Graduate Seminar — Spring 2026 — Room: 201 Wooten
Einstein’s theory of relativity revolutionized our understanding of space and time. But did it also transform the metaphysics of material objects?
This seminar explores how relativistic physics bears on fundamental questions about what physical objects are, how they persist, and how they are represented in spacetime. We will examine whether relativity favors a field ontology over a particle ontology, whether it supports a four-dimensional (“worm”) view of persistence over three-dimensional endurance, and what role (if any) is played by classical notions such as rigidity, shape, and localized structure.
The seminar will combine close reading of contemporary philosophical work with careful attention to the physics itself.
With visits from Heather Demarest (University of Colorado, Boulder), Cody Gilmore (UC Davis), and Thomas Sattig (University of Tübingen).
The seminar will be introduced on April 10 by a lecture-based preparatory session. The three following sessions will each focus on a specific topic, beginning with an introduction by the seminar leaders (max 45 minutes), followed by extensive general discussion (approximately 1.5–2 hours).
For questions or enrollment information, please contact the seminar leaders.
By appointment. Write to the seminar leaders at the email addresses above.
Relativity and the four-dimensional view of reality
Mandatory. Gilmore, Costa, Calosi (2016), “Relativity and Three Four-dimensionalisms,” Philosophy Compass 11(2), 102–120. [doi]
Relativistic change
Mandatory. Sattig (2015), The Double Lives of Objects, OUP (selection). [OUP]
Optional. Himelright & Murgueitio Ramírez (2024), “Getting back in shape: Persistence, shape, and relativity,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110(1): 75–96. [doi]
Optional. Hans Halvorson, “Invariance and ontology in relativistic physics” (draft). [philarchive]
Optional. Kit Fine, “Endurance in special relativity” (draft).
Relativistic persistence
Mandatory. Gilmore (2006), “Where in the relativistic world are we?”, Philosophical Perspectives 20, 199–236. [doi] [preprint]
Optional. Gibson & Pooley (2006), “Relativistic persistence,” Philosophical Perspectives 20(1): 157–198. [doi] [preprint]
Supersubstantivalism
Mandatory. Lehmkuhl (2018), “The Metaphysics of Super-Substantivalism,” Noûs 52(1): 24–46. [doi] [preprint]
Optional. Schaffer (2009), “Spacetime the one substance,” Philosophical Studies 145(1): 131–148. [doi] [pdf]
Optional. Gilmore (2014), “Building enduring objects out of spacetime,” in Calosi & Graziani (eds.), Mereology and the Sciences. Springer, pp. 5–34. [doi]