when he had left Paris, and when in the solitude of country life there was no occasion for wrath, the energy of prophecy was again replaced by rapture. The undivided states held sway again, and the resistance he had met, and the enemies he had had (or believed he had had), were then at once forgotten. In his solitude it was the immediate feeling of life, the delightful sensation of existing, that filled him, and that, especially when he roamed about in the woods or let his boat drift with the current, found vent in smiling memories and fantasies.

Is it possible to be consistent? he asks. He does not believe so, and we understand from the foregoing why he does not believe so. Each single state gains complete power over him. To think, to compare, was always for him a painful and little attractive activity. Thinking presupposes, after all, that the ideas in which the changing states find expression can be preserved and held together. But that was precisely what Rousseau feared and shunned, because such holding together, and the relations it leads one to establish, conflicted with the ecstatic absorption in the single state.

Even if it is not possible to be wholly consistent, it is nevertheless, Rousseau thought, possible to be honest. And he prides himself on his honesty and on his *[144]* repentance. He writes in a letter: "Voici ce qui me distingue de tous les hommes que je connais: c'est qu'au milieu de mes fautes, je me les suis toujours reprochées". — But honesty and repentance surely presuppose thinking, comparison! He must, then, have been able to gain a survey of his changing states, however extremely opposed they might be; in him there was an unceasing oscillation between the highest and the lowest. Or else repentance in him had a passive, dreaming character.

And yet Jean Jacques was a brave man. He could not in the long run appear as a prophet quick to strike back, but when his ideal of life — the whole, undivided living in the immediate state of the mind — had in earnest dawned on him, he sought out solitude in spite of his friends' mockery and unmoved by all their attempts to play Providence and draw him back to the one saving salon life. He now guarded his independence as the most precious good of his life, and the fear of losing it overwhelmed his fantasy to such a degree that it degenerated into persecution mania.

And from his solitude he then sent out the great works that were directed against

the radical as well as against the reactionary tendencies of the time and therefore aroused bitterness on both sides. In contrast to Voltaire he put his name on his books and took the danger and persecution that followed. Here too he was both honest and brave. However hard he found it to think, he nevertheless managed, through a series of fruitful impulses, to deepen his first paradoxes about the opposition between nature and culture and to hold up a great ideal of freedom and originality before the age.

Finally he was also, in spite of the constant alternation of the high and the low in his life and in his moods, clear about where the high points of his life lay. They were the moments of great enthusiasm, when the movement of the mind was raised to dizzying ecstasy, and when no thought and no word could express what he felt. In such moments he felt himself one with the innermost of existence. And such moments
[145] he called his religious moments. Then "nature" had overcome the fragmentation and externality of "culture" and proved its unity in spite of all resistance. This highest feeling of unity was Rousseau's personal religion. —

It will now appear that the merits and imperfections of his religious standpoint are closely connected with his own personality and the experiences it made possible.

2.

In Lettres de la Montagne Rousseau says that the confessions of faith of the Savoyard Vicar and of Julie agree so closely that they can mutually illuminate each other, and that their author sympathizes with both. On closer consideration, however, a certain difference appears between the standpoint of Julie, of the Vicar, and Rousseau's own. These are three types whose difference has its psychological interest.

Julie is first and foremost the loving woman, like the medieval Héloïse. But just as love at its height can take on the character of enthusiasm and devotion, so conversely the religious feeling borrows the language of love in order properly to find expression. And the kinship that shows itself here between erotic love and religion Rousseau sought to portray in Julie's character and course of development, without, however, succeeding in making this portrayal natural and probable. Julie's character was to be an example of the thought that Plato expressed in so brilliant a way in the "Symposium". But — it is not the aesthetic criticism of "Julie" that concerns us here. As she is portrayed, it is her urge to love that leads her to religion, because nothing earthly and finite could take full possession of her "affections surabondantes". Here she recalls Ste Thérèse; but her religious love does not, like Ste Thérèse's, stand in

contrast to the love of human beings, so that it must exclude the latter; the religious and the human love mutually strengthen each other.

The Vicar's confession of faith is the fruit of a seeking, a criticism, called forth by the opposition to the positive dogmatism of the Church on the one side, the negative dogmatism of the freethinkers on the other side. He appeals to the inner light, to the testimony of the heart. His only concern is to satisfy the heart's urge; *[146]* all further-reaching theological questions he puts aside. And yet he makes use of philosophical reflections, gives a whole system of "natural theology" and applies with full consciousness the analogy with human will to explain the nature of the Deity. His religion is the expression of his gratitude for existing, which leads him to admiration and worship of the highest power. "De mon premier retour sur moi naît dans mon cœur un sentiment de reconnaissance et de bénédiction pour l'Auteur de mon espèce, et de ce sentiment mon premier hommage à la divinité bien-faisante. J'adore la puissance suprême, et je m'attendris sur ses bienfaits. Je n'ai pas besoin qu'on m'enseigne ce culte, il m'est dicté par la nature elle-même. N'est-ce pas une conséquence naturelle de l'amour de soi, d'honorer ce qui nous protège, et d'aimer ce qui nous veut du bien?" (Émile. Livre IV).

For Rousseau's own personal part, religiosity stands in the closest connection with his urge for independence and solitude, — to live out of himself. In free nature, far from human beings, his inner life could properly unfold. From nature and its glory he rose to the ideal world of fantasy and raised himself — not least when the contrast with reality made itself felt — to the idea of an infinite being which no thought, no word could express. In the third letter to Malesherbes we have the most characteristic expression of his cosmic feeling of life. —

Common to all three types is the great opposition that underlies Rousseau's psychology and is at work in his whole personality, — the opposition between "nature" and "culture", as he has presented it most clearly in his Dialogues (Rousseau juge de Jean Jacques). To this opposition corresponds the opposition between absolute and relative feeling, — between states in which one lives wholly and undividedly, and states that presuppose opposition and comparison. His psychological theory is built on the experiences of his own life, on the great opposition between times in which he could give himself over wholly to the unfolding of his rich nature, and other times when he was hampered and embittered by his relation to people with whom he *[147]* could not feel himself one. In the distinction between absolute and relative feeling, amour de soi and amour propre, he has a predecessor in Vauvenargues and older

Cartesians. The absolute feeling is one with the instinct of self-preservation, is an involuntary urge to assert and expand one's being. So long as it can easily overcome the resistance it meets, its nature is not altered. But when the obstacles become stronger, so that they draw attention to themselves at the expense of the original end, which was mere self-assertion, relative feelings arise such as anger, hatred and fear. And when imagination and thought make it possible for the individual to compare himself with others, his lot with theirs, the relative feelings are favored at the expense of the absolute. Amour de soi becomes amour propre. Needs, and with them occasions for discontent, fear and hatred, grow.[1)]

When Rousseau speaks of comparison as the cause of relative feeling, he is thinking especially of the perception of difference. Likeness to other beings, on the other hand, will not hinder self-unfolding. It can lead us to take others up into the involuntary stream of our self-unfolding, involuntarily to put ourselves in their place, to rejoice and suffer with them and help them. Pity and love therefore belong (in Rousseau's later accounts) to the domain of absolute feeling: La force d'une âme expansive m'identifie avec mon semblable! And therefore love of mankind can spring from the urge to self-preservation.

This theory of absolute and relative feeling has sprung from deep psychological understanding. It reappears, remarkably enough, in Nietzsche, who was nevertheless hardly influenced by Rousseau, whom he deeply despised. But whereas Nietzsche counts precisely pity, love and the feeling of equality among the relative feelings, in Rousseau it is fear and hatred that stand as the most important relative feelings. An
[148] inconsistency such as the one Nietzsche commits in extolling the feeling of distance (das Pathos der Distanz), directed from above downward, especially contempt, as the mark of the great, is not found in Rousseau. On the other hand it is an imperfection and an inconsistency in Rousseau when he regards all relations of difference, especially all obstacles, as unfavorable to self-assertion. That means impotence and isolation in the face of reality. When self-preservation and self-unfolding have sufficient energy, they will be able to bridge the distance and become richer by entering the world of differences. Rousseau was only himself, was only "what nature [in his opinion] had willed", when on his solitary walks he was free of all obstacles (sans diversion, sans obstacle, Rêveries II). This is connected with the fact that his emotional life so

[1)] It is perhaps characteristic that in "Rousseau juge de Jean Jacques" Rousseau particularly stresses the provoking effects of the obstacles, whereas in his earlier accounts he lets fantasy and comparison unfold and work more without external occasion.

easily came to stand in an inverse relation to his life of thought and his volitional life, and thereby took on a dreaming character. Obstacles can, after all, release new forces, hitherto hidden qualities, and thereby indirectly further emotional life too. And reverie gains content and value precisely only when it stands in reciprocal action with work. Precisely the opposition, the relation of contrast, has its significance here, which Rousseau himself has experienced, when he says that it is to his adversaries that he owes the ecstasies on his solitary walks. His first, paradoxical opposition between nature and culture is still at work here. And it had in turn sprung from his romantic and vagabond life, in which every relation came to stand as an intolerable bond.

Religious feeling is now, according to Rousseau, like love, an involuntary expression of self-assertion. It leads us to believe in life, to feel ourselves one with nature, "se fondre pour ainsi dire dans le système des êtres", and at its height to religious ecstasy (Rêveries VII; 3e lettre à Malesherbes). Only in this state do all relations, all possibility of comparison, fall away. No thought, no image would be able to express what is experienced in such moments. Both Julie and the Savoyard Vicar speak of this in the same way as Rousseau when he speaks in his own name. There are three reasons why no thoughts or images suffice: the fullness of what is experienced; — there is no relation between what is experienced and what is otherwise known; — the *[149]* total concentration of all faculties leaves no force over for comparing.

In Rousseau's last years these ecstatic states took on a somewhat different character than before. There was lacking the violent force with which the inner longing could formerly gain free course. In return his solitary experiences were marked by a resignation that had long been hindered by amour-propre. Now, when the external relations and the comparisons they had given occasion for had receded, amour propre could again become amour de soi. This made possible the beautiful, mildly resigned mood that prevails in Rêveries d'un promeneur solitaire. —

Through the religious feeling, as absolute feeling, being set in opposition to all relations, since these constantly threaten to annul it, there arises the great one-sidedness of Rousseau's psychology of religion. The religious feeling does not become a feeling that includes in itself and expresses the result of life's struggle and suffering, of its tragedy and comedy; its stamp is determined precisely by life and its oppositions being kept away. There is lacking an element of courage and an element of fellow-feeling, which cannot be lacking in the feeling for which the many-sided experience of life is to form the foundation. —

Where thought is not a hindrance to feeling, it is, according to Rousseau, an effect of feeling, at any rate in the religious domain. The Savoyard Vicar limits his search for truth to what is of interest to him in a practical respect; the rest he leaves aside. His ideas of God he grounds on the feeling of the relation in which God stands to him. Rousseau is clearly aware that reason in the long run takes on "le pli que le cœur lui donne".

From all this it follows that the religious problem could not present itself to Rousseau in its sharpest form. The purely objective view of the world never came, in him, to be set in relation to the heart's urge. In the strongest spiritual strife he has never been placed. The cosmological problem has not presented itself to him in its
[150] difference from the religious problem. He has never doubted. In the remarkable letter to M*** of 15 janvier 1769 we read:

"Vous me marquez, Monsieur, que le résultat de vos recherches sur l'Auteur des choses est un état de doute. Je ne puis juger de cet état, parce qu'il n'a jamais été le mien. J'ai cru dans mon enfance par autorité, dans ma jeunesse par sentiment, dans mon âge mûr par raison; maintenant je crois, parce que j'ai toujours cru".

Perhaps it is so with most people. Even those who set themselves in the sharpest opposition to the authorities of their childhood and to the feelings of their youth are determined, directly or indirectly, through continuity or through contrast (which is also a kind of continuity), by the subterranean currents of their earlier life. Rousseau belonged to "the once-born". He went through his various conversions — from Protestantism to Catholicism and back again, and from both to his emotional rationalism, — and through his various circles (pious Cartesians and impious Encyclopedists), — untouched, with the voice of "nature" in his heart. Although, as we shall see, he criticizes the doctrines of the Church on essential points, and although the problem of evil in particular has had an influence on his religious ideas, he has nevertheless not carried out any real work of thought in the domain of the religious problem. His merit lies in his having decisively referred the religious question to feeling and to personal urge. That is a great merit, even if not all questions are thereby settled. He finds in the ideas of so-called "natural" religion the adequate and only valid expression of the highest, without examining the justification of the analogies on which these ideas rest. The Cartesian philosophy and the deist tradition have exerted influence on him here. There is in his religion something other and more than what immediate feeling
[151] and a faith grown out of experience of life must necessarily assume.

Rousseau has an entire "natural" theology, which he energetically sets in opposition partly to ecclesiastical orthodoxy, partly to materialism.

God is, the Vicar teaches, an infinite being which none of our concepts or images can express. Even the concept of spirit is not adequate; for God and our spirit cannot be of the same kind. For God all truths are contained in a single thought, all places in a single point, all times in a single moment. Whether he has created the world is not known; but the indestructibility of matter and the reality of evil speak decidedly against it; the very word creation in an absolute sense is unintelligible, and it is in any case too abstract to be able to be a biblical concept. But the order that prevails in the world, and the evident way in which everything leads in the direction of the same ends, shows that there is a first moving force, a God, who directs the course of things in the world.

Against the materialists he emphasizes that we must think every cause of motion in analogy with our own will. When we begin the analysis of the universe with our own being, instead of with the dead masses, we shall find the key to the arrangement of the universe in ourselves. That the soul must be a being distinct from matter follows from the very faculty of thought, the faculty of comparing, a faculty that cannot be ascribed to matter. It is a faculty of activity that stands in opposition to passive sensation, which is due to the influence of the body on the soul.

The distinction between an active and a passive principle which Rousseau is thus led to make in accordance with his "analysis of the universe" now finds its application to his position on the problem of evil. Here too, moreover, his psychological conception makes itself felt.

This problem has, by Rousseau's own declaration, never made any strong impression on him. It arises only when one regards God as almighty creator, and when one overlooks to how great a degree the misfortunes in the world are due to man himself. For his own part Rousseau solves the problem by conceiving God as an active *[152]* principle that can intervene, ordering and altering, in the material processes, but yet often meets with resistance from them, — and moreover by pointing to the source of happiness that already lies in the immediate feeling of life, when all comparisons and refinements that are due to human beings themselves are kept away. Our unhappiness consists in the disproportion between urge and faculty, and it is fantasy and comparison that have inflamed the urge, so that the faculty no longer suffices.

In the famous letter to Voltaire (1756), written on the occasion of the latter's poem Sur le désastre de Lisbonne, Rousseau's position on the religious problem, and

especially on the problem of evil, appears in a characteristic way. The comparison which this letter occasions between Rousseau's and Voltaire's religious standpoints is moreover of considerable interest from the standpoint of the psychology of religion.

In his Poëme sur le désastre de Lisbonne Voltaire had given vent to his indignation at the belief that the evil in the world could be reconciled with the world's origin in an almighty and all-good being. With great force the usual insipid grounds of consolation and edifying phrases with which people meet great misfortunes are rejected, and there is also polemic against the aesthetic-contemplative way of regarding the disharmonies of existence that makes itself felt in many optimists, not least in Leibniz. The problem is posed sharply and severely, and the whole poem has a dark and bitter character. As usual Voltaire declares, which in his mouth is of course only a phrase, that only a revelation can solve the riddle. — In later editions of the poem Voltaire, "instruit par la vieillesse", changed its ending and inserted some lines in which the hope of a better future finds voice:

> "Un jour tout sera bien", voilà notre espèrance,
> "Tout est bien aujourd'hui", voilà l'illusion.

But it was not in this form that the poem lay before Rousseau, whose statements become unintelligible if one does not keep to the poem's original form.

