

LECTURE 24: THE CARNAP–QUINE DEBATE

1. Carnap & the point of “rational reconstruction”
 - rational (rule governed) vs. pragmatic
 - things held fixed (rules) vs. things up for grabs
2. Carnap’s notion of analyticity (L -truth) in formal languages
 - the consequence relation
 - semantical rules
3. Quine’s attack on analyticity
 - (a) A vicious circle: analyticity, necessity, synonymy
 - (b) Explaining “ S is analytic for L ,” where S is an arbitrary sentence, and L an arbitrary formal language.
 - (c) No cash value
 - can’t distinguish between violating rules and adopting new rules
4. Quine: no external–internal distinction without a notion of analyticity
 - external questions are supposed to be about which rules to adopt (about which sentences should be called analytic)
5. Empiricism without the dogmas: Quine’s global pragmatism
 - (a) Collapse of the distinction between rational and pragmatic
 - (b) “Exists” is univocal
 - (c) In principle, any statement is subject to revision