[153] In his reply to Voltaire's poem Rousseau finds use for his favorite theme, the opposition between nature and culture. How many evils are there not that human beings bring upon themselves — not least by moving together into great cities? A disaster like that in Lisbon would not strike a scattered rural population, which moreover does not live in houses of 6—7 stories, so hard. And as regards the question of the value of life, experience shows that human beings prefer existence to non-existence, which can only be explained by the immediate feeling of life having the character of a feeling of pleasure. But this doux sentiment de l'existence, which can be found, and is most readily found, where life is led under limited circumstances, is as a rule overlooked when the account is drawn up. And in addition, one poses the question wrongly when one infers from the value of life and of existence to God's existence. It is the opposite way one must go: he who believes in God, and thereby has the foundation for a great hope, will always see existence as valuable. Rousseau later has Julie in her "swan song" give the ground for this thus: Toutes les misères s'évanouissent devant un plus grand objet. —

In the letter to Voltaire the subjective, personal turn that Rousseau has given the

discussion of the religious problem has found its first energetic expression. Henceforth the discussion could really turn only on whether an urge such as the one Rousseau refers to is universally human, — how it arises, — whether it always expresses itself in the same way and leads to the same postulates, — and what significance it has for human intellectual life. Rousseau does not go further into this, any more than Kant did later. —

For the first time, too, this letter brings out the theological conception that Rousseau later presented in detail in Émile, in the letter to the Archbishop of Paris and in the letter to M***. He reproaches Voltaire for not sacrificing omnipotence rather than goodness. "Si l'embarras de l'origine du mal vous forçait d'altérer quelcune des perfectures de Dieu, pourquoi vouloir justifier sa puissance aux dépens de sa bonté? S'il faut choisir entre deux erreurs, j'aime encore mieux la première". — His later reflection came, starting from the general assumption of an active and a passive principle in existence, to the same result. The divine spirit constantly has a resistance *[154]* to overcome in matter and therefore cannot always, and not immediately, realize its ends. When Rousseau said in the letter to Voltaire that instead of the almighty God who in Voltaire's poems was depicted as the author of all evil, although he could have prevented it, he would prefer Manichaeism, he later shows (in the letter to the Archbishop) that his doctrine is not Manichaeism, since he assumes not two gods, two active principles, but one active and one passive principle.

When Rousseau defends Leibniz against Voltaire, it is because he has seen that Leibniz in fact also assumed two principles, only that he (like Böhme) conceived them as elements within the Deity itself: the one the selecting, realizing will, the other the intellect, which presents the many possibilities among which a choice must be made[1)]. For Rousseau himself only the first element belongs to God's nature, while the many possibilities among which a choice must be made are contained in matter.

The theological turn that Rousseau intimated in the letter to Voltaire and later carried through in *Émile* (1762) and in the *Letter to the Archbishop* (1763), Voltaire for his part made later, in *Dictionaire philosophique* (1764)[2)]. And thus the two men, who in so many respects were antipodes, came to agree in their theology. They

[1)] See *Den nyere Filosofis Historie*[2] I p. 368.

[2)] The view at which Rousseau and Voltaire thus arrived had already been expressed earlier by Ludvig Holberg, as the result of his brooding over the problem of evil raised by Bayle. Cf. *Danske Filosofer* p. 14 f. Among later thinkers who have arrived at a similar result must be mentioned Stuart Mill, Charles Renouvier and William James. (Cf., on the latter's religious view, the excellent characterization by Th. Flournoy: *La philosophie de William James.* 1911. Chap. IX).

stood together in the struggle against orthodoxy. But this agreement does not mean much, since such a negative attitude can unite the most opposed standpoints. On the other hand it is of the greatest psychological significance to see the great personal
[155] opposition that can be bound up with agreement in religious ideas. The difference lies chiefly in this, that Voltaire is filled with joy at the "culture" and refinement of the age, when his indignation is not aroused by remnants of medieval brutality among the rulers, with whom he otherwise tries to keep on good terms, whereas Rousseau deeply felt the externality and superficiality of the culture of the age, its lack of originality and naturalness. Moreover, Rousseau had in his joy in nature and his enthusiasm sources of life from which he could constantly draw new spiritual nourishment, and by whose help he was kept up through illness, want and persecution. This gave his religiosity inwardness and originality and paved the way for a new way of treating the religious problem. It led to religious ideas being regarded as derived in relation to the lived experiences and practical experiences that are the real psychological foundation.

4.

In Rousseau's religious conception the Christian tradition makes itself strongly felt. In the period of his life when his thought was most searching, there were especially two currents by which he was influenced: the Cartesian mystics of the 17th century (Pascal, Fénélon) and the pietist movement that from Germany penetrated Romance Switzerland, and by which his foster-mother Mme de Warrens had been so strongly influenced. When, after the wanderings of his youth from confession to confession and through the purgatory of the Encyclopedists, he drew up his account, the result was that he claimed the right to call himself a Christian, although he set aside essential aspects of the Church's Christianity. In the proud letter to the Archbishop of Paris he says:

"Monseigneur, je suis Chrétien, et sincérement Chrétien, selon la doctrine de l'Évangile. Je suis Chrétien, non comme un disciple des prêtres, mais comme un disciple de Jésus-Christ. Mon Maître a peu subtilisé sur le dogme, et beaucoup insisté sur les devoirs; il préscrivoit moins d'articles de foi que de bonnes œuvres; . . . et il m'a dit... que celui qui aime son frère a accompli la loi".

[156] In Émile and in Lettres de la Montagne he expresses himself more fully. He believes the Gospel — but not on external authority. And as soon as there is talk of historical facts, we build on human testimony, and then books and learning come to play a

part. If the essential in life could only be known from books, what means would one then have had to come to know it before there were books? It is impossible that God should punish human beings for lack of learning. Therefore the Vicar has closed all books. But the great book of nature and the book of our own heart lie always open to us. The Gospel is the most sublime of all books, but it is still a book, and God's law stands written not on leaves but in the heart of man. That we understand the Gospel rightly, and that it is its spirit we nourish our hearts with, we notice by the peace of soul we feel.

Rousseau here anticipates Lessing's famous proposition (in the controversy with Götze) that historical truths cannot be proof of necessary truths. It is connected with Rousseau's democratic spirit that he wishes to free human beings from dependence on learning. Locke had already asserted the point of view that hard-working people did not have strength and time to spare for investigating the sources. The truth must therefore be findable by a simpler way. Incipient rationalism has a democratic character, wishes to emancipate the layman from learned orthodoxy. Later the orthodoxy reawakening in the period of Romanticism was guided by a similar motive; learned rationalism met the same fate as learned orthodoxy.

In putting away the special dogmas, Rousseau is clear that his type of Christianity is St. James's, not St. Paul's. And if one would deny the name of Christians to those who do not have the developed faith of the Church, then Christ's first disciples — he says — could not be called Christians either. He wishes to keep to the character of the doctrine and of the teacher, to let it work on him. "Nous reconnaissons l'autorité du Jésus-Christ, parce que notre intelligence acquiesce à ses précepts et nous en découvre la sublimité. Elle nous dit qu'il convient aux hommes de suivre ces précepts, mais qu'il était au dessus d'eux de les trouver". (Lettres de la Montagne. I).

As for the miracles, they certainly, Rousseau admits, made a strong impression *[157]* on those for whom they were intended. That is the main thing. What does it matter, then, whether they were real miracles or not? But now they are rather obstacles than proofs for Christianity. Take the miracles away from the Gospel, and the whole earth will lie at the feet of Jesus Christ! — One cannot assert that something is a miracle without ascribing omniscience to oneself. For one must know all the laws of nature in order to be able to maintain that some event or other is an exception to them. Whether miracles happen or not, it is in any case impossible to convince oneself that in the single case a miracle is present.

One may very well accept a doctrine, after all, even though one does not accept all

the proofs with which people have sought to support it. The proofs are only means, faith is the end. And faith I have, if only one single reason convinces me! —

It was, then, a Christianity without dogmas and miracles that Rousseau embraced. As for worship, it was for him only ceremony, but it had significance for him through the spiritual community among human beings, and during his stay in Neufchâtel he took part with great enthusiasm in Holy Communion, feeling with heartfelt emotion: Je suis avec mes frères! —

The books in which Rousseau expressed his conception of religion and of Christianity were banned and burned both in Protestant and in Catholic countries. But he has expressed thoughts on whose validity the future both of religion in general and of Christianity in particular will in large part depend. It was indeed in part his thoughts, too, that in turn paved the way for a religious renaissance. This excuses him with his ecclesiastical opponents, but is the great count of the indictment against him with his anticlerical opponents. But for a historical consideration it is clear that both his appearance and the consequences it has had are testimony that he has pointed to a side of human mental life that is not satisfied by intellectual and aesthetic culture but demands more thorough nourishment. Whether the reformation of Christianity for
[158] which he spoke could have led to the goal is another matter. And the whole problem lies deeper than he, the son of the eighteenth century, could see. Nevertheless it is great to have seen what he has seen.

There is one side of the question whose significance he does not see, — the purely historical. He is too afraid of learning. But however much one sublimates and rationalizes Christianity, it is and remains a historical phenomenon, whose origin and development it is the task of historical research to trace. One cannot here be content to take what one can use and leave the rest aside. And it is, as it happens, not in St. James's type that Christianity has become a great power in the world. It is through the apotheosis of the figure of Christ, through the grand mythology that formed around this figure, and through the exalted moods and deep emotions that found nourishment through its worship, that Christianity has become a world-historical phenomenon. It is one of history's greatest tasks to portray the origin and growth of this phenomenon. And the results of this research will gradually come to be of significance for the future of the religious problem.

The individual naturally always has the right to take from a historical formation what he needs in the conduct of his personal life. It is characteristic of Rousseau that what he selects from Christianity is something that he believes all human beings will

be able to rally around. He imagines (in the letter to the Archbishop) that human beings (i.e. Jews, Mohammedans and Christians), weary of religious quarrels, assemble to agree on a common religion. At first it does not succeed, because every speaker maintains his own religion as the true one and rejects all others. But then theologians of all religions are excluded, and this furthers the negotiations considerably. Agreement is now easily reached on — the Savoyard Vicar's confession, without each giving up his national worship for that. — This thought recalls Jean Bodin's Colloqvium heptaplomeres[1)], which, however, had not been printed in Rousseau's time.

It is not only the positive religions that have their history. "Natural" religion too *[159]* has its history, especially its history of dogma. Rousseau's religious ideas point back to older "deists" as well as to the Cartesian philosophy. Here too he has taken what he could use. Within Rousseau's private religion one must distinguish between what is due to personal experience of life and what he has, naturally under the influence of the latter, taken over from speculation and tradition. However great or small his own existential contribution is, it is nevertheless that which has the greatest psychological interest, and we shall therefore return once more to his personality in order to characterize this contribution.

5.

Some years before Émile and Lettres de Montagne appeared, David Hume (1757) had published his famous Natural History of Religion and had thereby laid the foundation of the modern psychology of religion. There is no trace of Rousseau's having known this work when he wrote his books on the philosophy of religion. The contrast between the two men's relation to religion is characteristic. Hume stands as an observer, as a spectator at the play which is performed in religion on the theater of mental life. But by his faculty for psychological observation and analysis he manages to let the various sides or tendencies in religion come more into their own than Rousseau manages, absorbed as he is in what stirs within himself, and without a sense for other types than his own. Rousseau's significance rests in large part precisely on this one-sidedness.

Hume has demonstrated a double tendency in religious consciousness. According to the one, the distance between the religious object and the religious subject, between gods and men, is stressed; the divine world is raised high above the human, so high sometimes that Hume cannot believe that a sound and natural feeling can be nourished

[1)]— See *Den nyere Filosofis Historie*[2]. I. p. 57—61.

toward so remote an object. According to the other tendency, religious consciousness
[160] seeks to bring its object as close to itself as possible, to imagine it in a perceptible way, through concrete images and as fellow-combatant and fellow-sufferer in the course of fate.

Rousseau's conception of religion lets only the first side come into its own. The religious feeling has for him the character of expansion; it is an enthusiasm that rises and wells up and leads beyond all limitation, so that at last no thought, no image can express what is experienced. Where Rousseau's Cartesian reminiscences do not make themselves felt, the idea of the infinite is not formed purely intellectually, so as thereafter to determine feeling; it is, conversely, the latter that by its rising drives thought beyond every limitation. This view is surely more correct than Hume's, who holds that men do not dare to set limits to the nature and power of their deity, but consider it safest to apply the highest terms of praise, for which reason they try to screw their feelings up to the height of the great words, which produces affectation (affected ravishment and devotion).

On the other hand, the second tendency in religion comes out very little in Rousseau. Religion leads beyond everything finite, the soul finding vent for its longing and being freed from the tension and the confinement that life in the finite, especially the human, world brings with it. He hastens out beyond experience to a world of ideals, but the great struggle between the world of ideals and the world of experience, and the experiences that are had in this struggle, gain no positive influence on Rousseau's religion. It has no expression for the living through of life's oppositions which all higher positive religions express, especially in their worship, — the opposition between exaltation and abasement, between light and darkness, between life and death. His religion has not sprung from a synthesis of life's opposite experiences, which at once holds fast to their reality and overcomes them in victorious resignation. He goes off along the tangent to the circle of life, and not always as victor. —

On the other hand, Rousseau has an eye for an element in the religious problem that does not come into its own in Hume's psychology, namely the concentrated
[161] energy with which religion in its classical periods can work. It is from this point of view that he defends fanaticism, although he grants Bayle that it is more harmful than atheism. In spite of everything, fanaticism is, he thinks, "une passion grande et forte qui éleve le cœur de l'homme, qui lui fait mépriser la mort, qui lui donne un essor prodigieux, et qu'il ne faut que mieux diriger pour en tirer des plus sublimes

vertus" (Émile. Profession du Vicaire Savoyard). In connection with the proposition that is so important in Rousseau's pedagogy: "on n'a de prise sur les passions que par les passions" (a proposition in which he has Bacon and Spinoza as predecessors), this statement shows that Rousseau has an eye for the significance of the principle of equivalence for all spiritual development. In the domain of the religious problem this means that so concentrated a form of spiritual life as religion has been in its classical times cannot disappear without an equivalent. A more distributed or parceled-out application of spiritual energy, the consequence of entropy in the spiritual domain, will bring with it a decline in value. This was one of the sides of the religious problem which the century of the Enlightenment did not have an eye for, and which many freethinkers still overlook in their shortsightedness and their psychological ignorance. Until spiritual development has led to a form of life as concentrated as the one the race has possessed in religion, a form of life that must be developed through experience and work, without the transcendent ways out that religion believed it could open, — until then the problem has not gone out of the world. It is Rousseau's honor that he has seen this, although this point of view has not come into its own in his personal attitude. —

In all his frailty, with all his contradictions, all his oscillations between the highest and the lowest, Jean Jacques has nevertheless seen more clearly than his contemporaries in one of the most important domains of intellectual life. By bringing the religious problem into close connection with the problem of culture as a whole, with the great problem of the division of labor, he has illuminated it from a central point of view. Whatever the fate of this problem may otherwise be, his name will not be able to be erased from its history.

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GOETHE AND PHILOSOPHY.

When Napoleon was staying at Erfurt in the year 1808, he had Goethe summoned to him. When the poet entered, the Emperor looked at him attentively and then said: Vous êtes un homme! — It must have been Goethe's manly and handsome figure, in connection with what Napoleon knew of his works — he had himself, on the expedition to Egypt, immersed himself in "Werthers Leiden," — and of the course of his life, that called forth this remark.

And Goethe was a man to whom nothing human was foreign. He lived life fully and warmly; only for that reason is there life in his poetry. And each time he had transformed his experience of life into image and thought, he returned with freshness to life. Heart and sense, imagination and thought stayed alive in him into his high old age. By his fullness of life and his concentration he stands as a great model, the greatest figure of modern humanism.

In his spiritual economy as a man and as a poet philosophical thinking too has played its part. Goethe was not a philosopher, and he did not wish to be one. But philosophical study and thinking were an element in his world, a tone that came to sound along in the harmony of his life and helped to determine its timbre.

I.

In the ferment of his youth he often took refuge in Spinoza. It was not only the
[163] clarity and the calm, in contrast to his own restless yearning, that worked on him. He also found in the philosopher, at that time still so misjudged, thoughts that brought coherence into his striving to understand nature and to live life.

He found in Spinoza a great and free view out over the world of nature and of mind, borne by a deep assurance that we have before us here not two different spheres, but in the end a single great and unified connection. Beyond the contending spiritualistic

and materialistic conceptions a doctrine of unity was here pointed to. The strictly logical-mathematical form in which Spinoza believed he could ground and present this doctrine, Goethe left aside. What especially appealed to him was the point at which Spinoza himself, without being clearly conscious of it, indicates that every completion of our view of the world and of life takes on an artistic stamp, namely his doctrine of the highest knowledge as a vision, a scientia intuitiva, by which we — after having traversed the regions of observation and of rational thinking — at last see the particular and individual in its peculiarity and yet as a member of the great whole, by whose inner forces it is borne. It was "a vision under the aspect of eternity" like the one Faust so fervently wished to attain, in which "the quiet world lay at his feet in an eternal evening sun". Such a great vision was for Goethe the highest; he knew it as an immediate divine gift in his poetic imagination, and as an inquirer and thinker he strove constantly up toward it through his scattered studies, even though it was not his way to go through the strict school that Spinoza demanded beforehand. But it was not only intellectual satisfaction that he sought and found in Spinoza's works. In his autobiography he emphasizes especially Spinoza's great unselfishness and lofty resignation. Whereas most men muddle through life by knocking off a little here and a little there, and let their limitation and resignation be forced upon them from outside, by circumstances and by the course of fate, he found in Spinoza's Ethics a lofty resignation that sees once and for all the necessity of limitation. The partial resignations are forced upon us, but the great resignation is the personality's own work and rests on one's having "convinced oneself of the eternal, the necessary, *[164]* the lawful, and formed for oneself thoughts that are unshakable, indeed are actually confirmed by the contemplation of the transitory instead of being annulled by this contemplation".

The reading of Spinoza appears at various points in Goethe's life. The earliest acquaintance was made while he was still in Frankfurt, and a visit to Jacobi played a strong part here. Later, in Weimar, he took up Spinoza again, and several notes (in particular a fragment brought to light by the Goethe Archive only 15 years ago, which Goethe dictated to Frau v. Stein) testify to how absorbed he was in Spinoza's line of thought. His association with Herder nourished this interest. Later too, for instance during the theological dispute between Schelling and Jacobi (1811), he took out his old copy of Spinoza's Ethics, furnished with many underlinings, and found confirmation of his old thought of the unity of nature with the Godhead. A Spinozist Goethe never was; but it speaks to the honor both of him and of Spinoza that the stern

philosopher's thoughts could be of such great value to him as a poet, as a thinker and as a man. —

Partly of a kindred, partly of an opposite character was the influence Goethe received from the great philosopher who was his older contemporary, Immanuel Kant. Here too it is not only in one period, but repeatedly, that Goethe's attention is turned to philosophy. It was not only his interest in everything human, but also his own peculiar striving, that guided him here. After his return from Italy (1788) he became aware of the influence Kant was beginning to exert, and which soon found its hearth in nearby Jena, where Goethe so often went for the sake of his scientific interests. He tried to orient himself, made excerpts from Kant's writings, which have recently been brought to light from the Goethe Archive[1)], and he had a younger scholar prepare a short survey of the new philosophy. It was not at first the philosophical master's chief
[165] work (Kritik der reinen Vernunft) that worked on him; the intricate course of the inquiry and the many distinctions confused him. On the other hand he greeted with joy Kant's concluding work (Kritik der Urtheilskraft), in which "the Old Man from the King's Mountain" (der Alte vom Königsberge), as Goethe calls him, at last declares his many critical distinctions between the subjective and the objective, phenomena and the thing in itself, the natural and the moral, to be of merely provisional significance, and, supported by the study of natural beauty, art and genius and of organic life, points toward a great unity in all things beyond all differences and oppositions. Here he won Goethe's heart. "I owe," he said much later, "to Kant's Kritik der Urtheilskraft a most happy period of my life." And he has aptly characterized Kant's standpoint and procedure when he says: "When I sought to make use of, if not to penetrate, Kant's doctrine, it often seemed to me as if the excellent man proceeded in a roguish and ironic way, in that he now seemed to strive to draw narrow limits for the faculty of knowledge, now with a sidelong hint pointed beyond the limits he himself had drawn." Goethe was especially glad of Kant's suggestion of a union of intellect and intuition; here he found his Spinozistic favorite thought again, and the passage in Kant where this suggestion is expressed is underlined in Goethe's copy.

When the intimate collaboration with Schiller began, his friend's great interest in Kant's philosophy had a great effect on Goethe. Here it is the critical fundamental thought itself, in its application to the theory of knowledge and to aesthetics, that exerts its influence. He later declared that through this occupation he gained a higher

[1)] Cf. *K. Vorländer's* essay: *Goethes Verhältnis zu Kant in seiner historischen Entwickelung.* (The journal "Kant-Studien" I—II).

concept of art and science than he had previously commanded. Yet in relation to Schiller he always felt himself to be "a philosophical child of nature", although he admitted that the critical purgatory was beneficial to him. Goethe's natural urge aimed at total intuition, at great, comprehensive images, but he saw clearly that combination has value only when the oppositions have been given freedom to assert themselves sharply. And he believed that he could for a time calmly give himself over to critical discrimination and to the many distinctions of analysis. In an extraordinarily apt way *[166]* he expressed himself on this in a letter to Schiller (10 February 1798): "Philosophy becomes ever more valuable to me, because it teaches me daily to separate myself from myself (mich von mir selbst zu scheiden), which I can do all the more, as my nature — like separated globules of quicksilver — easily and quickly unites again".

When Goethe later wished to write the history of his thoughts and studies, he names Shakespeare and Spinoza and, next after them, Linné[1)] as those to whom he owes most. But it is clear that on his whole conception of thinking, nature and art in his later years Kant exerted a deeply penetrating influence[2)]. Two of the greatest figures of modern philosophy have thus played a strong part in the great poet's intellectual life, and this although he, as already said, neither was nor wished to be a philosopher.

II.

Goethe had his own philosophy of life, which had developed in him on the basis of his experience of life and as an expression of his personality. We know it from his poems and letters and from his conversations with Eckermann. It has drawn nourishment and found confirmation in his philosophical reading, but it stands as a distinct, independent contribution to philosophy in the wider sense of the word.

He did not believe in a real opposition between the claim of the single moment *[167]* and the demand that life should form a coherent whole. Every single state, every single moment has infinite value, for they represent a whole eternity! Take up the

[1)] "Nach Shakespeare und Spinoza ist die grösste Wirkung auf mich von Linné ausgegangen, und zwar gerade durch den Widerstreit, zu welchem er mich aufforderte. Denn indem ich sein scharfes, geistreiches Absondern, seine treffenden, zweckmässigen, oft aber willkürlichen Gesetze in mich aufzunehmen vermochte, ging in meinem Innern ein Zwiespalt vor: das was er mit Gewalt aus einander zu halten vermochte, musste, *nach dem innersten Bedürfniss meines Wesens,* zur Vereinigung anstreben." (Geschichte meines botanischen Studiums.) Linné's influence was of a kind similar to that of Kant's criticism; but then Kant in turn gave Goethe a happy time by his suggestion of a doctrine of unity.

[2)] See the section "Zur Naturwissenschaft im Algemeinen" in Goethe's works, and under it especially the fragments "Einwirkung der neueren Philosophie" and "Anschauende Urtheilskraft".

nearest task — then you will get through! And he believed that in this respect there was much to learn from women. It is this that especially captivated him when, at 75 years of age, he fell in love with the young girl he came to know in Marienbad:

> Es ist als wenn sie sagte: Stund um Stunde
> Wird uns das Leben freundlich dargeboten.
> Das Gestrige liess uns geringe Kunde;
> Das Morgende, zu wissen ist's verboten;
> Und wenn ich je mich vor dem Abend scheute,
> Die Sonne sank und sah noch was mich freute.
> Drum thu' wie ich und schaue, froh verständig,
> Dem Augenblick ins Auge! Kein Verschieben!
> Begegn' ihm schnell, wohlwollend wie lebendig,
> Im Handeln sey's, zur Freude, sey's dem Lieben;
> Nur wo bist, sey alles, immer kindlich,
> So bist du alles, bist unüberwindlich!

But the very elegy in which these lines are found shows that it was not always easy for him to fit the moment, as an eternal element, into the whole. The moment of farewell and separation came:

> Was hilft es mir so hohe Weisheit lernen!
> Nun bin ich fern! Die jetzige Minute
> Was ziemt denn der!

Thus even in his high old age he had to learn how difficult it can be to carry through the great doctrine of resignation that in his youth he had admired in Spinoza. But that he was able to do it, — that the sorrow could fade away, — was due not only to "the divine value of tones and tears", which he (see the poem "Aussöhnung") experienced shortly after that separation, but also to the fact that his whole view of
[168] life had impressed upon him the great law of resignation and self-conquest. It was his conviction that only he who has stood in the struggle of self-conquest has a real personality. 40 years before that episode he had written (Die Geheimnisse):

> Wenn einen Menschen die Natur erhoben,
> Ist es kein Wunder, wenn ihm viel gelingt.
> Doch wenn ein Mann von allen Lebensproben

Die sauerste besteht, sich selbst bezwingt,
Dann kann man ihn mit Freuden andern zeigen
Und sagen: das ist er, das ist sein eigen!
Von der Gewalt, die alle Wesen bindet,
Befreit der Mensch sich, der sich überwindet.

When Goethe here and elsewhere preaches the gospel of self-conquest, it is nevertheless not his meaning to praise self-compulsion and asceticism. He had learned from his Spinoza and first and foremost from his own experience that an impulse can only be checked by another impulse. The struggle against hindrance and resistance must be waged in a positive way. Evil must be displaced by putting something good in its place. Great spiritual interests must fill the place from which the momentary claim had to give way. And so Goethe also took his stand toward the bad and the wrong that he saw around him: "He who would truly do good work must not scold; he should not trouble himself at all about the wrong, but only always do the good. For what matters is not that something is torn down, but that something is built up in which mankind can feel a pure joy". And when he had now and then spoken in bitter words of the attacks to which he was subjected in his later days, he broke himself off: "Not another word about the bad business, lest I myself become unreasonable in combating the unreasonable!" —

One of the positive ways Goethe struck out on, when he had to work his way beyond a sorrow or a disharmony, was that of transforming his experience into poetry. It was not his intention to forget, still less to enjoy, in this way[1)]. But in the poetic *[169]* form the experience was seen "under the aspect of eternity" — in its peculiarity and yet as a single member in the great connection of life. In Werther, in Tasso, in Faust and Mephistopheles, in Wahlverwandschaften, in his lyric poems he has carried out such a transformation, into the clear form of art, of what during the experience filled him with passionate infatuation, with sorrow, with bitterness or with remorse. Of "Werther" he could say in his old age that it was written with his heart's blood, and that he was afraid to read it again. His poetry was not a road by which he withdrew from life, but a part of his own personal conduct of life, a way in which he worked what he had lived into his personality, so that it could thereby also gain significance for others.

It was far from being the case that he carried out this transformation from life to

[1)] Cf. my essay on Goethe in "Mindre Arbejder" II p. 231—234.

poetry with full consciousness, let alone with calculation. Where it happened perfectly, it took place unconsciously and in silence. The great images formed themselves in him without his suspecting it, and then suddenly thrust themselves forward before him. He therefore could not, like Schiller, talk with others beforehand about his poetic plans. "Ich trug Alles still mit mir herum." The details he could work out afterwards with clear consciousness. But the main thing was "the surprising gift", the outcome of the "daemonic" power that he found not only in the imagination, but in all involuntary modes of action, in the whole of nature. He therefore could not abide the word "composition", because it suggested an external and mechanical putting together. And since what matters above all is the quiet growth, he advises not to force artistic work, not to "whip oneself up in the bad time", but to wait for the good times. In his art too he found use for his philosophy of life.

III.

When the work has come into being through quiet growth and conscious after-
[170] work, it stands as a total image that can neither be expressed in a general idea nor be explained from definite, actual experiences and circumstances. Life, imagination and thought have worked together in so intimate a way that neither a speculative-idealistic nor a psychological-realistic aesthetics can unravel the living web that is the fruit of this collaboration. What "the daemonic" has joined together, criticism cannot and shall not put asunder.

Again and again Goethe declares that every work of art is incommensurable and irrational. "Man kann über Shakespeare gar nicht reden; es ist Alles unzulänglich." "Je inkommensurabler und für den Verstand unfasslicher eine poetische Produktion ist, desto besser." He firmly rebuffed those who asked what the "idea" in Tasso or Faust was. He could not say it. It was life in its fullness and in its oppositions that he wished to present, on the basis of what he himself had lived, and it could not be strung on a single thread. "Der Faust ist doch etwas Inkommensurables!" And of "Wilhelm Meister" he says: "Es gehört dieses Werk zu den inkalkulablesten Produkten, wozu mir fast selbst der Schlüssel fehlt!"

Nor do the definite facts that were the occasion of the work or were used as motifs in it have decisive significance for the understanding of it. He was amused that people wanted to know which town on the Rhine was meant in "Hermann und Dorothea", and that King Ludwig of Bavaria wished for information about the fact that lay at the

basis of the "Roman Elegies". "People seldom consider that the poet is for the most part able to create something good out of slight occasions."

The conception he thus asserted of the work of art as a whole that could be grasped neither from an idea nor from its elements agrees entirely with the one he asserted in his conception of nature and in his inquiry.

One should, he maintains, keep as long as possible to immediate intuition and keep analysis and judgments away. "Anschauen" and "Urtheilen" form sharp oppositions in Goethe. He speaks of "the quiet fruitfulness of such impressions as one takes in and enjoys without dissolving judgment" (ohne zersplitterndes Urtheil). During his Italian journey he writes: "I merely keep my eyes always open and impress the objects *[171]* firmly upon myself. I would rather not judge at all, if it were only possible".

This principle he followed in his inquiry. Whether he is studying colors or plant and animal forms, his concern is not to find laws and mechanical connection, but to find typical intuitions, which he could find again everywhere, only in different nuances. It was a procedure that suited the comparative study of plant and animal forms better than a physical theory of colors. When a typical phenomenon, what Goethe called a primal phenomenon, had been found, the task was to show its nuances. Nature was for him a play of forms, and the task was to see the fundamental form that expresses itself in this interplay. But he is indignant with those who want to go further back and seek an explanation of the primal phenomenon itself. At this one must stop; it is the limit of our vision; from it one must proceed by way of analogy to the multiplicity of the special phenomena, but behind it one cannot get. For behind it stands the Godhead itself, the active force of nature. Goethe's theory of colors (to keep to that) has a more aesthetic than scientific character, but he trusted it to such a degree that he engaged in a vehement polemic against modern physics, as it had developed from Newton's time on. The conception of nature should, according to Goethe, come into being in us just like the work of art, through the involuntary emergence of typical images, only that the natural scientist finds these images, the primal phenomena in the various domains, by observation and comparison. Thus in his theory of colors Goethe wished to explain all colors as different mixtures of light and darkness; his primal phenomenon here was the yellow or blue shadows that are seen when the sun shines on faintly darkened media (with a lighter or darker background). A further explanation of this primal phenomenon itself he held to be impossible. Here, he believed, we must resign ourselves, because we stand at the limit of human capacity. It was his fear of letting go of intuition that called forth this hasty

resignation. It was the poet in him that held the inquirer back.

[172] Goethe knew very well that the work of thought consists both in distinguishing and in combining, both in analysis and synthesis. He himself compares this double procedure with breathing out and breathing in, which are both equally necessary. And he maintains that one understands nature only when one distinguishes sufficiently to be able to combine, and combines sufficiently to be able to distinguish. But he could not, as exact natural science and critical philosophy demanded, regard every image, the "primal phenomenon" too, as provisional and insufficient, or as a mere example. He clung to intuition and harbored distrust of concepts and judgments. He wished to explain everything by analogy with his primal phenomena and did not see that these themselves are phenomena like other phenomena and can have no privilege over them.

The reason was not that he held a completed knowledge of nature, an absolute system, to be possible. Nature is for him incommensurable like the work of art. Nature has no system; it moves from an unknown center to an unknowable limit. And man does not exist in order to solve the problems of the world, but to seek where the problematic begins, and then to keep within the comprehensible! — When a student laid before Goethe questions that lay beyond this limit, Goethe wrote in his album: "Der liebe Gott hat die Nüsse wohl geschaffen; er hat sie aber nicht auch geknackt".

When Goethe has thus come to the limit of knowledge, he turns aside and returns to his proper domain, the art of poetry. Science can never make thought and experience wholly cover each other, but ends in the eternal strife between what is intuited and what is thought; only art speaks a language that expresses nature, that great weaver, whose work is not mechanically joined together from scattered threads, but where whole and parts are in eternal unity.

IV.

In Goethe's religious conception we find fundamental features that correspond to his conception of art, of science and of nature.

[173] He believed in a Godhead that worked in nature from within, through nature's own forms and forces. A God who pushes against nature from outside to set it going could not be a true God. If one asks how he conceives the Godhead, he answers that the highest truth, which is one with the divine, cannot be known directly, — "only in reflection, example, symbol". But he is convinced that "the spirit's highest fiery yearning has enough in image and likeness". And he himself could not be content

with a single symbol, but had to have changing symbols, according to the urge and capacity in him that especially asserted itself in the particular state. He writes to his theistic friend Jacobi (6 January 1813): "I for my part cannot, on account of the manifold directions of my nature, be content with a single way of thinking: as a poet and artist I am a polytheist, as a naturalist I am a pantheist, and the one as decidedly as the other. And if I then need a God for my personality as an ethical being, that too has no doubt been provided for". A similar statement is found on a slip among his papers. A dogmatic formulation and working together of his religious ideas he did not feel any urge for. For this reason he was attacked as irreligious. "I believed in God and nature and in the victory of the good over the bad; but that was not enough for the pious souls."

He believed in an immortality for all those in whom a spiritual energy, a firm type, had been developed; such a one, he believed, nature cannot do without. But there are degrees in this respect, and we are not immortal in the same way. Only for him who constantly acts is nature obliged to provide a new form of existence when the earlier one is dissolved. But then one also has enough to do with one's striving and acting in the present life and can leave the future life to itself, all the more since no definite ideas of its nature are possible. Goethe shunned those who wallowed in thoughts of immortality and were busy examining the faith of others in this respect, and when some importunate ladies examined him on the matter, he declared that he would in any case hope not to meet those who had already been busy with immortality down *[174]* here, for it would be unbearable when they came rushing up and cried: "Haben wir nicht recht gehabt? Haben wir es nicht vorhergesagt ?" —

More markedly than in the form of ideas, Goethe's religiousness expresses itself in feeling. This already comes out in Faust's confession of faith, when he is catechized by Margaret: "Gefühl ist Alles! Name ist Schall und Rauch!" And as the worshiper of nature Goethe was, — as one who had a sense for the mysterious (daemonic) in nature and in man, as well as for the great and life-furthering forces in the world, for man's connection with nature, as well as for the limits of mankind, — his feeling toward existence had to take on the character of reverence. In the work of his old age "Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre" this feeling is described in such a way that we are reminded in an interesting manner of what he admired in his youth in Spinoza.

There is one thing, it says, that no one brings with him into the world, and on which nevertheless everything depends if man is in all respects to be man: it is reverence. The natural man is tossed back and forth between fear and freedom, and

only with difficulty does he work his way out beyond this swell. Or rather: he does not work his way out of it, but it is a higher sense, lying in his nature, that leads him to reverence, which at once lets him see his dependence and his independence. Herein consists the worth and significance of all genuine religions. — Reverence stands here as akin to the lofty resignation Goethe had come to know in Spinoza. But it is a stronger and deeper feeling that is described here; in the meantime Goethe has lived life and seen nature. Reverence has three different directions: upward toward the great powers of nature; — downward toward the beings that stand below us, or that suffer and are crushed; — forward toward the other men, our fellows in the battle of life. There are three religions that spring from these directions: the first is the
[175] heathen, the second the Christian, the third the philosophical. The mature man unites all three in reverence for himself, which leads to finding his right place in existence.

Goethe has here characterized the fundamental mood that, throughout his life, animated his poetry and his inquiry and his whole conduct. When he ended his greatest poem with the thought that he who constantly strives can be redeemed, reverence lies at the basis here too; for a world order that makes high and great striving possible itself takes on the character of sublimity, and reverence must be the fundamental mood that the thought of it awakens.

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AT THE SCHILLER COMMEMORATION

25 NOVEMBER 1909.

The man[1)] who was the one rightly called to open this festival is held captive by illness. If, despite much misgiving, I undertook to take his place, it was because I trusted that I did have one qualification for carrying out the task: the great admiration and the deep gratitude toward the great figure whose memory we are to celebrate this evening. I wish especially to speak in the name of the many for whom Schiller's lyric poems, weighty in thought and shaped in powerful rhythms, have been, from our young years on through the years of manhood, a constant source of courage for life, a constant spur to new and higher striving up above everything that can dull or drag down. The manly force and the great pathos will at all times make his most significant poems some of the best examples of the poetry of life, a poetry that does not lead into a dream world or in romantic fashion veil the disharmonies, but gives expression to the feeling of life of one who stands in the midst of life's work and toil, striving despite everything to hold fast to a great goal. And then his tragedies, in which we hear the heavy tread of mighty fate, — where clearly drawn, if not picturesquely nuanced, figures come to meet us, — and where from their lips sound striking and energetic words about the conditions of life, about the demands of life and about the battle of life, words that have become winged words even for many who do not know their origin! For my part Schiller as a thinker too has been of great interest. In *[177]* the great Renaissance in German intellectual life toward the end of the eighteenth century — in many respects the most significant spiritual movement since the days of the Italian Renaissance — Schiller's figure stands between the two giants Goethe

[1)] Georg Brandes.

and Kant, akin to both and a characteristic intermediate link between them. Not that he could be, or himself believed he could be, set as their equal. Thinking was, especially in a certain period, an essential element in his spiritual work, but only an element. And as for poetry, he saw clearly Goethe's unique worth. "Gegen Goethen bin und bleib' ich ein poetischer Lump" (letter to Körner 27 June 1796). But he was not unworthy to be named together with the two spiritual heroes. As his friendship procured Goethe a new spiritual youth, so his conviction of the significant place of the artistic in human life has helped to harmonize and humanize what was sharp and hard in Kant's ethical ideas. — And now finally the man Schiller himself, as we know him through the course of his life, from the fermenting youth in the period of Storm and Stress, through the period of work with its groping attempts, to ever increasing clarity in understanding and firmness in artistic activity, despite want and illness always striving forward toward the high ideals, which indeed stood before him in different shapes at different times, but always signified for him the great goal for which alone it was worth living. A peculiar luster lies over the beautiful life together with Goethe, in which each of them stands at once as helper and as helped forward. Outside the theater in Weimar their proud figures stand, shoulder to shoulder, looking upward, up toward the goal toward which each by his own ways strove, and which ennobled life for them both. — —

It would not be my province to give you a thorough characterization of Schiller as an artist and of his place in the history of literature. Such a characterization you have missed because the man did not come to speak who alone could speak with authority on it.

[178] What I shall try, in all brevity, is to show Schiller's own conception of the relation between art and life. When Schiller philosophized, it was especially the significance of art for human life that occupied him.

He had a great idea of what art had been and is for the race and in the life of the individual. The raw and unruly forces of nature and impulses of nature, which the stern law of duty was unable to bend without crushing them, indeed which it perhaps even provoked with its severity, — shape and limit themselves involuntarily when they stand before the works of the plastic arts, or when the harmonies of tones sound for them. And art itself springs involuntarily from man's nature. Other living beings surpass man in strength and in instincts; but art is man's distinguishing mark: Die Kunst, o Mensch, hast du allein!

Art, then, is the great educator; it is the first form in which man comes to know

spiritual enjoyment; it leads up from rawness or asceticism to complete and harmonious human nature, where no single element rules at the expense of the other elements, and where the high demand of the ideal can be met with the enthusiasm that art's images of the great and sublime or of the gentle and graceful are able to awaken. But it is not merely an educator. Only by becoming art does a human work reach its perfection, whether it be the work of thought or of the hand. Art is both beginning and end, both means and goal. The dignity of mankind lies in the hands of the artists; they are appointed to assert and preserve it!

These thoughts Schiller expressed in the great poem "Die Künstler", which was written in his thirtieth year. Some years later he took up this line of thought again in a longer treatise: "Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen". It is here especially the significance of art for modern man that he discusses. The great dark sides of our culture are connected with something that, seen from another side, is a great advance, and that in any case has come as a necessity, — the division of labor in the material and in the spiritual domain. The individuals become more and more *[179]* members of a great machine. Each gets his own, often insignificant and monotonous, task to perform, a task that lays claim to only a single side of his nature, perhaps requires only a single, simple manipulation. Whole and full living, in which all sides of man's being come to work together, becomes more and more difficult to attain. And even those who can work in the world of the spirit suffer under the division. They lead one life in their intellect, another in their heart, a third in their imagination. But in art — both in those who are influenced by it and in those who create it — all the powers of the soul work together. What shows itself in childlike form in play, a use of the powers merely for the sake of using them, without any external end, without fear and without desire, — appears on a grand scale in art, when the mind is taken up by the images in which the fates of life are presented in their changing forms, showing us now the sublime, now the graceful. It is no external need that leads to such presentation; it springs from the inner urge of the mind. Give man moments in which he can rise from the scattered and isolated life to dwelling on a great and comprehensive image of life, — and from such moments there will radiate after-effects whose ennobling influence is felt when he again returns to his place of work! The very fact that he feels joy and enthusiasm over something that is not a sensuous reality is a testimony of freedom and self-activity, of independence of narrow interests and impulses. — —

Such, roughly, were Schiller's thoughts on the significance of art for life. The

artist was for him a prophet. And this prophethood he celebrated in poems and in treatises. It was in the period from his thirtieth to his thirty-sixth year that he especially brooded on this question. It was characteristic of him that he felt this urge to assure himself that what he sacrificed his life to was also a great and indispensable human good. It was his heavy nature, ever struggling with inner and outer difficulties, that thus for a time let him brood over art instead of working in art. He himself
[180] felt the self-contradiction in it: he, the poet, who prized his art as the true, full life, occupied himself with speculation, this most one-sided occupation! He even writes to Goethe (7 January 1795): "So much is certain, the poet is the only true *man,* and the best philosopher is only a caricature beside him," — a remark every philosopher will approve, *when* it is a Schiller who says it to a Goethe.

But in Schiller's artistic work itself too we find this urge to brooding and reflection in contrast to full self-surrender. It was not, says Goethe, in Schiller's nature to work involuntarily, as if by instinct; a certain deliberateness was always present. The particular traits and images were often brought into the world with effort and as a result of deliberation. They did not come, as Goethe tells of his good inspirations, "like free children of God, who suddenly stood there and said: Here we are!" His work was severe, though it was his highest life. He could be far down in doubt, darkness and spiritual trial as long as the preparatory work went on. He expresses himself very strongly on this in a letter to Körner (25 May 1792): "It often happens to me that I am ashamed of the way in which my works, even the most successful, come into being. It is often said that the poet must be fully absorbed in his subject while he writes. But in my case it is often a single and not always an important side of the subject that makes me work on it, and only during the work does the one idea then separate itself from the other... But how is it possible that from so unpoetic a procedure something excellent can nevertheless arise?" Schiller finds the solution of this question in the fact that it is often an indeterminate urge to give vent to feelings striving forth that leads to the poetic works. As long as this urge had not yet found means and ways, there could be heavy times. But according to what his friend Wilhelm v. Humboldt, who in some of his most important years of breakthrough was with him daily, has said, everything that made the work hard for him served to increase the perfection of the matured work. — Unfortunately it is not all hard work of which this can be said.

[181] I cannot in this connection refrain from thinking of the Song of the Bell, which we are later to hear interpreted here. As so often in Schiller, there are released from the images he gives other, more or less symbolic images, which consciously or

unconsciously may also have stirred in the poet during his work. In the progressing work of the casting there is not only occasion — often through beautiful and inspired hints in the situation — to depict the course of human life from cradle to grave, through happiness and misfortune, through war and peace, but we also hear the master's moods during the work. Will what is now being prepared here in the darkness of the casting pit really become a shining bell, whose tones can be heard far and wide from up in the tower?

> Wird's auch schön zu Tage kommen,
> Dass es Fleiss und Kunst vergilt?
> Wenn der Guss misslang?
> Wenn die Form zersprang?
> Ach! vielleicht, indem wir hoffen,
> Hat uns Unheil schon getroffen.

In this anxiety speaks Schiller's own experience of his artistic work. From his correspondence with Goethe we know that he had trouble getting this poem finished. — Both as a man and as an artist his life was full of struggling oppositions. But then he also knew the master's joy when the work succeeded and could by its tones interpret and guide the course of life. It was his conviction of the high worth of art that kept him up in the dark times. He sacrificed, as Goethe has said of him, his very life to bringing forth the great images of life. —

When we here this evening celebrate Schiller's memory, it is of interest to recall that from Denmark a helping hand was extended to him at a time when economic pressure threatened to halt his poetic activity, precisely in the years when he was, through brooding, to work his way forward to the last great period of his poetic life, the one in which Wallenstein, Maria Stuart and Wilhelm Tell came into being. The treatise I mentioned before, "Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen", is dedicated to Duke Frederik Kristian of Augustenborg, brother-in-law of Crown *[182]* Prince Frederik and Danish minister of education. The dedication was a thanks for a high-hearted support that the duke together with another Danish minister, Schimmelmann, had given the sick and needy poet. It was the greatest Danish poet of the time, Baggesen, whose enthusiasm for Schiller had communicated itself to the two magnates, who were also his patrons. The summer before their gift to Schiller, he had been dangerously ill, and the rumor spread that he was dead. His Danish admirers, not least Baggesen, were seized by the deepest grief, and at Schimmelmann's estate

in Hellebæk a memorial celebration was held, at which Baggesen recited the Hymn to Joy, accompanied by music. This token of sympathy too moved Schiller deeply, and it is kind thoughts that he in his last years sent up here. His influence on Danish literature has surely been great; I need only mention names like Oehlenschläger and Grundtvig; the latter names not only his poetry but also his view of life as something that has had significance for his development. — And this assembly here this evening is a testimony that he still exerts his influence among us and finds understanding and admiration.

We have, then, reason to be glad and proud that from here an indispensable help was given him.

But proud above all may the people be to whose best sons he belongs. No poet has, as he has, become the German people's property. If it can be disputed that he should stand in the first rank of the great spirits of the poetic world, the rank in which only four or five places can be filled, there is no dispute that he has brought high poetry into human minds and human homes where works of poetry otherwise do not reach. And this is connected with the relation of his art to life. His art wished to carry the dark image of reality over into its own bright realm, the seriousness of life over into its cheerful world, so that reality and life could in turn be strengthened and elevated by the spiritual forces that art gives occasion to exercise.

When the "Lied von der Glocke" was performed at Weimar's theater a few months
[183] after Schiller's death, Goethe had written an epilogue to it, in which it sounds again and again with pride: "Er war unser!" This applies here especially to Weimar itself, the little town on the Ilm, — "wie Bethlehem in Juda klein und gross", — where Schiller had found shelter in his last years. Goethe recalls how people here had seen him in his daily life, his severe work, his constant struggle with illness, but above all had been witness to how his spirit had steadily advanced:

> Indessen schritt sein Geist gewaltig fort
> Ins Ewige des Wahren, Guten, Schönen,
> Und hinter ihm, im wesenlosen Scheine,
> Lag, was uns alle bändigt, das Gemeine.

A more beautiful memorial, a more beautiful characterization than Goethe has given in these lines cannot be imagined. — —

"Er war unser!" — Beyond the little town's, and beyond the German land's borders this word can be repeated. He was and is ours, as truly and as long as the spiritual

treasures he has raised, and the great conception of life and of art that he has expressed in poem and in thought, win understanding and appropriation among us.

High above life's confused paths, above the noise of egoisms, above the much that can ensnare and crush, his clear, manly spirit points constantly, through an art that from the very midst of life leads upward toward its heights. Never may the time come, not in our fatherland either, when there is not sense and enthusiasm for a hero of art, of thought, of life like Friedrich Schiller!

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NAPOLEON AND PHILOSOPHY.

If one wonders what Napoleon and philosophy could have to do with each other, one must consider that power, whether it appears as the power of the state or the power of the church, as absolutism, as aristocracy or as democracy, cannot do without thought, without ideas, to guide the use of power and, first and foremost, to justify the right of power. And on the other hand thought cannot in the long run do without power. What is fostered in the secret chamber and is tended and developed in the smaller circles will in the end come to set those in power tasks they cannot get around. But besides, those in power themselves, and not least the man in power we have before us here, are a rich subject for philosophy, through their character, their genius, their conduct and their fate.

Napoleon's relation to the philosophy of his time is in any case a not uninteresting chapter of the history of philosophy.

Napoleon, the son of the eighteenth century, came to power by the help of the ideas of the Revolution. In their service he fought his first battles and won his first victories. And from the first he saw the power he could win as a servant of ideas and of scientific inquiry. When, after the Peace of Campo Formio, he was received into the National Institute, France's academy of sciences, he said: "The true conquests, the only ones that give rise to no sorrow, are those that are made over ignorance. The true power of the French Republic must henceforth consist in not permitting a single thought to arise that does not belong to it."

[185] There was accordingly, for the time being, mutual sympathy between him and the French philosophers of the time.

The philosophers had been persecuted under Robespierre's reign of terror. Power had here shown itself suspicious of thought. Destutt de Tracy, for instance, had been imprisoned. He continued his work in captivity, from which he was released only at Robespierre's fall on the ninth of Thermidor (1794). Cabanis, next to Destutt de

Tracy the most eminent of the French philosophers of the time, had been spared only because of the respect his love of humanity inspired; out in Auteuil, where he lived, he practiced medicine without payment among the poor.

Napoleon visited Cabanis in Auteuil and sought in vain to get Destutt de Tracy to come with him to Egypt. When he came home, the philosophers sympathized with his action against the Directory. People hoped that he would become another Washington, and greeted the eighteenth Brumaire with joy. Under the new constitution Destutt de Tracy became a senator.

The group of philosophers in question here has received the common name of Ideologists. The name is owed to Destutt de Tracy's chief work *Éléments d'Idéologie,* which appeared in 1801, an exposition of what we would now call psychology and theory of knowledge, built on a series of more special treatises that had been published in the Transactions of the National Institute in the preceding years. Ideology properly means merely the doctrine of representations or ideas. It aims to give an analysis of the life of thought and of mental life. A careful distinction is drawn between facts, hypotheses and speculations. Psychology is brought into close connection with physiology. Characteristic of the fundamental psychological conception is — in critical contrast to Condillac's attempt to reduce mental life to a mere product of passively received sensations — the weight laid on activity in mental life, on the will, in connection with the original tendencies to movement, as they already appear in the movements of the fetus in the mother's womb. Great weight is laid on resistance as the mark of reality, and on our capacity to offer resistance to what is not ourselves. "To will and to offer resistance," says Destutt de Tracy, "that is in truth to be!" *[186]*

Ideology is a forerunner of the more recent empirical psychology. It has exercised no slight influence on later inquiry; philosophers and psychologists such as Schopenhauer, Bain and Taine were influenced by it and continued its work. Ste Beuve thought of writing the history of this school, but did not carry out this plan. A learned and thorough account of it has been given by F. Picavet (Les Idéologues Paris 1891), and this, besides the study of the works of Destutt de Tracy and Cabanis, underlies this sketch.

One sees that the word ideology designates a sober inquiry, far from speculation and utopia. But through a great collision between thought and power an entirely different meaning was forced on the word, which — so great was the influence of power — it has kept in common usage! —

After having saved France, Napoleon did not let go of the grip his iron hand had

got on power. From now on power gradually became everything to him, although in the first period of his rule he used it to carry through several of the thoughts of the Revolution. The philosophers' criticism began to become unpleasant to him as he proceeded to reactionary measures. The Concordat in particular met with opposition from their side. It should be well noted that it was in the first instance the political opposition that embittered him; but he traced it back to philosophical criticism as its ultimate cause. From now on, then, the word ideologist became in his mouth a term of abuse, synonymous with a nebulous and pedantic metaphysician; ideology became one with speculative cobweb-spinning. But the real meaning of the word ideology in his mouth Lanfrey has probably rightly stated thus: the sum of all the ideas that were hateful to Napoleon.

The reason for the opposition he met from the side of the "Ideologists" lay in his despotic measures. The freedom of the press was abolished. The Concordat was established. Special courts were instituted for political crimes. From dislike of free inquiry, instruction in history and jurisprudence was abolished in the higher schools;
[187] philosophical instruction was restricted, and the philosophical section of the National Institute was abolished. Books too were persecuted; Mme de Staël's "Allemagne" went to the paper mill, and Destutt de Tracy's commentary on Montesquieu had to be printed in America.

Thus he defied the ideas on which the right of his power rested. He forgot, as so many in power constantly forget it, what Rousseau, the object of his youthful admiration, had declared: fait ne fait pas droit! Power, which had been a means, now became his only end.

The opposition in France he could subdue. Yet here too it became his nemesis that he could as little tolerate proud souls around him as he could tolerate free ideas. And it became his downfall that he lacked respect for every kind of spiritual movement. The religious movement that lay behind the opposition of the Catholics, and the national movement that lay behind the opposition of the conquered peoples, were for him a kind of ideology that he believed he could defy. Yet it was the German "Ideologists" who in high degree helped to awaken the enthusiasm that led to his fall. Fichte and Schleiermacher, Wilhelm von Humboldt and Henrik Steffens showed by their national activity that ideas are, after all, a power.

When the catastrophe then came (1814), it was precisely Destutt de Tracy who in the French Senate made the motion for his deposition. — —

Let us hear about the fate of the two men later on.

After his death Napoleon came to honor again. In the time of reaction that followed he stood as the hero of the new age, a symbol of the revolutionary thoughts, and his figure towered in the popular consciousness high above the small men who now governed Europe.

Goethe has expressed this mood in a poem. The Devil appears before God's throne with a long register of the sins of the fallen greatness. But his long speech bores the Deity, and the following words cut short the accusation:

> Wiederhol's nicht vor göttlichen Ohren!
> Du sprichst wie die deutschen Professoren.
> Wir wissen Alles, mach es kurz! — —
> Getraust du dich ihn anzugreifen,
> So magst du ihn nach der Hölle schleifen! —

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In the July Days of the year 1830, when the reaction was overthrown, an old gentleman with silk stockings, a long cane and a green shade over his eyes was seen moving among the barricades. It was Destutt de Tracy, who despite the commands of Robespierre, Napoleon and the Bourbons had not lost his faith in the principles of 1789, which he now heard proclaimed again, although he was not satisfied with Louis Philippe's conduct. He lived, however, to see the philosophical section of the Institut de France restored before his death, which occurred in the year 1836.

[189]

KIERKEGAARD AND NIETZSCHE.

It might seem a strange thought to place side by side these two men, who on decisive points stand in the sharpest opposition to each other.

The one asserted Christianity in its strictest form, sharpened orthodoxy into paradox and presented it in expressions that set its doctrine in absolute and hostile opposition to natural, human ways of thinking. In particular he set Christian ethics in the sharpest conflict with human demands and endeavors. The other was a radical freethinker with so strong an antipathy to Christianity and to all views of life related to it that he could not find words strong enough for his aversion. On the other hand he asserted with ecstatic enthusiasm the health and strength of human nature and believed in its unlimited possibilities of development.

For the one the ideal lay in the past. Only a single time in history had the divine light shone into the darkness of existence, and the relation to this point of light was decisive for the life of the human race and for the personal value of each individual human being. The other held just as energetically to an ideal of the future, proclaimed the coming of the superman and, in connection with this, a revaluation of all values.

In their outward circumstances too the two men form a remarkable contrast. Kierkegaard wandered about in the narrow streets of Copenhagen, and what occupied the small, gossiping town penetrated all too much into the cloistered solitude in which
[190] he lived. Apart from a few stays for study in Berlin and his excursions to the forests of North Zealand, he walked back and forth in his rooms, now and then stopping at his desk to write down his thoughts. For the rest he immersed himself in strictly ascetic books of devotion. Nietzsche had spent his youth in the study of classical antiquity and had for a time been a teacher in this subject; later he spent his time on the Elysian heights of the Engadine or on the Riviera. His thoughts were born out in open nature.

But precisely these extreme contrasts could be evidence of a spiritual kinship. Rivers that flow in opposite directions may for all that have their source on the same mountain. And the philosopher is more interested in the source than in the course, — more in the deepest-lying demands than in the different ways in which their satisfaction is sought, — more in the leading thoughts than in the dogmas or symbols by which they are expressed, — more in the experiences of life than in their interpretation.

What Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have in common is that they both look far out beyond the usual, bounded, rational tracks of life. They assert what is innermost and original in man, something that (provisionally at least) cannot be analyzed and formulated in exact fashion, but which can nevertheless possess the highest power and the highest value. They could not find that modern culture, with all its science, art and industry, satisfied the urge of personality, and they were led besides, though from entirely opposite points of view, into sharp opposition to the prevailing religious and ecclesiastical system. They are symptoms of something that is stirring in the age, and that has here found a volcanic expression.

There can be no question of any historical connection between them. Kierkegaard (b. 1813, d. 1855) was in Nietzsche's time (b. 1844, insane 1889, d. 1900) very little known in Germany. — On the other hand I find very significant analogies between them on three points.

The first point concerns the relation to truth.

Kierkegaard asserted the proposition that subjectivity is truth. What matters is not so much what the truth you embrace contains as that you have won or appropriated it through your own personal work and live in it with all the inwardness of your soul! *[191]* Two men go up to pray. The one lives in a heathen land and prays to an idol; but he puts his whole soul into his prayer and gives himself up in it: then in reality he prays to the true God! The other lives in a Christian land and prays to the true God; but he prays dully and out of habit; his personality is not in the prayer: then in reality he prays to an idol!

Kierkegaard's emphasis on personality led him out beyond all scientific thinking. What interested him as a thinker were the boundary problems. His thought had an irresistible urge to follow the line to its end, to seek out what cannot be thought but lies out beyond the limits of thought. Hereby he came into conflict with the doctrine of the church, which it was nevertheless precisely his intention to hold fast to, but which presupposes an objective concept of truth.

Nietzsche's watchword was "will to power". It is this will that determines what is to be truth. Art stands above science, but life stands above art; Apollo stands above Socrates, but Dionysus stands above Apollo! The wonderful and overflowing fullness of life can be contained neither in the forms that thought has put in order nor in the forms that art can create. In particular Nietzsche strove for a liberation from "the theoretical man". What mattered to him was "die grösste Erhöhung des Kraftbewusstseins". To his closest friend (Overbeck) he once said: "Die reine Aufklärung genügt mir nicht; es muss doch etwas Anderes geben". This makes his attack on Strauss understandable; his position here recalls Rousseau's relation to Voltaire and the Encyclopedists.

The two men have, each in his own way, known the constant tension between thought and life. Life, both the inner and the outer life, brings us such a fullness of content that thought cannot at once master it. Therefore life constantly has a head start, and only gradually and in part can thought produce the rational forms in which the content of life can be ordered. This relation is best expressed in a journal entry of Kierkegaard's: "Life must be understood backwards; but we live forwards; life in
[192] temporality therefore never becomes properly understandable, because at no moment can I get complete quiet to take up the position backwards." To this correspond Nietzsche's words: "Erkenntnis und Werden schliesst sich aus". —

Another analogy between the two thinkers I find in the standard they both apply in order to determine the height of a personality's life and development. Their standard testifies to a deep understanding of the nature of personality.

Kierkegaard has presented, partly in poetic, partly in philosophical form, a series of types (or, as he calls them, "stages") of different views of life and ways of taking life, — types whose difference from one another rests on the degree and range of the oppositions that life comprises, and thereby of the resistance that must be overcome. Personal life stands the higher, the greater and sharper the oppositions are that can persist without the unity and concentration of the personality being annulled. Lowest stands he who is absorbed in the enjoyment of the *moment*, in the arbitrary playing with the circumstances of life that characterizes the "aesthetic" view of life. After this come, by degrees, the ironist, the ethicist, the humorist and the religious man. Increased content of life and increased energy, but also increased pain, is the law of life on the higher stages. The pain is caused by the conflict of the oppositions, finally — for the religious man — between time and eternity. By abating the oppositions one lowers the level of life. The highest is the great courage that is required when spirits

are tried in strife.

This courage was for Nietzsche too the highest virtue. Throughout his whole activity as an author he fought to strike down all pessimism. All dwelling on the dark sides of life, on the weak and the pitiable, all pity, all mistrust of happiness and of the happy were to be rooted out. But his passionate optimism did not make him blind to suffering. He saw, like Kierkegaard, that when great demands are made on life, great possibilities of suffering arise at the same time. Suffering he knew from his own experience, ill as he was long before he succumbed to insanity; but it could not bring him to bear false witness about life. He was a brave man. Longest he had to struggle with his contempt for "the great mob", a feeling that underlay the opposition *[193]* between master morality and slave morality which was perhaps what made the most impression on his contemporaries. It is clear, of course, that both the contempt and the social dualism between masters and slaves mark a great inconsistency in one who wants to strike down pessimism. One can indeed perceive, especially through fragments and drafts, an unceasing striving to remove this inconsistency. It was Nietzsche's tragedy that he did not come to complete the development of his thoughts on this subject.

Kierkegaard saw the danger especially in aesthetic play with life; Nietzsche saw it in weakness and complaint; but both maintained that life was to be conceived as a struggle to preserve both the changing richness of life and its unity and coherence.

A danger, finally, of an entirely opposite kind is one to which neither of them is blind either, — the one that repetition brings.

Kierkegaard carries out the finest analyses here, and the problem of repetition appears at every point in his reflection on life. The main point is the dulling power of repetition. It robs the life of feeling of its freshness and strength. One can, with the "aesthetic" type, avoid repetition by keeping oneself hovering, so that one withdraws from every lasting relation in life. But one can also struggle with repetition, by directing the will toward preserving the originality and ideality of life amid the daily work and within the given social conditions. Here too Kierkegaard found a standard for the degree of development of a personality: "He who wills repetition, he is a man". — Repetition plays a special role in his religious polemic. It was his last great accusation against the church and Christendom that they had succumbed to the dulling power of repetition, which began to work from the moment when Christianity became a member of existing human institutions and forgot its divine origin and its first enthusiasm.

Nietzsche came upon the problem of repetition more from outside. His Greek
[194] studies led him to the thought that everything must repeat itself. The Greeks did not have the idea of a constantly progressing development, but in connection with the idea of the limitation of the universe in space there awoke among them (especially among the Stoics) the thought of a rhythmic recurrence of the same situations. And Nietzsche believed he found this thought confirmed by his studies of modern natural science. For since one — so he believed — must assume that the number of atoms was limited, the number of their combinations must also be limited. — This thought (which has wrongly been regarded as a symptom of insanity) filled Nietzsche with the greatest horror. For a long time he went about carrying it as a great secret. It must, it seemed to him, lead back to the pessimism he had set himself the task of rooting out of the world. The hourglass of existence is turned ever anew! Time is a ring, and the wheel of the world rolls eternally without moving from the spot! — Like Kierkegaard he saw the only way out in a mighty, creative will that constantly brings forth new values. In the planned conclusion of the Zarathustra book the proclamation of such an enthusiastic and energetic will to life in defiance of the fact of repetition was to be a main feature[1)]. —

Kierkegaard and Nietzsche do not stand alone in the weight they lay on the relation of tension between life and thought. In the course of the last century we see a whole series of thinkers who, like them, are symptoms of something that is stirring
[195] in the age, and that will surely prove to be stronger both than the old dogmas and than the new doubts. Carlyle, Guyau and William James bear witness in the same direction, though not with the passion that drove Kierkegaard and Nietzsche out into their paradoxes.

Reflection — what a poet calls "the deep calm of the still, the faithful reflection" — is the philosopher's spiritual home. But reflection presupposes experience. Thought gets its content and its tasks from life, and without faith in the life in us and around us we cannot believe in thought. But the time of thought comes ever anew; it need not hamper or subdue life for fear of not being able to master it. Nor need it take

[1)] On the influence of repetition on the life of feeling see my Psychology VI E, 4—5. — While the law of repetition filled Nietzsche with the greatest horror and sets Kierkegaard one of the most decisive problems in his doctrine of the "stages", it had for Marcus Aurelius the great significance of a calming thought, which contained the assurance that he would meet nothing on his way that his will should not be prepared to receive and take up. Only on a rare occasion does the thought of the dulling working of repetition come forward. (See the essay on Marcus Aurelius above). — This opposite way of taking a stand toward repetition is characteristic of the difference between the ancient and the modern outlook on life. (See on this also the essay on Plato's Symposium above).

refuge in theological dogmas or metaphysical speculations. Life itself will best be able to show in what forms of thought it can be grasped. As long as life moves forward, its whole content cannot be wholly and completely put in order by thought; but it will always be a matter of keeping the mind open to the new that life and experience can bring.

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AT THE COMMEMORATION OF PETER SEVERIN KRØYER

4 DECEMBER 1909.

One beautiful summer afternoon about 27 years ago a band of younger men walked across the Eremitage Plain. They were members of a society that had been founded a couple of years before, and that consisted for the most part of painters and writers. Krøyer, who had recently come home from a long stay abroad, walked at the head, and I see him clearly before me, gazing out over the glorious countryside and pointing — as he used to — with his whole hand (as in Viggo Johansen's evening picture) out toward the horizon. He had won his first victories and now moved in our midst, bright and clear, fresh and warm-hearted, and all were glad to have him back.

Together with many others in the little band of painters he marked a new age in Danish painting. There had been a decline and a slackening when the masters who in the '40s and '50s had produced such beautiful works had for the most part passed away, and the judgment that had been passed abroad on our art (at the exhibitions in Vienna in 1873 and in Paris in 1878) had been severe. Now there was a new generation with fresh courage and a new vision, and in it Krøyer stood in the front rank. There was a joy throughout the whole band over every work of value that appeared. It was art that mattered, and the comrades rejoiced just as much as the single fortunate master. There was in this respect, as I remember it, a greater fellow-feeling among the painters than among the writers; and our society was in fact dissolved because
[197] of frictions among the writers. I believe that this fine relation among the artists has held. Oppositions may have come forward between different schools and points of

view. But I am still of the opinion that the visual artists, in respect of fellow-feeling on behalf of art, stand above the writers. It was a great joy to move among them.

There was a question that was much discussed at that time in this circle too. It was the question of the national element in art. Our two great art historians of the last century, Høyen and Julius Lange, viewed this question somewhat differently. Høyen laid great weight on visual art's taking its subjects from the people's own nature and history. Art had come to us from outside; but it was to become the people's property by taking its subjects from its nature and its history or mythology. Julius Lange maintained, on the contrary, that what mattered first and foremost was that the work of art should spring from the artist's own innermost personality, no matter what subjects he then chose. Art is life, and all life must be lived at first hand. It is the nation that is to come to see the demands of art, not art that is to accommodate itself to the nation's. But from this point of view he came to a result similar to Høyen's; for he believed that native subjects would most easily be able to set the artist's own personality in motion. In foreign subjects he will not so easily be able to become at home. And to travel abroad to learn technique Lange finds unreasonable, since technique has no worth except as the form of a personal work — and every such work brings its own technique with it.

Yet Lange too surely viewed this matter too anxiously. If there is a real and original gift, it can, without harm to its distinctiveness, learn a great many things from others, even from complete strangers. True geniuses are distinguished from ordinary people not least by being able to learn more than others, because they have a more open sense and a deeper urge. And as for the national element, it will — without any stress being laid on it — involuntarily and unconsciously assert itself when the artist, as Lange indeed demands, works with his whole innermost personality. When all the strings *[198]* of the soul sound, the national distinctiveness will assert itself; for it is not something external that is added, but lies in the way in which the individual involuntarily does his work. Therefore it will also be quite able to bear the learning from abroad, where this really has value.

Krøyer is a great and fine example of this. His personality and his art were developed by what he learned in Bonnat's atelier and by the study of the older Spanish painters. The foreign became his property, and his finest works have in rare degree become the property of the Danish people. In rare degree our people has found in them what can gladden its eye and its mind. Through his development and his work a proof has been given of the independence of Danish intellectual life. Even in

the small country the human mind, the human eye and the human hand can work in a new and distinctive way, so that its art even gains significance abroad and becomes more than an offshoot of the art of other countries. — Krøyer is far from the only artist of whom this holds. And it holds besides also for our literature, our science and for the development in the practical spheres of life. But he is one of the best and greatest examples.

What, then, is the distinctiveness of Krøyer's art? — He is in the first place the painter of light and of open nature, shows us the glory of life in sunshine and clarity. It has been objected from several sides against his pictures of nature that the human beings vanish before the great effects of light and air. But however absorbed he is in the glory of light, man is never vanishing or mere staffage for him. In the large picture of a summer night at Skagen the fishermen are rather the main element; their powerful figures recall the hard work; they wait only for the breeze to begin it; the idyll of the summer night thereby gets a serious background. In the glorious evening picture where the two young women walk along the beach, and in the coastal picture with the bathing boys, it is precisely something essential that the human beings are there; the festiveness and clarity of nature pass over into their minds and stamp
[199] themselves on their movements. — It has also been held against him that only once, in the picture of the Italian hatmakers, has he followed the light into the dark, wretched rooms where so many human lives are spent. When the picture first appeared, the opposite complaint was raised against it: it was marked by a piercing pessimism and was meant to serve socialist agitation! Both objections sin against the artist's individuality. He simply wanted to follow his favorite subject, light, on its way, and thereby for once came in with it into the wretched hut. When otherwise he seeks out its working in free, open nature, he follows his urge, seizes what lies near to his mind, his eye and his hand. He has seized aspects of our country's nature that we constantly need to have brought out; gray weather and sleet we truly have enough of. His works will continue to be a source of joy in life, both in themselves and by teaching us how we should look at our country and its nature. And besides — the glory that is represented is the glory of free nature itself, of light and of air, which can become accessible to all. The boys who leap about in the water in the clear summer sun are boys of the common people, and the picture shows us that there are goods and joys from which no one *needs* to be excluded. Quite as much as a realistic depiction of the dark dwellings of the unfortunately placed, a picture such as this will testify to human sympathy. There lies a wish behind it — a wish that no child in our country

might be excluded from the nature and the joy of life it depicts! — There is here an opposition that asserts itself in analogous fashion in all spheres of life: is the law or is the gospel to be put in the front rank? is it Noureddin or Aladdin who is to provide the type of life?

A single artist cannot exhaust everything. There is much that Krøyer did not take in, because it was not his concern. Henrik Ibsen once in a conversation compared the Danish landscape to a soulful face that constantly changed its expression with the changing moods. This side of Danish nature — the role of the clouds and the wind — it did not lie in Krøyer to depict. But what he has seen has an imperishable value.

There is another remembered image of Krøyer that has often come forward for *[200]* me in these days. About twelve years ago he regularly attended the meetings of the Academy of Sciences, in order to make preliminary studies for his well-known painting. Sitting behind the blackboard he made sketches for the arrangement of the picture, or for single figures. Attention often left the scientific lecture at a glance at the clear, sharply observing eyes that from their hiding place were directed at the assembly or at a single member of it. In the picture that thus came into being, his great gift for grouping as well as for the characterization of the single individuals proved itself. He took joy in the diversity of the types and sought to bring it out by a sharp stress on one or another particular peculiarity in the individuals. Through this bringing out there came a greater fullness of content into the picture. It has often been thought that he came close to caricature through this strong emphasis on single traits. Far rather, however, this sprang from an interest in the special peculiarities and from an eagerness to avoid repetition and uniformity. He even said to me in jest that, as a contrast to the many attentive and listening faces at the lecture, he would have liked to have one who sat asleep; but of course no model could be found for that. Sometimes he could be mistaken in his inference from physiognomy to character. There was one member whom he, in a conversation I had with him, described as a Viking nature, which that decent man was very far from being, as Krøyer too discovered on closer acquaintance.

Behind his striving to bring out the characteristic peculiarities lay a great human sympathy, a joy in the fullness and multiplicity of life within humanity too. And when the conversation turned to common friends, an amiable warmth and cordiality came out in him. Even one who has met him only a few times on his way will keep the memory of his open, cheerful, art-loving and friendly mind.

I cannot here go through Krøyer's whole world of pictures, one of the most *[201]*

precious treasures our generation leaves behind. And such a survey would also only have significance if it were undertaken by an art theorist or art historian. I have understood my task here tonight to be that I should speak on behalf of the many who have rejoiced in what he has given his people, without their presuming to have the ability and the authority to determine his place within the world of art and in relation to his fellows, who have often developed along quite other paths than he. — I merely recall that he has given, in groups and in single pictures, striking and characteristic pictures of our fishermen, our artists, our businessmen, besides our scholars. He leaves to the following generations a glorious record of how our nature and how the people of our time looked when seen with a great artist's eye, an eye that had a predilection for light in all its nuances, and for human characters in all their multiplicity.

And the master's own bright image, which he himself has indeed repeatedly given us, will accompany his works and live in memory, the image of one of the most glorious artistic personalities our people has fostered.

Like every artist, like every intellectual worker, he has had his struggles to endure: the struggle with the dark times when nothing would succeed and when even the inner possession seemed to fail, — the struggle with refractory subjects that would not take shape, — the struggle with the prejudices and habits of the beholders. And now in later years the struggle with sorrow and illness. Despite all, he stands as a figure of light and will continue to stand so in his people's memory and in its gratitude.

He was a son of light. Light and honor he has brought our people.

Honor be to his memory!

[202]

CHARLES DARWIN AND PHILOSOPHY[1].

A consideration in the centenary of Darwin's birth and the fiftieth year since the publication of the "Origin of Species".

It is not so easy as many believe to draw a sharp line between philosophy and natural science. The naturalist who introduces a new principle, or demonstrates a fact which throws a new light on existence, not only renders an important service to philosophy but is himself a philosopher in the broader sense of the word. The aim of philosophy in the stricter sense is to attain points of view from which the fundamental phenomena and the principles of the special sciences can be seen in their relative importance and connection. But philosophy in this stricter sense has always been influenced by philosophy in the broader sense. Greek philosophy came especially under the influence of logic and mathematics, modern philosophy under the influence of natural science. And here the name of Charles Darwin stands with those of Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, and Robert Mayer. These names denote new problems and great alterations in our conception of the universe.

First of all we must in this connection lay stress on Darwin's own personality. His deep love of truth, his indefatigable inquiry, his wide horizon, and his steady self-criticism make him a scientific model, even if his results and theories should eventually come to possess only an historical interest. In all domains of thought the *[203]* primary object is to reach high summits from which wide surveys are possible, to reach them toiling honestly upwards by way of experience, and then not to turn dizzy when a summit is gained. Darwinians have sometimes turned dizzy, but Darwin never. He saw from the first the great importance of his hypothesis—not only because of its

[1] Printed in English in the Festschrift *Darwin and Modern Science* (1909), published in Cambridge.

solution of the old problem as to the value of the concept of species, not only because of the grand picture of successive evolution which it unrolls before thought and imagination, but also, and not least, because of the life and inspiration it would impart as a principle of method, by calling forth investigations in the study of comparative anatomy, of instinct and of heredity, and finally because of the influence it would exert on the whole conception of existence. He wrote as early as the year 1837, shortly after his return from the great voyage which furnished him with the most important material for his hypothesis: "My theory would give zest to recent and fossil comparative anatomy; it would lead to the study of instinct, heredity, and mind-heredity, whole (of) metaphysics."

We can distinguish four main points in which Darwin's investigations possess philosophical importance.

The evolution hypothesis is older than Darwin; it is, indeed, one of the oldest guessings of human thought. In the eighteenth century it was put forward in an interesting manner by Diderot and Lamettrie. Kant embraced it (as is seen from his essay "Muthmaaslicher Anfang des Menschengeschlechts" 1786), though in the "Kritik der Urteilskraft" (1790) he makes critical reservations. As we shall see later, it was held also by several philosophers in the first half of the nineteenth century. In his preface to "The Origin of Species", Darwin himself mentions the naturalists who were his forerunners. — But he has set forth the old hypothesis in so energetic and thorough a manner that it perforce attracts the attention of all thoughtful men in a much higher degree than before.

And this leads us to the second point. He, much more than his predecessors, even
[204] than Lamarck, sought a foundation for his hypothesis in definite facts. Modern science began with the demand for what Kepler and Newton called vera causa, i.e. with the principle that the cause to which a phenomenon is referred must be demonstrable in experience, just as much as the phenomenon itself which is to be explained. This great principle Darwin set himself to satisfy by means of the wealth of material which he collected by his observations, his experiments and his reading. He not only revived an old hypothesis, but he saw the necessity of verifying it by facts. Whether the special cause on which he founded the explanation of the origin of species—"Natural Selection"—is the true cause, is now a subject of doubt and investigation. He himself had some doubt in regard to this question, and the criticisms which are directed against his hypothesis hit "Darwinism" rather than Darwin. In his indefatigable search for empirical evidence he has been a model even for his antagonists. He

has compelled them to approach the problems of life along other lines and by other methods than those which were formerly followed.

Whether the special cause to which Darwin appealed is sufficient or not, at least to it is due the greater part of the influence which he has exerted on the general trend of thought. "Struggle for existence" or "natural selection" are principles which have been applied in every department of thought. Recent research, it is true, has discovered greater leaps ("mutations"), more discontinuity in evolution as it appears to observation and experiment, than Darwin supposed. He believed in the importance of small variations slowly accumulated. It has also been shown—by the experimental method, which in recent biological work has succeeded Darwin's more historical method—that types once constituted possess great permanence, the changes ("fluctuations") being restricted within clearly defined boundaries. The problem has become more precise, both as to variation and as to heredity. The inner conditions of life have in both respects shown a greater independence than Darwin had supposed in his theory,—though he always admitted that the cause of variation was to him *[205]* a great enigma, "a most perplexing problem," and that the struggle for life could only occur where variation already existed. But, at any rate, it was of the greatest importance that Darwin gave his age so living an impression of the struggle for life which is everywhere going on, and to which even the highest forms and ideals must be amenable. The philosophical importance of this idea does not stand or fall with the answer to the question, whether it can furnish a sufficient explanation of the origin of species. It has an independent, positive value for everyone who will observe life and reality with an unbiased mind.

Finally, it is of interest to see that in accentuating the struggle for life Darwin stands as a characteristically English thinker. He continues a train of ideas which Hobbes and Malthus had already begun. Moreover in his critical views as to the conception of species he had English forerunners—in the middle ages Occam and Duns Scotus, in the eighteenth century Berkeley and Hume. In his moral philosophy he is an adherent of the school which is represented by Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith. — Just because he is no philosopher in the stricter sense of the term, it is of great interest to see that his attitude of mind is that of the great thinkers of his nation. —

In considering Darwin's influence on philosophy more specially I will begin with an examination of the attitude of philosophy to the conception of evolution at the time when "The Origin of Species" appeared. I will then examine the effects which

the theory of evolution, and especially the idea of the struggle for life, has had, and naturally must have, on the discussion of philosophical problems.

II.

When "The Origin of Species" appeared fifty years ago Romantic speculation, Schelling's and Hegel's philosophy, still reigned on the continent, while in England Positivism, the philosophy of Comte and Stuart Mill, represented the most important trend of thought.

[206] a. German speculative philosophy had much to say on evolution, and pretended to be a "philosophy of evolution". But then the word evolution was to be taken in an ideal, not in a real, sense. To speculative thought the forms and types of nature formed a system of ideas, within which any form could lead us by continuous transitions to any other. It was a classificatory system which was regarded as a divine world of thought or images, within which metamorphoses could go on—a condition comparable with that in the mind of the poet when one image follows another with imperceptible changes. Goethe's ideas of evolution, as expressed in his "Metamorphosen der Pflanzen und der Thiere", belong to this category; it is, therefore, incorrect to call him a forerunner of Darwin. Schelling and Hegel held the same idea; Hegel expressly rejected the conception of a real evolution in time as coarse and materialistic. "Nature," he says, "is to be considered as a system of stages, the one necessarily arising from the other, and being the nearest truth of that from which it proceeds; but not in such a way that the one is naturally generated by the other; on the contrary (their connection lies) in the inner idea which is the ground of nature. The metamorphosis can be ascribed only to the notion as such, because it alone is evolution ... It has been a clumsy idea in the older as well as in the newer philosophy of nature, to regard the transformation and the transition from one natural form and sphere to another as an outward and actual production". (Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften § 249).

The only one of the philosophers of Romanticism who believed in a real, historical evolution was Oken (Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie. 1809). In Denmark—in express opposition to German speculation—the historical reality of evolution was maintained by Treschow (Elementer til Historiens Filosofi 1812) and by Sibbern (Spekulativ Kosmologi 1846), as also, from a more scientific starting-point, by Olufsen (Om Menneskets Rolle i den fysiske Verden. 1822). —

Schopenhauer's philosophy has a more realistic character than that of Schelling's and Hegel's, his diametrical opposites, though he also belongs to the romantic school of thought. His physiological and psychological views were greatly influenced by *[207]* French naturalists and philosophers, especially by Cabanis and Lamarck. He praises the "ever memorable Lamarck," because he laid so much stress on the "will to live." But he repudiates as a "wonderful error" the idea that the organs of animals should have reached their present perfection through a development in time, during the course of innumerable generations. It was, he said, a consequence of the low standard of contemporary French philosophy, that Lamarck came to the idea of the construction of the species of living beings in time through succession (Über den Willen in der Natur. 1836). —

b. The positivistic stream of thought was in its way not more in favor of a real evolution than was the Romantic school. Its aim was to adhere to positive facts or groups of facts: it looked with suspicion on far-reaching hypotheses. Comte laid great stress on the difference, the discontinuity found between the different domains of experience, as well as within each single domain. As he regarded as unscientific every attempt to reduce the number of physical forces, so he rejected entirely the hypothesis of Lamarck concerning the evolution of species; the idea of species would in his eyes absolutely lose its importance if a transition from species to species under the influence of conditions of life were admitted. His disciples (Littré, Robin) continued to direct against Darwin the polemics which their master had employed against Lamarck.

Stuart Mill, who, in the theory of knowledge, represented the empirical or positivistic movement in philosophy—like his English forerunners from Locke to Hume—founded his theory of knowledge and morals on the experience of the single individual. He sympathized with the theory of the original likeness of all individuals and derived their differences (on which he practically laid much stress) from the influence both of experience and education, and, generally, of physical and social causes. He admitted an individual evolution, and, in the human species, an evolution based on social progress; but no biological-physiological evolution of species. He was *[208]* afraid that the hypothesis of heredity would carry us back to the old theory of innate ideas. —

Darwin was more empirical than Comte and Mill; experience disclosed to him a deeper continuity than they could find. Closer than before the nature and fate of the single individual were shown to be interwoven in the great web binding the life of the species with nature as a whole. And the continuity which so many idealistic

philosophers could find only in the world of thought, he showed to be present in the world of reality.

III.

Darwin's energetic renewal of the old idea of evolution had its chief importance in strengthening the conviction of a real continuity in the world, of continuity in the series of forms and events. It was a great support for all those who were prepared to base their conception of life on scientific grounds. Together with the recently discovered law of the conservation of energy, and in general with the new era which began for natural science about 1840, it helped to produce the great realistic movement which characterized the last decades of the nineteenth century. After the decline of the Romantic movement people wished to have firmer ground under their feet and reality now asserted itself in a more emphatic manner than in the period of Romanticism. It was easy for Hegel to proclaim that "the real" was "the rational," and that "the rational" was "the real": reality itself existed for him only in the interpretation of ideal reason, and if there was anything which could not be merged in the higher unity of thought, then it was only an example of the "impotence of nature to hold to the idea." But now concepts are to be founded on nature and not on any system of categories too confidently deduced a priori. The new devotion to nature had its recompense in
[209] itself, because the new points of view made us see that nature could indeed "hold to ideas," though not to those which we had cogitated beforehand. —

A most important question for philosophers to answer was whether the new views were compatible with an idealistic conception of life and existence. Some proclaimed that we have now no need of any philosophy beyond the principles of the conservation of matter and energy and of the natural evolution of organic life. Existence should be completely explained by the laws of material nature. But abler thinkers saw that the thing was not so simple. They saw it as their task to give the new views their just place in the whole conception of life and of the world and to examine what alterations the old views must undergo in order to be brought into harmony with the new data.

The realistic character of Darwin's theory was shown not only in the idea of natural continuity, but also, and not least, in the idea of the cause whereby organic life was supposed to advance step by step. The idea of the struggle for life implied that nothing could persist, if it had no power to maintain itself under the given conditions. Inner value alone does not decide. Idealism was here put to its hardest trial. In

continuous evolution it could perhaps still find an analogy to the inner evolution of ideas in the mind (and it was precisely on such an analogy that the philosophy of Romanticism was founded, without being conscious of it); but in the demand for power in order to struggle with outward conditions Realism seemed to announce itself in its most brutal form. Every form of Idealism had then to ask itself how it was going to struggle for life with the new doctrine.

I will give a short account of the position which leading thinkers in the principal countries of Europe took up in regard to this question.

a. Herbert Spencer was the philosopher whose mind was best prepared by his own previous thinking to admit the theory of Darwin to a place in his conception of the world. His criticism of the arguments which had been put forward against the *[210]* hypothesis of Lamarck, showed that Spencer, as a young man, was an adherent to the evolution idea. In his "Social Statics" (1850) he applied this idea to human life and moral civilization. In 1852 he wrote an essay on the Development Hypothesis, in which he definitely stated his belief that differences of species, like individual differences, were the result of development. In the first edition of his Psychology (1855) he took a step which put him in opposition to the older English school (from Locke to Mill), in that he acknowledged an organic basis for the mental development of the individual, a basis which had come into being in the course of generations through the inheritance of acquired qualities, so that the nature and functions of the individual are only to be understood through its connection with the life of the whole species. In 1857, in his essay on "Progress", he propounded the law of differentiation as a general law of evolution, verified by examples from all regions of experience, the evolution of species being only one of these examples. On the effect which the appearance of Darwin's "Origin of Species" had on his mind he writes in his Autobiography: "Up to that time I held that the sole cause of organic evolution is the inheritance of functionally-produced modifications. The 'Origin of Species' made it clear to me that I was wrong, and that the larger part of the facts cannot be due to any such cause. To have the theory of organic evolution justified was of course to get further support for that theory of evolution at large with which all my conceptions were bound up." — Instead of the metaphorical expression "natural selection," Spencer introduced the term "survival of the fittest," which found favor with Darwin as well as with Wallace.

In working out his ideas of evolution, Spencer found that differentiation was not the only form of evolution. In its simplest form evolution is mainly a concentration, previously scattered elements being integrated and losing independent movement.

Differentiation is only forthcoming when minor wholes arise within a greater whole.
[211] And the highest form of evolution is reached when there is a harmony between concentration and differentiation, a harmony which Spencer calls determination and which he defines as a moving equilibrium. At the same time this definition enables him to illustrate the expression "survival of the fittest." "Every living organism," he says, "exhibits such a moving equilibrium—a balanced set of functions constituting its life; and the overthrow of this balanced set of functions or moving equilibrium is what we call death. Some individuals in a species are so constituted that their moving equilibria are less easily overthrown than those of other individuals; and these are the fittest which survive, or, in Mr Darwin's language, they are the select which nature preserves." — Not only in the domain of organic life, but in all domains, the summit of evolution is, according to Spencer, characterized by such a harmony—by a moving equilibrium.

Spencer's analysis of the concept of evolution, based on a great variety of examples, has made this concept clearer and more definite than before. It contains the three elements; integration, differentiation and harmony. It is true that a concept which is to be valid for all domains of experience must have an abstract character, and between its forms in the several domains there is, strictly speaking, only a relation of analogy, e.g. between psychical and physical evolution, and between organic and inorganic evolution. But this is no serious objection, because general concepts do not express more than analogies between the phenomena which they represent. In defining evolution (in the simplest form) as integration of matter and dissipation of movement, Spencer takes his leading terms from the material world. But as he—not always quite consistently[1)]—assumed a correspondence of mind and matter, he could very well give these terms an indirect importance for psychical evolution. Spencer has always, in my opinion with full right, repudiated the ascription of materialism. He is no more a
[212] materialist than Spinoza. In his "Principles of Psychology" (§ 63) he expressed himself most clearly: "Though it seems easier to translate so-called matter into so-called spirit, than to translate so-called spirit into so-called matter—which latter is indeed wholly impossible—yet no translation can carry us beyond our symbols." — These words lead us naturally to a group of thinkers whose starting-point was psychical evolution. But we have still one aspect of Spencer's philosophy to mention.

Spencer founded his laws of evolution on comparative experience, but he was convinced that they could be deduced from the law of the conservation of energy.

[1)] Cf. my letter to Spencer, 1876, now printed in *Duncan*, Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer, p. 178.

Such a deduction is, perhaps, possible for the more elementary forms of evolution, integration and differentiation; but it is not possible for the highest form, which is a harmony of these two forms. Spencer can no more deduce the necessity of harmonious totalities, "moving equilibria," than Hegel could guarantee the "higher unities" in which all contradictions should be reconciled. In Spencer's hands the theory of evolution acquired a more decidedly optimistic character than in Darwin's. — I shall deal later with the relation of Darwin to the opposition of optimism and pessimism.

b. While the starting-point of Spencer was taken in outer experience, was biological or cosmological, psychical evolution being conceived as in analogy with physical, a group of thinkers—in Germany Wundt, in France Fouillée, in Italy Ardigò—took, each in his own manner, their starting-point in psychical evolution as an original fact and as a type of all evolution; the hypothesis of Darwin comes in here too as a corroboration and as a special example. These thinkers find the continuity of evolution most prominent in psychical evolution, and this is for them a motive to demand a corresponding continuity in the material, especially in the organic domain.

To Wundt and Fouillée the concept of will is prominent. They see the type of all evolution in the transformation of the life of will from blind impulse to conscious choice; the theories of Lamarck and Darwin are used to support the view that there is *[213]* in nature a tendency to evolution in steady reciprocity with external conditions. The struggle for life is here only a secondary fact. Its apparent prominence is explained by the circumstance that the influence of external conditions is easily made out, while inner conditions can be inferred only from their effects and do not immediately catch the eye. — For Ardigò the evolution of thought was the starting-point and the type. The history of every scientific hypothesis shows a progress from the indefinite (indistinto) to the definite (distinto), and such a progress is characteristic of all evolution, as Ardigò seeks to show in a series of works. The opposition between indistinto and distinto corresponds to Spencer's opposition between concentration and differentiation. The hypothesis of the origin of differences of species from more simple forms is then a special example of the general law of evolution.

In the views of Wundt and Fouillée we find the fundamental idea of idealism: psychical phenomena as expressions of the innermost nature of existence. They differ from the older (speculative) Idealism in the great stress which they lay on evolution as a real, historical process which is going on through steady conflict with external conditions. The Romantic dread of reality is broken. It is beyond doubt that Darwin's

emphasis on the struggle for life as a necessary condition of evolution has been a very important factor in carrying philosophy back to reality from the heaven of pure ideas. — The philosophy of Ardigò, on the other side, appears as a continuation and deepening of positivism, though the Italian thinker arrived at his point of view independently of French-English positivism. The idea of continuous evolution is here maintained in opposition to Comte's and Mill's philosophy of discontinuity. From Wundt and Fouillée Ardigò differs in conceiving psychical evolution not as an immediate revelation of the innermost nature of existence, but only as a single, though the most accessible example, of evolution.

c. The French philosophers Boutroux and Bergson lay greater stress on the differ-
[214] ence between psychical and material evolution than the thinkers hitherto mentioned do. What to immediate intuition, purified of all reflection, stands as a continuous evolution proceeding through qualitative changes, becomes for the outer apprehension, bound to differences of time and space, on which natural science builds, always broken up into fragments, which are brought into connection with one another in a mechanical way. To Bergson there lies at the basis of all evolution a spontaneous striving forward (élan de vie), which to our ever fragmentary observation and analytic reflection appears as an outward manifold of elements and processes. The very concept of matter in its scientific form is the result of the breaking asunder of the immediately given which all scientific reflection must perform. — In this conception, which dominates Bergson's philosophy, the strongest opposition between inner and outer conditions of evolution is expressed: in the domain of internal conditions immediate (spontaneous) development of qualitative forms,—in the domain of external conditions discontinuity and mechanical combination.

We see, then, that the theory of evolution has influenced philosophy in a variety of forms. It has made idealistic thinkers revise their relation to the real world, and it has led positivistic thinkers to find a closer connection between the facts on which they base their views. And it has made us all open our eyes for new possibilities—through the prima facie inexplicable variations which are the condition of all evolution. This last point is one of peculiar interest. Deeper than speculative philosophy and mechanical science saw in the days of their triumph, we catch sight of new streams, whose sources and laws we have still to discover. Most sharply does this appear in Hugo de Vries's theory of mutation, which is only a stronger accentuation of a main point in Darwinism, the inexplicability of variations. It is interesting to see that an analogous problem comes into the foreground in physics through the discovery of

radioactive phenomena, and in psychology through the assumption of psychical new formations (as held by Boutroux, William James and Bergson). From this point of view, Darwin's ideas, as well as the analogous ideas in the physical and psychological *[215]* domains, incite us to renewed examination of the first principles of our knowledge, their foundation and their value. On the other hand, his theory of the struggle for existence challenges us to examine the conditions and discuss the outlook as to the persistence of the human forms of life and of human values. It is not enough to hope (or fear) the rising of new forms; we have also to investigate the possibility of upholding the forms and ideals which have hitherto been the bases of human life. Darwin has here given his age the most earnest and most impressive lesson. This side of Darwin's theory is of peculiar interest to some special philosophical problems to which I now pass.

IV.

Among philosophical problems the problem of knowledge has more and more come to occupy a foremost place. It is natural, then, to ask how Darwin and the hypothesis whose most eminent representative he is, stand to this problem.

Darwin started an hypothesis. But every hypothesis is won by inference from certain presuppositions, and every inference is based on the general principles of human thought. The evolution hypothesis presupposes, then, human thought and its principles. And not only the abstract logical principles, e.g. that the self-contradictory cannot be true, are thus presupposed. For the evolution hypothesis purports to be not only a formal arrangement of phenomena, but to express also the law of a real process. It supposes, then, that the real data—all that in our knowledge which we do not produce ourselves, but which we in the main simply receive—are subjected to laws which are at least analogous to the logical relations of our thoughts; in other words, it assumes the validity of the principle of causality. If organic species could arise without cause there would be no use in framing hypotheses. Only if we assume the principle of causality, is there a problem to solve.

Though Darwinism has had a great influence on philosophy considered as a striv- *[216]* ing after a scientific view of the world, yet here is a point of view—the epistemological—where philosophy is not only independent of natural science but reaches beyond any result of natural science.

Perhaps the following consideration will be urged against this. The powers and functions of organic beings only persist (perhaps also only arise) when they

correspond sufficiently to the conditions under which the struggle of life is to go on. Human thought itself is, then, a variation (or a mutation) which has been able to persist and to survive. Is not, then, the problem of knowledge solved by the evolution hypothesis? Spencer had given an affirmative answer to this question before the appearance of "The Origin of Species". For the individual, he said, there is an a priori, original, basis for all mental life; but in the whole species all powers have arisen and developed in reciprocity with external conditions. Knowledge is here considered from the practical point of view, as a weapon in the struggle for life, as an organ which has been continuously in use for countless generations. In recent years the economic or pragmatic epistemology, as developed by Avenarius and Mach in Germany, and by James in America, points in the same direction. Science, it is said, only maintains those principles and presuppositions which are necessary to the simplest and clearest orientation in the world of experience. All assumptions which cannot be applied to experience and to practical work, will successively be eliminated as superfluous.

In these views a striking and important application is made of the idea of struggle for life to the development of human thought. It is true that thought must, as all other things in the world, struggle for life. But this whole consideration belongs to the biology or psychology of knowledge, not to the theory of knowledge, whose task is not to examine the actual, historical origin and development of knowledge, but to
[217] discuss its validity. Every hypothesis to explain the historical origin and development of knowledge is itself an *object* for the theory of knowledge, because it works with the forms and principles of human thought. We cannot go further back than these forms and principles. It is the aim of epistemology to ascertain which these forms and principles are that constitute the ultimate presuppositions of all proof, and for which therefore no further reason can be given. — In my "Psychology" (VII C, 3), and already in my book "Den engelske Filosofi i vor Tid" (1874), I have criticized the evolutionistic treatment of the problem of knowledge.

But there is another side of the problem which is, perhaps, of more importance and which epistemology generally overlooks. If new variations can arise, not only in organic but perhaps also in inorganic nature, new tasks are placed before the human mind. The question is, then, if it has forms in which there is room for the new matter? We are here touching a presupposition which the great master of epistemology did not bring to light. Kant supposed confidently that no other matter of knowledge could stream forth from the dark source which he called "the thing-in-itself," than such as could be synthesized in our existing forms of knowledge. He mentions the possibility

of other forms than the human, and warns us against the dogmatic assumption that the human conception of existence should be absolutely adequate. But he seems to be quite sure that the "thing-in-itself" works constantly, and consequently always gives us only what our powers can master. This assumption was a consequence of Kant's rationalistic tendency, but one for which no warrant can be given. Evolution and rational connection stand in a constant opposition to each other. For the new, a place must first be sought in the world of thought, and can it always be found? Evolutionism and systematism are opposing tendencies which can never be absolutely harmonized one with the other. Evolution may at any time break the forms which the system constructs.

Darwin himself felt a great difference in looking at variation as an evolutionist and as a systematist. When he was working at his evolution theory, he was very glad *[218]* to find variations; but they were a hindrance to him when he worked as a systematist, in preparing his work on Cirripedia. He says in a letter: "I had thought the same parts of the same species more resemble (than they do anyhow in Cirripedia) objects cast in the same mould. Systematic work would be easy were it not for this confounded variation, which, however, is pleasant to me as a speculatist, though odious to me as a systematist." — Darwin could indeed be angry with variations even as an evolutionist; but then only because he could not explain their origin, not because he could not classify them. "If," he says in another letter, "as I must think, external conditions produce little direct effect, what the devil determines each particular variation?" —

What Darwin experienced here in his particular domain holds good of all knowledge. All knowledge is systematic, in so far as it strives to put phenomena in quite definite relations, one to another. But the systematization can never be complete. And here Darwin has contributed much to widen the world for us. He has shown us forces and tendencies in nature which make absolute systems impossible, at the same time that they give us new objects and problems. There is still a place for what Lessing called "the unceasing striving after truth," while "absolute truth" is unattainable so long as life and experience are going on. —

There is here a special remark to be made. As we have seen above, recent research has shown that natural selection or the struggle for life does not explain the origin of species. Hugo de Vries distinguishes between partial and embryonal variations, or between variations and mutations, only the last-named being heritable, and therefore of importance for the origin of new species. But the existence of variations is not only of interest for the problem of the origin of species; it has also a more general interest.

[219] An individual does not lose its importance for knowledge, because its qualities are not heritable. In higher beings at least, individual peculiarities will become more and more independent objects of interest. Knowledge takes account of the biographies not only of species, but also of individuals[1]. It seeks to find the law of development of each single individual. As Leibniz said long ago, individuality consists precisely in the law of the changes of a being (la loi de changement fait l'individualité de chaque substance). Here is a world which is almost new for science, which till now has mainly occupied itself with general laws and forms. But general laws and forms are ultimately only means to understand the individual phenomena, in whose nature and history a manifold of laws and forms always cooperate[2]. The importance of this remark will appear in the sequel.

V.

To many people the Darwinian theory of natural selection or struggle for existence seemed to change the whole conception of life, and particularly all the conditions on which the validity of ethical ideas depends. If only that has persistence which can be adapted to a given condition, what will then be the fate of our ideals, of our standards of good and evil? Blind force seems to reign, and the only thing that counts seems to be the most heedless use of power. Darwinism, it was said, has proclaimed brutality. No other difference seems permanent save that between the sound, powerful
[220] and happy on the one side, the sick, feeble and unhappy on the other; and every attempt to alleviate this difference seems to lead to general enervation. Some of those who interpreted Darwinism in this manner felt an aesthetic delight in contemplating the heedlessness and energy of the great struggle for existence and anticipated the realization of a higher human type as the outcome of it: so Nietzsche (at least in some of his writings). Others, such as Dühring and Kropotkin, recognizing the same consequences in Darwinism, regarded precisely this as one of the strongest objections against it.

This interpretation of Darwinism was frequent in the interval between the two main works of Darwin—"The Origin of Species" (1859) and "The Descent of Man"

[1] The new science of Ecology (the theory of plant communities, their economy and their relation to their surroundings) occupies an intermediate position between the biography of species and the biography of individuals. Cf. *Warming: Om Planterigets Livsformer* (University program 1908) p. 76, and *Drude's* and *Robinson's* lectures on Ecology at the Congress in St. Louis. (Congress of Arts and Science). St. Louis 1904 V p. 177—206.

[2] See on this my work *Den menneskelige Tanke, dens Former og dens Opgaver* p. 222—226 and p. 338—343. (Later note.)

(1871). But even during this interval it was evident to an attentive reader that Darwin himself did not found his standard of good and evil on the features of the life of nature he had emphasized so strongly. He did not justify the ways along which nature reached its ends; he only pointed them out. The "real" was not to him, as to Hegel, one with the "rational." Darwin has, indeed, by his whole conception of nature, rendered a great service to ethics in making the difference between the life of nature and the ethical life appear in so strong a light. The ethical problem could now be stated in a sharper form than before.

This was not the first time that the idea of the struggle for life was put in relation to the ethical problem. In the seventeenth century Thomas Hobbes gave the first impulse to the whole modern discussion of ethical principles in his theory of the war of all against all (bellum omnium contra omnes). Men, he taught, are in the state of nature enemies one of another, and they live either in fright or in the glory of power. But it was not the opinion of Hobbes that this made ethics impossible. On the contrary, he found a standard for virtue and vice in the fact that some qualities and actions have a tendency to bring us out of the state of war and to secure peace, while other qualities have a contrary tendency. Later even Immanuel Kant's ideal ethics had—so far as can *[221]* be seen—a similar origin. Shortly before the publication of his fundamental work on ethics, Kant wrote his "Idee zu einer allgemeinen Weltgeschichte" (1784), where—in a way which reminds us of Hobbes, and is prophetic of Darwin—he describes the forward-driving power of struggle in the human world. It is here as with the struggle of the trees for light and air, through which they compete with one another in height. The unrest and anxiety of struggle in the human world can only be allayed by an ordinance which gives everyone his full liberty so far as it can coexist with the equal liberty of others. And such an ordinance is precisely what is acknowledged and proclaimed in the moral law which Kant, in the year after that essay, put forward in his "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten" (1785): the rule one follows in one's action must be able to hold for everyone in the same position,—and in a more positive form: every man is to be treated as an end, never merely as a means[1)]. — Similarly this whole line of thought may be traced in Hegel, though with him it has acquired a more abstract character. And in Schopenhauer's theory of the blind impulse of self-preservation, which he calls "the will to live," and of its abrogation by the ethical feeling, which is founded on sympathy, we have a more individualistic form of the same idea.

[1)] Cf. *Den nyere Filosofis Historie*[2]. II 72—76.

It was, then, not entirely a foreign point of view which Darwin introduced into ethical thought, even if we take no account of the poetical character of the word "struggle" or of the more direct adaptation, through the use and non-use of organs, which Darwin also emphasized. And he has (in the third chapter of "The Descent of Man") given a special discussion of the origin of the ethical consciousness. The characteristic expression of this consciousness he found, just as Kant did, in the idea of an "ought"; it was precisely the origin of this idea which should be explained. His hypothesis was that the ethical "ought" has its origin in the social and parental
[222] (maternal and paternal) instincts, which, as well as other instincts (e.g. the instinct of self-preservation), lie deeper than the feelings of pleasure and pain and are to a certain degree independent of them. In many species, not least in the human species, these instincts are fostered by natural selection; and when the powers of memory and comparison are developed, so that single acts can be valued according to the claims of the deep social instinct,—then consciousness of duty and remorse are possible. Blind instinct has developed to conscious ethical will.

Darwin, as a moral philosopher belongs to the school that was founded by Shaftesbury, and was afterwards represented by Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith, in the nineteenth century—besides Darwin—by Comte and Spencer. His merit is, first, that he has given this tendency of thought a biological foundation, and, secondly, that he has stamped on it a doughty character in showing that ethical ideas and sentiments are forces which are at work in the struggle for life.

There are still many questions to solve. In the first place, the ethical development within the human species contains many features still unexplained. This side of the ethical problem has in most recent times been illuminated by the works of Westermarck and Hobhouse. But, secondly, we are confronted by the great problem whether after all a genetic-historical theory can be of decisive importance here. To every consequent ethical line of thought there is a standard of valuation, a primordial value which determines the single ethical judgments as their last presupposition. The "rightness" of this basis, the "value" of the primordial value, can as little be justified as the "rationality" of the last presuppositions of a reason (the logical principles). There is here revealed a possibility of ethical skepticism which evolutionistic ethics (as well as intuitive or rationalistic ethics) has overlooked. No demonstration can show that the results of the ethical development are definitive and universal. We meet here again with the opposition of systematization and evolution. There will, I think, always be an open question here, though comparative ethics, of which we have so far

only the first attempts, can do much to throw light on it. —

It would carry us too far to discuss all the philosophical works on ethics, which *[223]* have been influenced directly or indirectly by evolutionism. I may here refer on this to C. M. Williams' book *A Review of the Systems of Ethics founded on the theory of Evolution* (New York and London 1893), in which, besides Darwin, the following authors are reviewed: Wallace, Häckel, Spencer, Fiske, Rolph, Barratt, Stephen, Carneri, Høffding, Gizycki, Rée. As instructive works which criticize evolutionism, may be cited Guyau's *La Morale Anglaise contemporaine* (Paris 1879) and Sorley's *Ethics of Naturalism* (1885, 2nd ed. 1904). — I will here only mention some interesting contributions to ethical discussion which can be found in Darwinism besides the idea of struggle for life. —

The attention which Darwin has directed to variations has opened our eyes to the individual differences in human nature as well as in nature generally. There is here a fact of great importance for ethical thought, no matter from what ultimate premise it starts. Only from a very abstract point of view can different individuals be treated in the same manner. And yet the most eminent ethical thinkers of the preceding period, Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant, who discussed ethical questions from very opposite standpoints, agreed in regarding all men as equal in respect of ethical endowment. In regard to Bentham, Leslie Stephen remarks (in his book *English Literature and Society in the 18. century* p. 187): "He is determined to be thoroughly empirical, to take men as he found them. But his utilitarianism supposed that men's views of happiness and utility were uniform and clear, and that all that was wanted was to show them the means by which their ends could be reached." And Kant supposed that every man would find the categorical imperative in his consciousness, when he came to sober reflection, and that all would have the same qualifications to follow it. But if continual variations, great or small, are going on in human nature, it is the duty of ethics to make allowance for them, both in making claims, and in valuing what is done. A new set of ethical problems have their origin here. In my *[224]* essay on the law of relativity in ethics *(Etiske Undersøgelser* 1891) I have treated this point more fully.

It is an interesting fact that Stuart Mill's book On Liberty appeared in the same year as "The Origin of Species". Though Mill agreed with Bentham about the original equality of all men's endowments, he regarded individual differences as a necessary result of physical and social influences, and he claimed that free play shall be allowed to differences of character so far as is possible without injury to other men. It is a

condition of individual happiness as well as of individual and social progress that a man's mode of action should be determined by his own character and not by tradition and custom. — Darwin's doctrine of the importance of variations in nature furnished a biological foundation for this view.

And here we have reached a point of view from which the criticism, which in recent years has often been directed against Darwin,—that variations are not always of importance in the struggle for life,—is of no weight. From an ethical standpoint, and particularly from the ethical standpoint of Darwin himself, it is a duty to foster individual variations that can be valuable, even though they can neither be of service for physical preservation nor be physically inherited. The distinction between variation and mutation is here without importance. It is quite natural that biologists should be particularly interested in such variations as can be inherited and produce new species. But in the human world there is not only a physical, but also a mental and social heredity. When an ideal human character has taken form, then there is shaped a type, which through imitation and influence can become an important factor in subsequent development, even if it cannot form a species in the biological sense of the word. Spiritually strong men very often succumb in the physical struggle for life; but they can nevertheless be victorious through the typical influence they exert, perhaps on very distant generations, if the remembrance of them is kept alive, be
[225] it in historical or in legendary form. Their very tragic failure can show that a type has taken form which is maintained at all risks, a standard of life which is adhered to in spite of the strongest opposition. The question "to be or not to be" can be put from very different levels of being. It has too often been considered a consequence of Darwinism that this question is only to be put from the standpoint of purely physical self-preservation. When a stage is reached, where ideal (ethical, intellectual, aesthetic) interests are concerned, the struggle for life is a struggle for the preservation of these interests. The giving up of them, of the higher claims on life which they make, is then a sort of death. There is a spiritual death as well as a physical one.

VI.

The Socratic character of Darwin's mind appears in his wariness in drawing the last consequences of his doctrine, in contrast both with the audacious theories of so many of his followers and with the consequences which his antagonists were busy in drawing. Though he, as we have seen, saw from the beginning that his hypothesis

would occasion "a whole of metaphysics," he was himself very reserved as to the ultimate questions, and his answers to such questions were extorted from him.

As to the question of optimism and pessimism, Darwin held that though pain and suffering were very often the ways by which animals were led to pursue that course of action which is most beneficial to the species, yet pleasurable feelings were the most habitual guides. "We see this," he says in a letter, "in the pleasure from exertion, even occasionally from great exertion of the body or mind, in the pleasure of our daily meals, and especially in the pleasure derived from sociability, and from loving our families." But there was to him so much suffering in the world that it was a strong argument against the existence of an intelligent First Cause.

[226] It seems to me that Darwin was not so clear on another question, that of the relation between improvement and adaptation. In a letter to Lyell (25 Oct. 1859) he says: "When you contrast natural selection and improvement, you seem always to overlook that every step in the natural selection of each species implies improvement in that species in relation to its condition of life . . . Improvement implies, I suppose, each form obtaining many parts or organs, all excellently adapted for their functions . . . All this seems to me quite compatible with certain forms fitted for simple conditions, remaining unaltered, or being degraded." But the great question is, if the conditions of life will in the long run favor "improvement" in the sense of differentiation (or, more exactly, harmony of differentiation and integration). Many beings are best adapted to their conditions of life if they have few organs and few necessities. And beings which have manifold organs and other necessities than the purely elementary ones will, if the standard is merely adaptation to the given conditions, fare best by being "degraded." Pessimism would not only be the necessary consequence, if suffering outweighed happiness, but also if the most elementary forms of happiness were predominant, or if there were a constant tendency to lower the standard of life, so that inertia or stable equilibrium were the result. There are animals which are very highly differentiated and active in their young state, but later lose their complex organization and concentrate themselves on the one function of nutrition. In the human world analogies to this sort of adaptation are not wanting. Young idealists very often end as old Philistines. There is, then, really a definite difference between progress and adaptation.

Another question of great importance in respect to human evolution is, whether there will be always a possibility for the existence of an impulse to progress, an impulse to make great claims on life, to be active and to alter the conditions of life

instead of adapting to them in a passive manner. Many people do not develop because
[227] they have too few necessities, and because they have no power to imagine other conditions of life than those under which they live.

In his remark on the pleasure from exertion Darwin has a point of contact with the practical idealism of former times—with the ideas of Lessing and Goethe, of Condorcet and Fichte. The continual striving which was the condition of salvation to Faust's soul, is also the condition of salvation to mankind. Salvation here means adaptation to the highest, most comprehensive and richest conditions of life. There is a holy fire which we ought to keep burning, if adaptation is really to be improvement. If—as I have tried to show in my Philosophy of Religion—the innermost core of all religion is faith in the persistence of value in the world,—and if the highest values express themselves in an Excelsior!—then the capital point is, that this cry should always be heard and followed. We have here a corollary of the theory of evolution in its application to human life. —

When Darwin declared himself an agnostic, i.e. when he held that no well-founded answer could be given to the question of the origin and final end of existence, this was not only because he could not harmonize the large amount of suffering in the world with the idea of a God as its first cause, but also for theoretical reasons. If we admit a first cause, the mind still craves to know whence it came and how it arose. And, further, it was clear to him that, however great the connection and purposiveness one may find in the world, it was just as impossible to derive it from an end as to assume chance or blind force as its ground. Darwin's position is similar to that which Kant took in the "Kritik der Urtheilskraft". For human thought there are only two possibilities: design—or blind force. But neither mechanism nor teleology can give any answer to ultimate questions. The universe, and especially the organic life in it, can neither be explained as a mere combination of absolute elements nor as the effect of a constructing thought. Darwin had learned by experience in his special domain how difficult it is to set up an Either-Or, because we cannot know all the possibilities
[228] beforehand. He came then to the conclusion, which Spinoza and Kant, each in his own way, had already reached, that the oppositions and distinctions which our experience and our thought present, cannot safely be regarded as valid for existence in itself.

Darwin reminds us of Kant also in that he found his last stronghold in the conviction that man has something to do, even if he cannot solve all enigmas. In a letter to a Dutch student who wished to know his theological opinions, he wrote (1873): "The safest conclusion seems to me that the whole subject is beyond the scope of man's

intellect; but man can do his duty."

Is this the last word of human thought? Does not the possibility, that man can do his duty as the relatively highly developed being that he is, necessarily suppose that the conditions of life allow of ethical striving, so that there is a certain harmony between cosmic order and human ideals? — Darwin himself has sought to show how the consciousness of duty can arise as a natural result of evolution. There are, then, lines of evolution which have their end in ethical idealism, in a kingdom of values, which must struggle for life as all things in the world must do, but a kingdom which has its firm foundation in reality.